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Abstract:  
This dissertation is focused on the relation between Christian metaphysics and philosophies of 
the tragic. Its context is within a modern debate, a setting where this interrelation has become 
contested. Its research question can be phrased so: can a classical account of transcendence 
account for ‗the tragic‘? Or to put the question from the other side: are there grammars of 
transcendence associated with ‗the tragic‘ (here understood as a metaphysical or philosophical 
trope) that hinder the reception of ‗tragedy‘ within orthodox theology? For the purposes of this 
study, such a question becomes concretized within the debate around the critical reception of 
Donald MacKinnon, particularly amongst David Bentley Hart and John Milbank.  
The core argument of this dissertation proposes that the most pointed tension within this 
controversy is centered on the language of transcendence, and how Christian orthodoxy has 
traditionally conceptualized it (e.g. aseity, the analogia entis, the transcendental convertibility of 
goodness and oneness, etc.). It also suggests that there are refractions of ‗the tragic‘ and 
‗transcendence‘ within the modern period that have created problems for the interrelations of a 
classical-orthodox metaphysics and the tragic. We specifically note three incarnations within the 
modern period, namely: the Kantian sublime, the suffering Absolute, and a rejection of the 
privatio boni. All of these concepts are related to the question of ‗the tragic‘ in the contemporary 
debate, and also have application to the discussion of MacKinnon, as seen in the critical responses 
to his work we will be addressing.  
This study hopes to move the conversation forward by engaging in a critical exposition of 
Donald MacKinnon and Rowan Williams within the context of this contemporary discussion. The 
research suggests that MacKinnon‘s insightful commentary on the interconnections between 
metaphysics and the tragic is marred by a strong dependence on Kantianism, as well as some 
misguided attacks on the Augustinian account of evil. Thereafter, this study wagers that Rowan 
Williams provides a corrective supplementation to MacKinnon: he adopts Mackinnon‘s emphases 
on taking tragedy in complete seriousness, while simultaneously transcending several drawbacks 
associated with MacKinnon‘s approach. This can be seen in the way that Williams is able to 
incorporate a deep sense of historicity and the tragic within a robust metaphysics of creativity, 
language and analogy. Moreover, he offers a defense of aseity, analogical participation and the 
privatio boni in a manner that exhibits a coherency with a sense of the tragic. Overall, we desire to 
make a contribution to the conversation by placing MacKinnon‘s and Williams‘s reflections on 
the tragic within their wider theological projects, hereby developing the argument that classical 
orthodoxy is able to sustain, with integrity, a vision that includes tragedy within it.  
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Opsomming:  
In hierdie verhandeling val die klem op die verhouding tussen Christelike metafisika en 
filosofiese sienings van tragedie. Hierdie verhouding het in ‘n moderne konteks opnuut bestrede 
geword. Die navorsingsvraag sou dus soos volg geformuleer kon word: kan ‘n klassieke 
benadering tot transendensie rekening hou met ‗die tragiese‘? Die vraag sou ook andersom gestel 
kon word: bestaan daar grammatikas van transendensie waarin die verhouding tot ‗die tragiese‘ (in 
die sin van ‘n metafisiese of filosofiese troop) weerstand bied teen die resepsie van ‗tragedie‘ 
binne die ortodokse teologie? In belang van hierdie studie word die navorsingsvraag konkreet 
toegespits in die debat rondom die kritiese resepsie van Donald MacKinnon se werk, veral onder 
denkers soos David Bentley Hart en John Milbank. 
 Die kern-argument van hierdie verhandeling is dat die bogenoemde twispunt die duidelikste na 
vore tree rondom die taal van transendensie; by name, hoe transendensie tradisioneel deur die 
Christelike ortodoksie gekonseptualiseer is (byvoorbeeld, aseïteit, die analogia entis, die 
transendentale verruilbaarheid van ‗goedheid‘ en ‗eenheid‘ ens.). Daar word ook beweer dat 
sekere moderne afstammelinge van ‗die tragiese‘ en ‗transendensie‘ probleme veroorsaak vir die 
verhouding tussen ‘n klassiek-ortodokse metafisika en tragedie as kunsvorm. Wat dit betref word 
drie voorbeelde in die moderne periode aangedui, naamlik: die Kantiaanse subliem, die lydende 
Absoluut, en die verwerping van die privatio boni. In die huidige debat staan al drie van hierdie 
konsepte in verhouding tot die vraag na ‗die tragiese‘ so wel as die bespreking van MacKinnon – 
soos duidelik sal word in die kritiese reaksies op MacKinnon se werk wat ons sal bespreek. 
Deur ‘n kritiese eksposisie van Donald McKinnon en Rowan Williams voor te lê, beoog hierdie 
studie om die gesprek binne die bogenoemde konteks te bevorder. Die ondersoek stel voor dat 
MacKinnon se insiggewende kommentaar op die verhouding tussen metafisika en tragedie 
belemmer word deur ‘n sterk afhanklikheid van Kantianisme, so wel as ‘n aantal ongegronde 
aanvalle op die Augustiniaanse verstaan van die bose. In die lig hiervan, beweer hierdie studie dat 
Rowan Williams ‘n korrektief bied op MacKinnon: in ooreenstemming met MacKinnon 
beklemtoon Williams dat tragedie met algehele erns aanvaar behoort te word; tegelykertyd slaag 
hy daarin om ‘n aantal tekortkominge wat met MacKinnon se benadering verband hou die hoof te 
bied. Die waarde van Williams se bydrae kom veral na vore in die manier waarop hy dit regkry 
om ‘n diepgaande waardering vir ‗historisiteit‘ en ‗die tragiese‘ met ‘n sterk metafisika van 
kreatiwiteit, taal en analogie te versoen. Verder nog, kry Williams dit reg om ‘n verdediging van 
aseïteit, analogiese deelname en die privatio boni te bied wat koherent bly met ‘n waarderende sin 
vir die tragiese. Deur op hierdie manier MacKinnon en Williams se nadenke oor die tragiese binne 
die breë raamwerk van hulle teologiese projekte te plaas, hoop ons om die argument te bevorder 
dat ‘n klassieke ortodoksie goed geleë is om ‘n teologiese visie wat die tragiese insluit met 
integriteit te dra en te onderhou. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. The Scope 
Broadly-speaking, the argument of this dissertation is premised on the interconnections 
between Christian metaphysics and the philosophy of the tragic, and the purported tensions 
that arise in their juxtaposition. More specifically, it is centered on ‗transcendence‘, and how 
a more ‗classical‘ or ‗orthodox‘ metaphysics is able to account for ‗the tragic‘. A relationship 
between these discourses cannot be assumed to be harmonious, and so it is our task to suggest 
why this might be the case, and how they could be reconciled. Its central argument is that 
there are accounts of transcendence that hinder an appropriation of ‗the tragic‘, at least as 
regards classical theology. This is exemplified in the contemporary debate between, on the 
one side, David Bentley Hart and John Milbank, and on the other, Donald MacKinnon and 
Rowan Williams. It is this particular debate, and its wider context, that will form the center of 
this study. Our trajectory is not concerned, primarily, with a Christian metaphysics in toto but 
rather with a specific tradition, that is, with what could be called a ‗classical orthodoxy‘.1 It is 
                                                          
1
 In our sense, ‗orthodoxy‘ has a special linkage to the classical tradition and the question of 
transcendence (e.g. aseity, analogia entis, etc.). But in our discussion it will also have an implicit 
connection to other regula fidei throughout – the Ecumenical Creeds, creation, salvation, atonement, 
the centrality of Christ, the gift of the Holy Spirit, the triunity of God, and the beatitude of life 
everlasting. And yet, there is another conception of ‗orthodoxy‘ presumed also, one which works at a 
meta-structure, and not simply at the level of the confession of specific dogmas. Here as elsewhere, our 
conception is influenced by Rowan Williams: this position does not equate ‗orthodoxy‘ with a 
carapaced traditionalism or conservatism – as if we could somehow repristinate a bygone era without 
changing the meaning of the tradition in the process. Williams‘s account is not concerned with this 
variety of conservatism. His account is an open-ended, humble – even kenotic – account of the 
handing-over of church tradition, one that includes the necessity of fabrication and invention within the 
continuation of ecclesial identity. Expounding on these themes, one could suggest that ‗orthodoxy‘, or 
‗traditioned creativity‘ (to use Jeffrey McCurry‘s terms), implies both the faithful transmission and the 
imaginative continuation of the church‘s identity– faithful because it is attentive to the church‘s 
historical and spiritual identity, and imaginative because it knows that the art of continuation cannot be 
achieved without the risks and joys of re-thinking the tradition within changing contexts. For more 
details on this, see Rowan Williams, ‗What is Catholic Orthodoxy?‘ in Rowan Williams and Kenneth 
Leech (eds.), Essays Catholic and Radical (London: Bowerdean, 1983), 11-25; Williams, ‗Does it 
Make Sense to Speak of a Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?‘ in Rowan Williams (ed.), The Making of Orthodoxy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-23; Williams, ‗The Nicene Heritage,‘ in James M. 
Byrne (ed.), Christian Understanding of God Today (Dublin: Columbia, 1993), 45-48; Williams, ‗The 
Seal of Orthodoxy: Mary and the Heart of Christian Doctrine,‘ in Martin Warner (ed.), Say Yes to God: 
Mary and the Revealing of the Word Made Flesh (London: Tufton, 1999), 15-29; Williams, Arius: 
Heresy and Tradition (rev. ed., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), and esp. 1-25; 233-245. For 
secondary literature, see Jeffrey McCurry, Traditioned Creativity: On Rowan Williams and the 
Grammars of Theological Practice (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 2006); Benjamin Myers, 
‗Disruptive History: Rowan Williams on Heresy and Orthodoxy,‘ in Matheson Russell (ed.), On 
Rowan Williams: Critical Essays (Eugene: Cascade, 2009), 47-67; Myers, Christ the Stranger: The 
Theology of Rowan Williams (London – New York: T& T Clark, 2012), 43-49. More generally, see 
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this point of departure that will inflect our language of ‗transcendence‘, and how we relate 
‗the tragic‘ to its contours. By working within a more classical tradition of Christian 
metaphysics, I am going forward with specific assumptions in regard to the nature of God and 
the matrix of beliefs connected to it. Here the language of ‗transcendence‘ is particularly 
emphasized as being central to the grammar of classical orthodoxy, and therefore accrues an 
elevated place in this discussion. Consequently, this adopted framework provokes special 
challenges to conceptual reconciliation – or what could be called systematic coherency – 
which will need to be addressed if we are going to try and relate the classical language of 
transcendence to ‗the tragic‘ and the overtones it has accrued, especially in recent times.     
Both ‗transcendence‘ and ‗tragedy‘ are multivalent and require longer expositions, but here 
already we can parse definitions. For instance, we see that the language of ‗transcendence‘ 
often concerns configurations of liminality associated with transition, as seen in the mundane 
intersections between past, present and future. Additionally, ‗transcendence‘ references those 
experiences which frustrate reduction, those moments of wonder and terror, where the 
sensibilities are overloaded and destabilized. They signify an intractability or non-
negotiability within the world, indicating those events that transport us or shock us into new 
modes of awareness – the tragic included. As we will come to see later, ‗tragedy‘ is an 
example of this phenomenological resistance, precisely to the degree it reveals what cannot be 
repressed or evaded, namely, the world‘s untameablity. But ‗transcendence‘ also betokens 
realities that are not experienceable in the ordinary sense of the term, and are rather concerned 
with questions of meaning, with that which creates experience (that is, religions, myths, 
philosophy, etc.). In this sense, we can speak of experiences as having a ‗metaphysical‘ or 
even ‗transcendental‘ scope.2 Furthermore, in our study, ‗transcendence‘ is placed within the 
context of a classical account of Christian language regarding ‗divine being‘ (e.g. aseity, 
impassibility, analogical ‗participation‘,3 the convertibility of being and goodness),4 with the 
aim of showing that this tradition expresses a level of penetration that is not often recognized 
by revisionists. These questions will come into focus, especially when we discuss the work of 
Rowan Williams.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
David Brown, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999).  
2
 Though not to be equated here with the Kantian sense of the term, as we will see later.  
3
 By ‗participation‘, I am referring to that ‗constitutive structure whereby a being or beings share to 
varying degrees in a positive quality or perfection that they receive from a donating source that alone 
enjoys the fullness of this quality of perfection,‘ in Jacob H. Sherman, ‗A Genealogy of Participation,‘ 
in Jorge N. Ferrer and Jacob H. Sherman (eds.), The Participatory Turn: Spirituality, Mysticism, 
Religious Studies (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2008), 81-112  (p. 82).    
4
 A description of this metaphysical vision can be found in David Bentley Hart, ‗No Shadow of 
Turning: On Divine Impassibility‘, ‗The Destiny of Christian Metaphysics: Reflections on the Analogia 
Entis‘, ‗The Hidden and the Manifest: Metaphysics after Nicea,‘ in The Hidden and the Manifest: 
Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 45-69; 97-112; 137-164 resp.   
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To state it concisely, our research question can be summarized like this: can a classical 
doctrine of transcendence account for the seriousness and particularity of tragedy? This main 
question implies sub-questions which will have to be addressed also, such as: are there 
conflicts between them? And if there are, where do they lie? Are they substantial or the 
product of miscomprehension?  As we progress, a couple of these tensions will become more 
apparent: on the one hand, there could be a query about whether classical metaphysics takes 
‗tragedy‘ seriously, since (as has often been prosecuted) it absconds from ‗historicity‘.5 Such 
interrogation might conclude that such language operates more like an ‗ideology‘ rather than 
a responsible discourse. On the other hand, an objection might arise regarding the acceptance 
of ‗the tragic‘ or ‗tragic theology, since respondents could argue that such an acceptance 
implies a rejection or limitation of Christian ‗orthodoxy‘. In summary: one could argue either 
that the implications of tragedy should be curtailed or re-imagined – because it remains too 
disturbing – or one should reject ‗classical orthodoxy‘ as an unnecessary hindrance.     
And yet the question remains: are these the only two options available, acceptance or 
rejection? As we hope to show, we think the answer should be a qualified no, thus suggesting 
a third way beyond the extremes of simple acceptance or rejection. But to do this, several 
things will have to be accounted for: (1) it will have to argue that Christianity, even in its 
more traditional variety, is not opposed to the tragic, and is able to account for the challenges 
it proposes. For the purposes of our study, it will do so by localizing this tension on an area of 
deep importance for ‗the classical orthodox tradition‘, namely, its grammar of transcendence. 
In this way, it provides a node of concentration for what is a daunting and complex tradition; 
but will also show how the language of transcendence impacts on our reception of the tragic. 
(2) It will have to express sensitivity to the aporias of contingency, since it is precisely these 
factors which give the tragic its edge. And (3), it will also need to demythologize certain 
entrenched perspectives on ‗the tragic‘, which for understandable reasons are often associated 
with the unremittingly catastrophic. It needs to address these concerns because if they remain 
in place, they express an incompatibility with a Christian account of redemption. As regards 
our argument, we will suggest that a MacKinnonesque position, as modified by Williams, is 
one that is able to address these concerns, insofar as it takes historicity and tragedy seriously 
within a more-or-less orthodox position, while simultaneously addressing the particularity of 
                                                          
5
 On ‗historicity‘, see Reinhart Koselleck, ―Space of Experience‖ and ―Horizon of Expectation‖: Two 
Historical Categories,‘ in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 255-275; François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism 
and the Experiences of Time, trans. Saskia Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 
David Carr, ‗On Historicity‘. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 37.2 (2016): 273-288. For a more 
theological perspective, see Hans Urs Von Balthasar, A Theology of History (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1963); Rowan Williams, Why Study the Past? The Quest for the Historical Church (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2005).   
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tragic experience. In this study, we hope to see if such compatibility is a workable and 
coherent one within the theological assumptions here adopted.    
Returning to the over-arching tensions as regards ‗tragedy‘ and ‗transcendence‘, it appears 
beneficial to anticipate some our arguments in their enfleshment, so that we can concretize 
some of the debates we are referencing. On the one hand, one can see that a ‗transcendence‘ 
which avoids historicity evades the problem, since finitude – in theatre and in life – remains 
an essential trait of the tragic; any theology which avoided this factor would remain unable to 
address or absorb the insights of tragedy. In terms of an ‗orthodox‘ response, one would then 
have to show that aseity and ‗the analogy of being‘6 are not opposed to the experience of time 
and development. On the other hand, if history and its tragic outcomes are transcendentalized 
then this produces conclusions which a classical theology would want to caution against. As 
we suggest later, a traditional or classically-orthodox metaphysics would reject three 
interrelated revisions that are occasioned by this acceptance: namely, the concept of a 
suffering God, the rejection of evil-as-privation, and the (post)modern aesthetics of the 
sublime. Of course, in a genealogical perspective these are distinct phenomena that have 
arisen in different stages, and so are not reducible to each other. But it is nevertheless argued,7 
that they are connected and converge within their substance. For instance, it argues that the 
concept of a suffering God ultimately ‗ontologizes‘ suffering and evil,8 and that this move has 
metaphysical implications, insofar as it tacitly opposes evil-as-privation. Firstly, this is 
because the transcendent good is conceived as mutable and therefore not infinite, as modified 
or placed ‗over-against‘ contingency and evil; and, secondly, evil is granted a status of its 
own that is independent of the Good, since it exists as ‗something‘ to be absorbed, whereas 
classically-orthodox metaphysics has asserted that evil has no existence of its own. On this 
account, evil or suffering becomes a ‗good‘ in itself, replete with a distinct existence, being 
no longer reducible to an ontological perversion. This revision, moreover, renders ‗Being‘ as 
good and evil (e.g. Manichaeism), or as ‗beyond good and evil‘ (e.g. Nietzschean-postmodern 
tragic sublime9), since once you ascribe a discrete ‗existence‘ to evil, then ‗evil‘ becomes an 
expression of ‗Being‘. Once ‗evil‘ and ‗suffering‘ are given a non-parasitic ‗existence‘ – to 
the extent that they are in a univocal sense to other existents – then this grants them an 
independence that is equal with the Good. This is irreconcilable with a classical metaphysics 
                                                          
6
 Especially after Aquinas, Catholic theology has tended to read ‗transcendence‘ within an analogical 
metaphysics that conjectures a participation of finite being within God‘s infinite act of being. This does 
not imply a reduction of God to finitude, but rather a similarity within an ever-greater dissimilarity.  
7
 Rowan Williams‘s arguments in this regard which will be detailed in Chapter Three and Chapter 
Seven.  
8
 This is not to say that all suffering is reducible to evil. There are varieties of suffering which are 
linked to the natural impingements of finitude, and are by-no-means evil as such.  
9
 See Simon Critchley, ‗The Tragical Sublime,‘ in Donald Loose (ed.), The Sublime and Its Teleology: 
Kant—German Idealism—Phenomenology (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 169-185.  
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which says that the Good is convertible with Infinite Being. If one accords ‗being‘ to evil, 
then it is hard to avoid an equiprimordiality of evil with the good. It is this conclusion that 
suggests there is an ontological pessimism within such a tragic vision, since now ‗Being‘ is 
severed from any special affinity to the Good, a move which promotes an ‗ontological 
violence‘ and a politics based on the irreconcilability of human goods (á la Hobbesian 
liberalism).10 And it is this ‗pessimism‘ – as witnessed in the writings of George Steiner – that 
supports ideas of unremitting disaster as belonging to the essentially ‗tragic‘, and buttresses 
arguments that Christianity and the tragic are finally opposed.11  
It is at this moment that the debate between our main discussion partners becomes 
intelligible. All of them, Hart and Milbank, MacKinnon and Williams, serve as 
representatives of theological orthodoxy, specifically as regards the theme of transcendence. 
However, it is the differences between them as regards the tragic that require explanation; 
such an explanation pivots around MacKinnon, and the others‘s responses to him, since (as 
becomes clear) he is a figure central to the modern12 theological debate surrounding ‗the 
tragic‘. It is in the critical reception of his work, and the particular tradition he mediates (e.g. 
Kantianism), that many of the key contentions will be adjudicated.  
However, it appears helpful to speak briefly regarding method and my own situatedness in 
this argument. In this section, we will draw upon Vincent Brümmer and Rowan Williams.  
 
1.2. On Beginning in the Middle 
 
A word on method and assumptions: as a theologian, one has to begin somewhere, and that 
‗somewhere‘ – as Rowan Williams has suggested – is ‗the middle of things‘.13 One begins 
where one is at, where one is located, within all the ‗middles‘ this implies. Any theology is 
‗placed‘ and cannot pretend otherwise; even the most systematic or interlaced arrangement 
can never be ‗self-referential‘ or ‗auto-poetic‘.14 One should emphasize this once more: 
theologies arise within contexts and the interplay between locations and their informing 
                                                          
10
 Here my argument is in large agreement with the work of John Milbank and others (e.g. Adrian 
Pabst). However, it should be said that this is not an exclusive explanation; there is a multitude of 
causation, both historical and intellectual, for any political tradition.   
11
 As regards ‗tragedy‘ as such, we are not bound to this schema. For in Hegel‘s reading (as read by 
Rowan Williams) tragic conflict is not a question of irresolvable dualities, but rather ‗one-sidedness‘. 
‗Goods‘ are not mutually opposed, as in the usual reading. Instead, they are misrecognized as being 
ultimate. ‗Reconciliation‘ is about learning to recognize my good as bound to yours, and it is the 
refusal of this that occasions tragic conflict.  
12
 In this study, the language of ‗modern‘ is often a circumlocution for ‗contemporary‘. However, it is 
also clear (especially after Chapter Three) that ‗modern‘ carries with it overtones of ‗modernity‘ as 
well.  
13
 Rowan Williams, ‗Prologue,‘ in On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), xii.  
14
 The language is drawn from Michael Murrmann-Kahl, "Mysterium trinitatis"?: Fallstudien zur 
Trinitätslehre in der evangelischen Dogmatik des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin-New York: Walter De 
Gruyter, 1997), 1-16. 
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traditions (their history, culture, language, religiosity, etc.). Every theology has ‗orthodoxies‘, 
since theologies – no matter how radical, venerable or established – cannot erase this 
limitation. Without this factor, we would be unable to say anything with coherency or fidelity. 
On the one hand, this is an existential necessity since we cannot step out of our own skins, so 
to speak. But on the other this reality intimates a theological truth also: that out knowledge of 
God is always socially and historically mediated. As finite beings, our rationality is sequential 
and diachronic, and so (because of this) one could say that theological language is a learned 
discourse, and is entwined with those habits that cultivate it. Or to adopt Marxist phraseology, 
one could say that orthodoxies are ‗produced‘,15 and gather their viability as they capacitate 
the traversal of ‗symbolic capital‘ across diverse contexts and strata.16 But because these 
‗texts‘ and ‗contexts‘ are continuously produced and appraised, they are neither value-neutral 
nor ‗natural‘. They are living and vibrant systems fabricated through historical signs and 
material practices, semantic densities that are subject to time and alteration.17 Theological 
reflection occurs within this flux, and the often ‗unsystematized speech‘ that is awakened 
within it.18 Once more, as theologians, we are placed within ‗the middle‘. We are unable to 
erase those ‗life-worlds‘ (Lebenwelten) and ‗backgrounds‘ (Umwelten) that shape us – 
including the present author. As a Caucasian-African male, as a descendent of European 
colonizers and refugees, I am shaped by Western tendencies of thought. This can be 
discerned, for example, in my metaphysical and genealogical proclivities, my preference for 
‗historicism‘, as well as my choice of subject-matter, which is dominated by North Atlantic, 
Euro-American men. However, one should also stress that being placed in South Africa 
makes one sensitive to questions which might not be readily apparent in others. The almost 
daily admixture of joy and despair, of laughter within the vale of tears as experienced by the 
majority of black and brown South Africans, cannot be lost on any sensitive commentator.19  
Tragedy, real or fictional, is not just a Western phenomenon.20 In this light, my study is 
contextual, personal and ‗biographical‘,21 in the sense that it exhibits what Williams has 
called the ‗lived incoherence‘ of theological writing, a factor which reminds us of ‗the 
                                                          
15
 Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columba University 
Press, 1980), 17-113.  
16
 Pierre Bourdieu, ‗The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods,‘ in The 
Field of Production: Essays on Art and Literature, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 74–111. 
17
 Graham Ward, How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 131-
135.  
18
 Cf. Williams, ‗Prologue,‘ xii-xiii.  
19
 For a window into this, see the phenomenological analysis of township life in Abraham Olivier, 
‗Heidegger in the township‘. South African Journal of Philosophy 34.2 (2015): 240-254.  
20
 Cf. Barbara Goff and Michael Simpson, Crossroads in the Black Aegean: Oedipus, Antigone, and 
Dramas of the African Diaspora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
21
 In my case, an interest in the theme of ‗the tragic‘ can be traced to my early postgraduate research as 
well as my Masters dissertation, which in many ways is a precursor to this current study.  
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inescapable place of repentance in all theological speech worth the name‘.22 Alluding to this 
should not, however, act as an alibi for ersatz or hazy argumentation, but should rather remind 
us of the angularity of its composition.     
Locatedness and particularity are intrinsic to know where one is speaking from. We cannot 
escape our ‗middles‘. But then how does one retain rigour or accountability? What approach 
should we take to maintain ‗objectivity‘? Here, I will adapt some concepts used by Vincent 
Brümmer23 and others24 to unravel my method and assumptions presupposed in this study. 
Firstly, as stated, my argument works within a trajectory of classical and orthodox 
metaphysics, and therefore aims to express continuity within this stream. I work within this 
‗tradition‘, one that traces its origins to those scriptural and patristic sources that provided the 
early seed-bed for Christian thought.25 This specificity establishes the limits and objectivity of 
the work, insofar as it projects not just any object, but a particular one. But I am apprised that 
one cannot simply repeat formulae without an awareness of how such language works in the 
present, and the overtones this might or might not carry due to changed circumstances and 
historical resonance.26 This suggests that translation and non-identical repetition remain 
essential for the process of handing-over, and that Christian ‗identity‘ does not persist apart 
from this, and assists us with understanding the theological criterion of relevance – the ability 
to speak to one‘s time – or what McCurry has called traditioned creativity. To quote Rowan 
Williams once more, ‗orthodoxy‘ (or tradition) remains ‗something still future‘, which ‗means 
that a briskly undialectical rhetoric‘ of ‗conserving‘ or ‗defending‘ ‗a clear deposit of faith 
may come less easily to us‘, since ‗Orthodoxy continues to be made‘.27 Therefore, we cannot 
make the assumption that holding strictly onto dogmas or scriptural language will guarantee 
faithfulness to the tradition. On the contrary, sometimes one requires a leap of imagination, a 
rupture within language, to maintain identity within the present. Moreover, I do not assume a 
homogenous tradition devoid of diverse streams and counter-arguments, as well as persecuted 
or minority voices. I presume a complex tradition, and affirm an existential requirement that 
different historical periods or contexts might require a shifting or pragmatic emphasis of one 
stream over another. This addresses the problem of practical adequacy, that the ‗symbolic 
capital‘ of one or another stream might change or dissipate – depending on its historical 
                                                          
22
 Williams, ‗Prologue,‘ xvi.  
23
 See Vincent Brümmer, ‗The Intersubjectivity of Criteria in Theology,‘ in Brümmer on Meaning and 
the Christian Faith: Collected Writings of Vincent Brümmer (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 
2006), 453-470.  
24
 Gerrit Brand, Speaking of a Fabulous Ghost: In Search of Theological Criteria with Special 
Reference to the Debate on Salvation in African Christian Theology. Contributions to Philosophical 
Theology Vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002), 38-57.  
25
 Brümmer‘s reflections in ‗The Identity of the Christian Tradition,‘ in Brümmer on Meaning and the 
Christian Faith, 375-389 for a philosophical account of ‗tradition‘.  
26
 See Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: SCM Press, 1986), 55-58 for more on 
this. 
27
 Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, 24-25. 
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location. As the past shows, repressed traditions may become ‗orthodoxy‘ and mainline 
traditions ‗heretical‘ insofar as they are able to, or fail to, open deeper ranges of meaning and 
coherency.28 This point is important to stress: throughout this study in particular we will stress 
again and again the ideal of a ‗systematic‘ coherence as regards the relation between 
classically-inclined Christian metaphysics and ‗the tragic‘. Such coherency is applicable to 
the question of its internal theological consistency, but also has connection to other regimes of 
knowledge. Ideally, it should offer an aesthetic and persuasive power, a capacity to account 
for diverse experiences and language-games within a comprehensive vision.29 In other words, 
it should exhibit credibility. If it fails to do so, or demonstrates a lack of coherency with 
available knowledge, its epistemic plausibility will suffer as a consequence. This does not 
necessarily mean that such a position is completely wrong or misguided, since novel 
hypotheses might propose a vision at odds with current sciences, and still be finally more 
correct (Galileo is an example of this).30 Still, theological traditions should aspire to an 
elegance of explanation, and not incoherency. This applies not only to the principle of non-
contradiction, but touches on broader theological themes as well.  
For example, from its inception Christian orthodoxy has constituted an attempt to garner a 
‗world,‘ and an intelligible arrangement of how we are situated in it. For Christianity, this 
‗world‘ assumes unity and rationality, since God is one and not divided. For this reason, the 
narrative of redemption cannot be localized in an exclusionary way, because that would imply 
that God‘s dealings with creation were not reflective of the divine nature. The possibility of a 
radically different path towards salvation would imply there was a different god, thus 
undermining Oneness. If God‘s actions were fundamentally disparate, one could not confess 
the deity of the biblical traditions. Apart from this metaphysical unity, the acclamation of 
‗truth‘ would be rendered dubious, since now there would be no trans-historical ‗sense‘ in 
which the world could be ‗read‘. It is this drift towards sense-making, of having a unified 
sense of ‗world‘, that gave inspired the early Christians to construct narratives about 
themselves, and the universe they inhabited.31           
Coherency and credibility also touch upon another area, namely what Brümmer calls 
intersubjectivity. This aspect privileges accountability between discourses, and the necessity 
                                                          
28
 As Williams says, heresy is largely about ‗a major reduction in the range of available sources of 
meaning‘ (‗What is Catholic Orthodoxy,‘ 16).  
29
 My theology of persuasion is influenced by David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The 
Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), and John Milbank, Theology and Social 
Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
30
 See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (3rd ed., London and New York: Verso, 1993).  
31
 Rowan Williams, ‗Origen: Between Orthodoxy and Heresy,‘ in Walther Bienert and Uwe Kühneweg 
(eds.), Origenia Septima: Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahurhunderts (Louvain: 
Peeters, 1999), 3-14; Williams ‗Defining Heresy,‘ in Alan Kreider (ed.), The Origins of Christendom in 
the West (Edinburgh-New York: T & T Clark, 2001), 313-335 but esp. 324-327. Also, cf. Williams, 
‗The Unity of Christian Truth,‘ in On Christian Theology, 16-28 
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of a continuing encounter, so they will not become isolated and insular in their scope. In other 
words, our argument will have to balance a desire for the ‗systematic‘ while also maintaining 
a sense of ‗realism‘, an awareness that it is not reducible to an internal ‗language game‘.32  It 
must remain alert to its finite and perspectival nature, and the particular tradition it works 
within. Of course, such an argument desires to demonstrate the intellectual resilience of this 
tradition in particular, but it does not try to be exhaustive or all-encompassing. It represents 
an argument situated within a very specific debate, and in our case, on the relation between 
the grammars of ‗transcendence‘ and ‗the tragic‘. In this context, however, there remains the 
question of how one retains ‗realism‘ or ‗objectivity – here assuming the theological 
requirement that our language gives us ‗access to something other than itself‘.33 Here 
intersubjectivity assists with the external criteria of ‗objectivity‘ in terms of responsibility and 
accountability to other language-games. However, Christianity has its own internal resources 
of ‗objectivity‘ that are unique to its ‗object‘, namely God. Speech about God should 
demonstrate real transcendence. And yet how does religious speech show this? One suggests 
that theological speech moves in the right direction to the degree that it does what it says it 
does.34 Its argumentation, its style and form, should bear witness to the peculiarity of its 
object. As Williams suggests, theology cannot claim a ‗total perspective‘ because ‗there can 
be no conversation with a total perspective‘.35 Consequentially, language about God must 
express ‗dispossession‘ – to use another phrase of Williams36 – if it is to demonstrate its 
integrity, an integrity that ‗declines the attempt to take God‘s point of view‘.37 For him, ‗the 
truth of a religious claim is a matter of discovering its resource and scope for holding together 
and making sense of our perceptions and transactions without illusion‘.38 This move relates 
itself to the criteria of unity and coherency. But it must therefore express accountability to its 
transcendent object, and should not remain stuck within a self-immunizing system. For 
Williams, theological language articulates ‗realism‘ insofar as it is ‗done in ways that are 
open to continuing scrutiny and revision‘. Thereby, it ‗shows that we are serious about the 
extra-mental by certain features of our linguistic behaviour, and ‗by the exposure of our 
representations to response and correction or expansion, by behaving as though they were 
accountable to something more than their own inner logic or the convenience of the 
                                                          
32
 For a critique of an ‗intertextual‘ theology, see Rowan Williams, ‗The Judgement of the World,‘ in 
On Christian Theology, 29-43; Paul J. Dehart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of 
Postliberal Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006).  
33
 Williams, ―Religious Realism‘: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt,‘ in Wrestling with Angels¸ 
247. However, the entire chapter is instructive in this regard.  
34
 For this argument, see Williams, ‗Theological Integrity,‘ in On Christian Theology, 3-15.  
35
 Ibid., 5.  
36
 Ibid., 8-12.  
37
 Ibid., 7.  
38
 Ibid., 14.  
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speaker‘.39 It must evidence a transparency, a dispossession, a willingness ‗to display modes 
of arguing and interpreting rather than to advance a single system‘.40 In this light, one may 
paraphrase Gadamer: when it comes to the question of theological argumentation, the truth is 
in the method. Or to put it differently, the question of how one argues is intrinsically related to 
what one argues.  
So while this study hopes to bypass any gestures towards ‗totalization‘,41 and is therefore 
resigned to the ‗lived incoherence‘ of particularity, one should emphasize that it remains 
committed to larger questions of meaning that are essential for theological argumentation.42 It 
has a regard for those ‗systematic‘ aporias that arise within the juxtaposition of thought-
worlds, while holding onto a vision of ‗integrity‘ or ‗coherence‘ that is intrinsic to sense-
making. Theology can never be parochial or ghettoized: the situatedness of all regimes of 
discourse does not necessitate reductionism. This is because any ‗context‘ is always-already 
situated in a more comprehensive ‗text‘ that prohibits closure,43 since every cultural 
production is encoded within a scope that cannot be pre-emptively foreclosed. Therefore, any 
reference to an index apart from its setting of intelligibility risks mystification, since 
particulars are not comprehended without their placing. Instead, the imagining of a ‗context‘ 
involves connecting ‗life-worlds‘ to a whole, to an intuited ‗totality‘ – or in the case of 
theology, to a sense of the divine. It is this intuition that remains essential for ‗systematic 
theology‘, insofar as it brings all existence into the remit of the divine light. To quote 
Aquinas: ‗in sacred science, all things [my italics] are treated of under the aspect of God: 
either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and 
end‘.44 If this is true, then reality has its raison d'être in divinity, since every existent is 
dependent on God and reflects God as cause. ‗Systematic theology‘ is therefore inextricably 
connected to the logic of creation, insofar that it traces the multiplicity of existents to a divine 
plenitude.45 It is this assumption that motivates the drive within ‗systematic theology‘ towards 
                                                          
39
 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 77. 
40
 Williams, ‗Prologue,‘ xvi.  
41
 My understanding of ‗totalization‘ is drawn from the realm of critical theory, and to some extent 
coheres with the understanding of the term as found in Adorno and Levinas. For a brief and critical 
discussion of the idea of ‗system‘ in relation to ‗totalization‘, see Theodor W. Adorno, Negative 
Dialectics  ¸trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 24-28. 
42
 See Vincent Brümmer, ‗Spirituality and the Hermeneutics of Faith (2010)‘. HTS Teologiese Studies/ 
Theological Studies 66.1, 5 pages. On the history of the term ‗sense‘, see Fabien Burgee, ‗Common 
Sense‘; Barbara Cassin, Sandra Laugher, Alain de Liberal, Irene Rosier-Catch and Giaconda Spinosa, 
‗Sense / Meaning‘; Alain De Libera, ‗Sensus Communis,‘ in Barbara Cassin (ed.), Dictionary of 
Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 
152–154; 949–967; 967–968 resp. 
43
 This I take to be Derrida‘s central contribution.  
44
 Summa Theologiae I.1.7. The translation is from http://dhspriory.org/thomas/.   
45
 A. N. Williams, ‗What is Systematic Theology?‘ International Journal of Systematic Theology 11.1 
(2009): 40-55; John Webster, ‗Principles of Systematic Theology‘. International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 11.1 (2009): 56-71.  
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imagining ‗the whole‘ – a théologie totale (Sarah Coakley). And it is this which gives 
systematics its inter-disciplinary tendency, its desire to connect ‗sacred doctrine‘ to diverse 
fields of study.46     
It is therefore an assumption of this study that the practice of systematic theology requires a 
‗metaphysic‘, that is, an attempt to think the multiple in its dependency on the One and, 
contrariwise, to show the One as reflected in the Many. In other words, it should account for 
this reality of divergence, while making conjectures regarding their interconnections within a 
prior unity. Admittedly, the language of ‗metaphysics‘, and especially after Martin Heidegger, 
has received a significant amount of bad publicity. One only has to mention ‗ontotheology‘47 
and there is a clamour to be distanced from it. According to Heidegger, it is by considering 
‗Being‘ as the Grund of ‗beings‘ that we, on the one side, forget the question of Being itself, 
and, on the other, ultimately include God within a causality that denies real transcendence.48 
In the wake of this diagnosis, modern theology has castigated ‗metaphysics‘ as promoting an 
abstract deity with precious resemblance to the living God of revealed theology (e.g. Karl 
Barth). Or to adopt an even stronger version, it has been argued that ‗metaphysics‘ aims to 
construct an idolatrous God within finite ‗being‘, and therefore that the God of metaphysics 
(or ontotheology) cannot be the ‗God‘ of the Christian tradition (e.g. Jean-Luc Marion). These 
criticisms are not without merit, and this study is in solidarity with several of its concerns. 
Nonetheless, it must be said that the history of ‗metaphysics‘ is rather variegated, and cannot 
be reduced to Heideggerian genealogy.49 One must remain alert to the ruptures within 
                                                          
46
 See Graham Ward‘s chapter in ‗What is an Engaged Systematics?‘ in Ward, How the Light Gets In, 
115–144. Also see Sarah Coakley‘s reflections on systematics as a théologie totale in God, Sexuality, 
and the Self: An Essay ‗On the Trinity‘ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33-65.  
47
 As is well known, the term was invented by Kant, and thereafter taken up by Heidegger: 
‗Transcendental theology either thinks that the existence of an original being is to be derived from an 
experience in general (without more closely determining anything about the world to which this 
experience belongs), and is called cosmotheology; or it believes that it can cognize that existence 
through mere concepts, without the aid of even the least experience, and is called ontotheology’ 
(Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A 632= B 660.  
48
 Martin Heidegger, ‗The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,‘ in Identity and Difference, 
trans. Joan Staumbach (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 42-74.  
49
 Olivier Boulnois, ‗Quand commence l'ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot‘. 
Revue Thomiste 95 (1995): 85-108; Boulnois, Étre et représentation: Une généalogie de la 
métaphysique moderne a l‘époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe -XIVe siècle). Épiméthée (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999); Boulnois, Métaphysique rebelles: genèse et structures d‘une science 
au Moyen Age. Épiméthée (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013); Jean-François Courtine, 
Suarez et le système de la métaphysique. Épiméthée (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990); 
Alain de Libera, ‗Genèse et structure des métaphysique médiévales,‘ in Jean-Marc Narbonne and Luc 
Langlois (eds.), La métaphyisque: son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux (Paris and Québec: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin / Les Presses de l‘Université Laval, 1999), 159-181; Constantino Esposito, 
‗Heidegger, Suárez e la storia dell‘ontologia‘. Quaestio: Journal of the History of Metaphysics 1 
(2001): 407-430; Esposito, ‗The Hidden Influence of Suárez on Kant‘s Transcendental Conception of 
‗Being‘, ‗Essence‘ and ‗Existence‘,‘ in Lukás Novák (ed.), Suárez's Metaphysics in its Historical and 
Systematic Context (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 117-134; Esposito, ‗Suárez and the Baroque Matrix of 
Modern Thought,‘ in Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi (eds.), A Companion to Francisco Suárez 
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medieval metaphysics and thereafter, and avoid overly-linear narratives of decline. 
‗Metaphysics‘ has multiple histories of ‗disruption‘50 that require re-narration. As regards my 
own metaphysical assumptions, however, I can safely say that they remain more-or-less 
classical and Thomistic in their temperament. For if Oliva Blanchette is correct, then a 
Thomistic metaphysics already states that it is only from particular beings that a meaning of 
‗Being‘ is extrapolated, since to the degree that any contingent entities are, they give an 
aperture into the to be. For Aquinas, the richness of being, of the to be, means that the 
multitude of beings ‗intensively‘ reflects that infinite being in which all things live, move , and 
have their being.51 This already exceeds Heidegger‘s history of metaphysics, and probably 
absolves Aquinas from charges of ontotheology.52    
Since we have now ‗recollected‘ some of the characteristics of our theological method,53 
we may move onto a schematic of our argument.         
 
1.3. The Argument 
 
In terms of our chapter outline: as we will see, the majority of this study centers upon a 
critical exposition of Donald MacKinnon‘s The Problem of Metaphysics (1974) and Rowan 
Williams‘s The Tragic Imagination (2016). Why I have decided, methodologically, to focus 
on these texts will become clear as we go on. But simply stated, one can say that MacKinnon, 
even until the present day, remains a significant discussion partner within the theological 
conversation on the tragic. Therefore, it appears logical that our discussion focus on the book 
where his most mature presentation appears. Much of this same reasoning could be adduced 
for choosing The Tragic Imagination. To date, it constitutes Williams‘s only monograph-
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 124-147; Jean Grondin, Introduction to Metaphysics: From Parmenides to 
Levinas, trans. Lukas Soderstrom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Honnefelder, ‗Der 
zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansatze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der 
Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert,‗ in J. P. Beckmann, L. Honnefelder, G. Schrimpf, G. Wieland 
(eds.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen (Meiner: Hamburg 1987), 165-
186; Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realitat in der 
Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suarez –Wolff – Kant – Peirce). 
«Paradeigmata 9» (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990); Lamanna, ‗Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez,‘ in 
Lukás Novák (ed.), Suárez's Metaphysics in its Historical and Systematic Context (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2014), 135-152.   
50
 For this language, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan-Smith 
(London: Routledge, 1989), 1-33. 
51
 Oliva Blanchette, Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics (Washington D. C., 
The Catholic University of America, 2003), 83-144; Rudi Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‗Divine 
Science‘ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 65-93.  
52
 For an argument showing that Aquinas should not be classed under ‗ontotheology‘, see Jean-Luc 
Marion, ‗Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,‘ in The Essential Writings (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), 288-311. 
53
 See Brümmer, ‗Philosophical Theology as Conceptual Recollection,‘ in Brümmer on Meaning and 
the Christian Faith, 433-452.  
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length consideration of this question – which is why it has received a prominent place in this 
study.   
Chapter 2 investigates where the tensions between orthodox Christianity and the tragic 
might have arisen. Here we argue that a retrojection of conflict onto abstract terms such as 
‗Christianity‘ and ‗the tragic‘ fails to address those peculiar strategies employed by early and 
medieval Christians. Our exposition is however premised upon a prior story, namely the 
placement of Attic tragedy within the debate between the poets and the philosophers (e.g. 
Plato). Thereafter, we discuss how ‗tragedy‘ was transmuted into the Christian period, here 
suggesting that any hard rejection of ‗tragedy‘ as such is rare, and that when ‗tragedy‘ is 
criticized it is due to an alignment with anti-theatrical sentiments which were not exclusively 
Christian. On the contrary, the patristic and medieval periods display a variety of responses to 
tragic themes, many of which are positive and creative. Thus it appears that the tensions 
between ‗Christianity‘ and ‗the tragic‘ only become marked in the modern theological scene, 
which suggests that there are other more recent developments at hand which have produced 
them. This is exemplified within the proposals of some literary critics (e.g. George Steiner), 
and in the contemporary reception of Donald MacKinnon (e.g. David Bentley Hart and John 
Milbank).  
In Chapter 3, we attempt to display where these moments of tension lie. It is suggested that 
a central problematic is the configuration of transcendence, particularly as regards to divine 
aseity. Thereafter, it suggests that the modern fabrication of a tension between Christianity 
and the tragic is manifest within three tendencies, all related to the nature of ‗transcendence‘. 
Most pointedly, it is connected to the invention of the tragic within European classicism and 
philosophy. Of these tendencies, it is particularly (1) the concept of the Kantian sublime (e.g. 
Schiller) and (2) a metaphysic of the suffering Absolute (e.g. Schelling and Hölderlin) that 
provides a lucid connection between ‗the tragic‘ and transcendence, and moreover how such 
trends create problems for aseity. These in turn are related to another trend which argues that 
an acceptance of the tragic implies (3) a rejection of the Platonic-Augustinian notion of evil-
as-privation (e.g. Kathleen Sands), and with it any ontological priority of goodness. It is then 
suggested that a more classical metaphysics will have to address these developments.    
Chapter 4 exposits the contemporary theological debate on the tragic, especially as this has 
occurred in the critical reception of Donald MacKinnon in David Bentley Hart and John 
Milbank. Hart‘s criticisms of MacKinnon are not exclusively addressed to MacKinnon but to 
tragic drama as such, which he reads as proposing a ‗sacrificial totality‘. But as regards 
MacKinnon himself, Hart argues that reading the gospel tragically ends-up misrepresenting 
the radicalness of Christ‘s resurrection, and intimates a vision that tacitly advances the 
ontologization of violence. Milbank‘s critique is related but more expansive: he would agree 
with Hart on the question of ontological pessimism and violence, since MacKinnon 
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categorically rejects the privatio boni. However, he also brings an emphasis on MacKinnon‘s 
Kantianism in a way that implicates him in a politics of liberalism and a post-Schillerian 
aesthetics of the sublime. It is this latter tendency, so Milbank claims, that is connected to 
MacKinnon‘s rejection of a Catholic doctrine of analogy, a move which in turn hinders 
MacKinnon from relating the historical to the metaphysical.  
Chapter 5-6 aims to address these critiques to see whether they hit their mark. To do this, 
we engage in an extensive reading of Donald MacKinnon‘s The Problem of Metaphysics. We 
begin by analyzing MacKinnon‘s encounter with Aristotle and Kant‘s metaphysics before 
moving onto his reading of Plato and Kantian ethics, thereafter turning to his reflections on 
‗the tragic‘. Our conclusions are mixed: overall, we confirm Milbank‘s critique of 
MacKinnon, but express disagreement as regards ‗the tragic‘. In the end nonetheless, we 
suggest that MacKinnon is finally unable to coherently relate the immanent to the 
transcendent, that is, in a way that is able to affirm the ultimate goodness of Being. Therefore, 
we think he remains entrenched, unwittingly, in a modern regime of the sublime. This is due 
to his Kantianism and his rejection of the analogia entis, as well as the concept of evil-as-
privation.  
Our next two chapters (7-8) will gravitate towards the contributions of Rowan Williams, 
who in our estimate provides the most admirable synthesis of the tensions we have been 
addressing. On the one hand, he expounds an analogical metaphysics that includes historicity, 
as seen in his reflections on poetics, language and analogy. Moreover, unlike MacKinnon, 
Williams is completely committed to the privatio boni and divine non-passibility, a move 
which assists him in avoiding the critiques of Hart and MacKinnon. On the other hand, he 
provides a riposte to Milbank and Hart as regards ‗tragedy‘, thereby showing how the story 
might be more complicated than Milbank and Hart‘s conclusions appear to imply.  
In our final chapter, there is a summary of our argument. In terms of our most pertinent 
question (namely ‗can a classical account of transcendence affirm the tragic?‘), our argument 
suggests that Williams provides a correction and supplementation to MacKinnon‘s approach. 
Firstly, he avoids Hart and Milbank‘s critiques of divine suffering – as well as their 
accusations of ontological violence and pessimism – as being incompatible with an orthodox 
perspective. Secondly, his affirmation of the privatio boni refuses an absolutization of evil, 
which MacKinnon‘s position was unable to sufficiently counter-act. Moreover, his acceptance 
of a modified Augustinianism at this point denies any order or meaning to evil and suffering 
per se. Such enables Williams to do at least two things: (1) it refuses any theodicy which 
grants meaning to all suffering, as if evil could be ‗justified‘ as an alignment with the best of 
possible worlds. On the contrary, evil and suffering as such have no necessary ordering 
towards the truth, and therefore should not be assumed as having meaningfulness. However, 
(2) such a perspective does not exclude the ability of human beings to create meaning out of 
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suffering and tragedy, specifically in the way that trauma becomes representable between 
relational agents. Additionally, Williams‘s clear denial of an eschatological cancellation of 
tragedy, and his suggestion that the risen body includes its wounds, is able to maintain (in a 
different fashion) what MacKinnon dubbed ‗the transcendence of the tragic‘ or what Paul 
Janz calls ‗the finality of non-resolution‘. Because of this, one could say then that Williams 
affirms the negativity of the tragic, while including an amelioration of its finality. Thirdly, 
Williams‘s conceptual superiority over MacKinnon becomes clearer as regards the 
contemporary ‗sublime‘. As will be argued, MacKinnon‘s metaphysics was ultimately unclear 
in his postulation of the convertibility of goodness with being, and that this was linked to his 
rejection of the privatio boni. However, because Williams clearly endorses the evil-as-
privation doctrine, and cogently defends Augustine‘s position against its critiques, it appears 
that Williams does not fall into the tradition of sublimity that conceptually ails MacKinnon. It 
is at this juncture where our study tries to make a unique contribution: it seeks to relate 
Williams‘s analyses, specifically within The Tragic Imagination, to his larger metaphysical 
enterprise, and to questions that were not addressed in the constraints of that work. Moreover, 
it draws out his implicit critique of Kantian sublimity and its postmodern iterations, as this is 
found in its assertions of the unthinkability and unspeakability of pain – implications which 
he did not substantially tease-out in The Tragic Imagination. However, and despite all of the 
benefits of Williams‘s position, his conclusions have not been un-criticized, and so towards 
the end of his chapter, we detail some of the critiques and some of the questions which might 
be left open as we bring the study to a conclusion. 
As we make our transition to the next chapter, here is a revision of what we have discussed: 
at the beginning, we outlined our research topic as this was related to the supposed tensions 
between a classical account of ‗transcendence‘ and ‗the tragic‘. There we hinted  how this 
debate is incarnated within the contemporary discussion between Hart, Milbank, MacKinnon 
and Williams. We then suggested a structure for the development of this argument, 
specifically as it proceeds through a critical reception of MacKinnon‘s work, and its 
supplementation by Williams. Thereafter, I disclosed my assumptions as regards method, here 
drawing upon Vincent Brümmer and Rowan Williams. Moreover, I suggested (after 
Williams) that transparency and dispossession should become intrinsic to theological 
argumentation. We also stated how the method of ‗systematics‘ requires a ‗metaphysics‘, 
specifically as this seeks to relate the particularity of contexts to a wider scope of intellectual 
integrity and coherency.  
In the following chapter, we address our understanding of tragic drama, with a particular 
focus on how tragic themes were appropriated by Plato and patristic-medieval thinkers. This 
is done with the aim of discerning where the supposed tensions between Christianity and the 
tragic are focused. In it, we suggest that things might be more complicated than the common 
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narrative might suggest, and that the opposition between Christian theology and tragedy 
might be a confabulation of modern critics and theologians. This is important for our task 
insofar as it relates to our attempt to investigate where the tensions between ‗Christianity‘ and 
‗the tragic‘ are to be located, and whether they remain valid within the current discussion. Our 
sense from reading the literature is that the enduring suspicions of ‗tragedy‘ within 
Christianity are related to an unstable Platonic evaluation of theatre in general. Moreover, 
these voices are not magisterial but rather minor when compared to the deluge of positive or 
neutral receptions among pre-modern Christian writers. The history suggests, therefore, that 
there is by-no-means a necessary contradiction between Christian language and tropologies of 
the tragic. However, it does raise the question where these tensions have arisen in the past. In 
this regard, we suggest that it is among modern critics that there have been developments that 
have tended to reify and essentialise ‗Christianity‘ and ‗the tragic‘  into mutually-exclusive 
visions, a move not required by the availing evidence. This insight, in the light of our general 
argument, will assist us exploring the relationship between the classical tradition of orthodoxy 
and ‗tragedy‘ in the broadest sense of that term, and our question regarding their conceptual 
reconciliation.    
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Chapter 2 
On a Perennial Debate   
 
This chapter will attempt to lay-out a definition of ‗tragedy‘ and the ‗the tragic‘, with the 
assistance of classicists such as Jean-Pierre Vernant. In doing so, it seeks to problematize the 
opposition between the performative and the reflective as regards tragic drama. It suggests 
that ‗tragedy‘ at its origins was engaged in contemplation (theoria), and was always-already 
amenable to philosophical readings. Thereafter, our deconstruction is strengthened through an 
analysis of Plato, with the purpose of showing that his contribution is unstable, a fact which 
renders his vituperations against the tragic (and theatre more generally) as liable to immanent 
critique. Here we draw upon the scholarship of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Stephen Halliwell. 
After that, we examine the reception of tragedy within patristic and medieval thinkers, there 
showing that there is by-no-means a single strategy of response in this regard. ‗Tragedy‘ and 
‗the tragic‘ were deployed in multiple ways by diverse thinkers, and was not received in a 
negative light by the majority. This then raises the question as to where the perceived tensions 
between Christianity and the tragic arise. Here already there is a sense that the opposition 
might be a relatively recent creation, and could have a lot to do with the modern invention of 
‗the tragic‘, as well as reductive readings of Christianity tradition and the tragic. This idea is 
developed more in Chapter 3, but already there are some intimations of this development.   
 
2.1. On ‘Tragedy’ and ‘the Tragic’  
The following study is in many ways devoid of novelty. It would not be out of place to situate 
its content within that ancient debate stemming from Plato, which considered poetry to be 
incompatible with truthful discourse. This point alone suggests that ‗tragedy‘ remains 
controversial, both in regard to its dramatic provocation, as well as its endless receptions and 
ramifications. ‗Tragedy‘ has a history and is an ‗effective history‘. In fact, one could even 
suggest that ‗tragedy‘ has in diverse ways stimulated the turn to ‗history‘ in both ancient and 
modern times. Already then, Attic drama connected the typologies of mythic folklore to 
politico-juridical debates within the ancient city, being traceable to the ‗invention‘54 of theatre 
in fourth century Athens (around 534 BCE).55 As is now well-known, the aetiology of tragedy 
                                                          
54
 In the words of Jean-Pierre Vernant, even though tragedy was thoroughly informed by its context 
and historical ‗moment‘ within Athens, it should still be considered as an ‗invention‘ not fully 
reducible to its immediate background. For this, see Vernant, ‗The Historical Moment of Tragedy in 
Greece: Some Social and Historical Conditions,‘ in Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth 
and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York, Zone Books, 1988), 23-28.  
55
 Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy. Martin Classical Lectures, vol. 20 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965).  
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has been sourced within the City Dionysia, and was linked to Dionysos and the sacrificial cult 
in ancient Greece, even though the exact nature of this causality remains murky.56 We cannot 
avoid the religious element within the genesis of tragedy, and will return to it again. But it 
must be emphasized here that ‗tragedy‘ also served as a paradigm of political engagement, 
one which sought to expose the fragility of the Athenic city-state, as it was formed during an 
important period of cultural transition. This was revealed within those liminalities between 
‗legal‘ traditions that emphasized personal responsibility under law, and those ‗archaic‘ and 
‗heroic‘ traditions (stemming from Homeric theology) that sought to assert the often-
inscrutable justice of the gods, and (in particular) the excessiveness of Dionysos.57 Here the 
mythological foundations of the πόλις were no longer immune from investigation and 
critique, but were migrated into the terrain of political scrutiny. Within this movement, it was 
particularly ‗the hero‘ who was subject to interrogation: in tragedy, she or he ceases to be a 
model to be simplistically emulated, but a problem to be represented (Vernant). This 
‗politicizing‘ trend can also be seen in the way that tragic art ascribed a greater importance to 
human agency than earlier mythical presentations which did not disclose this sensitivity.58 
Such emphasis on human volition (not to be understood in the post-Enlightenment sense of an 
individual will, but as a contributing factor within the matrix of divine-human causalities59) 
has a connection to the democratic impulse that informed early drama – a factor obfuscated 
since Aristotle‘s Poetics.60 The political function of tragedy within this context was to tease 
out the dangers within the ‗civic ideology‘ of the Athenic state,61 even though it cannot be 
                                                          
56
 Walter Burkert, ‗Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual [1966],‘ in Wolfgang Rösler (ed.), Kleine 
Schriften VII: Tragica et Historica (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 1-36. On the general 
religious ethos that informs Attic tragedy, see Stephen Halliwell, ‗Human Limits and the Religion of 
Greek Tragedy‘. Literature & Theology 4.2 (1990): 169-180.   
57
 Vernant, ‗Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy‘ in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, 29-
48. Here one could mention the point raised by Paul Veyne regarding the importance of heroic legends, 
and how belief in such legends was less subject to the acids of cynicism than even the Olympian 
deities. This means that the subjection within tragic drama of ancient heroes to moral ambiguity should 
not be taken lightly, in light of the importance attached to them. See Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks 
Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination, trans. Paula Wishing (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988).  
58
 For more on the conception of human volition within Greek tragedy, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, 
‗Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy,‘ in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, 49-84. 
59
 Cf. Albin Lesky, ‗Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus‘. The Journal of Hellenic 
Studies 86 (1966): 78-85. 
60
 Wolfgang Rösler, Polis und Tragödie: Funktionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen zu einer Antiken 
Literaturgattung (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Kostanz GmbH, 1980); Edith Hall, ‗Is There a Polis in 
Aristotle‘s  Poetics?‘ in M. S. Silk (ed.), Tragedy and the Tragic, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 294-309; Page DuBois, ‗Toppling the Hero: Polyphony in the Tragic City‘. New Literary 
History 35.1 (2004): 63-81.  
61
 On the function of tragedy in regard to the ‗civic ideology‘ of Athens, see Simon Goldhill, ‗The 
Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology‘. The Journal of Hellenic Studies 107 (1987): 58-76. 
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separated from the ideological drive to establish consensus within its ranks also. 62  
Nevertheless, by representing this agon, tragedy contributed to the democratic project within 
ancient Greece, as can be seen, for example, in its emphasis on the presentation of conflict 
and the balancing of interests within the demos of the city (e.g. The Oresteia).63 This is 
evidenced by all of the great tragedians associated with the golden age of its development, 
including Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides.64  
The historicist aetiology of Greek tragedy assists to hold in check an overly-generalized 
recounting of Attic drama,65 tendencies which (amongst others) stem from the long dureé of 
de-politicized readings of tragedy, as well as Kantian traditions of subjective aesthetics.66 
Such contingencies were combined with the priority of private reading during eras of intense 
speculation regarding the tragic form, since tragedies were not widely performed in Europe 
until rather late in its history.67 This lesson needs to be absorbed, because there has been a 
tendency to underplay the context that eventuated in the tragic form. Nonetheless, we should 
not acquiesce to those who militate against its universalizing thrust. One sees from early on 
that ‗tragedy‘ already invited reflection and abstraction. Within the substance of the drama 
itself, the tragic Chorus – who are by-no-means simply bystanders in the action –provide 
contemplative diatribes on the action being witnessed, often drawing conclusions that are not 
peculiar to the characters in question, but relate to human experience universally or 
collectively,68 as seen in the ‗Ode to Man‘ (Antigone 332-375) and the Chorus‘s assertion that 
Oedipus is an instructive paradigm of human unhappiness generally (Oedipus Tyrannus 1524-
1530).69 Additionally, the content of ‗tragedy‘ was already generalized within antiquity (as in  
                                                          
62
 Oddone Longo, ‗The Theater and the Polis,‘ in J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.), Nothing to do 
with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
12-19. 
63
 See Aeschylus. The Oresteian Trilogy: Agamemnon, The Choephori, The Eumenides, trans. Philip 
Vellacott (Great Britain: Penguin, 1956).  
64
 J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 67-163.  
65
 For examples, scholars such Michelle Gellrich have pointedly shown how ‗tragedy‘ often escapes the 
confines of ‗tragic theory‘. For this, see Tragedy and Theory: The Problem of Conflict since Aristotle 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
66
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall (2nd rev. ed., 
London and New York: Continuum, 1989), 37-49. 
67
 Simon Goldhill, ‗Generalizing About Tragedy,‘ in Rita Felski (ed.), Rethinking Tragedy (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 45-65. 
68
 See John Gould, ‗Tragedy and Collective Experience‘ and the response by Simon Goldhill, 
‗Collectivity and Otherness – The Authority of the Tragic Chorus: Response to Gould,‘ in M. S. Silk 
(ed.), Tragedy and the Tragic, 217-243 and 244-256 resp.  
69
 I have drawn my references from Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the King, 
Oedipus at Colonus, trans. Robert Fagles (Great Britain: Penguin, 1984). For the ‗Ode to Man‘, see 
Charles Segal, ‗Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the ―Antigone‖‘. Arion: A Journal of 
Humanities and the Classics 3.2 (1964): 46-66. On the Chorus‘s reflection in Oedipus Tyrannus, 
Kamerbeek writes that ‗Oedipus‘ fate is represented as paradigmatic of the human condition, but in 
such a way that the misery of the man Oedipus is not lost sight of, nor his greatness,‘ in J. M. 
Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles, Part IV: The Oedipus Tyrannus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), 222.   
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Aristophanes‘s Frogs and Aristotle‘s Poetics), and by time of the Roman historian Cassius 
Dio (c. 150–235 AD) one could already be apply ‗tragedy‘ to historical events, such as Nero‘s 
murder of his mother.70 What this says is that ‗tragedy‘ and ‗the tragic‘ already had developed 
a degree of formalized content by this time, and that this trend – while certainly exacerbated 
in the modern period – is not completely unique or unprecedented. One could add to this 
Charles Segal‘s comments: he says that Oedipus (or tragedy) has ‗always be torn between the 
historicists and the universalizers‘, and that both sides need ‗to rescue the work from the 
other‘.71 Similarly, the Cambridge-based classicist Simon Goldhill has spoken of ‗a double 
attentiveness‘ within our reflection on tragedy, one that needs to ‗pay due attention to the 
specific socio-political context of ancient drama, while recognizing the drive towards 
transhistorical truth in the plays‘[s] discourse and in the plays‘[s] reception‘. This means that 
‗tragedies and ―the tragic‖ are in a productive and dialectical tension‘, and continually need to 
be placed alongside one another in order for this relation to be beneficial.72 He goes on to say 
that because ‗drama itself is committed to dialogue, to a play or contest of different voices‘, 
this means that ‗the tension between locatedness and generality is integral to Greek tragedy‘.73 
This is why there is a need to maintain a balance between treating ancient or modern tragedies 
as ‗texts‘, and our ever-changing cultural deployments of them as ‗scripts‘.74 ‗Scripts‘ are 
linked to ‗performances‘, and are tied to our ‗culturally produced horizons of expectation‘. 
While evidencing a ‗historical contingency‘, a script ‗exceeds the process of its performance‘ , 
and does not ever achieve ‗the status of an ordinary or fixed object‘.75  
One can conclude then that tragedy exhibits a simultaneous tendency towards the particular 
and the universal, towards the abstractive and the concrete – which is a philosophical gesture. 
From a hermeneutical perspective, Gadamer has argued that the temporality of an aesthetic 
consciousness implies a non-identical repetition of an artwork‘s presence in the here and now. 
The work becomes ‗contemporaneous‘ with our own time, and includes us within it.76 The 
same can be said for ‗the tragic‘, since it contains ‗no unchanging essence‘ to which we are 
                                                          
70
 I draw this example from Adrian Poole, Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 14.  
71
 Charles Segal, Sophocles‘ Tragic World: Divinity, Nature, Society (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), 142.  
72
 Goldhill, Sophocles and the Language of Tragedy, 165.  
73
 Ibid., 261.  
74
 Ibid., 262-263.  
75
 Ibid., 263.  
76
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 119-125. Gadamer is attempting here to overcome the emphasis on 
‗alienation‘ and ‗subjectivity‘ that have characterized aesthetics since the time of Kant and Schiller. 
See pp. 37-101 for his deeply perceptive reading of this trajectory. For what follows, also see Daniel L. 
Tate, ‗Transcending the Aesthetic: Gadamer on Tragedy and the Tragic,‘ in Oleg V. Bychkov and 
James Fodor (eds.), Theological Aesthetics after von Balthasar (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 
2008), 34-50.  
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objectively referred, but is made present in multiple forms and to which response is invited.77 
Gadamer says that tragedy is self-involving in this sense because its very definition is 
included in the ‗effect…on the spectator‘. But this immersive experience is not merely 
individualized or subjective, but includes a transformative ecstasy whereby the spectator is 
temporarily taken outside of themselves through an experience of ‗commiseration‘ and 
‗apprehension‘ (to adapt Aristotle‘s terms). This provides release and reconciliation with the 
truth of reality,78 namely, a discovery of that ‗tragic suffering‘ that is ‗truly common‘ to the 
human lot.79 Thus there is a dynamic interplay in the ‗tragic pensiveness‘80 of ancient drama, 
between the theatrical moment of ritual immersion (theoros) and the theoretical moment of 
reflective contemplation (theoria).81 Once more, we can see how the opposition between 
tragedy and philosophy is subjectable to deconstruction.  
However as this dynamic is translated beyond the sphere of theatre as such, one could say 
(with Larry Bouchard)  that there must be a focus on the particularity that ‗tragedies‘ assume 
– whether they are real or fictional – in order to make responsible generalizations. In applying 
this observation, our definition of ‗tragedy‘ or ‗the tragic‘ will have an open-texture that 
makes allowances different and changing concepts of ‗the tragic as an existential or religious 
dimension‘.82 As a result, this hermeneutical circle will, in turn, feed back into our definition 
of tragedy qua tragedy, or even expand the meaning of ‗the tragic‘.83 This means that there 
will be interplay between the different manifestations of the tragic, between ‗the literary, the 
philosophical, and the vernacular‘ (here adopting Felski‘s terms84). According to Felski, the 
‗literary‘ aspect refers to the textual-aesthetic productions of tragic themes (e.g. Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, Euripides, Shakespeare, Racine, etc.), while ‗the philosophical‘ refers to abstract 
reflections on ‗the tragic‘ (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Schiller, Hegel, Nietzsche, etc.). Finally, ‗the 
vernacular‘ speaks to that everyday sense of the term, as when we refer to this or that event as 
being ‗tragic‘. Such a judgement will also have to be context specific, since not all suffering 
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 Truth and Method, 125.  
78
 Ibid., 126.  
79
 Ibid., 128.  
80
 Ibid., 127.  
81
 Ibid., 122.  
82
 Larry D. Bouchard, Tragic Method and Tragic Theology: Evil in Cotemporary Drama and Religious 
Thought (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 244.  
83
 Bouchard wonders whether events like Hiroshima and the Shoah can really be classified as tragedies 
rather than just ‗events, brutal facts, of such enormity as commonly to provoke the sense that they are 
different from ordinary events, beyond the grasp of reason‘ but then backtracks a little by saying that 
maybe these events change the way we perceive what ‗tragedy‘ or ‗the tragic‘ even means, and writes 
that ‗there has never been much warrant for demanding that tragedies comport to sacrosanct formulas‘ 
(Ibid., 249). 
84
 Rita Felski, ‗Introduction,‘ in Rita Felski (ed.), Rethinking Tragedy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008), 1-25 (pp. 2-4).  
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or death should be deemed ‗tragic‘.85 One could say that ‗the tragic‘ expresses a sort of 
‗relativity‘, since what might destroy one person might not have the same effect on another.86 
Ultimately, the particular circumstances that actualize events should be taken into account.  
This will assist us in making distinctions between different kinds of pain. Without such 
distinctions, ‗tragedy‘ as a term would be too diffuse, lacking heuristic capacity.  
By way of summation, I suggest that this back-and-forth movement between tragedy as 
discourse and tragedy as empirical history appears advantageous for a capacious account of 
tragic experience,87 and moreover seems to be internal to the conceptualization of ‗the tragic‘ 
itself.       
2.2. On Poets and Philosophers 
But if this movement towards the contemplative is already present within tragic drama,, then 
what is one to say about the debate between the poets and philosophers, or, more specifically 
for our purposes, the debate between theology and tragedy? The debate has come to be 
exemplified in concrete terms by Plato‘s expulsion of the poets from the ideal city. But as we 
will see things are not quite so simple as far as Plato is concerned.  
At the outset one can say, against commonplace reductions of his thinking, that Plato‘s 
objections to the poets are only partially based upon the critique of Homeric theology. If this 
was the main concern of his invective, Plato would be hardly different from Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, Pythagoras or even the tragic poets, who all in one way or another expressed 
distaste for an anthropomorphic religion. Plato assumed this as a matter of course, but this is 
not where the weight of his emphasis lies: his deeper problem with poetry is both more subtle 
and more radical. His critique can be summarized as follows: while philosophy is concerned 
with truth, poetry is an imitation (mimesis) of what it sees. Poetry is about ‗appearances‘ 
(doxa), with the ‗look‘ of things rather than the discovery of things-in-themselves. It is variety 
of Sophism because it does not attempt to reflect upon the meaning of ‗the just‘ or ‗the good‘, 
but is content with the ‗opinions‘ (doxa) of the hoi polloi. Much like the Sophists, it makes 
the weaker argument appear stronger through aesthetic embellishment. It does not question 
the perceived world, but imitates, repeats, and represents it. As a consequence, it promotes the 
degradation of society and the self, because in simply being concerned with salubrious or 
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 See Reinhold Bernhardt‗Die Erfahrung des Tragischen als Herausforderung für Theologie. Versuch 
zur Theodizee‘. Theologische Zeitschrift 59 (2003): 248-270 (pp. 258-259). 
86
 Dalferth has spoken of ‗the relativity of evil‘ in the sense that evil is always the perversion of 
something (von etwas) for a particular individuals (für jemanden). For more detail on this argument, 
see Ingolf U. Dalferth, Malum: Theologische Hermeneutik des Bösen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 
86-88. 
87
 I take this distinction from Paul D. Janz and his discussion of Donald MacKinnon in God, the Mind‘s 
Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
171-173. 
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mellifluent presentation, one becomes alienated from truthful awareness. The mimetic 
impulse then, for Plato, does not concern itself with self-introspection, or the moral formation 
of citizens, but rather surrenders us to the complacency of the present order. Its aesthetic is 
finally an anaesthetic, a dulling of moral sensibility. Through imitation, one is distanced from 
ethical personhood, because one aims to imitate ‗the other‘ rather than engage in self-
knowledge (gnōthi seauton). But since any representation of ‗the other‘ remains at the level of 
surfaces, the enterprise is rendered doubly superficial, since one is not concerned with the 
thing-in-itself, that is with ‗truth‘, because ‗truth‘ becomes simply a matter of persuasion and 
aesthetic adornment. ‗Truth‘ is reduced to mere ‗opinion‘. It follows then that even if poets 
give assurance of their afflatus, they are still not concerned with the discovery of truth. They 
remain unable to put forward a reliable procedure whereby truth might be sought. They 
mystify rather than clarify their particular gnosis. And even if they chance upon wisdom, this 
would be through happenstance rather than through a maieutic process. Since it could not be 
followed or taught, it would therefore be unreliable as a paideia. For Plato, ‗poetics‘ – in the 
broadest sense of any aesthetic representation – ultimately encourages laziness of thinking, 
and promulgates enthusiasm at the expense of critical efficacy.88  In conclusion, poetry sits 
lightly on the question of truth, because mimesis, as Plato says, remains ‗far removed from the 
truth‘ (The Republic 598b).89  
But one has to ask: what about Plato‘s conception of ‗tragedy‘ specifically?90 On this there 
are some scattered references throughout Plato‘s texts: Philebus 50b refers to the tragic and 
comedic aspects of life, as they imply a living fluctuation between pain and pleasure, while 
Cratylus 408b-d implies that the tragic is associated with the ‗human‘ side of the god Pan, and 
therefore with falsehood. The implication of this is that tragedy fails to give us veridical 
access to the divinity in its purity, since it locks us into a limited perspective of the material 
world. Then there is a well-known passage in Laws 817b that describes the encounter between 
the city‘s lawmakers and a group of tragic actors, in which the guardians describe their ideal 
as superseding tragic theatre, since they have fashioned the city-state in accordance with ‗the 
finest and noblest life‘, that is, a ‗tragedy‘ which is the ‗best we can create‘. Another 
reference can be found in Phaedo 115a in which Socrates adopts the position of a tragic 
character who is destined with a certain kind of death (in this case, suicide by hemlock). But 
Plato‘s most stringent treatments of tragedy are to be found in The Republic, especially in 
Books II, III, and X. There he makes many of the arguments we have mentioned above; but in 
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addition to the critique of mimesis, one can mention the following, namely: tragedy‘s negative 
portrayal of the gods as the causes of evil (379a-c), its teaching that death is to be feared 
(386a-387c), that the death of loved ones is a loss of paramount scope (387d-388d), and its 
intimation that the just and happy life are not necessarily correlated (392b). The most 
pertinent critique however, as mentioned already, is the tendency for the poets to collapse 
reality into a form of representation. This impacts on the ethos of the city-state, since those 
who imbibe tragic emotions will equate such pathos with truthfulness. Emotions become 
disconnected from rational discernment, because the audience is immured in the lamentation 
that is connected to the experience of death (cf. 605a-d, 606a-b); but this immersion in pity 
and despair shows that we take death too seriously, and human life also. For Plato, however, 
‗human affairs aren‘t worth taking very seriously‘ in themselves (604b-c). Ultimately, the real 
danger of tragedy for Plato, in the words of Stephen Halliwell, is that ‗emotional responses to 
tragedy are the carriers of implicit values and thus hold the potential to generate, or intensify, 
a tragic sense of life‘,91 values which are, in the estimation of Plato, unprofitable for our 
knowledge of the good life. Imitations that are seen and practiced from youth will become a 
part of one‘s nature (395c-d), and Plato worries that tragic theatre does not put forward 
images worth imitating. For him, tragedy corrupts those who are nurtured on its vision, and 
therefore it should be excluded from the ideal city he seeks to construct.  
It is worth mentioning in passing that such a view is opposed to Aristotle‘s appreciation of 
mimesis, and tragedy in particular. As he famously said, tragedy is an ‗imitation of an action 
that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself‘, which in its enactment 
involves ‗incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such 
emotions‘ (Poetics 1449b22-31).92 Aristotle was also more nuanced than Plato as regards 
suffering and happiness, since he allowed that ‗the intermediate kind of personage‘ – a person 
having good and bad traits – could through their hidden ‗fault‘93 endure a tragic ‗discovery‘ 
and ‗reversal‘ of fortunes (1452b31-38; 1452b10-13; 1452a22-b9). For Aristotle, it appears 
that imitation had an instructive and phronetic role for the listeners and readers – even if not 
presented as a spectacle (1453b1-11). For Aristotle, tragedy provides us with a universality 
that transcends the actors, since it is able to show us (in a delimited arrangement) the 
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connections between actions and their outcomes; it thereby acts as a pedagogical measure for 
the young who lack the practical experience that comes with age.94 Thus as regards the moral 
worth of tragic poetry, Aristotle and Plato, it would seem could not appear more different.     
But this is not the whole story: as already seen above, in Book VII of the Laws, Plato 
considers the ideal city-state as the best kind of ‗tragedy‘. This implies that Plato potentially 
works with a looser definition of tragedy that allows for a more positive appreciation of its 
content. It is especially noticeable in Plato‘s modes of argument, which can only be tenuously 
distinguished from theatrical presentations.95 Additionally pertinent is his reference, 
throughout his writings, to various myths and imagery which are essential to his dialogues. To 
be sure, this imagery is bracketed by the claim that the philosopher may return to images only 
after she has grasped the truth that they represent.96 But their usage should nonetheless give us 
pause when it comes to evaluating his ultimate position vis-à-vis the tragic and poetry more 
generally. In addition to this, there also have been several intelligent attempts to read Plato as 
a tragic philosopher: whether this applies to his account of reason, and its inability to 
convince those opposed to it,97 or his understanding of eros as a never-to-be-accomplished 
search for unity.98 One could also mention his account of the philosopher-king who must rule 
in the ideal city, but who is nonetheless condemned to play the dirty and mendacious games 
of politics in order to rule in the present.99 And there is the question of whether tragedy as 
such, with its agonies of moral deliberation, does not already anticipate the dramatic aporias 
that Plato was deeply concerned with – a fact which intimates that Greek tragedy might have 
opened the way for Socratic philosophy.100 Moreover, the suggestion could be made that this 
ambiguity, both in regard to the content and structure of Plato‘s philosophy, is echoed in the 
history of its countervailing receptions.  
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2.3. On Christianity and the Tragic 
Some of these tensions continue to play out in the interpretation of tragedy within 
Christendom; but as we will suggest, their supposed opposition is more of a modern invention 
than intrinsic to the subject matter at hand. A full description of this topic is not possible in 
the space given, and so is here very restricted and eclectic in its scope. But nonetheless, from 
the representative examples given, it appears to be that the interaction of Christian theology to 
tragedy has not followed a linear mode of development. On the one side, there is a critique of 
tragedy that belongs to the wider antipathy towards pagan theatre, as seen in Tertullian, 
Novation, John Chrysostom, and Augustine – a movement that reached its apogee in Puritan 
iconoclasm.101 The decline of theatre in the East and West has been connected by some to the 
dissemination of Christian culture, especially after the reign of Constantine, as seen in the 
marked decrease in theatre construction in the period that succeeded it. However, the 
evidence is ambiguous, and might even reflect changing attitudes towards the theatre among 
pagans themselves.102 Nevertheless, even if there was a special causality between Christianity 
and the decline of theatre, this would apply to all dramatic presentation and not just tragedies.  
Additionally, most patristic, medieval and post-Reformation thinkers did not express an 
especially antagonistic relationship to tragedy. In fact, the most stringent assertions of a 
contradiction between Christianity and the tragic have been made in the modern period, and 
appear to be predicated on a presumed antithesis between the respective metaphysics of 
Christianity and tragedy. It is argued, especially by certain literary critics, that these two 
visions cannot be reconciled. For instance, I. A. Richards has said that ‗The least touch of any 
theology which has a compensating Heaven to offer the tragic hero is fatal‘.103 George Steiner 
has persisted within similar lines when he says that since tragedy is concerned with absolute 
and irremediable loss, and Christianity is about eschatological recovery, their reconciliation 
remains unachievable.104 Karl Jaspers also has concurred insofar as he says that ‗Der 
glaubende Christ anerkennt keine eigentliche Tragik mehr‘,105 a view repeated by D. D. 
Raphael106 and Laurence Michel.107 All of these are significant figures of influence, who have 
in many ways contributed to the perceived irreconcilability of Christian language and the 
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tragic. But in many ways, these modern critics and philosophers are working within a rather 
simplistic characterization that does not account for the complexity of these respective 
traditions, ‗Christianity‘ and ‗the tragic‘. Chief among them is George Steiner, who in many 
ways remains a key pivot within this development. Steiner is particularly interesting because 
he remains theologically literate, and was a close friend of Donald MacKinnon. However, he 
has been seriously criticized for his tendency to essentialise of the tragic, via the cipher of 
‗absolute tragedy‘. For Steiner, ‗absolute tragedy‘ concerns sequences of resolute catastrophe 
and dereliction, events beyond any hope of restoration or amelioration. However, and because 
of this decision, Steiner also ends-up re-reading the canon of tragic literature through this 
lens, and as a result excludes significant examples that do not match up to his standard of the 
absolutely tragic. Here the ‗idea‘ reigns supreme, and diversity is removed through an 
exclusionary focus.     
In more recent times, theologians such as David Bentley Hart and John Milbank have, in a 
more nuanced fashion, expressed a continuing opposition between Christianity and the tragic. 
However, the anti-tragic reading of Christianity is not consistently upheld by all. One can see 
this in the nuanced comparisons given by Terry Eagleton who remains sharply critical of the 
anti-tragic reduction of Christianity and Marxism.108 Moreover, amongst modern theologians, 
there has been a more commodious approach to tragic tropes and metaphors – a fact which is 
undoubtedly connected to a profounder sensitivity to human catastrophe, especially after the 
debaucheries of the twentieth century. In this vein, Christian theology has undergone a 
significant transformation, one in which there is a greater willingness to connect Christianity 
and the tragic can be seen, as is noticeable in several contemporaneous attempts to re-imagine 
the divine as a suffering entity. As regards the influence of tragic themes in modern theology, 
the list is continually expanding.109 One could mention especially also collected volumes such 
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as Christian Theology and Tragedy: Theologians, Tragic Literature, and Tragic Theory 
(2011), edited by Kevin Taylor and Giles Waller,110 and also older volumes such as Christ, 
Ethics and Tragedy: Essays in Honour of Donald MacKinnon (1989), edited by Kenneth 
Surin.111 Here it can be remarked that both of these volumes – and many of the above 
theologians and thinkers too – are deeply influenced by Donald MacKinnon. This indicates 
that he has a central place in the current debate regarding the perceived tensions between 
Christianity and the tragic, and that if one wants to deal with this relation, then MacKinnon 
remains a deeply important and controversial figure – but more on that later.  
However, the appropriation of ‗the tragic‘ within Christianity is not a recent development; 
on the contrary, tragedy has linkages to the Judeo-Christian tradition from early on. And as 
we will see, its reception is more variegated than modern portrayals would imply. To start 
with, scholars have noticed the similarity of biblical stories to tragic narratives, particularly 
within the Deuteronomistic History (Saul, David, etc.), with some even suggesting a reliance 
on Hellenistic sources.112 One also cannot leave out Old Testament examples like Job, 
Lamentations or the Suffering Servant of Deutro-Isaiah, that is, in terms of substantial affinity 
if not actual dependence.113 One can also detect Hellenistic influence in the earliest sample we 
have of Jewish playwriting: the Exagōgē by Ezekiel the Tragedian (dated in the second 
century BCE), and of which only fragments have survived in Eusebius, Clement of 
Alexandria and Pseudo-Eustathius.114 Entering the Christian epoch, however, we discover a 
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panoply of receptions worth detailing.115 It should be admitted, by way of contextualization, 
that the Latin Fathers did not have much first-hand knowledge of tragedy: most of what they 
referenced were commonplace ideas regarding the genre, and was not by-and-large the result 
of an encounter with the Greek texts themselves (though there are significant exceptions, as 
with ninth century Irish scholar Sedulius Scotus). The exposure they did have, especially in 
medieval times, was due to the revival of Seneca and not primarily Aeschylus, Sophocles or 
Euripides. Such was not a new problem, since already in the fourth century BCE – as can be 
already seen in Aristotle‘s Poetics – there is a significant amount of historical uncertainty 
regarding the origins of tragedy and its ideal form of production. This obscurity constitutes 
one explanation for the diversity of responses to the tragic genre, and theatre more generally. 
Another factor is the perceived detrimental influence of theatre on society: much like Plato, 
austere individuals such as Tertullian and Augustine were perturbed about the societal effects 
of tragic drama. The huge majority of negative references to tragedy within the early church 
stem from this trajectory – especially Tertullian and those who continued to reference him 
(e.g. Lactantius). Tertullian‘s contributions, which are the most vociferous within ancient 
Christianity, were shaped by theatre‘s connections to pagan rituals, and were thus primarily 
motivated by its affiliation to idolatry, and its provocation of base emotions. Augustine‘s 
influential aversion to theatre was tied to its assumed connection to deception, as seen in his 
commentary on the ‗Sermon on the Mount‘, where he equates thespianism with hypocrisy 
(hypocrita). But while these strains of interpretation were influential – as can be seen in the 
way such writings were co-opted after the Reformation – they certainly were not the only 
readings offered by ancient and medieval Christianity. Moreover, these critiques are directed 
at ancient drama in toto, and not simply tragic drama; they would have had just as much 
aversion to comedies, satyr-interludes or childhood pantomimes.    
Overall, the Christian usage of tragic themes is either neutral or positive in its 
appropriation. Byzantine writers (e.g. Cassiodorus) could argue that theologians (such as the 
Cappadocians) had imitated or quoted Greek poetry and tragedy in their writings, and others 
like Ambrose of Milan had also made favourable comparisons between the Psalmist and the 
lyric of Attic tragedy (Bede made similar concessions regarding the Canticles). Beyond 
literary conceits, however, there are appropriations which sought to apply tragedy to actual 
historical events: people such as Fréculf and Rupert of Deutz described the history of the 
Jews in tragic terms– especially the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE as recounted by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ezekiel‘s Exagoge: Tragedy, Sacrificial Ritual, and the Midrashic Tradition‘. Greek, Roman, and 
Byzantine Studies 48 (2008): 393–415.  
115
 For most of what follows, see Carol Symes, ‗The Tragedy of the Middle Ages,‘ in Beyond the Fifth 
Century, 335-369. Also cf. Henry Ansgar Kelly, Ideas and Forms of Tragedy from Aristotle to the 
Middle Ages. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1993), 23-27, for some of the examples given.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
Josephus.116 The beheading of John the Baptist, and the bacchanal surrounding his execution, 
is categorized in Euripidean imagery by Peter Chrysologus and Paschasius Radbertus. The 
poet Prudentius once described the martyrdom of St. Romanus as a ‗tragedy‘, and Boethius 
(even more significantly) called the incarnation a ‗tanta tragoedia‘ – a term which certainly 
alludes to the reversal of Christ‘s fortuna. One can also find examples where war, and 
especially internecine conflict (national or otherwise), is described in the language of 
‗tragedy‘ (e.g. Peter the Deacon and Williams of Malmesbury). This is idiom was eventually 
translated into an ecclesial context, as seen in the way that ‗the tragic‘ was used to describe 
church schisms, here exemplified by Irenaeus‘s lost treatise on the Nestorian crisis (which 
was entitled ‗Tragoidia‘). This trend is continued in several church fathers: here ‗tragedy‘ is 
equated with the schismatic crises of the church, as seen in some letters of Pope Leo I and 
Pope Gelasius I. Such a  trajectory is also noticeable, more problematically, in the anti-Judaic 
tractates of this period, where the ‗heresies‘ of the Jews are subjected to critical scorn by 
Christian teachers, and are described as ‗tragedies‘.  
What these references confirm is that already from early on Christian teachers were able to 
use the language of ‗the tragic‘ in more expansive terms than is often realized. However, this 
is not the end: there were some significant liturgical and sacramental deployments within a 
couple of medieval thinkers which are particularly striking as well: Aribo Scholasticus could 
compare ‗harmonious‘ and ‗inharmonious‘ music with ‗tragedy‘ and ‗comedy‘ respectively, 
and even more suggestive is that writers (e.g. Sicard of Cremona) could compare the liturgical 
order of service to the structure of Greek drama, in which each of the various clergy occupied 
a role in a ecclesial theatre. Peter of Blois argued that stories of tragic misfortune could 
actually inspire repentance and self-examination among penitents, and that tragedy could 
have a transformational effect on its audience. A remarkable text is also found in Gemma 
animae of Honorius Augustodunensis where he seeks to conceptualize the Catholic Mass as a 
‗tragedy‘ in which the participants, through ritual signs, postures and utterances, are invited to 
repeat the narrative of Christ‘s suffering in the present. Domenico Pietropaolo even argues 
that the Mass, after Honorius, could be read as providing the ontological rationale for 
Christian tragedy, constituting a ‗sacramental catharsis‘ for participants within the drama of 
the Eucharist..117 Finally, it would be remiss not to mention here the ‗Christos Paschōn‘ 
(Ξριζηός πάζτφν) or ‗Christus Patiens,‘ (originally attributed to Gregory Nazianzus, but now 
dated to the eleventh or twelfth century) which re-imagines the story of Pentheus in the 
language of Christian sacramentality, with the severed body of the tragic hero now being 
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replaced with a crucified and sacramental body. It is certainly this theatrical aspect of 
Christian liturgy which inspired the mystery and passion plays of later periods. After the 
Reformation, it was Philipp Melanchthon, in his Corhortatio (1545) who– after drawing upon 
the revived interest in the Poetics after the publication of Alessandro Pazzi‘s translation 
(1536) – promulgated an Aristotelian and Christianized reading of tragedy with the aim of 
asserting a moral symmetry between actions and consequences.118  These examples drawn 
from the history of the Christian church, while certainly not comprehensive in scope, give an 
indication of the complexity of reception.     
In light of these appropriations, the question needs to be asked: why the perceived tension 
between Christianity and tragedy? If our previous narrative has demonstrated anything it is 
that Christianity has provided a diversity of strategies in appropriating or rejecting the tragic, 
and that there is not one method of appropriating it. What this suggests is that a projection of 
a supposed tension between Christianity and the tragic could be a largely modern invention 
that is not connected to the substance of the tradition. Then again, it might not resolve the 
problem completely. One would still need to address the claims of those theorists who assert 
incompatibility, precisely because there might substantive issues raised that were not noticed 
by earlier generations. For example: are these visions contradictory because Christianity 
imagines happy endings while tragedy only disastrous ones? Or does it lie within the different 
religious perspectives that characterize Greek religion and Judeo-Christianity respectively? Or 
can one say that the conflicts only lie between a specific kind of Christianity and particular 
sorts of tragedy?  
Of these questions, it is the last possibility that appears the most penetrating. That is 
because conclusions about whether there is any conflict will imply a judgement that is 
generally informed but also context-specific, one that is related to particular tensions or 
contradictions that arise within their juxtaposition. If one speaks about ‗Christianity‘ or 
‗tragedy‘ in general, one is bound to a level of abstractness that is not helpful for making 
adjudications. It depends on what Christianity of which you are speaking of, and which 
tragedy you are referring to. If someone, for instance, proposes a mode of confident or 
triumphalist religion, then one could conclude that this will sit rather uneasily with the tragic. 
Similarly, if one proposes that tragedy qua tragedy is about unmitigated disaster, then this 
will not cohere with Christianity as traditionally understood. But if one relaxes these 
extremes, can one conclude that the contradictions remain. Possibly not, but that does not 
necessarily resolve the tensions completely, because even if one could put forward an account 
of tragedy that was more congenial to Christian assumptions, or put forward a less 
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triumphalist account, one still might not have not addressed other concerns – as can be seen in 
the contributions of David Bentley Hart and John Milbank, who will be discussed in Chapter 
3.    
We can exemplify this in the following way: it appears that some modern theologians who 
incorporate tragedy within theology are able to do so with greater alacrity because they have 
problems with traditional accounts of divine aseity and transcendence, insofar as they allow 
suffering to enter the Godhead (e.g. Balthasar, MacKinnon, Bulgakov, etc.). Within this 
theological stream, others take a leap and describe the trinity ad intra as an eternal tragedy of 
suffering love, initiated through a temporalisation of divinity within the cross and resurrection 
of Christ. This move necessitates a transcription of dramatic categories – of alienation and 
reconciliation – onto the divine life as such (e.g. Moltmann), which means that they are more 
open to the idea that God is subject to change and contingencies, in distinction from the 
‗apathetic‘ God of so-called ‗classical theism‘.119 Such amenability implies a connection 
between the doctrine of God‘s transcendence, and one‘s willingness or not to absorb ‗the 
tragic‘. This is so because if tragedy is concerned with historicity and suffering, then it 
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 I am aware that ‗classical theism‘ is a pejorative term in modern theology and that it has been 
heavily chided in recent times (e.g. Eberhard Jüngel, John Caputo, Richard Kearney, Jean-Luc Marion, 
etc.). I am not sure always however what it actually refers to, since the reference often shifts. Is one 
referring to the entire metaphysical (or ‗ontotheological‘) tradition that has now, supposedly, been 
discarded by post-Heideggerian thought? If this is the case, then it has flaws as regards to historical 
genealogy (as we have suggested earlier). To take one example: one could query whether the priority of 
‗possibility‘ over ‗actuality‘ (endorsed by Jüngel, Caputo, Kearney) is not itself a continuation of 
modern metaphysics since Scotus and Suárez. Strictly-speaking, it is this tradition which is the most 
‗ontotheological‘ and ‗metaphysical‘ of them all (as Marion confirms). On top of this, one could 
suggest that the ‗omni-God‘ of absolute power, which they reject, has more affinity for the nominalist 
conceptions of potentia absoluta than the God of the classical tradition. Similar criticisms have been 
directed towards Kearney by William Desmond (see William Desmond, ‗Maybe, Maybe Not: Richard 
Kearney and God,‘ in John Panteleimon Manoussakis (ed.), After God: Richard Kearney and the 
Religious Turn In Continental Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 55-77). 
However, it can be said Marion should not be placed within the same trajectory. But even his more 
nuanced approach appears not to appreciate the complexity of early Christian thought, especially as 
regards its analogical re-conception of ‗being‘, insofar as it resisted modelling the divine ‗being‘ after 
finite causality. This has been pointed out by David Bentley Hart, John Milbank and Rowan Williams.   
But returning to Caputo, Jüngel, and Kearney once more, it appears that they might have slightly 
different foci in relation to ‗classical theism‘. For his part, Jüngel continues a Lutheran-Barthian 
opposition to ‗metaphysics‘ in general, and Aristotle in particular. Moreover, he is critical of Thomism 
insofar as it proposes an overly-negative account of divinity, one that excludes any cognoscibility and 
speakability of the divine nature. However, one should point out Rudi Te Velde‘s excellent monograph 
entitled Aquinas on God: The ‗Divine Science‘ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot and Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2006), which argues that Thomas escapes a ‗classical theism‘ of this kind. As regards 
Kearney and Caputo, one wonders (as Fergus Kerr suggests) whether their proposals are not largely a 
poetically-inclined reaction to the ‗neo-scholastic apologetics‘ of manual Thomism (See Fergus Kerr, 
‗Book Review: Reimagining the Sacred: Richard Kearney Debates God, edited by Richard Kearney 
and Jens Zimmermann (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016).‘ Modern Theology 33.2 
(2017): 325-327). But if this is so, what does one make of the ressourcement tradition of nouvelle 
théologie (Lubac, Balthasar, Ratzinger, etc.) which is also opposed to Baroque neo-Thomism insofar as 
it constituted, for them, a departure from the classical and patristic vision? One could suggest then that 
if by ‗classical theism‘ one is referring to the dry and rationalistic traditions of the neo-scholastics, then 
one is referring not to the ‗classical‘ or ‗Thomistic‘ tradition, but rather to an early modern 
development.        
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follows that if God is ontologically implicated in these dynamics, then one has less anxiety 
about the problem of tensions. However, if one is predisposed to a more orthodox accounts of 
divine aseity (e.g. David Bentley Hart, John Milbank), then there does seem to be a 
corresponding suspicion that incorporating ‗the tragic‘ or a ‗tragic theology‘ into Christianity 
will lead to doctrinal aporias. But this is not a complete picture since there are still other 
thinkers, who also assume God‘s aseity, but who remain nonetheless more open to the 
insights that ‗tragedy‘ might provide (e.g. Graham Ward, Rowan Williams, etc.). The fact that 
these latter thinkers are more disposed to accept tragedy as a theological trope implies that a 
more classical rendering of God might not be opposed to such a procedure. But if this is the 
case, where does the problem lie then? Without being reductionist, it seems that the central 
problematic might not just be an abstract problem, but much like Plato‘s Socrates, is also 
centred on a figure. That figure, we would suggest, is Donald MacKinnon, a thinker who has 
served (over several decades) as the catalyst in the discussion of tragedy and transcendence 
within the contemporary theological scene. In other words, it appears that this debate is not 
simply focused on conceptual tensions that have arisen in recent times, but that they are 
concretized (at least for modern theology) within the reception of a specific person.    
Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994) was a Christian philosopher who had a seminal impact on 
British academia in the latter half of the twentieth century. Already then, theologians, 
philosophers, playwrights, and intellectuals absorbed his teaching, many of whom went on to 
have a significant impact on the intellectual culture of the British Isles. Some of these include 
heavyweights such as Philippa Foot, Mary Midgely and Iris Murdoch, the playwright Tom 
Stoppard, the literary critic George Steiner, and, more pertinently for our immediate purposes, 
theologians such as Fergus Kerr, Nicholas Lash, and Rowan Williams. MacKinnon also had a 
seminal impact more generally, and has been credited with reversing the tide of British 
theology against the liberalism of 1960‘s towards a more intellectually robust and subtle 
defence of theological orthodoxy.120 This trajectory can be further seen in other theological 
movements such as Radical Orthodoxy, which in many ways trace their lineage to the 
influence of MacKinnon at Cambridge. Central figures such as John Milbank and Graham 
Ward have admitted this as much.121 But one could ask: why should MacKinnon have a 
centrality in this discussion? Firstly, he was a thinker who, by all accounts, has had the 
greatest impact in the revived interrelation of tragedy and theology. It was a question which 
he was intensely engaged with, as his academic output will show. Furthermore, even beyond 
his students, his influence on this question is wide-spread, as can be seen in his reiterating 
                                                          
120
 On this see, Rowan Williams, ‗John A. T. Robinson (1919-1983): Honest to God and the 1960s,‘ in 
Anglican Identities (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2004), 103-120.  
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 Cf. Danie Goosen and  Jaco Kruger, Radical Orthodoxy – Panel Discussion between Profs Graham 
Ward, John Milbank, Danie Goosen and Dr Jaco Kruger‘. Acta Theologica, Supplementum 25 (2017): 
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presence within volumes such as Theology and Tragedy: Theologians, Tragic Literature, and 
Tragic Theory – never mind the books and research dissertations that have been written on 
similar themes. Secondly, MacKinnon broadened the question of ‗the tragic‘ to include not 
only tragedy as a literary genre, but also the larger questions of time and historicity and their 
bearing on moral deliberation, seeking to show the connection of the tragic to the questions of 
life. Thirdly, his teaching had an influence not only on the orthodoxy of his students, but also 
on their reception of tragic themes. It is not coincidental that it is from these thinkers – all 
with links to Cambridge – that some of the most intelligent defences and critiques of ‗tragic 
theology‘ have arisen. Rowan Williams‘s influence on John Milbank is well-known – more 
generally but also on the question of the tragic – and Milbank in turn has had a significant 
influence on David Bentley Hart, who both spent significant periods at the universities of 
Cambridge and Virginia. It is particularly the latter two thinkers who have provided the most 
trenchant responses to his influence as regarding the tragic. Therefore, since MacKinnon has 
had such a central place within these debates, one concludes that he should serve as a lodestar 
in our discussion.  
But the question remains: what is the substance behind their differing responses? Why is it 
that theologians who are very similar in many other regards, come to different conclusions 
regarding ‗the tragic‘, and ultimately the reception of MacKinnon‘s work itself? And if these 
differences are significant, can they be ameliorated? Admittedly, some questions have already 
been addressed by Rowan Williams in The Tragic Imagination (2016) for example. But it is 
arguable that Williams, while dealing with many of the significant areas of conflict (as put 
forward by Steiner, Milbank and Hart) does not deal with all of their substantial 
disagreements. This is where our present study tries to make a contribution. As will be shown, 
continuing disagreements, which Williams as such does not address, occur within the 
following areas, namely, (1) the arena of metaphysics, especially as it relates to transcendent 
being and historicity, (2) the question of genealogy, as it relates to the impact of Kantianism 
on the reception of tragic themes (and its impact in turn on MacKinnon himself), and (3) its 
connection to politics, especially as regards the impact of ontological pessimism on socio-
political arrangements. All of these tendencies, I will argue, are related to the configuration of 
transcendence, specifically as regards transcendent goodness and aseity. With this in mind, 
the central question of this study can be posed again: within the modern theological context 
and debate, can one reconcile a classical account of infinite and transcendent goodness– as 
put forward by Hart, Milbank and Williams – with the insights of the tragic? This problem 
raises the question of coherency, with all its intellectual, doctrinal and spiritual overtones. Or 
more specifically: what kind of Christian metaphysics provides the greatest level of cogency 
in relation to questions of transcendence, without repressing the difficulties that the tragic 
exposes. It is to these questions that we turn to in the next chapter.   
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In this chapter, we suggested that a supposed opposition between Christian theology and 
the tragic does not have a deep history within the tradition; rather, the reception of the tragic 
is more diverse and complicated than a homogenous narrative allows. Our argument was both 
conceptual and historical: it tried to ask where the node of the contention really lies, with the 
aim of reaching our research question. Our query, broadly-speaking, is concerned with the 
relationship between classical Christianity and the tragic, and as we will see shortly, how this 
is centred on the problem of transcendence. But at this stage, our method was more probing, 
asking where and why perceptions of conflict might have arisen. To do this we began the 
chapter by discussing tragedy itself, as well as the debate between Plato and the poets. There I 
suggested that the tensions, while not without substance, are not immune to deconstruction 
both from within tragedy and Plato himself. As we saw, tragedy is not opposed to philosophy 
and Platonism is not irreconcilable with tragedy. Moreover, even though Platonism did 
influence some early Christian rejections of ancient drama, it was not decisive in its impact 
throughout. This raises the question once more of where the real tensions lie in the debate. 
Here we wagered that the tensions, specifically as regard classical Christianity and the tragic, 
might be more recent than ancient in origin. We suggested that such assertions of 
contradiction might be traceable to tendencies within literary criticism, which has sometimes 
espoused a more strenuous opposition between Christian theology and tragedy. In this light, 
we mentioned John Milbank and David Bentley Hart as being possible inheritors of this 
recent trajectory. It was in this setting that we introduced Donald MacKinnon, and the 
importance he has had in the debate regarding the theology and the tragic, here specifically as 
regards the question of transcendence. But at this stage, many of these questions have been 
left open-ended and await development within the chapters to follow.      
But one question seems especially pertinent at the moment: what do I mean by a classical 
account of ‗transcendence‘?  In the next chapter, I hope to provide some answers with the aim 
of showing their connection to the research question. I also hope to render lucid some of the 
interconnections between ‗transcendence‘ and ‗the tragic‘, with purpose of deepening our 
thesis that the supposed abrasiveness between classical metaphysics and the tragic has been 
strengthened by modern developments.       
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Chapter 3 
Tragedy and Transcendence: 
A Quest for Coherency 
 
This chapter aims to lay bare some of the theological assumptions which will be advanced in 
this study. As was intimated previously, it appears that claims of an incompatibility between 
‗Christianity‘ vis-à-vis ‗the tragic‘ depends upon how one substantiates those terms. There it 
was wagered that the assertion of contradiction might be a more recent phenomenon in 
intellectual history, bound up with proximate trends in the recent past. However, the reason 
for this development was only hinted at: on the one hand, the opposition between Christianity 
and the tragic was exacerbated by some literary critics who might be working with a rather 
jaundiced conception of Christian theology – which is illuminated when one compares their 
swift juxtapositions with the more elaborate comparisons of Terry Eagleton.122 But on the 
other hand, this admission did not resolve the issue completely, because some modern 
theologians – who are fully apprised of Christianity‘s complexity – still remain adamant that 
irreconcilable tensions persist. Exemplary of this trend are David Bentley Hart and John 
Milbank. Our suggestion as to why this is so was sought within their continued commitment 
to a classical metaphysics and Christian orthodoxy, with a particular regard for their espousals 
of aseity and transcendence. Of course, these suggestions are only anticipations of a more 
complete exposition of their work, and the tensions these might create when compared with a 
more tragically-slanted theology. Because of this, conclusions cannot be asserted as of yet. 
However, what can be stated here at the outset is that I remain in agreement with many of the 
concerns of these authors, more generally, including what is to my mind their nuanced 
repetition of a classically-informed metaphysics. I am persuaded that Hart and Milbank are 
neither pious reactionaries nor practitioners of fusty mystification, but thoughtful exponents 
of a renewed orthodoxy within our so-called ‗postmodern‘ epoch. Because of this, I assume a 
significant amount of their insights, as will be seen in the developing argument. However, 
there are some clear disagreements on my part, especially (as we shall see) as regards the 
applicability of tragic themes to Christian orthodoxy. It will become apparent in what is to 
follow that I have a great sympathy for the account of Donald MacKinnon as this has been 
critically supplemented by the scholarship of Rowan Williams. Both of these thinkers, within 
differing degrees of acceptance, show adherence to a more classical ‗orthodoxy‘ while at the 
same time remain deeply informed by the insights of ‗the tragic. But what are my 
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assumptions regarding that loaded term ‗classical metaphysics‘, especially as regards the 
problem of transcendence? And why is there a continuing perception that Christianity and the 
tragic are finally conflictive?  In this chapter, I seek clarity regarding the terminology of 
‗transcendence‘, here with the assistance of Rowan Williams and John Webster. I outline how 
this tradition has construed the metaphysics of transcendence, with the aim of articulating, 
against misconstructions, what it really affirms and what it does not. Such remains important 
for ‗coherency‘ and sense-making, since systematic theology remains implicitly committed to 
the idea of an ultimately rational order, one that is predicated on the unity and simplicity of 
divine action. But since it is this classical tradition in particular which has expressed a marked 
tension regarding tragedy and theology in recent times, it is important to analyse why these 
tensions have arisen, with the purpose of asking whether they can be ameliorated. This 
tension can be most clearly seen in three trends that have developed in the modern 
deployment of ‗the tragic‘, all of which have a connection to the ontological topology of 
transcendence, namely: the post-Kantian sublime, the idea of a suffering God, and a rejection 
of the privatio boni.  
  
3.1. On Divine Transcendence and Aseity   
 
My purpose is not to give a comprehensive treatment of divine aseity. Rather, it is attuned to 
whether a reading of God‘s transcendent goodness is suitably pared with the negativity of the 
tragic, that is, with the way that tragedy challenges and even undermines overly-harmonious 
perspectives of order within the cosmos. Here already, the demand of ‗coherency‘ becomes 
stringent, as will become recognizable shortly. But it is worthwhile at the outset to establish 
the doctrinal contours of a classical account of divine transcendence, so that we may have 
clarity on what we are speaking about. At the outset, it should be said that ‗transcendence‘ has 
several valences which need to be clarified, and which are by no means univocal, especially 
between diverse epistemic regimes (e.g. literature, religion, philosophy, psychology, 
aesthetics, etc.).123 In our own register, one could say that ‗transcendence‘ has to do with what 
is non-negotiable or intractable within experience, with those events that arrest and carry us 
beyond ourselves; or by adopting Karl Jasper‘s terms, we say that ‗transcendence‘ pertains to 
our encounters with liminality and limit-situations.124 However, a lexicon of ‗transcendence‘ 
also presupposes that we speak of ‗immanence‘, since we cannot understand ‗transcendence‘ 
without grasping what it is transcendent to. Moreover, these concepts are asymmetric because 
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it is firstly ‗transcendence‘ that allows us to understand the distinction initially, and is what 
gives ‗immanence‘ its sense of being derived from something. This means that immanence-
as-such remains semantically undecipherable apart from its connection to transcendence. This 
distinction is a useful one, but some more are required: since all projections of transcendence 
remain within the immanent, one needs to make a distinction not only between the 
transcendent-as-such (e.g. the Absolute, the One, God, etc.) and immanent-as-such (e.g. the 
cosmos, created beings, history etc.), but one must also distinguish between the transcendent 
and immanent as it appears within the immanent-as-such. Ingolf Dalferth has framed this 
distinction as absolute and relative forms of transcendence.125 Absolute transcendence speaks 
to those realities that exist independently from relative transcendence, those apart from which 
no immanence could be postulated (e.g. God, the Unmoved Mover, etc.). Relative 
transcendence encapsulates those moments of transcending within the immanent world, as 
seen paradigmatically within religious practices, moments of self-transcendence or rituals of 
transition (e.g. conversion, rites de passages, falling in love, etc.). Such transitions occur in 
the movement between events of anticipation and events of transformation, those passages 
between ignorance and knowledge. Self-transcendence is relative because regardless of the 
magnitude of elevation, it always remains within immanence. This is not to say that relative 
transcendence is incapable of intimating absolute transcendence, but rather that its speculative 
grasp is always non-absolute.126  
The above clarifications should help us, but we should register its complications – not only 
for the sake of accuracy but because it also anticipates some themes that will be engaged later. 
These complications relate to the contrastive dualism that is presupposed in transcendence-
immanence language. The first concern is that, genealogically-speaking, ‗immanence‘ has its 
first occurrence in Diderot‘s Encyclopédie.127 This rather late occurrence should give pause 
before we impose such language on older traditions. Such a suspicion is deepened further 
when we realize that the earliest definition of the transcendence-immanence duality is found 
in Immanuel Kant, namely in his Critique of Pure Reason. There his treatment of this duality, 
within the ‗Transcendental Dialectic‘, served to delimit the metaphysical reach of the rational 
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powers. Kant‘s transcendentalism had a seminal impact on this usage within German Idealism 
and in the so-called Pantheismusstreit– a trajectory that found its way into the interpretation 
of ancient philosophy and early Christianity. This schematic was certainly creative, and 
instituted a significant amount of original thinking and research. But one cannot avoid the 
conclusion that this paradigm, in retrospect, also led to a misreading of ancient categories of 
thought, especially as regards modernity‘s secularizing division between the immanent and 
the transcendent.  
The second concern is an explicitly theological one: the grammar of aseity is misconstrued 
within a dualistic or conflictive approach, as has been argued by John Webster and Rowan 
Williams.128 Webster distances a more traditional account of divine aseity from an approach 
that establishes content through a contrast with contingency.129 He reckons, here following the 
principle of Deus non est in genere, that the ‗theological usage [of] aseity is not primarily a 
comparative or contrastive concept‘, since ‗the content of the term cannot be determined 
simply by analysis of the difference between God and contingent creatures‘.130 On the 
contrary, the doctrine of aseity references ‗the glory and plenitude of the life of the Holy 
Trinity in its self-existent and self-moving originality‘, as well as ‗its underived fullness‘. It is 
this plenitude which ‗constitute[s] the ground of his self-communication‘.131 Such grammar is 
obscured when aseitas becomes about whether ‗contingent reality is to be secured by a 
ground of existence beyond itself‘. On this model, aseity is ‗inseparably attached to, and 
expounded in terms of, the contingency of the world‘, leading to a ‗curious irony‘ in that the 
‗divine self-existence itself becomes a derivative concept‘.132 With this move, the language of 
aseity appears less a matter of doxological affirmation, and is instead reduced to a functional 
causality (such as Descartes‘s causa sui, that bête noire of Heideggerian genealogy). Here, 
divinity is understood in ‗largely nonagential and nonpersonal‘ terms‘133, becoming ‗detached 
from the theological metaphysics of God‘s immanent and economic love‘, and is ‗reduced to 
the bare self-positing cause of created reality.‘134 In contrast to this, Webster argues that it is 
                                                          
128
 To put it simplistically: in these two essays, Webster focuses more on the trinity while Williams 
more on divine oneness. Neither is to the exclusion of the other, but is simply a question of emphasis.  
129
 John Webster, ‗Life in and of Himself: Reflections on God‘s Aseity,‘ in Bruce L. McCormack (ed.), 
Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives (Grand Rapids and Edinburgh: 
Baker Academic and Rutherford House, 2008), 107-124.  
130
 Ibid., 108.  
131
 Ibid., 107-108.  
132
 Ibid., 110. It is for this reason that Webster is critical of the language of God as causa sui and ens 
necessarium (pp. 117-119) – the causa sui because it implies a notion of temporal causation, a 
postulated ‗before‘ which preceded actualization, which obviously creates problems for any affirmation 
of divine eternity or immutability – the ens necessarium because it remains too entwined with a 
contrastive and functional approach, since the language of ‗necessity‘ always implies a necessity for 
something. On this point, Ebehard Jüngel‘s statement that God is ‗more than necessary‘ most certainly 
lies in the background.  
133
 Ibid., 111.  
134
 Ibid., 113.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
the divinity‘s ‗triune character‘ that is ‗the distinguishing feature of the Christian confession 
of God‘s aseity‘: ‗God a se is the perfection of paternity, filiation, and spiration in which he is 
indissolubly from, for, and in himself and out of which he bestows himself as the Lord, 
Saviour, and partner of his creature‘.135 In this light, the trinitarian structure of aseity can be 
concisely expressed in this way: ‗God is from himself, and from himself God gives 
himself…Aseity is life: God‘s life from and therefore in himself‘.136 
Nonetheless, some further distinctions need to be made: while we must speak of ‗the aseity 
common to all three persons by virtue of their sharing in the divine essence‘, as regards aseity 
as a ‗personal property‘, this belongs only to the Father: ‗although all the persons of the 
Trinity are a se according to essence, the Father alone is a se according to person‘.137 What 
Webster means is that while the Son is ‗eternally begotten of the Father‘, he is not ‗as Son, a 
se, since he does not share the Fathers property of being anarchon‘. But Webster quickly adds 
that this ‗does not entail that the Son is in some manner subsequent to or inferior to the 
Father‘, because ‗The Son‘s generation is eternal‘ and ‗not a ―coming-to-be‖ as the Father‘s 
creature but a relation which is constitutive of the divine essence and the identity of Father as 
well as of the Son‘.138 Conceptualizing triune relations so implies that there is no distinction 
between God‘s eternal self-distinction and eternal self-giving in se and his existence as being 
a se.139 And it is this distinction ad intra which is the ontological basis for the divine mission 
ad extra, since ‗the life which the Son receives and has in himself is that which he in turn 
bestows upon creatures…if aseity differentiates the divine Son from creatures, it is also at the 
same time the ground of his saving gift‘.140. So while not collapsing the economic into the 
immanent trinity, Webster holds these movements together: ‗God‘s aseity, although it marks 
God‘s utter difference from creatures, does not entail isolation, for what God is and has of 
himself is life and this life includes a self-willed movement of love‘.141 
Rowan Williams‘s reflections are framed by an awareness of the ‗impatience‘ surrounding 
language of divine oneness and aseity.142 For this stream, an orthodox conceptualization of 
divine unity imagines God as ‗a solitary transcendent individual‘ within an ‗abstract theism‘. 
This schema, so the story goes, promotes a ‗thinking of the unity of the divine nature … as 
giving a kind of priority to some reality lying behind the concrete relationality of God to God 
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as Trinity‘.143 In this light, feminist and process theologians have advocated ‗a more 
obviously immanentist account‘ of a divinity who acts as ‗an endlessly resourceful manager 
of suffering and change‘.144 But Williams wonders whether these tendencies have internalized 
the implications of their revisions, and he also doubts whether these count as accurate 
readings of the tradition. He asserts that the classical rendering of transcendent being, on the 
contrary, has included many of the concerns which its critics raise. Moreover, Williams is 
also not insensitive to how the language of ‗being‘ invokes controversial resonances within 
‗the politics of discourse‘.145 Nonetheless, he asserts that the postmodern rejection of 
metaphysics capitulates even more blatantly to these temptations, especially as regards the 
question of power. In the name of rejecting hierarchical models of deity,146 they have left the 
dynamics of power intact, rather than undermining their premises.  
Now advocates of the revisionist model claim that they have the Bible on their side, which 
appears to portray God has having anthropomorphic traits. Williams does not respond to these 
claims extensively in this essay (though Thomas Weinandy does in a monograph referenced 
by him147). He does nonetheless engage with the scriptural tradition: for instance, he argues 
that the Old Testament portrays a God whose ‗claims on the human community are not the 
claims of a divine monarch to worship only, but are identical with the claims of justice 
between human agents and strangers‘.148 This is because ‗God is not an object competing for 
attention‘, since ‗to know God is to be involved in the entire range of actions specified by 
law‘, as exemplified in the way in which the knowledge of God is paralleled to Israel‘s 
commitment to compassion (hesed). For Israel, there is no religious sector cordoned off from 
the rest of its life: one‘s cultic dedication to YHWH is inseparable from the enactment of 
reciprocity. God‘s being is not a thing amongst others, but is that which gives meaning to the 
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whole: ‗God‘s relation to the chosen community is thus not an element in the community‘s 
life…it is the constitutive fact for there being a community at all‘.149 The implication to be 
drawn from this is that ‗divine life can‘t be discussed in the terms in which we speak of finite 
activity, as a contingent and interdependent reality‘.150 It was for this reason that early 
Christianity (drawing on Platonic categories) spoke of God as ‗beyond being‘, insofar as 
‗God‘s nature‘ was ‗characterised primarily by the stripping away of the attributes of 
contingent agency‘. This was done because ‗Action, for the agent within the universe, is 
always bound up with response, passivity as well as initiative‘.151 The same could not be said 
for God. As regards the New Testament, and especially Pauline language of the weakness of 
the cross, he thinks that the identification of God with suffering tends to obviate the rhetorical 
overtones of Paul‘s texts.   
 
Paul‘s language is professedly a way of asking where we might expect to discern God 
in the world‘s experience, and displaying how God‘s actual presence upsets those 
expectations. To read it as endorsing a projection onto God of the vulnerability of 
subjects in the world is, ironically, to remove the upset by removing the paradox. If 
God as such is vulnerable in the sense that we are, God becomes a case of contingent 
passibility and discerning God in the cross of Jesus or in the action of grace in the 
poor, the voiceless, the failed and the spiritually incompetent is no longer surprising. 
What has been changed by the emancipatory move in theology is the locus of power 
and of suffering, not the nature of power relations themselves.152 
 
For ancient Christians and theologians, God does not appear in the world as an item amongst 
others, but is rather the personal act of being that gives existence to all things. God is not-
other to finite beings, but exists beyond all relativized difference – a point summarized by 
Nicholas of Cusa‘s non aliud, and contemporized by Michel de Certeau. According to 
Williams, Certeau managed to re-envisage the language of transcendence within the context 
of secularity. He does this through the concept of heterology, which describes a theological 
discourse that would ‗not describe a set of independent things‘, but would offer ‗an 
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‗equivocal‘ account of their significance – or, more accurately, of their reality.‘ Theology 
would no longer then focus on what remains ‗hidden‘ within the discourses it encounters, but 
on what remains ‗un-said‘.153 Williams argues that Certeau‘s account of Christianity – in 
which the absent body of Christ who opens up a multiplicity of responses – remains non-
competitive in its relation to other knowledge-regimes.154 To assert Christian difference does 
not mean that religious practice is defined over-against other human practices: rather, ‗it 
allows what religious discourse purports to be about‘, namely, a ‗place at the source of 
communicative action‘ which should avoid ‗any battle to secure a place among other places 
for ‗the religious‘‘.155 For Williams, a Christianized heterology serves as a cultural 
‗transcription‘ of Aquinas‘s doctrine of God‘s Being as ‗pure act‘‘ (actus purus).156  
 
Divine action can be ‗pure‘ only if it is in no sense in ‗negotiation‘ with specific 
agencies. And so far from this leaving us with a God uninvolved in creation‘s life –as 
the polemic of revisionist theologies so often suggests – this allows some grasp of 
what is being claimed in saying that God is ‗pure‘ giver (and therefore that any talk of 
God‘s favour or grace or goodwill must be a way of honouring the primacy of God‘s 
action rather than a drama of seeking and winning a desired reaction).157 
 
The idea of God-as-pure-act is an alternative to the theological revisionism of modernity, in 
which God is paralleled to finite agency, because if God changes or suffers, then we have to 
concede ‗that there are agents or agencies that are strictly external to the agency of God‘. This 
remains the case ‗even if we grant that God is in some way the ultimate source of their 
existence‘, whereby the act of ‗creation…bestows on them a life on the other side of an 
ontological frontier such that they may [also] modify not only each other but their source‘. 
This paradigm, at first glance, appears to offer respite for North Atlantic post-theism, where 
traditional metaphysics no longer seems to hold sway. However, its comes at a price: ‗If the 
source is in this way modifiable, is it still possible to say that it is unequivocally the source of 
the meanings constructed or enacted in the world? And if it is not to be thought of as source, 
it has to be thought of as standing with, negotiating with or even contesting other possible 
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meanings‘. And does this not, ultimately, presuppose the conflictive model that revisionists 
want to avoid? And how is this distinguishable from what John Milbank has described as 
‗ontological violence‘?158 If this is the case, then it has deleterious implications for the 
spiritual life,159 and also promotes a metaphysics that ontologizes conflict; this is because   
  
if there is no guaranteed ‗triumph‘ for God, if contest is perpetual and unresolved, we 
are stuck with a metaphysic (the fact that it is commonly presented as a kind of 
alternative to metaphysics is irrelevant) in which what is unambiguously good has no 
necessary relation to how things fundamentally are, or are thinkable. Good becomes a 
function of the will, separated from ‗nature‘, as in the familiar forms of debased 
Kantianism, and from intellect. If the former problem (God as an agency confronting 
others) tends to a reduction of God to an item in the world, the latter allies the reality 
of God to the workings of an ‗inner‘ life, detaching God from the processes of 
learning that take place in a material and historical environment. In plainer terms, 
while the former interprets God‘s existence as being on the same footing as that of 
contingent realities, the latter moves towards evacuating talk of God‘s existence of all 
content.160 
 
There is a lot in here which will re-appear again in this study: if God is the subject of change 
or suffering in se, then one could suggest that we have baptized competitive violence, since 
the Good has no necessary linkage with reality, but only ‗goods‘ that are produced without 
any ontological basis for harmonization. In this quotation, we can see that this matrix of 
assertions – passibility, ontological violence, evil-as-privation, the primacy of the will, and 
the Kantian sublime – have a connection to the question of aseity. Without it, so Williams 
argues, the Good itself becomes de-natured, and God is conceived within a regime of the 
sublime that denies the deity‘s transcendent goodness and perfection. Moreover, it places God 
within the scope of ontotheology, since (on this model) God acts like a finite cause. On the 
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traditional account, God as creator (who is not in competition to creatures) brings everything 
into a ‗natural‘ relation to the Good, without hereby denying the freedom of creatures.161 To 
enter into the Good is to become more creaturely and more human. But if one conceives God 
as subjected to temporal process, then that means that the divine nature also is subjected to 
that same historical logic, and the Good is no longer considered as unchangeable. But now 
since the world has no metaphysical or ‗necessary‘ connection to goodness, this means that 
there is no created aptitude for this, in the sense that finite being now has no more ‗natural‘ 
affinity for either goodness or evil. It is purely a matter of voluntary imposition one way or 
the other.   
Our excursus on the question of aseity and transcendence has served to outline its contours, 
as it has appeared within the classical tradition of theology. What we have seen is that if our 
concept of aseity is diminished or misread then the grammar of theology is fundamentally 
changed. If God is mutable or suffers in se, then this has some significant consequences: if the 
Good, which is convertible with Infinite Being, does not hold some kind of eschatological 
finality or priority in relation to evil, then goodness no longer has a more intrinsic position in 
reality, and evil (or material conflict) ascends into an equivalency with the Good. Beatitude as 
a result becomes less a moral attuning to reality, and rather a voluntary imposition. And since 
there is no necessary connection between goodness and being itself, the universal compass of 
the Good is unsustainable. There are other problems also: if God is the not the infinite source 
of all things, but rather an eternal manager of change ‗outside‘ of God- – since there is an 
externality which is not included within divine infinity– then can we even speak of ‗creation‘ 
as creatio ex nihilo? One must admit that it remains difficult, as confirmed by contemporary 
process thought (e.g. Catherine Keller, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, John Caputo, etc.). Moreover, 
a denial of a non-rivalrous aseity creates Christological aporias also, since God and humanity 
are imagined as actors working within the same plane of reality. If God is an entity within the 
universe whose actions come into ‗conflict‘ with human agency, then the grammar of the 
hypostatic union is altered. God and humanity exist alongside each other within Christ – 
which is a Nestorian conclusion. Such a model also raises problems for divine providence, 
since the divine and human agencies are understood as mutually restrictive or competitive.  
Aseity might alleviate these problems: since God is the transcendent cause of everything, 
we should not understand God as being in opposition or other to reality itself. Because God is 
not in competition with anything, and is not hindered by material restriction, God remains 
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infinitely close to every creature. Moreover, omnipotence should not be construed as a power 
over or against.162 Instead, God‘s creative activity is aimed at our flourishing: it is a power for 
us.163 God‘s desire is not opposed to our nature as created beings, but is in accord with our 
telos. And since the Good is identical with Infinite Being, the Good is not a resource which is 
expended the more it is enacted, but is expanded through communication.164 In addition other 
problems are also softened: creatio ex nihilo no longer resonates with the imagery of a cosmic 
overlord who exerts power over us, as if this power surrendered us into complete passivity. 
One could also argue that a non-competitive transcendence ameliorates the aporias of 
Christological doctrine: if God and creatures are not in competition for ontological ‗space‘, 
then there is no question of God existing alongside the humanity of Christ.165 Similar 
comments can be related to the providential causal-joint, because now it is no longer a 
question of conflict, but rather an intensification of freedom.  
Hopefully what has been said above gives a sense of how the language of ‗transcendence‘ 
will be used in this study. The above exposition has served to articulate the centrality of this 
teaching for theological orthodoxy. But there is a query which needs further treatment, 
namely: what does tragedy have to do with transcendence? Related to this is the question as 
to why Christian orthodoxy, in its affirmation of aseity, would create tensions vis-à-vis ‗the 
tragic‘? Here we see once more that some of the difficulties that have arisen are connected to 
modern trends, and are by-no-means necessary developments.   
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3.2. On Tragedy and Transcendence: On Modern Inversions  
 
Our definition of transcendence has emphasized the aseity of God and the convertibility of the 
infinite good with such transcendence. But the question remains: why is this important for our 
discussion of tragedy and theology? As an initial salvo, we will attempt to sketch three nodes 
of potential conflict, especially within the modern period: (1) the aesthetics of the sublime and 
the theory of the tragic, (2) the question of history and transcendence, specifically as it 
concerns the historical suffering of the Absolute, and (3) the problem of conflicting goods and 
its connection to a rejection of evil-as-privation.  
From its origins, tragedy has been tied to a religious backdrop that projects transcendence 
(e.g. the gods, necessity, etc.). Attic tragedy was concerned about what could not be mastered 
or controlled, in other words with the transcendent and the intractable (the Homeric tradition). 
At the same time, tragedy concerns the instauration of law within Athens, which occasioned a 
transition to critical reflection and legal order (the Solonic tradition). Tragedy tapped into this 
liminality and period of transition, along with its ambiguities.166 As a result, ‗this tension [of 
traditions] that is never totally accepted nor entirely obliterated makes tragedy into a 
questioning to which there can be no answers. In a tragic perspective man [sic] and human 
action are seen, not as things that can be defined or described, but as problems. They are 
presented as riddles whose double meanings can never be pinned down or exhausted‘.167 In 
other words, tragedy did not uncritically inherit Homeric traditions, nor did legality 
completely repress the Dionysian. Stephen Halliwell has spoken about how ‗Greek tragedy 
displays yet confounds, invites yet defies‘ those ‗efforts [that search] after [a] secure and 
coherent understanding‘ of ‗the religious concerns and mentality of its characters‘.168 
Halliwell writes that ‗The gestures of tragedy's own people towards unified explanations of 
their world are reenacted by interpreters seeking to identify and circumscribe a stable centre 
of significance in concepts‘, including ideas such as ‗fate, god-sent derangement, inherited 
‗guilt‘, divine malevolence, the conflict of freedom and necessity, the punishment of hybris 
[sic], or perhaps some final theodicy beyond the realm of suffering‘. These concepts do not 
have finality since ‗tragedy itself often dramatizes the inconclusive value of these and other 
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religious ideas which find expression in its characters‘ discourse of reflection and emotion. 
Moments of human insight in tragedy are rare and precarious; such insight can never certify 
its penetration into the designs of gods‘.169 Consequently, ‗tragic experience is most religious 
precisely at the points where determinacy and wholeness of explanation prove most 
elusive‘.170 Such is applicable to actors on the stage, and the audience too, because ‗There is 
no tragic equivalent to the (ostensibly) omniscient voice of the epic narrator‘; ‗tragedy's 
religious ideas are mediated through the claims and judgments of those involved in, or close 
to, the action of the plays‘.171 We thus do not have access to the transcendent agencies that 
inform our choices, but can only engage in speculations of their influence.172 Such does not 
mean, however, that characters do not attempt self-transcendence: Oedipus does not remain in 
ignorance but seeks to know. ‗Sophoclean daimonic heroes are mortals who cannot but go 
beyond the mortal human measure into a realm closer to the immortal gods in order to reach 
whatever tragic knowledge may be available by the journey into that unknown‘.173 Or to quote 
Halliwell again: ‗the tragic-heroic rises above the level at which human lives are absorbed in 
the patterns of the natural world or in the routines of social being‘, reaching thereby to ‗the 
more-than-human‘.174 Tragedy hereby dramatizes the impulse towards disclosure, however 
disastrous or beneficial such knowledge might be. However, there is no necessity that the 
outcome of tragedy has to be destructive, since tragedy does not provide certainties of this 
kind.175 One could suggest that tragedy most clearly expresses transcendence here, within 
what we have previously called the negativity of the tragic, that intractability which refuses 
consolatory systems.  
Aristotle once said that ‗tragedy‘ reaches towards something more universal than ‗history‘ 
(Poetics 1451b5-b26). But while this philosophical expansion of ‗the tragic‘ is there already 
from the time of Aristophanes, this universalizing scope of tragedy is particularly stringent 
with the advent of modernity,176 especially in the period after the so-called Querelle des 
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Anciens et des Modernes (circa. 1792). The modern invention of the tragic was birthed in 
France and Germany in the seventeenth century. This reflexive turn towards Attic drama was 
instigated by an intense study of Aristotle‘s Poetics – revived in the Renaissance –and also by 
the French Revolution which brought to mind the politics of emancipation. ‗Tragedy‘ became 
a horizon of significance in which ‗modernity‘ achieved self-understanding. Joshua Billings 
has argued177 that a duality appears within the criticism of this period: on the one hand, there 
is a transition towards historicization and classical philology, which emphasized the 
peculiarity of ancient tragedy in comparison with eighteenth-century norms.178 But on the 
other hand, ‗tragedy‘ was also subjected to universalization, a movement that became 
epitomised in ‗the philosophy of the tragic‘ (Schelling, Schlegel, Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, 
etc.).179 Initially, this development centred on whether the so-called tragic effect – or 
Aristotelian catharsis – exhibited trans-historical significance, and became a site of debate 
regarding the continuity or discontinuity between ancient and modern tragedies. Following 
this aggrandizing trajectory, ‗the tragic‘ gradually assumes a more metaphysical and 
ontological stature.  
A watershed moment in this reception is the arrival of Kantian aesthetics, especially as 
regards the emphasis (after Locke) on the subjective representation of the beautiful object.180 
But even more pertinent was that Kant – in the wake of Edmund Burke181 – accomplished a 
deeper separation between the categories of the sublime and the beautiful,182 a move that 
issued in a departure from the tradition of Pseudo-Longinus.183 This alteration is important for 
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at least two reasons. Firstly, it is salient because the modern concept of the sublime (as 
mediated via Kant and Schiller) promoted the emergence of a noumenal transcendence. Why 
this is important will become clearer later in this study. But what is illuminating now is that as 
an acceptance of the post-Kantian sublime became more widespread, specifically as regards 
its disconnection from any beautiful order, the idea of ‗transcendence‘ becomes unthinkable 
and unpresentable, equated with what cannot be cognized or communicated (e.g. Lacoue-
Labarthe, Lyotard, Nancy, etc.).184 This tendency (as we will see) remains incompatible with 
an account of metaphysical analogy, which proposes an ontological and axiological 
participation of the finite within the infinite.185 It also connects to a related question to be 
addressed later, namely whether there are varieties of tragic suffering and pain that are finally 
unthinkable and unspeakable. Can we bring pain into speech, or are we relegated to absolute 
silence?  
Secondly, this shift affected readings of ‗the tragic‘ itself, which were now conceptualized 
through a post-Enlightenment sense of the autonomy of the subject. These tendencies were 
stimulated through the political changes in France as well as Cartesian philosophy. Under this 
inspiration, Kant and Schiller‘s deployment of a mathematical and dynamical sublime helped 
to solidify the modern opposition between freedom and necessity. For Kant (and Schiller), the 
mathematical sublime concerns experiences of magnitude, as when the mind is unable to 
grasp the manifold. This in turn inspires the powers of reason to imagine a totality that would 
encompass this immensity. The dynamical sublime refers to those feelings of being 
overpowered and deprived of one‘s capacity to act. For Kant, this disenfranchisement of the 
will agitates the subject to assert itself over-against the power which countervails against 
them. This post-Critical opposition between freedom and determinism is paralleled with the 
noumenal and phenomenal distinction: even though the subject is submitted to biological and 
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historical necessity in the world of appearances, within the noumenal sphere one remains 
transcendentally free. The Kantian schema was eventually taken up within Schiller‘s 
criticism, and thereafter dispersed into classical scholarship.186 Such a tradition continues until 
recent times within the writings of Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, and Slavoj Žižek.187 
Overall what is important to register is that after the Kantian moment ‗the tragic‘ receives a 
greater speculative adornment, even reaching to theological vantages.188 In the philosophies of 
Schelling and Hölderlin,189 the idea of ‗the speculative tragic‘ comes to project an Ultimate 
Reality (or Absolute) that is subjected to contradiction, scission and suffering.190 On this 
reading ‗all gods and every God, including the God of faith and the Spirit of absolute 
knowing, is subject to the same ambiguity and is on the same bumpy ride as the rest of us.  
Suffering is written into the script. Languishing is of the essence‘.191 Adopting Heideggerian 
language, one could say that ‗the speculative tragic‘ implies an ontotheology of suffering: for 
Schelling and Hölderlin, the One is not self-identical or simple but ruptured and traumatized, 
always-already from the ages of the world. There is no escape from suffering and tragic 
haemorrhaging – even the Absolute is having a rather rough time. 
What should be brought to attention is that this speculative trajectory is present in modern 
dogmatics also. Jürgen Moltmann is exemplary, as can be seen in his stridency against divine 
impassibility, as most famously expounded in The Crucified God.192 This monograph has few 
explicit references to tragedy as such,193 but the overall thematic of transcendental dereliction 
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and ‗godlessness‘ certainly places Moltmann within a Schellingesque trajectory.194 In God in 
Creation, there are references to the tragic quality of a creation that is subject to ‗futility‘.195 
Elsewhere, he also makes mention of tragedy in reference to Miguel de Unamuno while 
discussing the mystical idea of ‗the sorrow of God‘ (congoja).196 However, Moltmann‘s most 
affirmative statement on ‗the tragic‘ is in relation to the Russian mystical philosopher 
Nicholas Berdyaev.197 Moltmann endorses the conjecture of a ‗tragedy in God‘ in which God 
struggles for freedom within time, so that ‗the tragedy of human history is God‘s own tragedy 
too‘.198 This sublimation of the tragic into the Godhead has shades of speculative idealism, 
and carries with the conceptual tensions we have mentioned already apropos divine 
passibility.199 What can be gleaned from this example is that a revisionist reading of divine 
transcendence does make the inclusion of divine tragedy or suffering conceptually ‗easier‘. 
Contrariwise, it appears that a more traditional account of aseity creates more difficulties, that 
is, if we wish to address tragedy within a classically-oriented theology. However, it also 
proposes that these tensions might have been exacerbated by a modern genealogy of the tragic 
that incorporates the post-Kantian sublime, and an absolutization of suffering found within 
                                                          
194
 Larry Bouchard places Moltmann‘s theology of the cross within the agon of a ‗negative dialectic‘ 
(Adorno), which is Bouchard‘s own rubric for tragic experience; cf. Bouchard, Tragic Method and 
Tragic Theology: Evil in Cotemporary Drama and Religious Thought (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1989), 229-234; 250-251.  
195
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation – The Gifford Lectures 
1984-1985, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1985), 68.  
196
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1981), 36-42. 
197
 Ibid., 42-47. 
198
 Ibid., 42.  
199
 I will not rehash my arguments once more, but will rather give a quotation from Moltmann‘s 
contemporary, and fellow political theologian, Johann Baptist Metz. Concerning the theological 
popularity of divine passibility, and its account of atonement, Metz has the following to say: ‗Is not a 
reconciliation with God at work here that is too speculative, too proximate to Gnosis, achieved too 
much behind the back of the human history of suffering? Is there not also and especially for 
theologians that negative mystery of human suffering which will not allow itself to be made sense of in 
anyone's name? How is discourse on the suffering God not just a sublime duplication of human 
suffering and human powerlessness? And from another direction: How is language about a solidaristic 
God who suffers with us not just a projective duplication, under the anonymous pressure of a socially 
prevalent ideal of solidarity (just as earlier, in feudal societies, God was represented as the 
unapproachable king and lord)? In any event, is not the classical doctrine of analogy (concerning the 
maior dissimilitudo that holds between God and world) violated? How can the language of the 
suffering God, or of suffering between God and God, avoid leading to an eternalization of suffering? 
Do not here God and human being end up under the weight of a quasi-mythical universalization of 
suffering, which finally overcomes even the impulse that resists injustice? Or perhaps in this language 
of the suffering there is too much of Hegel, too much sublation of the negativity of suffering into the 
conceptually comprehended self-movement of absolute spirit and, therefore, too much reduction of 
suffering to its concept? In this language of the suffering God, does not something like a secret 
aestheticization of all suffering secretly come into play? Suffering, which makes us cry out or finally 
fall wretchedly silent, knows no majesty. It is nothing great, nothing sublime; at root it is something 
entirely different from a powerful, solidaristic suffering-with [Mitleiden]. It is not simply a sign of 
love; rather, it is much more a horrifying sign of no longer being able to love. It is that suffering which 
leads into nothingness if it is not a suffering unto God‘. This quotation can be found in Johann Baptist 
Metz, ‗Suffering unto God‘. Critical Inquiry 20.4 (1994): 611-622 (p. 619).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
German Idealism. Nonetheless, simply asserting this genealogical connection does not resolve 
the problem which has been raised within modernity, namely that of historicity. A question is 
therefore presented: how is one to relate historicity and classical metaphysics if historicity 
remains an indubitable aspect of tragic experience?  
Another contention of classical metaphysics is the assertion of an ontological primacy of 
the good over evil. Since Plato and Augustine, the so-called privatio boni has claimed that 
‗evil‘ does not have its own ‗existence‘ or ‗being‘ but is traceable to a perversion of the good. 
However, in recent times this doctrine has been found wanting by some, especially by 
theorists who lean towards Kantian ideas of ‗radical evil‘, and also by those who in the wake 
of twentieth century totalitarianisms and exterminations consider it to be inadequate. Against 
Plato and Augustine, Kant connects the ethical not to the natural desire for the transcendent 
good, but to the self-legislating law that establishes non-heteronomous moral criteria. But as 
Milbank has argued,200 Kantianism proposes a pure formality of law that has no intrinsic 
orientation to good or evil. Rather, as a kind of pre-actualized possibility, ‗freedom‘ is that 
catalyst which enacts the distinguishability between good and evil as such; and because of 
this, ‗freedom‘ persists within a hazy and un-decidable sublimity that is disconnected from 
natural determination or teleology, since ‗freedom‘ cannot be phenomenologically deduced or 
constrained by sensibility. For Kant, the criteria for discerning a perverted will from a good 
will can only be adjudicated in relation to its commitment to duty, specifically as it 
counteracts the self-interests of individuals. But problems arise at this juncture: since we 
cannot ever be certain that we are acting out of ethical duty or self-interest at any particular 
moment, we can only prove adherence by consciously acting against our self-interest – which 
is why Kant favours heroic sacrifice as the paramount demonstration of freedom.201 
Moreover, since there is no deeper connection between goodness and the will, and evil as 
such is accorded co-priority with the good, evil could just as well be counted as a veracious 
expression of ‗being‘, since both are equally truthful accounts of reality. Once more, ‗being-
as-such‘ becomes equipoised between goodness and evil and maybe even persists beyond this 
opposition altogether in an unfathomable abyss – as seen in Schelling‘s metaphysics of a 
divinity that pre-exists both goodness and evil.   
This analysis gains relevance for our discussion of the tragic as we consider the work of 
Kathleen Sands, who attempts to affirm tragic theology at the expense of privation theory. 202 
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Sands will be discussed again in Chapter 7, but for now it is worth tracing the outlines of her 
argument to illuminate their present connections. Sands‘s contribution to tragic theory is 
found in her disavowal of any idea of a transcendent and metaphysical ‗Good‘, specifically as 
bequeathed through the Augustinian tradition. For her this is reducible to ‗moral dualism‘, 203 
an assertion of a ‗good‘ separated from the entanglements of time and tragedy. For Sands, 
there is no ethical action that is devoid of the potential for tragic consequences, and therefore 
all moral reasoning has to take into account the temporal and interconnected quality of every 
action. We cannot transcendentally extract the good from the bad; and any attempt to do so 
simply succumbs to the Manichaean temptation to divide and exclude. Alternatively, ‗the 
good‘ (with a small ‗g‘) should be exposited as radically contingent and non-metaphysical, as 
an ‗immanent good‘ rather than a ‗transcendent‘ one.204 This requires us (and especially 
women) to acknowledge ‗the absence of a limitless and transcendent good‘ , and ‗take 
responsibility for sin and grace into [our] own hands‘.205 At this juncture, Sands works with 
an either-or logic: either you accept tragedy, and acknowledge the finality of non-compossible 
goods, or you reject tragedy for the sake of Augustinian dogmas. You cannot have it both 
ways.  
On this point, Sands‘s contributions certainly deserve to be taken seriously, even if they 
probably present a rather skewed reading of Augustine (as we will see later). Moreover, she is 
not alone: George Steiner has argued that ‗absolute tragedy‘ rejects any Platonic-Augustinian 
metaphysics. In his words, it proposes a ‗heretical‘ vision of the world, since ‗absolute 
tragedy‘ imagines that there is an ‗innate evil‘ within things, a ‗manichean dialectic‘, and that 
the tragic is best exemplified within a ‗performative mode of despair‘.206 On this point, 
Steiner is profoundly deferential to the traumas of post-war Jewishness, and a philosophical 
pessimism traceable to Schopenhauer.207 But what these assertions raise, once more, is 
whether the question of transcendence (and specifically the ontological priority of the Good) 
might come into potential conflict with an affirmation of the tragic. If you are willing to 
accept the one, can you accept the other as well? But it also suggests a possibility that some of 
the supposed tensions between Christianity and ‗the tragic‘ have a more recent origin, and are 
traceable to post-Holocaust affinities for ‗radical evil‘, and maybe not ‗the tragic‘ as such.    
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At this stage, some of these questions are left open-ended, since a larger argument is 
needed to address them. But what can be said now is that there are central affirmations of 
Christian orthodoxy – such as divine aseity, analogy and the primacy of the Good – that could 
present issues for an incorporation of tragedy, especially after its contemporary 
reconfigurations. Whether or not these tensions can be addressed is the exploration of this 
study. So in order to adjudicate this, we have decided to examine Donald MacKinnon, and 
those critically engaged with him, since the tensions discussed hitherto play themselves out in 
his oeuvre, and in the sceptical commentary they have occasioned. Crucial for MacKinnon are 
the relation between the tragic and transcendence; more than any other theologian or moralist 
in contemporary times, he emphasised the importance of tragedy for Christian theology. And 
so in the following chapter, we will introduce MacKinnon, putting forward the general 
outlines of his theology and method, as well as the criticisms of him crystalized in writings of 
David Bentley Hart and John Milbank. The chapters that come thereafter should be read as a 
response that is shaped by this critical reception.     
In this chapter, gave an outline of the classical teaching regarding transcendence and aseity. 
We then suggested that this teaching sits in tension with some tenets of the modern idea of the 
tragic, and in particular its connections to the Kantian sublime, a suffering absolute and a 
rejection of evil-as-privation. In the following chapter, and those to follow, we will see how 
these questions re-appear within a modern theological debate between Hart, MacKinnon and 
Milbank. It is to these interactions that we now turn.  
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Chapter 4 
Donald MacKinnon I:  
On Critical Antiphony  
 
This chapter constitutes our initial foray into the work of Donald MacKinnon. It attempts to 
interpret his basic theological posture, and how this impacts our structure of argumentation. 
After delineating a skeletal outline of his theological output, it will attempt a detailed reading 
of his most stringent critics. This moment is profoundly important for such a study, since it is 
these dissentions that will serve as a catalyst for the following chapters, as they attempt a 
response to such questions. As will be seen, such a response will be constituted by a mixture 
of confirmation, qualification, and contestation.    
 
4.1. On Donald MacKinnon and the Question of Difficulty 
 
There is a sense in which Donald MacKinnon‘s scholarly testament defies simple description 
or reduction,208 but if one could hazard a workable dilution it would be less a single dogma 
(philosophical, theological or otherwise) than a certain transparency to ‗difficulty‘. It has been 
commented upon that MacKinnon‘s style resists systematic formulation: ‗His was a trust in 
the fragment, in the incomplete torso, in that which sprang resoundingly and at risk from 
provocations, the calling occasioned by the immediate moment or setting‘. So says George 
Steiner, a close friend and colleague (who dedicated his On Difficulty and Other Essays to 
Donald and Lois MacKinnon).209 Such should not be understood to mean that MacKinnon had 
a piecemeal or dilettantish approach. Instead, one should read this tendency as part of his 
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commitment to an intellectual integrity that refused to trivialize phenomena, especially those 
rebarbative aspects that defy cheap circumscription (e.g. evil, the tragic).210 Accordingly, the 
prose of MacKinnon‘s argumentation displays a ‗tortuous thoroughness‘211 rather than an air-
tight systematic flourish. These sentiments have been echoed by Paul Murray, who describes 
his method as ‗a rigorously self-critical fallibilism‘.212 This posture stems from his distaste for 
easy answers when complex questions are implied, and his resistance to the idea that the 
world is beholden to epistemic closure or attempts at ‗finalization‘ – hence the language of 
‗difficulty‘.    
What is meant by ‗difficulty‘? In an essay polarized on what she calls ‗the difficulty of 
reality‘,213 Cora Diamond defines this as ‗experiences in which we take something in reality 
to be resistant to our thinking it, or to be painful in its inexplicability‘,214 or as ‗the apparent 
resistance by reality to one‘s ordinary modes of life, including one‘s ordinary modes of 
thinking.‘ She goes on to say that ‗to appreciate the difficulty is to feel oneself being 
shouldered out of how one thinks, or how one is supposed to think, or to have a sense of the 
inability of thought to encompass what it is attempting to reach‘.215 The avoidance of such 
difficult knowledge is described by Diamond as ‗deflection‘, as a failure to imaginatively 
inhabit ‗bodies‘, resulting in them being treated as ‗mere facts‘ without moral relevance.216 
Such knowledge is overwhelming, and without imaginatively inhabiting such ‗exposure‘ (in 
which we recognize it as ‗our exposure…in a shuddering experience of death and life held 
together‘217), we risk closing in upon ourselves, failing to yield to what we know (as Stanley 
Cavell said of Shakespeare‘s Othello218). However, Diamond is perceptive enough to realize 
that ‗difficulty‘ does not only apply to our experiences of alienation and suffering, or what 
Stephen Mulhall calls ‗disvaluation‘.219 She also makes reference to the experiences we have 
of beauty and order within a backdrop of inhumanity. She pays tribute the idea that 
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miraculous occurrences can shock us into new modes of being and perception.220 She quotes 
the poet Czesław Miłosz, who once said that beauty ‗should not exist‘.221 Diamond‘s point is 
that if suffering produces a problem for easy description, then the appearance of goodness 
does so too. And as Mulhall has said elsewhere: ‗Some difficulties in reality…are not ones we 
would wish to wish away‘ [italics mine].222  
The above statements help us with our heuristic definition of ‗difficulty‘. But at this stage it 
remains open whether MacKinnon is able to account for both sides of this problematic with 
equal dedication, especially as regards ‗the problem of evil‘ and what could be called ‗the 
problem of the good‘. A surface reading of MacKinnon‘s overwhelming preoccupation with 
evil might lead one to think that this habit approached the level of the obsessive. The reasons 
for this temperament are surely manifold. Biographical factors are of course determinative,223 
but they are not my main concern here. I have already mentioned MacKinnon‘s concern for 
intellectual ‗integrity‘, but one could say also that such integrity is predicated on a preference 
for ‗realist‘ and ‗pluralist‘ accounts of philosophy, against British currents of idealism and 
monism. MacKinnon‘s ‗realism‘ does not finally exclude creative receptivity, but he 
remained strenuous in asserting the priority of ‗discovery‘ over ‗construction‘, and rejected 
any pre-eminence of ideation over the truthful disclosure of reality.224 Such ‗particularist‘ and 
‗realist‘ leanings are confirmed by his friends and students (e.g. George Steiner225 and 
Nicholas Lash226), and can be seen in interactions with his dialogue-partners, from R.G. 
Collingwood to more avant garde figures like Vladimir Lenin and Teilhard de Chardin – 
much to the irritation of some who knew him.227 MacKinnon was concerned throughout his 
career with ‗the true service of the particular‘,228 which (while not rejecting larger 
metaphysical placement) sought to attend faithfully, and truthfully, to the exigencies that form 
the substance of the moral life. Particularly poignant was the reality of suffering, as well as 
the stubborn presence of the tragic in human affairs. But while he was ‗deeply fascinated by 
pain‘ (in the words of George Steiner229) he was rarely sentimental in his judgements, and 
rejected vague invocations of ‗the tragic sense of life‘ as a hindrance to critical thinking and 
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ethical mobilization. Nonetheless he performed a kind of ‗painful apostolate‘230 in which he, 
through the very contortedness of his witness, sought ‗to enact certain recognitions‘.231 His 
character and prose can be read performatively, indicating a transparency to the many-
sidedness of ‗the real‘, as demonstrated in a multitude of styles and sources that are 
commandeered to bolster his persuasive enterprise. Certainly, MacKinnon‘s agonizing in this 
area can seem to be too stringent, a bit too non-conciliatory. Cornelius Ernst once remarked 
(in a review of MacKinnon) upon ‗an indulgence in ‗problems‘ for their own sake, a sense 
that one‘s moral being is somehow heightened by the mere fact of having become 
problematic‘.232 Similar criticisms are echoed by other interpreters of MacKinnon, including 
John Milbank whose reading we shall elaborate in due course. But with this in mind, one 
could phrase the tension so: is MacKinnon‘s peculiar agony merely an indulgent revelry in 
‗the beastliness of things‘,233 or is it a meditation on Christ‘s vigil at Gethsemane, as it was 
poised between a trust in divine response and the dark epiphany of human betrayal?234 It is to 
such questions, and the adequacy of MacKinnon‘s answers, that we shall turn in the following 
chapters.  
The awareness of ‗difficulty‘, and his non-systematic or fragmented style, leaves one with 
the problem of beginnings.235 His preoccupation with the ‗difficult‘ and ‗the particular‘ does 
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create some problems for formulating a straightforward method of interpretation. By and 
large, his proclivity was for the essay, rather than the extended dilations of a monograph. 
However, there are two exceptions: A Study in Ethical Theory (1957) and The Problem of 
Metaphysics (1974). Both studies are important, since they provide a larger canvass for 
presentation, and in some sense bring together many of the scattered expostulations found in 
his essays and shorter writings. Our preference, however, leans towards The Problem of 
Metaphysics, for the following reasons: (1) it was MacKinnon‘s last monograph and therefore 
provides a better vantage for reading his mature thought. (2) A Study in Ethical Theory leans, 
though not absolutely, towards being a historical account of other thinkers (Bentham, Butler, 
Kant, Hegel), and therefore should not be given the same status as his more constructive 
ventures. And lastly, (3) the later text addresses more explicitly the themes of tragedy and 
metaphysics, and therefore is deemed to be more pertinent for our present task.  It is for these 
reasons that I have decided to focus in detail on this later text, which will provide not only a 
window into MacKinnon‘s mature thinking, but will also give a framework in which to order 
our presentation of a thinker who seems to resist such tidiness.  
However before we discuss this specific monograph in detail, it seems necessary to place 
its exegesis within the context of its reception. And so it is important at this stage to step back 
to clarify the context of my argument. My aim here is directed towards interpreting 
MacKinnon‘s approach to the question of metaphysical transcendence, and its connection to 
the tragic. What should be salient though is that I am trying to read MacKinnon in light of the 
most important criticisms of his work; inevitably, this means that the argument is slanted 
towards the questions raised by such criticisms. The two figures who will be engaged are 
David Bentley Hart and John Milbank. Both of these thinkers are critical of his work, but they 
also have criticisms that reach beyond MacKinnon himself and address larger questions. So 
their criticisms should be seen in the developing argument as a whole, and not just in the 
current chapter. This is because they have views that evince pertinence on larger questions 
which are the concern of this study, namely, that of tragedy and a classical rendition of 
Christian metaphysics. They reach beyond MacKinnon and deserve a wider engagement than 
can be contained in this chapter alone. This means that, throughout the argument, I will be 
glancing backwards towards the criticisms expounded here, with the hope of addressing some 
of the lingering concerns which may remain. This implies that my consideration of their 
arguments is taken in stages, some of which extend beyond the present chapter. One result of 
this methodological choice is that in order to present my take on MacKinnon‘s work, it seems 
that I am obliged to present the arguments of MacKinnon‘s interlocutors before I represent his 
own positions on this question in detail. Such an ordering will provide clarity and direction 
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regarding the emphases and turns in my argument. And since an appreciation or criticism of 
their interpretations of MacKinnon can only be properly evaluated once the evidence is laid 
out, there will be periodic repetitions of their readings when an informed rebuttal or 
confirmation of their views can be encountered.  
We will turn to these views shortly, however one more thing needs discussion: since Hart 
and Milbank assume some knowledge of MacKinnon‘s work, I will briefly (and inadequately) 
give a summary of his intellectual tendencies. Overall, one could say that MacKinnon‘s 
proclivity was towards a moral realism236 that sought to place human agency within a 
resolutely attentive mode of awareness. He sought to place a priority on the fact that our 
knowledge of the world, while having an undeniably constructive element, was nonetheless 
fundamentally premised on an openness to objective reality, to the fact that we first discover 
before we create. Our being is placed within an ontological receptivity that defines us as 
human beings, that is, having a sense of being generated out of something that exceeds 
selfhood. We are not self-created, and therefore because we are limited beings, it follows that 
we are dependent on a reality that exceeds immediate grasp. Coming to an awareness of this 
condition is essential if we want to enter our creatureliness. And to say that we are ‗created‘ 
means, additionally, that we exist within time, that we are historical beings who are subject to 
an irreversible flow of development. Our agency is placed within this context, which 
necessitates that actions also take place within limitations that constrain all forms of human 
activity. It is for this reason that MacKinnon has a particular affinity for Kant‘s metaphysics, 
since it sought to place limits upon the mind‘s capacity for transcendent knowledge. Our 
knowledge is ‗transcendental‘ in the sense that it remains limited by the incapacity to know 
things-in-themselves. It also explains MacKinnon‘s perennial adherence to Joseph Butler's 
ethical vision, which treated the question of morality within a persistent focus on the 
particularity of human nature. For MacKinnon, it is the attempt to usurp this limitation that 
constitutes our drift towards sinfulness, because by doing so we deny our ineradicably time-
bound nature.  
This concern for limitation and finitude also explains MacKinnon‘s preference for the 
particular, as seen in his rejection of idealism for a critical realism. For MacKinnon, rather 
than imposing alien structures upon reality, one must patiently and creatively allow the realia 
to manifest themselves rather than pre-empting their disclosure. This does not however imply 
sheer passivity, but necessitates that one cultivate certain habits of perception that will assist 
one in recognizing and discerning the truth when it manifests itself. Much like an artist or 
poet – MacKinnon uses the example of Paul Cézanne – one needs to hone a set of material 
capacities in order to allow the work to speak, for it to take on a life of its own in a way that 
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exceeds the objective willing of the persona. Thus one must allow the particularity of things 
to show themselves, rather than imposing a pattern which misprisions then. It is for this cause 
that MacKinnon rallies against any philosophical monism that collapses the individual into an 
all-embracing totality. Here the influence of G. E. Moore is decisive, especially as regards his 
rejection of F. H. Bradley‘s account of ‗internal relations‘. This is intrinsically connected to 
MacKinnon‘s realism, since the drive to establish ‗a whole‘ once more implicates the 
philosopher in the conceits of idealism, in an attempt to impose a totalizing pattern upon the 
intractable diversity of the world. This is why MacKinnon‘s metaphysics is best described as 
a form of pluralistic realism.237   
All of these factors help to explain MacKinnon‘s penchant for tragic motifs, and is 
especially enlightening as regards his rejection of religious theodicy. Tragedy is about the 
denial of easy answers and quick fixes: its vision is one of human beings existing in a world 
of unforeseen consequences. Our actions create effects that exceed our control, and 
sometimes imply innocent suffering that defies any just rationale. Thus any attempt to explain 
away or curtail suffering implies a denial of reality. This is why MacKinnon has little 
patience for theodicies that seek to impose patterns and meaning upon narratives of suffering, 
since this drive to justify suffering, in the words of Rowan Williams, is ultimately ‗an attempt 
to forget it as suffering, and so a quest for untruthfulness‘.238 MacKinnon is thus opposed to 
any metaphysics that seeks to plot tragedy within a larger order of justification. But 
MacKinnon is also radically opposed to a metaphysical relativism that denies meaning 
altogether. Without values, such as the dignity of human freedom, the substance of tragedy 
becomes altered beyond recognition, since without a non-trivial form of valuation, one could 
not say why tragedy and loss is so violating, why it is so difficult. It is for this reason that 
MacKinnon can speak of ‗the transcendence of the tragic‘ as a metaphysics, while also being 
a kind of anti-metaphysics as well. One cannot impose any confident order upon the 
rebarbative nature of the tragic, but one also cannot deny transcendent order altogether, 
because without it ‗tragedy‘ itself would cease to be a problem. For MacKinnon then, this 
interplay remains a continuing issue for metaphysicians, unless one tries to avoid ‗tragedy‘ 
altogether.  
One hopes that the last few paragraphs have given us an adequate sense of the general trend 
of MacKinnon‘s philosophy. Such will assist us then as we engage with the critiques lodged 
at it – a subject which will occupy us for the remainder of this chapter.              
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4.2. David Bentley Hart: The Tragic as Sacrificial Economy and Metaphysical 
Consolation 
 
Any cursory reading of Hart‘s magnum opus will encounter its profuse conviction and 
alienating volubility.239 Such rhetoric is deliberate since Hart is not content to demurely hand 
over the socio-cultural realm to a ‗neutral‘ and secularizing discourse. For him, any supposed 
‗neutrality‘ is already to have capitulated to a particular ‗telling‘ of the human story, and so is 
a thoroughly ‗ideological‘ gambit. Taking cues from John Milbank, he would argue that such 
a tale is a historically-constructed and contingent interpretation of the world, and therefore not 
insuperable or inevitable. This sentiment betrays a significant awareness of ‗postmodern‘ 
accounts of how language and narrative structure our reality, and also underlies his concern 
for a ‗rhetorical‘ turn in relation to the communication of Christian truth.240 This theological 
conviction makes his treatise a kind of anti-Nietzschean manifesto, an unashamed affirmation 
of the infinitude of beauty.  
Hart‘s treatment of this topic occurs in the section entitled ‗The Consolations of Tragedy, 
the Terrors of Easter‘ (373-394).241 The overarching concern of his argument is to distinguish 
between two orders of ‗beauty‘, namely that of Christ‘s self-donation, and, contrastively, the 
supposed harmony of Attic tragedy. For Hart, these constitute two different and ‗opposed‘ 
aesthetic visions of the world, since the perspective of Greek tragedy belongs to ‗[t]he 
sacrificial regime of the totality‘ as well as an ‗economy of violence‘ in which human 
sacrifice is given ‗aesthetic necessity‘ and ‗moral symmetry‘ (373). This constitutes Hart‘s 
initial criticism of interpreting the gospel through the lens of tragedy. The second one is that 
the tragic vision, in Hart‘s opinion, fails ‗to take suffering seriously enough‘ (373), and serves 
as a ‗consolation‘ that is unable to really account for the gravity of evil and suffering. Both of 
these criticisms underlie Hart‘s rejection of any kind of ‗tragic theology‘. For him ‗every 
tragic wisdom is in fact far too comforting to grasp what has occurred in Christ‘, and ‗it can 
scarcely, at the last, inspire any ethos but one that hovers disquietingly between resignation 
and masochism (or even sadism)‘ (374).  
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Underlying Hart‘s rejection of ‗tragic theology‘ is his distaste of any preference for a 
‗suffering God‘ (374-375).242 For Hart these are theologies of ‗masochism‘ to the extent that 
they cede ontological ‗positivity‘ to suffering and evil. Hart refuses any such ‗positivity‘ 
because, firstly, ‗theology must insist upon ‗‘historicizing evil‘‘, treating it as ‗the 
superscribed text of a palimpsest, obscuring the aboriginal goodness of creation‘ (384). Hart 
is clear then in his affirmation of the privatio boni: evil is not a ‗thing‘ or ‗entity‘, but rather a 
privation of goodness. It follows then that a denial of divine impassibility for Hart leads to an 
undermining of the goodness and metaphysical transcendence of God, and renders evil an 
ontological necessity (since not even God as the being of all things243 can avoid the scope of 
its advancement). Such a perspective also romanticizes suffering, since for Hart there exists 
no intrinsic connection between suffering and existential betterment: ‗suffering is only 
suffering and nothing more: it is not creative, it does not inspire love but destroys it… pain is 
essentially parasitic, a privation of being, capable of enriching or perfecting nothing‘ (375).244 
In Hart‘s estimate, ‗the gospel of divine apatheia as revealed in Christ‘ (375) is glad tidings, 
since it refuses any divine declension before the reality of suffering. God is not altered by the 
dialectic of evil or finitude but rather, eschatologically-speaking, is able to take creation 
beyond evil altogether (Hart is a proud exponent of the apokatastasis panton).245  
For Hart then, ‗tragic theology‘ is damaging precisely because it is too conservative, too 
constrained in its aesthetic receptivity to account for the world-altering event of God‘s saving 
action. On the contrary, the ‗sacrificial logic‘ of tragedy ultimately resigns us to injustice, 
rather than prompting a resistance to the structural evils of society. Speaking of Attic tragedy, 
Hart says that ‗tragedy does not encourage; it offers no promise and seems heroically devoid 
of mystification; it may endow its protagonist with a certain tragic grandeur, but only one that 
ends in the embral glow of his or her holocaust‘. For him, tragedy does not ‗pretend to 
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penetrate the mystery of evil...there is an inscrutable inevitability in the malignity of things 
that human freedom, far from averting, can only serve‘ (376). This has theological 
underpinnings because evil within the antique Greek mind was to be superimposed onto the 
Olympian realm: ‗Attic tragedy often locates evil in no particular place, but in a tension 
between human culpability and divine malice‘, one in which ‗the tragic is older than the gods‘ 
themselves (377). Hart therefore questions references to the ‗tragic wisdom‘ which might be 
gained, for example, from the Chorus‘s contemplation of undue suffering. He wonders 
whether the outcome is less the gaining of ‗wisdom‘ than rather an ‗emotional exhaustion‘ 
that is unable to counteract ‗the invincible violence of being‘ (379). He examines (briefly) 
some Greek tragedies (e.g. The Oresteia, The Bacchae), and comes to the conclusion that they 
do not contradict his assertion that ―the religious dynamism of Attic tragedy‘ entails ‗the form 
of a closed circle,‘ that ‗it reinforces the civic order it puts into question, by placing that order 
within a context of cosmic violence‘ (380). 
An exposition of Donald MacKinnon and Nicholas Lash becomes pertinent now: regarding 
Lash, Hart argues that he ‗more or less collapses Easter into Good Friday in such a way that 
the former takes on the character of simply a second perspective upon the latter‘, ‗a 
speculative return to the cross‘, constituting its ‗most inward meaning‘ (382). Particularly 
worrying for Hart is ‗the way [that such a] reading makes knowledge and spiritual comfort the 
fruit of an annihilation of finite form‘ (387), turning it into a quasi-pagan auto-da-fé. For 
Hart, Lash‘s reading of resurrection implies an eternalisation of the cross, a move he rebuffs 
by saying that ‗to reinterpret the resurrection as the speculative inner fold of the crucifixion is 
also an attempt to moderate the aesthetic affront of Easter‘ (389). This implies a denial of the 
radicalness of Easter, and thus underwrites a perpetual return to ‗the Same‘ (387-388). Hart 
rejects identifying the cross with the resurrection, and argues rather that ‗the resurrection 
occurs apart from the crucifixion, after the crucifixion, in time, and...vindicates not the cross 
but the Jew who died there‘ (391). 
Regarding MacKinnon, he wonders if one ‗might ask whether MacKinnon...has not read 
the story of the crucifixion in the light of Attic tragedy as read tragedy in Christian terms‘ 
(383). Read so, it implicates the story of Jesus in the trajectory of Olympian metaphysics in 
which violence is ultimately ‗mystified‘ (384), as exemplified in the case of the tragic hero 
who is scapegoated for the cause of civil harmony (the influence of René Girard is explicit 
here). He expands this by saying that ‗Tragedy universalizes the form of the splendid hero,‘ 
but that this figure is ultimately ‗excluded, pushed to the margins‘, and that ‗his [or her] 
suffering cannot inaugurate a new civitas, but only restores the balance of the old order‘. Thus 
the hero ‗ventures into the void, and so affirms once again that beyond the city walls there is 
only void‘. The hero, therefore, ‗dwells always in that penumbral region between the sublime 
and the beautiful, guarding the boundaries of both‘ [my italics] (385). Referencing Lash‘s 
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and MacKinnon‘s tragic realism – a realism that seeks to disillusion us of world-denying 
fantasies – Hart suggests (on the contrary) that ‗Tragedy is not…an art of disenchantment‘ 
because ‗metaphysical solace is precisely what the tragic is‘ (386). Tragedy, rather than being 
a rupture of bloated expectations, is precisely too ‗optimistic‘. In distinction from this, the 
narrative of cross and resurrection is able to affirm both the horrific quality of evil, as well as 
the ‗insane expectation that what is lost will be given back‘ (392). For Hart, the resurrection is 
a truly irruptive event, whereas tragic wisdom is resigned to a world of hopeless 
circumambulation.  
As seems clear from the above, Hart is strenuous in his assertion that the adoption of a 
specifically tragic perspective within Christian theology can only imply a confirmation of 
exclusionary political systems, in which human beings are sacrificed for social harmony. On 
this point, Hart‘s refusal seems clear. However, all of this does not mean that he is rejecting 
tragedy as a poetic form outright (cf. 375-376), nor that he is homogenizing all ‗tragedy‘ 
under a rubric of ‗sacrificial logic‘ (he does not think that Shakespeare or Calderón can be 
painted with the same brushstrokes246). Nor does this imply that Hart is unable to sympathize 
with the pathos and grandeur of Greek religion,247 or that Christ cannot be understood as a 
‗tragic‘ figure in his own right.248 Nonetheless, and despite these qualifications, it is the 
specifically Greek incarnation of tragic consciousness that remains problematic for Hart. For 
him, it is embroiled in the sacrificial economy of Olympian religion and ritual, and cannot 
account for the radical novelty of the Christian gospel. And it is precisely this ‗Greek‘ 
trajectory which he claims to find in both Lash and MacKinnon‘s appropriation of tragic 
themes. With Lash, we have a ‗Hegelian‘ collapse of the resurrection into the crucifixion, and 
with MacKinnon we have the gospel being read as a Greek tragedy (with all its implied 
‗sacrificial‘ overtones).  
I will not enter here into an interpretation of Lash‘s theology of the cross (or contest Hart‘s 
reading of Hegel). Rather, my focus is on Donald MacKinnon, and the influence he initiated. 
Since we have yet to expound MacKinnon‘s thought in more detail it seems expedient at this 
stage not to get into an intense debate regarding the content and form of Hart‘s critique, since 
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 Cf. David Bentley Hart, ‗Response from David Bentley Hart to McGuckin and Murphy‘. Scottish 
Journal of Theology 60.1 (2007): 95–101. 
247
 See for example his short story entitled ‗The House of Apollo‘ in The Devil and Pierre Gernet, 64-
88. 
248
 In Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies (New Haven-London: 
Yale University Press, 2009), Hart has mentioned in passing (p. 173) that ‗Try as we might, we shall 
never really be able to see Christ‘s broken, humiliated, and doomed humanity as something self-
evidently contemptible and ridiculous; we are instead, in a very real sense, destined to see it as 
encompassing the very mystery of our own humanity: a sublime fragility, at once tragic and 
magnificent, pitiable and wonderful.' It should however also be said that his rather bleak view of Greek 
religion and culture (including tragedy) remain intact. On this, see Atheist Delusions, 129-145. Also cf. 
David Bentley Hart, ‗Baptism and Cosmic Allegiance: A Brief Observation‘. Journal of Early 
Christian Studies 20.3 (2012): 457–465.  
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this is the burden of what is to come in later chapters. What can be said at this stage (by way 
of foretaste) is that Hart‘s judgements seem to have a rather sweeping character to them, one 
that renders his arguments vulnerable in relation to detail. His rather brash examination of 
MacKinnon, without regard to his complexity, seems to undermine the durability of his 
critique. Such a tendency is also apparent in his treatment of the Greek tragedians. Does his 
heuristic of ‗sacrificial totality‘ have universal sway in this regard? One could ask whether 
this illuminates plays such as Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus or even The Eumenides. On his 
estimate, these plays are rather odd tragedies. Much like the essentialisation of the tragic as 
found in George Steiner (who Hart quotes at length), he seems to be rather reductive in his 
approach to Greek tragedy and ostensibly lacks regard for recent scholarship. It is also worth 
asking whether Hart is sufficiently aware of the Kantian trajectories he incarnates, as when he 
speaks of ‗the tragic hero‘ as one who dwells between ‗the sublime and the beautiful, 
guarding the boundaries of both‘.249 Is this not an anachronistic poetics? Can it historically 
account for the fact that this language is precisely the product of a post-Kantian aesthetic of 
the tragic? These are questions I would pose to Hart. As mentioned earlier, my questions are 
tentative and require deeper argumentation. However, they serve to give an indication of 
where my trajectory is leading.    
 
4.3. John Milbank: The Tragic as Transcendental Limitation and Sublime Speculation 
 
Milbank‘s riposte to MacKinnon is different, but cognate with Hart‘s disagreements. Milbank 
is less focused than Hart on how we interpret Greek tragedy, and is more concerned about 
how ‗the tragic‘ moves within MacKinnon‘s thought both philosophically and ethically. His 
most sustained critique of MacKinnon is found in a collection of writings penned in honour of 
MacKinnon,250 which was later re-titled ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right‘.251 The burden 
of Milbank‘s essay is to question the Kantian legacy within theology in the name of a revived 
Thomism.252 Of particular concern are the ‗transcendentalist‘ assumptions that have migrated 
                                                          
249
 The Beauty of the Infinite, 385.  
250
 John Milbank, 'Between Purgation and Illumination': A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ in 
Kenneth Surin (ed.), Christ, Ethics and Tragedy: Essays in Honour of Donald MacKinnon (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 161-196.  
251
 John Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ in The Word Made Strange: Theology, 
Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell 1997), 7-35. My quotations shall be taken from this later 
version. The pagination is found in the text.  
252
 The rejection of the Kantian delimitation of metaphysics is pervasive in the writings of Milbank 
(and Radical Orthodoxy more generally), for a sample and summary of this critique, see John Milbank, 
‗Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi,‘ in John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 21-37; Milbank, ‗The Soul of Reciprocity, Part One: Reciprocity Refused.‘ 
Modern Theology 17.3 (2001): 336-391 (pp. 371-383); Milbank, ‗The Invocation of Clio: A Response‘. 
Journal of Religious Ethics 33.1 (2005): 3-44 (pp. 13-21); Milbank, ‗The Grandeur of Reason and the 
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uncritically into theological thought. Milbank desires to counteract these tendencies by 
advocating a renewed focus on theology as ‗metaphysics‘ and as a form of ‗historicism‘, 
which he attempts through a Thomistic-inspired and postmodern ‗repetition‘ of the analogia 
entis (here understood a ‗paradoxical‘ participation of creatures in the divine perfections). 
Such notions (as seen in his more recent work) are strongly inflected by a Christian 
Neoplatonism that seeks to relate notions of analogical participation to ‗theurgic‘ accounts of 
liturgy and human creativity.253  
It is for these reasons that Milbank considers Kantian metaphysics to be dubious, since by 
confining access to the transcendent only to the practical will (and not ‗reason‘), Kant renders 
transcendence as ‗beyond‘ the aegis of discernment, making it unable to adjudicate between 
rival metaphysical claims, or to articulate a positive  account of collective and distributive 
justice. Such transcendental ‗agnosticism‘ is the political foundation for liberalism, since a 
‗theology proceeding in the wake of transcendentalism is partially reducible to a liberal rights 
ideology‘ (7).254 Such a political vision is often assumed to be agnostic regarding transcendent 
values, but such a perspective already assumes a secularized and heterodox theology, as 
Milbank stresses continuously.  
Milbank‘s metaphysical concerns are immediately apparent in this essay: he initiates it by 
diving into a portrayal of theological analogy, particularly construed as ‗participation‘. Such 
‗participation‘ implies a truthful speculation of divine being through the capacities of human 
language; but it is also apophatic since divine nature can never be comprehended. Milbank is 
critical of Eberhard Jüngel who (he argues) conflates negative theology with a kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Perversity of Rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy‘s First Decade,‘ in Simon Oliver and John Milbank 
(eds.), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 367-405 (pp. 368-
373); Milbank, ‗Hume Versus Kant: Faith, Reason and Feeling‘. Modern Theology 27.2 (2011): 276-
297.  
253
 For a fuller exposé of Milbank‘s retrieval of metaphysics, see John Milbank, ‗Only Theology 
Overcomes Metaphysics,‘ in The Word Made Strange, 36-52; Milbank, ‗Only Theology Saves 
Metaphysics: On the Modalities of Terror,‘ in Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler Jr. (eds.), 
Belief and Metaphysics (Great Britain: SCM, 2007), 452-500; Milbank, ‗The Double Glory, or Paradox 
Versus Dialectic: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek,‘ in Slavoj Žižek and  John Milbank, The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, (ed.) Creston Davis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 110-
233; Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the 
People (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 19-113; Milbank, ‗Manifestation and Procedure: 
Trinitarian Metaphysics after Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas,‘ in Marco Salvioili (ed.), 
Tomismo Creativo (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2015), 41–117. For some secondary 
literature on Milbank‘s metaphysics, see Josef Bengston, Explorations in Post-Secular Metaphysics 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 53-74, and the very good summary found in Olivier-Thomas 
Venard, O. P., ‗The Litany of Truth and the Scholia on Reason according to Radical Orthodoxy.‘ 
Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 90.2 (2014): 287-322.  
254
 One can consult here especially Milbank‘s critical work on the Western discourse of rights and 
liberalism. For more, see Milbank, ‗On Complex Space,‘ in The Word Made Strange, 268-292; 
Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 162-
211; Milbank, ‗Against Human Rights: Liberty in the Western Tradition‘. Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 1.1 (2012): 1–32; Milbank, ‗Dignity Rather than Right‘. Open Insight 5.7 (2013): 77-124; 
Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 114-269; Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism 
and the Human Future (London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).    
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Kantian transcendentalism, in which the ultimate ‗cause‘ of things can only be construed as 
an indefinite ‗as if‘, lacking eminent attribution. Milbank contests Jüngel‘s ‗agnostic‘ reading 
of Aquinas as overemphasizing the ‗analogy of proportion‘ (e.g. A/B:C/D) while neglecting 
Aquinas‘ more ‗mature‘ statements affirming the ‗analogy of attribution (e.g. A/B:C/B).255 In 
this later version, creation has an analogous relation to being – with God as the medium of 
such relation – and not some prior known proportion into which God and creation are 
inserted. Such a construal of analogy maintains ‗a dynamic ontological tension‘, in which 
created being‘s analogical naming of God ‗constantly draw[s] forwards towards the divine 
perfection‘ (9). Milbank argues that Kant‘s use of the ‗analogy of proportion‘ implies ‗a 
specifiable, fixed, precisely known sort of relation of God to the creation‘ , since ‗God is only 
related to creation as efficient cause – he ‗constructs‘ the world outside himself as an artisan 
manufactures a clock‘ (9). This implies that Kant‘s metaphysics is ultimately more ‗dogmatic‘ 
than Aquinas‘, in the sense that while Aquinas is more ‗agnostic‘ regarding God‘s relation to 
the world, Kant is much less so (despite him being more chary, than Aquinas, regarding God-
in-se). His position is confirmed further when one examines the metaphysical lineage that 
underpins Kant‘s ‗phenomenalism‘ (e.g. Leibniz and Wolff) whereby ‗noumena‘ are 
unknowable, and yet are fixed by the boundedness of ‗pure reason‘.256 For Kant, things-in-
themselves remain without content, constituting a ‗sublime‘ speculation whereby ‗one is 
brought up against the margin of organized, formal, ‗beautiful‘ experience, and at this margin 
becomes overwhelmed by the intimation of the materially formless, and infinitely total‘ 
(10).257 Kant‘s ‗dogmatism‘ asserts an aprioristic division of the metaphysical realm from 
phenomena, and the categories of understanding from ‗things-in-themselves‘. But such a 
standpoint already implies the conceit of a metaphysical spectator who is able to survey the 
interrelations within being, determining from ‗outside‘ where one ‗phenomena‘ ends and 
another begins. Furthermore, it assumes a scheme-content dichotomy in which categories 
apply only to the epistemological surface of things, rather than to ontological depth. Such a 
                                                          
255
 For more on this see, Bernard Landry, ‗L'analogie de proportion chez saint Thomas d'Aquin‘. Revue 
néo-scolastique de philosophie 24.95 (1922): 257-280 ; ‗L'analogie de proportionnalité chez saint 
Thomas d'Aquin‘. Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie 24.96 (1922): 454-464; Louis Millet, 
‗Analogie et participation chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin‘. Les Études philosophiques 3-4 (1989): 371-
383.Bernard Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas, trans. E. 
M. Macierowski and Pol Vandevelde (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004); Reinhard 
Hütter, ‗Attending to the Wisdom of God – from Effect to Cause, from Creation to God: A relecture of 
the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas,‘ in Thomas Joseph White (ed.), The Analogy of 
Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 209-245. 
256
 Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 9.  
257
 For more on Milbank‘s critique of the modern aesthetic of ‗sublimity‘, see John Milbank, ‗The 
Sublime in Kierkegaard,‘ in Phillip Blond (ed.), Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and 
Theology (London: Routledge, 1998), 68-81; Milbank, ‗Beauty and the Soul,‘ in John Milbank, 
Graham Ward and Edith Wyschogrod, Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty (Harrisburg, 
Trinity Press International, 2003), 1-34 (pp. 1-9); Milbank, ‗Sublimity: The Modern Transcendent,‘ in 
Regina Schwartz (ed.), Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 211-234.  
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move is objectifying in the sense that it places the observer ‗above‘ the fray of metaphysical 
entanglement, in the name of rational delimitation. For Milbank, these are unfounded 
assumptions which assume a panoptic contemplation of things that is both ahistorical and 
dogmatist. Such a procedure is predicated largely on a ‗metaphysics of the sublime‘ , in which 
‗one can step up to a boundary where one ‗sees‘ that phenomenal categories no longer apply, 
and where one grasps, with necessity, that there are things-in-themselves, even if one can give 
no content to them‘ (11).  
The political implications of this metaphysics for Kant‘s ethics is that freedom is 
understood in a largely formalist sense, in which each individual is understood to have an 
unalienable, negative liberty vis-à-vis other agents.258 However, such freedom is ultimately 
without content, and can only be politically guaranteed by the state, and ontologically inferred 
from a law-giving, unknowable God who ordains permanent and unchangeable statutes of 
‗nature‘ that are read off by the rational subject.259 Such a notion of freedom for Milbank 
exemplifies the tradition of liberalism, whereby the concept of freedom comes to be treated in 
a purely ‗negative‘ sense, without including more substantive notions of how freedom is to be 
understood as collective negotiation and interrelation. Milbank thinks that Kant remains 
largely within this liberal tradition, but he does not disregard some countervailing instances 
where Kant might want to push beyond it (though Milbank thinks these are finally 
unsuccessful).  
His discussion of Kant weaves back into a reflection on Aquinas,260 where he is critical 
(though appreciative) of the work of David Burrell. Burrell, in his earlier work, sought to 
understand Aquinas‘s ‗grammatical‘ reflections on analogy in a ‗speculative‘ and ‗agnostic‘ 
fashion, in the sense that language of God is able to take us to the edge of finitude, without 
providing a intuition regarding the content of such language beyond the realms of human 
experience. Milbank interprets this move to be both anachronistic and proto-Kantian since 
this ‗involves the assumption that Aquinas thought in terms of straddling the boundary of the 
sublime in a way different from, but not wholly dissimilar to, that of Kant‘. For Milbank, ‗it is 
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 This language of negative freedom is drawn from the analyses of Isaiah Berlin in ‗Two Concepts of 
Liberty,‘ in Liberty, (ed.) Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 169-178. 
259
 Milbank considers this to be a move within the ‗Baroque‘ tradition of scholasticism that stems from 
Francisco Suárez. More generally speaking, one can infer from this essay that Milbank considers the 
Kantian tradition overall to lie within a certain Scotist (and Ockhamist) trajectory, whereby God‘s 
relation to the world is understood in a ‗fixed‘ and ‗univocalist‘ fashion, and the will is given priority 
over the faculties of reason and understanding. Milbank is by no means the only figure to have traced 
such a genealogy. For example, see André De Muralt, Kant, le dernier occamien: une nouvelle 
définition de la philosophie moderne‗. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 80.1 (1975): 32-53.  
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 Milbank‘s more recent appropriations of Aquinas only confirm and a further buttress the ‗linguistic‘ 
and ‗historicist‘ interpretation presented in this early essay. For more, see Milbank and Pickstock, 
Truth in Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Milbank, ‗The Thomistic Telescope: 
Truth and Identity.‘ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80.2 (2006): 193-226; Milbank, ‗On 
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wholly relevant to say here that such an aesthetic was not culturally available to Aquinas‘ , 
and also thinks that it is ‗relevant to ask whether associating Aquinas with a ‗speculative 
grammar‘ of this precise type is not slightly anachronistic in terms of the chronology of 
mediaeval thought‘ (13). Milbank argues that the ‗quasi-foundationalist‘ understanding of 
grammar, one that attempts to scientifically fix the meaning of words before they are 
appropriated theologically, stems from Scotism rather than Thomism. Such foundationalism 
(as Milbank‘s later work emphasizes strongly) leads to an overly epistemological and 
‗semantic‘ approach to questions of ‗truth‘, being predicated upon Kantian theories of 
correspondence.261 As such, Milbank thinks that Burrell‘s interpretation of Aquinas‘s thought 
is located in a misreading of Thomas‘s idea of ‗participated perfections‘ (and ultimately his 
theology of creation), in which the ‗known‘ and ‗unknown‘ meaning of words are formed 
together, since (within contingency) our designations of being always remain within the 
tension of esse and essentia, where actualities can exceed notions of fixed ‗substance‘ and 
abstract ‗possibility‘. Aquinas‘s notion of ‗active potency‘, according to Milbank, effectively 
‗eschatologizes‘ reality, directing it towards the ‗super-addition‘ of divine grace (14).262 It 
follows from this that Aquinas does not give reasons why there is ‗being-in-general‘ (a 
Leibnizian question), nor is he interested in the Kantian question of whether being is merely a 
predicate or not.263 For Aquinas, ‗being-in-general‘ is disclosed through particular beings, 
who themselves participate in God, who is a ‗super-ordinate trans-essentiality‘ (14) that gives 
existence to beings themselves. Being, rather than being fixed and predetermined, is open and 
non-finalisable, since it participates in the infinitude of God. This constitutes the ontological 
ground for analogical language: for Aquinas ‗the possibility of analogy is grounded in this 
reality of participation in being and goodness. Analogy is not, for him, primarily a linguistic 
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 One can compare here the comments made by Milbank in ‗The Grandeur of Reason and the 
Perversity of Rationalism,‘ 388: ‗[Radical Orthodoxy] regards the linguistic turn as fundamentally 
correct, but does not read this in a quasi-transcendentalist way…as confining us all the more within 
finite limits, but rather as rendering the Kantian basis of securing these limits as ‗impossible‘ by 
undoing the Kantian ‗correlation‘ between a priori categories and a posteriori appearances, 
respectively established from independent sources.‘  
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 Also see John Milbank, ‗Faith, Reason and Imagination: The Study of Theology and Philosophy in 
the 21st Century.‘ Transversalités: Revue de l‘Institut Catholique de Paris 101.2 (2007): 69-86 (p. 82) 
for more comments on metaphysics and historicity, and its relation to the interplay between essence 
and existence. For a similar reading of Aquinas‘s notion of esse and essentia, see Josef Pieper, The 
Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays (London: Faber & Faber, 1957) and Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., 
‗Thomistic Realism?‘ Nova et Vetera, English Edition 8.4 (2010): 783–798.  
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 Cf. ‗Manifestation and Procedure,‘ 89: ‗Aquinas thinks that there can be no real or thought essence 
independent of unity or some degree of actuality. Thus he has…shown that the merely formal 
distinction of being and essence (which in modern times will be exacerbated to the view that ‗being is 
not a predicate‘ in Kant and Frege), by tending at once to existentialize essence and essentialise an 
empty existence, tends to fantasise their prising apart. By comparison, Aquinas clearly indicates that 
the real distinction involves no such virtually latent sundering‘. Kant‘s own discussion of this can be 
found in his critique of the ontological argument; cf. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A592-602 = 
B620-630.  
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doctrine, even if…it must become so for us – though not in a manner which persists in the 
transcendentalist illusion that a ‗semantic‘ account of analogy can be given before an 
ontological account of participation‘ (15). A Thomistic ‗metaphysics of participation‘ implies 
that all generalized ‗grammar‘ lies upon a truly theological foundation (in distinction from the 
tradition of Scotus), and that axiological language regarding degrees of ‗perfections‘ implies 
analogical participation.264  
In the second part, Milbank moves onto a discussion of how ‗liberal deontology‘ has 
entered into theology, here seeking to include Donald MacKinnon within this trajectory. 
According to Milbank, MacKinnon‘s work ‗straddles the boundary of the sublime‘, and ‗does 
so with more perplexity and more intensity than almost anyone else‘s‘. Milbank notes in 
MacKinnon‘s dual insistence on the category of ‗purgation‘ as merely a ‗descriptive‘ exercise 
in metaphysics, and the more ‗speculative‘ category of ‗illumination‘ which aims at ‗some 
sort of positive affirmation of transcendence‘. As such, MacKinnon attempts to articulate 
something like the analogy of attribution, but here through ‗a kenotic and tragic Christology‘. 
However, Milbank estimates that this bifurcation between ‗purgation‘ and ‗illumination‘ (like 
its Kantian counterpart) is problematic since ‗to conceive of purgation entirely as a prelude to 
illumination, or of ‗description‘ as a task innocent of speculation, may forestall illumination 
altogether, or else radically determine its instance‘ (18). Milbank‘s argumentation here is 
aimed at placing MacKinnon within a Kantian trajectory, as seen especially in MacKinnon‘s 
program of relating ethics to metaphysics. Following in the footsteps of Joseph Butler, 
MacKinnon suggests that ‗a deontological ethics requires qualification in so far as our 
conduct may be radically guided by attention to particular facts or particular persons regarded 
as embodying particular sets of values‘, and  that ‗metaphysics may have to become 
constitutive rather than merely regulative to the degree that our naturally-given metaphysical 
disposition cannot help assigning to this or that representation a better clue to ultimate reality 
than what is found elsewhere‘ (18). Butler is important for his metaphysico-ethical project 
because ‗MacKinnon effects a sort of Christological reworking of Butlerian analogy, such 
that the essential content of revelation tends to be reduced to a more intense affirmation of the 
essential ‗natural‘ limits of human existence as providing sufficient guidance for our lives‘ 
(19). 
However, Milbank thinks that this method exudes an unstable ‗freight of positivity‘, and 
links this heritage to the influence of the Anglican Henry Mansel,265 whereby natural law (in a 
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 Cf. Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 16.  
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 Of Mansel, Milbank writes (‗A Critique of the Theology of Right‘, 19) that he ‗was consequently 
anti-mystical and clearly stressed that the positive critical determination of the ‗limits of religion‘ and 
positive finite knowledge of revelation was opposed to any via negativa‘. This is because, as Don 
Cupitt has shown, Mansel equated orthodoxy with a form of ‗practical divinity‘, which he understood 
to be a purely ‗regulative‘ account of faith, eschewing all varieties of metaphysical ‗speculation‘. For 
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post-Suárezian manner266) achieves such an apex of importance that now the contents and 
‗facts‘ of revelation do not tell us anything new about the criteria of moral behaviour. This is 
not to forget the ‗critical‘ and ‗negative‘ procedure of Butlerian ethics that greatly influenced 
MacKinnon; however Milbank thinks that he is too quick in identifying this tradition with the 
via negativa (19).267 Additionally problematic for Milbank is MacKinnon‘s version of ‗realist 
pluralism‘, as drawn from G.E. Moore. In a passage worth quoting at length, Milbank argues 
that the tendency of ‗realist pluralism‘ is to insist that  
 
things can be adequately known and distinguished as they are in themselves without 
believing that their full determination awaits upon the infinity of relations they may 
have to everything else…This should adequately avoid any absolute determinism, 
because here there can be no ‗whole‘ distinct from the network of relationships, 
which are always relations of particular, distinguishable things. Certainly, to maintain 
this distinguishability, one needs to say that entities may be relatively discrete, 
relatively indifferent to certain relations in which they may fall. And yet even such 
indifference, such ‗resistance‘ can help negatively to determine what they are and 
what they become (19). 
 
Milbank does grant that Aristotelian ‗substance‘ is helpful in avoiding any ‗totalizing‘ picture 
of ―pure‘ process‘, but he suggests that ‗substance‘ should rather be understood as ‗a 
linguistic marker for certain patterns of narrative consistency in which, none the less, we can 
never identify any ‗underlying‘ constant element‘. MacKinnon‘s ‗non-dialectical‘ 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Mansel, God is fundamentally unknowable, and therefore theology is concerned with propounding 
practicable verities that are to be obeyed rather than thought. Since God is eminently un-cognizable, 
there can be no growth or development in theological knowledge, no coherent account of analogy, or 
any negative theology for that matter. It is not insignificant to notice here also that Mansel, through an 
adoption of a Kantian epistemology and its divorce between rationality and faith, assisted in the 
development of Victorian and theistic agnosticism. This current, drawing from the insights of Kant and 
Hamilton, contributed to the religious scepticism found in thinkers such as Hebert Spencer, T. H. 
Huxley and Sir Leslie Stephen. On Mansel‘s place within the history of British agnosticism, see 
Bernard Lightman, ‗Henry Longueville Mansel and the Origins of Agnosticism‘. History of European 
Ideas 5.1 (1984): 45-64. For his opposition to ‗speculation‘, see Don Cupitt, ‗Mansel's Theory of 
Regulative Truth‘. The Journal of Theological Studies 18.1 (1967): 104-126 
266
 See Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 19. The French jurist and philosopher Michel 
Villey confirms this picture of Suárez: in distinction from the Aristotelian, Roman and Thomist 
tradition, Suárez has an a priori, ‗systematic‘ and ‗rationalist‘ account of legality, in which jus 
becomes convertible with lex, and ‗right‘ has becomes equated with the subjective and individualist 
rights. Cf. Michel Villey, ‗Remarque sur la notion de droit chez Suarez‘. Archives de Philosophie, 42.2 
(1979): 219-227. It is this tradition, as Villey argues, that has led to a ‗juridical positivism‘, and a rather 
scientistic conception of law that fails to account for the reality of prudence and flexibility as essential 
to any exercise of legal judgement. He makes these arguments in Villey, ‗Epitome of Classical Natural 
Law‘. Griffith Law Review 9.1 (2000): 74-97 and ‗Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part II)‘. Griffith 
Law Review 10.1 (2001): 153-178.  
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appropriation of Aristotelian ‗substance‘ (here mediated through logical atomism) opens up 
aporias since it appears on the contrary that ‗things are, in fact, entirely constituted through 
networks of changing relationships‘, and that ‗the more one seeks to isolate them in their 
determinate finitude, the more their concreteness altogether escapes us, and their sheer 
particularity becomes paradoxically their only remaining property: a particularity about which 
we can say nothing‘, ‗with the result that for all practical purposes one particular becomes the 
same as all other particulars‘. This formalism leads ‗back to the Kantian things-in-themselves 
which turn out to be the economic and political equivalences of liberal, post-enlightenment 
society (19-20). 
MacKinnon‘s version of sublime speculation ultimately leads to Milbank‘s critique of his 
use of tragic themes. In addition to the existential focus on ‗the tragic‘ found in MacKinnon‘s 
work, Milbank speculates that there are additional reasons for MacKinnon‘s choice of such 
motifs. He suggests that ‗there may also be a disguised formalist reason for his concentration 
on this mode of narrative‘. He suggests that his election of this genre is based on a hyper-
realist ‗transcendence‘ that is ‗preoccupied with the Platonic notion of presence [rather] than 
with the Aristotelian version of telos‘. Such metaphysical concentration privileges a ‗tragic 
indecision which occasions a kind of exit from the narrative instead of remaining in the plot 
and seeking for resolutions‘. Milbank suggests that it is wrong to say ‗that MacKinnon simply 
discovers history to be tragic‘; rather, he ‗emplots history within a privileged tragic 
framework‘, hereby transforming ‗the categorical imperative itself into something very like 
the view that it is only in tragic perplexity that we know we are free, and at the same time are 
brought up against the very margins of the humanly responsible world‘. This imitates post-
Kantian and Schillerian trends, since it implies that we only discover our authenticity when 
‗we do not any longer know how to act, then we discover ourselves as transcendent subjects 
standing ‗above‘ our usual narratively instantiated characters. But this has to be read as an 
extremely subtle version of the aesthetics of the sublime, of the liberal discourse of 
modernity‘ (21). Rather than placing choices within an unfolding history, MacKinnon 
apparently converts tragic complexity and limit into a transcendentalized mode of ‗presence‘ 
that defies any narrative ‗solution‘. Rowan Williams captures Milbank‘s critique of 
MacKinnon succinctly. For Milbank, MacKinnon‘s moral philosophy aims to ‗naturalize‘268 
the tragic, since it is only within ‗the destructively conflicting absolutes of tragic decision that 
we discover the nature of our human responsibility‘. Milbank worries that MacKinnon ‗lacks 
a theory as to how non-destructive social practices may be created and maintained, and so is 
trapped in a standoff between purely individual motivation, with whatever integrity it can 
muster, and the inescapably corrupting and lethal realities of the public world‘. MacKinnon 
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therefore is unable to articulate thicker descriptions of Sittlichkeit, in which we come to 
recognize ‗the moral self in the other or in the communal discourse of humanity‘.269 Rather 
his tendency to treat tragic irresolution as a mode of ‗presence‘ seems to imply ‗a near-
Manichaean metaphysic‘, or even a ‗fundamental sickness or rupture in reality‘.270 For 
Milbank, the operative mode of ‗tragic narration‘ in Mackinnon leads to a denial of ‗the 
significance of narrative itself‘, in which human characters are able to ‗genuinely grow and 
change with the passage of time‘, implying an emptying of ‗the very idea of plot‘ since it fails 
to account for the reality of ‗change‘ that is bound up with ‗a sequence of narrated events‘. In 
MacKinnon‘s account, it seems, ‗nothing really alters‘.271 His transcendentalism avoids 
historical mediation, foreclosing its outcome before it has arrived.   
Milbank supports this by focusing on MacKinnon‘s ‗Butlerian‘ balancing of utilitarian and 
deontological claims, which he argues (in distinction from Kant) ultimately creates a kind of 
tragic conflict between privatized self-authenticity and public duty. In MacKinnon, such a 
‗conflict‘ is introduced as a ‗surd‘ element in the spheres of human interaction. This move is 
‗ahistorical‘ since it assumes ‗the permanence of the conflict between a public sphere of 
objective, and strictly equivalent justice and a private sphere of forgiving cancellation of 
fault‘ (22).272 Milbank is quick however to clarify that he is not chiding MacKinnon for his 
willingness to wrestle with tragic realities as such, but he does wonder whether ‗the ultimate 
Christian perspective may not be one of tragi-comic irony rather than unappeased tragedy‘. 
He wonders whether it might be possible ‗in retrospect…to determine our failure to attain the 
Aristotelian mean,‘ that is, to discern where ‗these sorts of conflicts…these sorts of ‗perverse 
upshots‘ of apparently desirable courses of action‘ may arise from. Might they be due ‗to a 
lack of integration in our society, or the lack of a sufficiently encompassing social 
imagination‘? To affirm this is to deny that evil is a necessary outcome, since ‗every evil is 
traceable to some lack, or perhaps rather to some sort of symbolic distortion, some imperfect 
vision‘ (22). But since MacKinnon appears to have problems with this move, Milbank thinks 
that his procedure discloses both his suspicion of the Augustinian privatio boni and his 
preference for modes of God-talk that espouse divine passibility. It seems then that a Kantian 
account of ‗radical evil‘ lurks in the background of MacKinnon‘s accounts of suffering. 273 
Additionally, an affirmation of divine passibility would appear to endorse an ontological 
determination of divine being by evil and suffering, leaving unclear how such a God could 
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 See Milbank, ‗Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 23-24. 
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 The Tragic Imagination, 109 
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 Ibid., 110.  
272
 For Milbank‘s account of forgiveness, one that seeks to engage the perspectives of Arendt, Derrida, 
and Jankélévitch, see John Milbank, Being Reconciled, 44-60.  
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 Milbank has stringently critiqued this Kantian tradition in a chapter entitled ‗Evil: Darkness and 
Silence‘, to be found in Milbank, Being Reconciled, 1-25.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
suffer evil in order to leave evil ‗behind‘.274 This position is ultimately entwined with a form 
of theodicy in which suffering is justified, and the tragic limits of the world are ontologically 
confirmed. For Milbank, ‗if evil is not a surd element outside the world-text which human 
beings write, then within this narrative it can be constantly re-enacted, re-presented, shown up 
as mere subjectivity, and so contained‘ (23). In other words: if evil is rational or has ‗being‘, 
then it can be justified. Milbank goes as far as to say that MacKinnon‘s kenotic Christology, 
arguably, is itself a form of theodicy, insofar as it involved the ‗making known of limits and 
of evil‘ (23) instead of rendering evil as nothingness, something that is to be eschatologically 
‗forgotten‘ rather than ‗known‘.  
Summarizing what we have said thus far: Milbank‘s concern (like Hart‘s) is implicated in 
his adherence to a ‗postmodern‘ retrieval of a traditioned, Christian account of metaphysics. 
Both see MacKinnon‘s penchant for tragedy as having dubious metaphysical and political 
outcomes. While Hart seems to emphasize, on a more general level, the negative floriations of 
‗tragic theology‘ (and its entwinement with a sacrificial economy), Milbank is focused on 
how a ‗Kantian‘ reception of tragedy within Christian thought leads to pessimism (i.e. ‗radical 
evil‘), a notion of theological metaphysics that is unable to account for historicity (due to its 
transcendentalist assumptions). Furthermore, it implies a minimalist account of political 
imagination that is focused largely on ‗authenticity‘ and negative liberty, as disclosed in 
dilemmas, while failing to articulate a robust account of common and distributive goods. 
Milbank suspects that MacKinnon‘s account of tragedy fails because of its ultimately 
‗speculative‘ and ‗transcendentalist‘ assumptions, since it insists (in a dogmatic fashion) on 
tragic necessities being inserted into stories, rather than being discovered in them, a tendency 
which precisely removes such narratives from their lived historicity and openness. This is not 
to say that Milbank gives no space for existential tragedy within his own thinking – his 
comments on the South African church struggle during Apartheid in the same essay counter-
act this assertion (30-31).275 Nor does it even imply that he is fundamentally opposed to 
nuanced ‗tragic theologies‘.276 He also contextualizes MacKinnon‘s polarization on 
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 Milbank also wonders whether accounts of divine passibility are subject to Rousseau‘s critique of 
sympathy, in the sense that it can displace the subjective, first-person dimension of suffering. Milbank 
also thinks that accounts of ‗divine passibility‘ can be partially deconstructed via Nietzsche‘s critique 
of Christianity‘s supposed glorification of sacrifice and weakness. For this, see Milbank, ‗Immutability/ 
Impassibility, Divine,‘ in Jean-Yves Lacoste (ed.), Encyclopedia of Christian Theology: Volume 2 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 760-762.  
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 Milbank‘s reference to the South African context is present in his earlier version of the same essay 
(cf. ‗Between Illumination and Purgation‘, 191), but has been removed in later version, due no doubt to 
the changed circumstances in the country since the early 1990‘s.    
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 Cf. Milbank‘s comments in ‗The Second Difference‘ in The Word Made Strange (p. 182): ‗If one 
claims, in the 'strong' sense, that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, then this can open the 
way to a tragic theology in which one sees that the fall takes away from God's own proper glory, and 
makes apparently unattainable the divine goal of absolute goodness‘. In passing, it should also be 
mentioned that David Toole has applied the rubric of ‗tragic theology‘ to Milbank‘s theology as a 
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deontology rather than on sittlich ethics as belonging to the fragmentation of Britain after the 
Second World War,277 a concession which does soften his stringent critique somewhat.  
Nevertheless, he continues to think that MacKinnon‘s metaphysics of ‗illumination‘ and 
‗purgation‘ is unable to reconcile historicism and metaphysics, and that this is due to his 
rejection of ‗the analogy of attribution‘ and its participatory metaphysics. Such is acutely 
apparent in his account of ‗the tragic‘, since it already claims to know in advance the limits of 
historical novelty, imagination and action before attending to the particularities of stories, and 
how narratives of suffering are reclaimed, re-imagined and re-worked. Again, this is due (in 
Milbank‘s view) to MacKinnon‘s Kantian ‗tragic piety‘, which is unable to think the 
historical ‗possibility of the ethical‘ since it ‗after all, evades the tragic, by hypostasizing it in 
a speculative fashion‘.278 Such a perspective locks us (here echoing Hart‘s concerns) into a 
metaphysics of sacrifice and scarcity that is unable to account for the ontological plenitude of 
divine generosity.279 Such a perspective, for Milbank, is the foundation for dubious ontologies 
of violence and unjust political arrangements, including liberalized capitalism (based as it is, 
ultimately, upon ‗the myth of scarcity‘). 
The concerns of Milbank and Hart have shown that there are several sites of contention and 
debate, namely (1) the relation of metaphysics to the question of history (as seen as pre-
eminently in the analogia entis), and how this relates to (2) the reception of Kantian 
metaphysics within MacKinnon‘s work (and tragic philosophy more generally). Here the 
question of how the tragic operates within MacKinnon‘s thinking becomes pertinent, and we 
should hope to discover whether the suspicions that both Hart and Milbank have are 
warranted. Of related concern is whether (3) ‗tragedy‘ as such participates in a sacrificial 
economy and if (4) Mackinnon‘s appropriation of the tragic within ethics leads either to a 
‗liberal‘ or ‗pessimist‘ mode of political reasoning. Additionally, there is the question of 
whether (5) MacKinnon underplays the resurrection in relation to tragic indeterminacy, and 
occludes the radical trans-valuation of death that Easter performs.  But also important for our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
whole (a description I am sure Milbank would have some qualms with, or at least would like to qualify 
drastically). On this see, David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on 
Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998). Also, cf. Catherine Pickstock, 
‗Reply to David Ford and Guy Collins‘. Scottish Journal of Theology 54.3 (2001): 405-422 (pp. 418-
419). However, preeminence should fall upon Milbank‘s own reflections in Being Reconciled, 138-161 
on ‗The Midwinter Sacrifice‘. Here Milbank seeks to redeem and radicalize the category of ‗moral 
luck‘ (echoing Bernard Williams) under the rubric of divine grace.   
277
 Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 30.  
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 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 149. He goes on to say, in the next sentence, that ‗Mackinnon failed to 
see that Speculative Idealism espoused exactly the romantic and not perhaps very Greek cult of the 
tragic, which he himself perpetuated – revealing thereby his own idealism despite all his explicit 
disavowals, rooted in his Kantianism‘.  
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 See John Milbank, ‗Enclaves, or Where is the Church?‘ New Blackfriars 73.861 (1992): 341–352 
(pp. 349-352). For a more nuanced account of sacrifice (one that is able to retrieve its insights, while 
acknowledging its potential pitfalls). Cf. Milbank, ‗Stories of Sacrifice‘. Modern Theology 12.1 (1996): 
27-56.  
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purposes are the cognate objections of Hart and Milbank relating to (6) theologies of divine 
suffering, and (7) the rejection of Platonic-Augustinian theory of evil-as-privation, and how 
these are connected to a post-Kantian mode of sublime speculation. Underlying all these 
questions is the problem of how Christian theology, narrates its specific account of God‘s 
transcendence since it relates to its analogical account of the creator-created, infinite-finite 
relation (1), and how this is to be distinguished from post-Kantian and postmodern theories of 
aesthetic sublimity (2). This classical recounting of divine transcendence, here presupposed 
and argued for by Hart and Milbank, also impinges upon (5), (6), and (7) since in different 
ways they are concerned about this fundamental question. Similarly, (3) and (4) concern the 
kind of transcendence here envisaged, and whether this is to be construed as malevolent or 
pessimistic. Such a vision underlies, according to Hart and Milbank, the sacrificial tendencies 
of the Greek polis, and ultimately – though with due respect to historical differences – the 
liberal order too.   
These are the main contentions which we hope to address in what is to follow. However, a 
detailed response to all of them would be difficult. For example, it would be difficult in the 
space provided to engage in some detailed readings of Attic tragedy, with the aim of showing 
that Hart‘s interpretations are simplistic. So since we are unable to address every issue here, 
we have decided to focus specifically on those critiques that relate to the research question, 
namely the relationship between metaphysics and the tragic, specifically as this relates to the 
grammars of transcendence. Here, once more, we can restate our research question: are their 
varieties of transcendence that make it harder for a classical metaphysics to appropriate the 
tragic? And if this is so, is there a systematic remedy? Can one conceptualize an orthodox 
account of transcendence (e.g. aseity, analogia entis, etc.) that is able to address the tragic in 
all seriousness, or is their relation strictly oppositional? There will be occasion along the way 
to address less pertinent objections and questions. But for the most part, the above node of 
concentration will serve as a guide for the way my arguments are spelled-out. My focus in the 
next chapter will be on MacKinnon‘s The Problem of Metaphysics, attempting here to 
structure its development according to that work‘s internal conjecture and argument, in light 
of the critical reception that we have just discussed.  
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Chapter 5 
Donald MacKinnon II:   
On Aporetics and Apophatics  
 
In this chapter, we begin to unpack the work of Donald MacKinnon, especially as it relates to 
his understanding of metaphysics, and how this inquiry relates to ‗the tragic‘. To gain a point 
of entry, we will focus pre-eminently on his Gifford Lectures. The structure of this text will 
provide a workable format in which to trace the wider contours of his rather complex and 
multifarious argument, spread over a diversity of published work. We cannot however avoid 
some detours in order to understand more fully his progression as it relates to those thinkers 
who informed him. In particular, we shall have to deal with the legacies of Aristotle and Kant 
as they impact his argument. We suggest here that MacKinnon‘s dependence on Aristotle‘s 
aporetics of substance provides an enlightening entrance into his metaphysics, firstly in that it 
privileges particularity as the starting-point for abstraction, and secondly in that it does not 
resolve the tension between these movements. Universality segues into minutiae and proceeds 
from them too. But this tradition is complicated by the fact that Aristotle‘s Prime Mover has 
no connection to the material particularity of things. When this is combined with an atomism 
of substance – after G.E. Moore – the metaphysical connectedness between things is rendered 
opaque, as is their relationship to the divine. Moreover, on top of this, MacKinnon adopts a 
Kantian apophatics without analogical participation. Following Aristotle and Plato‘s 
Parmenides, MacKinnon rejects methexis as a resolution to the problems of predication – of 
how we come to know distinct things – since it simply pushes the dilemma into a regression 
(the Third Man Argument).280 Similarly, after Kant, MacKinnon thinks that ‗being‘ cannot be 
a predicate considered as something added to essence (Kant‘s Critique of the Ontological 
Argument).281 Like the previous argument, it says that duplication does not clarify anything. 
On the contrary, ‗being‘ is simply a positing, that is, a judgement about concrete existence. To 
be does not add anything to the essence of things, but just describes there sheer presence. For 
MacKinnon and Kant, to speak of ‗being‘ as a predicate is just tautology.  
 MacKinnon initiates his discussion in The Problem of Metaphysics (PM) by embarking on 
an exposition of Kant and Aristotle, who serve as examples of ‗descriptive metaphysics‘ (a 
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 See Alvin Plantinga, ‗Kant's Objection to the Ontological Argument‘. The Journal of Philosophy 
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phrase borrowed from P. F. Strawson).282 MacKinnon‘s estimation of them is that they ‗both 
carried out systematic enquiries aimed at laying bare the most fundamental and pervasive 
features of the world around us, the manner in which those features are interrelated and the 
identity and nature of those concepts revealed by analysis to be involved in all descriptive and 
referential discourse‘ (PM, 1).283 For Kant, metaphysics is that systematic framing of any 
conceivable and objective world within repeatable structures, so that for any world to appear 
to us it must take place within such forms (this is Kant‘s ‗transcendental deduction‘). They 
cannot be observed but must be presupposed to make sense of the world, that is, they must be 
a priori synthetic judgements. These patterns are articulated as the ineradicable setting of our 
‗recognitional capacities‘, which are further subdivided into the first and second order 
concepts of ‗understanding‘. The latter of these is defined as being an activity of ‗pure‘ 
cognition whereby the human mind or subject seeks to relate, abstractly, the various features 
of the world as it presents itself (PM, 2-4).284 Such structures are conceptualized by Kant 
within those elemental laws of constancy and constraint which are foundational for any 
coherent or rational understanding of the world (PM, 4-6). However, these consistencies need 
to be chastened, according to Kant, when we move from the immanent to the transcendent 
realm, since we cannot simply ‗estimate the relations of the conditioned to the unconditioned, 
the relative to the absolute‘ (PM, 7), that is, by applying the concepts of ‗substance‘ and 
‗causality‘ beyond the phenomenal plane of perception. For MacKinnon, such a metaphysical 
reserve acts as a of theologia negativa within the logics of transcendentalism.  
MacKinnon is at pains throughout to emphasize that the Kantian deduction of experience 
should not be understood in a non-realist fashion, as if such structures in the world were there 
merely ‗for us‘ and not inherent within what-is-perceived. For Kant, ‗neither understanding 
nor imagination creates its own objects‘, since ‗to come to know what is the case is a finding, 
not a fashioning‘ (PM, 7). MacKinnon‘s predisposition here is towards the priority of 
‗discovery‘ over fabrication, and is aimed at preserving a sense of the objectivity or over-
against-ness of reality. Such empiricism cannot be conceived apart from creative assimilation 
and conjecture, even though MacKinnon is strident that the mind does not create what 
confronts it. This sits in tension with Kant‘s general ‗anthropocentricism‘, but MacKinnon is 
quick to add that Kant‘s awareness of the inherent finitude of reason can also be 
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 The phrase is found chiefly in P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1959). Strawson distinguished two kinds of metaphysical 
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commandeered for theological purposes, since conceptualization should not transgress the 
bounds of sense (PM, 9).  
For Aristotle, the question hinges on the relation between ‗being‘ and ‗substance‘, in which 
‗the categories of being‘ are considered as ‗a developing series‘ in which ‗substance‘ is ‗the 
most fundamental form of being‘ (PM, 10-11). Philosophical reflection on substantiality 
implies that ‗The whole pattern of our conceptual organisation is pivoted on that which exists 
of itself‘ (PM, 12), that is, with the nature of things, and what they essentially are. Seeking to 
defend Aristotle against Collingwood (cf. PM, 10, 12), MacKinnon argues that ‗for Aristotle 
being is not a generic universal, but a transcendental one which manifests a peculiar sort of 
analogical unity‘, a unity which is ‗identified in the end with the most fundamental sorts of 
things there are in the world, in the peculiar dependence of lower form upon higher‘ (PM, 12-
13). Such analogical predication implies that existence is not ‗univocal‘ since this would 
obfuscate the manifoldness of existing things. Metaphysical reflection on the proliferate 
diversity of being, in Aristotle, is understood to be a combination of ‗analytic‘ and 
‗speculative‘ procedures, since the ontological foundations of experience are not enclosed 
within febrile certainty, but instead appear in a confusion of the ‗extremely elusive‘ and the 
‗extremely familiar‘ – hence the need for analogy (PM, 14). But important to note is that 
MacKinnon‘s preference is ultimately for Plato and Kant‘s ‗negative theology‘ over 
Aristotelian analogy: in his eyes, anthropomorphism is the graver religious temptation when 
compared to aphasia. It is shortly hereafter that MacKinnon expresses a tacit agreement with 
Aristotle‘s critique of the Platonic ideas, and his account of methexis (PM, 18), despite his 
worry that the Stagirite remains overconfident in his relating of ‗ontological analysis‘ and 
‗cosmological theology‘ (PM, 14-16).   
The above delineation gives some sense of MacKinnon‘s appreciation of Kant and 
Aristotle. But since MacKinnon has developed these readings in more detail elsewhere, we 
will engage these texts before returning again to PM, since the influence of these respective 
thinkers is essential for understanding his intellectual habits more generally.  
 
5.1. Aristotle’s Aporeticism: On Substance 
  
For Aristotle, to know the particular is difficult since the essence (or ‗what-ness‘) of things 
remains elusive. To grasp concrete examples involves the persistent labour of description and 
re-evaluation; it is because of this that the individual remains ‗aporematic‘ (or ‗difficult‘). The 
abstraction of real entities involves establishing the essential and the universal, while not 
avoiding the accretions of the accidental and contingent. In the process of reflection, Aristotle 
argues, one intuits the intelligible Forms of nature, thereby excavating their connection to 
material composition, while always seeking to connect these discoveries to their ultimate 
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reason-for-being (ηὸ ηί ἦν εἶναι). Such implies a cosmos teleologically-orientated towards 
conceptualization, a movement that imitates the supreme intelligence and self-understanding 
of the Prime Mover itself.285 It is this dynamic that informs the unending experimentation and 
exploration at the basis of Aristotle‘s inquiry into ‗substance‘.  
Aristotle recognized that ‗being‘ had multiple instances (Metaphysics VI.1026a34ff.). But 
as MacKinnon says, such diversity is unified in accordance with an ‗analogous polarisation‘ 
on the idea of ‗substance‘: ‗The metaphysician‘s subject matter can be…properly identified 
with substance as the nuclear realisation of being quâ being‘.286 MacKinnon understands 
‗substance‘ within the divisions given in the Categories, a project that requires an open-ended 
empiricism inspired by observation. For him, Aristotelian metaphysics seeks to relate this 
experimentation to the ultimate causes of particularities, including ousia. MacKinnon 
articulates the contemporaneity of this project by juxtaposing it with G. E. Moore‘s essay on 
external and internal relations.287 This essay, as biographical details make clear,288 was 
instrumental in MacKinnon‘s turn towards philosophical realism, and so its appearance is not 
arbitrary. Encapsulating Moore‘s rather dense argument, one could say that he sought to 
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207 and Heike Seifrin-Weis, ‗Pros hen and the Foundations of Aristotelian Metaphysics‘. Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2009): 261-285.  
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 G. E. Moore, ‗External and Internal Relations,‘ in Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1922), 276-309.  
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 Cf. André Müller, Donald M. MacKinnon (1913-94): An Intellectual Biography (forthcoming). I 
thank André for giving me access to these texts. In this regard, one should also mention that 
MacKinnon once said that ‗Moore made it possible for me to be a realist…for the logical atomist, there 
were things with which men [sic] were coming to terms; the world was not simply an expression of 
their immanent rationality, but something given (MacKinnon, ‗Philosophy and Christology,‘ in 
Borderlands of Theology, 63).  
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critique the idealism of F. H. Bradley, and in particular the proposal that all relations are 
‗intrinsical‘, in the sense that all relational propositions are ‗internal‘ to their logical object. 
The problem of such universalized relations is that it disallows any excessiveness or 
externality within the world of objects, since every procedure of interrelation between objects 
or propositions is incorporated into their essential definition. It is a closed system. On this 
model, a lack of a relational property (not-p) necessarily entails the non-deducibility of a 
particular object (not-A).289 In other words, any predicate is metaphysically inseparable from 
its object. However, for Moore, deducibility is not limited to relational properties. Logically-
speaking, nothing prevents us from discovering realities that exceed or are non-reducible to 
any supposed relational predicate. Things may exist without being defined or predetermined 
by something else. This move assists philosophical analytics insofar as it seeks to discover 
what each particular thing is, without its connection to anything else. Butler‘s statement that 
‗everything is what it is and not another thing‘ was a reference-point for MacKinnon here.290 
For instance, I may stop to examine a pear, but the pear is not changed through my 
examination of it, or (as Wallace Stevens would have it): ‗…The pears are not viols / Nudes 
or bottles. / They resemble nothing else…The shadows of the pears / Are blobs on the green 
cloth. / The pears are not seen / As the observer wills.‘291 Without this excessiveness, it is 
difficult to avoid monism and totalization, that is, a denial of ‗externality‘, since all ‗external‘ 
or contingent relations become ‗necessary‘ conditions. For Moore, on the contrary, while 
‗internal‘ relations are ‗necessary‘ for certain objects, ‗external‘ relations are simply a 
question of facticity.292 One cannot presuppose in every case that one relation implies the 
other, since the variables or (f)x of any predication indicates an openness to temporality, and 
therefore cannot be comprehensively prejudged.293 I can know certain truths without knowing 
others, and I can know all the propositions that make such a truth possible, without deducing 
the particular truth in question. Truths are the product of empirical discovery and case-by-
case examination.  
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 For a summary of MacKinnon‘s understanding of Moore‘s argument, see Rowan Williams, ‗Trinity 
and Ontology,‘ in On Christian Theology, 148-154.  
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Bishop Butler, (ed.) David E. White (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 44. This motto 
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 Wallace Stevens, ‗Study of Two Pears,‘ in Collected Poems (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), I.2-4; 
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 See Moore, ‗External and Internal Relations,‘ 302-303. The potential atomistic and positivistic 
outcomes of such a procedure should, however, also be emphasized, but they were, to a certain extent, 
questioned already by MacKinnon himself who spoke of ‗the logical mythology of ‗atomic 
propositions‘ corresponding with ‗atomic facts‘‘. He nonetheless still emphasized the core of the 
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This reveals why MacKinnon compares logical atomism to ousia. Since ‗substance‘, or 
more specifically, ‗primary substance‘, constitutes the first ‗category of being‘ for 
Aristotle,294 it follows that what is ‗substantial exists of itself‘, and that ‗whatever else there 
is, whatever fundamental modes of being there are, all are relative to substance‘.295 The 
addition of accidents or ‗secondary substance‘ to primary substance is essential thereafter for 
differentiations within the categories of knowledge. But a lingering question remains: ‗What 
is it that makes an individual thing an individual thing?‘296 This remains a reoccurring node of 
contention within Aristotelian scholarship: according to one view ‗the individuating factor‘ is 
the ‗bare substratum‘ to which accidents added,297 and in another it is precisely the factor of 
‗secondary substance‘ that individuates the ‗substratum‘. For MacKinnon, it is the latter 
perspective that is able to account for the ‗concrete realisations of the features of our world 
that in their severalty make up that world‘.298 MacKinnon, however, believes there is a textual 
indeterminacy within Aristotle regarding ‗individuation‘ that appears to say that we can have 
‗primary substance‘ as bare materiality without form. But he contends that individuation, in 
the mature Aristotelian perspective, is concerned rather with a concrete existent, with a 
determinate ‗this‘ (ηόδε ηι299) that cannot be thought apart from material instantiation and 
form.300 As a result of this indeterminacy, it appears – paradoxically – that the hylomorphic 
compound is ontologically prior to what constitutes it.301 There remains an aporia here, as 
MacKinnon notes, since there is a latent tendency somewhat to assert formalization at the 
expense of concreteness. One can see this tendency in Aristotle‘s statement that ‗being is not 
the substance of anything‘, meaning that existence (that something is) and essence (what 
something is) are quite different (Posterior Analytics II.7.92 b13-14).  
The doctrine of substance, as MacKinnon summarizes, is ‗an attempt to lay the foundations 
of the doctrine of degrees of being at the level of the humdrum and the everyday‘,302 and so is 
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 MacKinnon, ‗Aristotle‘s Conception of Substance,‘ 100.  
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297
 Ibid.  
298
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 For Aristotle, ‗The doctrine of a ‗this‘ shows that the form is individual and is identified per se with 
the singular thing as its act‘ (Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics, 399).  
300
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the first within the categories of being. This should not lead us to confuse substance with a 
generic essence,303 since substance is tied to particularity.304 Nonetheless, ‗substance‘ – not to 
be confused here with Locke‘s ‗substratum‘305 – is concerned with the question of what-is-
the-case, and should therefore be related to facticity (as MacKinnon suggests). The ‗realism‘ 
of such a position is important for him in that it serves to support the general trustworthiness 
of mental ‗reference‘, the fundamental other-directedness of human thinking.306 Echoing the 
poet and theorist J. H. Prynne, one could say that Aristotle‘s notion of ‗substance‘ exhibits for 
MacKinnon both the qualities of ‗difficulty‘ and ‗resistance‘.307 The world is not merely of 
our making but surprises us in its novelty.  
MacKinnon is aware that the relation between theology and ontology within Aristotle‘s 
Metaphysics remains tricky: is metaphysics primarily theological? Or are they distinct 
sciences? Both of these remain debated questions within scholarship (up to the present day). 
MacKinnon thinks that Aristotle‘s reflections on ‗substance‘ cannot be separated from his 
thoughts on the Unmoved Mover, and that his ‗ontology‘ is inextricably concerned with the 
interrelation between particularity and universality (a theme that is particularly important for 
Christian theology, as can be seen in the ancient debates regarding the ὁμοούζιος).308 Such 
sentiments seem to underscore for Aristotle, in distinction from more modern treatments, that 
‗metaphysics‘ cannot be separated from ‗first philosophy‘. As has been suggested already, the 
subordination of theology-as-first philosophy to the science of being qua being remains 
problematic for Christian orthodoxy.309 But whether Aristotle ultimately makes this onto-
theological move is, however, subject to continuing speculation.310  
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 Ibid., 115: ‗Although primary substance, that is substance in the sense of self-existence, is prior to 
essence, yet without essence the self-existent lacks that which renders it determinate.‘ 
304
 Ibid., 109.  
305
 MacKinnon thinks (‗Aristotle‘s Conception of Substance,‘ 114) that Locke‘s notion of the 
‗substratum‘ has led to a wide misinterpretation of Aristotle‘s doctrine of substance. He considers 
Aristotle‘s own teaching to be more subtle and open-ended. On the translation of οὐζία, substantia, and 
essentia, Joseph Owens writes ‗The English word ‗substance‘ is…unsatisfactory as a rendition of the 
Greek term…‘Substance‘ fails to express the direct relation with Being denoted by οὐζία. It can be, 
moreover, very misleading. Because of Locke‘s influence, ‗substance‘ in English philosophical usage 
strongly suggests exactly what its etymology designates. It conjures up the notion of something 
‗standing under‘ something else. The background is the view of accidents ridiculed by Malebranche. 
Such a perspective inevitably falsifies the Aristotelian οὐζία and ends up reifying the accidents as in 
Locke‘ (Owens, The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics, 144). Eric Perl suggests that we 
translate ousia with the word ‗reality‘ (cf. Perl, Thinking Being, 82-89).  
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The above excursion has shown that MacKinnon‘s reading of Aristotle aims to incorporate, 
though not uncritically, the latter‘s aporetics within a larger project of descriptive and realist 
metaphysics. Aristotle‘s ‗particularism‘ had resonance for him since it proffered an empirical 
engagement with the world that resisted the grand narratives of idealism.311 It also provided a 
fecund comparison with contemporary theories of logical atomism. That said, however, 
MacKinnon‘s particularism should not be overly-emphasized. As André Müller has argued, 
already in the Signpost pamphlets,312 MacKinnon placed empiricism within a broader 
universalizing thrust, without which no ‗particular‘ could be rightly understood. This means 
that any attention to particularity required an attention to its wider context (MacKinnon had 
learned the lessons of Hegel). 
But some disquiet can be admitted regarding MacKinnon‘s appropriation of Aristotle. For 
some, the paring of Aristotle and Moore exhibits MacKinnon‘s ‗residual tenderness‘ towards 
‗atomist realism‘, which (as Rowan Williams has suggested313) has a trouble in accounting for 
the constructive element of discovery, and displays an overly ‗modern‘ theory of subject-
object dichotomy. It tacitly works with an idea of objects existing out there, existing as brute 
facts or stable essences just waiting to be discovered. As we will see later, MacKinnon desires 
to overcome such duality, in a blending of creativity with discovery, but his appropriation of 
Moore at this point probably does not help his cause. His position has difficulty accounting 
for a stronger interrelation between the observer and the observed, between mind and world. 
Ultimately here, MacKinnon appears to rely too much on what has come to be called ‗the 
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Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics, passim.   
310
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 Donald MacKinnon, God the Living and the True (London: Dacre Press, 1940); MacKinnon, The 
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myth of the given‘.314 Milbank similarly states that in order ‗to maintain [the] 
distinguishability [of things], one needs to say that entities may be relatively discrete, 
relatively indifferent to certain relations in which they may fall‘. But one must also add that 
‗even such indifference, such ‗resistance‘, can help negatively to determine what they are and 
what they become.‘315 MacKinnon‘s objectivism, on these accounts, appears to render 
‗substance‘ as simply a continuum of stabilized objects that exist apart linguistic description, 
leaving the impression that we are dealing simply with discrete items of knowledge that exist 
without any necessary connection to intelligent formation. In the words of Graham Ward, the 
idea that ‗the world‘ (or ‗substance‘ in our case) simply ‗asserts its own reality‘, is predicated 
upon an ‗atomism‘ in which ‗ultimate reality is found in the independence of each atom 
asserting its own self-enclosed being‘316 – a belief which engenders a primacy of the 
individual, as Ward also makes clear.  
There are also lingering questions about the coherency of Aristotle‘s project in relation to 
Christian metaphysics, since Aristotle‘s account of individuation (as scholars such as Adrian 
Pabst have argued317) denies a relation between the Prime Mover and the individuation of 
material being. God is understood here as having a ‗final‘ causal relation to being, but is 
absolved from its ‗formal‘, ‗material‘ constitution, and even (potentially) its ‗efficient‘ 
causality.318 These concerns are echoed by Philipp Rosemann who argues that Aristotle‘s 
notion of ‗form‘ lacks an openness to historical development, and has difficulty explaining 
vertical causality within the cosmological hierarchy.319 Milbank says that Aristotle ‗thought 
that the eidē were perfectly stable within the material, temporal world, without participation 
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in transcendence‘.320 The obvious problems this makes for any analogical relating of divine to 
created being are clear, since particularities are not intrinsically related to their transcendent 
source.  
It seems plausible to suggest then that MacKinnon‘s appropriation of Aristotle, against his 
intentions to correct dogmatic Kantianism, might actually hinder him from tracing those 
ontological intimacies between created and uncreated being that a more Catholic account of 
analogical participation might espouse. To be sure, MacKinnon might have been perfectly 
happy with this because, as we have seen,321 he remained somewhat uncomfortable with 
‗analogy‘, since it ran the risk of metaphysical domestication. But what our investigation has 
shown is that MacKinnon and Aristotle are even closer in their substantial positions than first 
appears. Both emphasise particularity and empirical discovery, as manifest in Aristotle‘s 
thoughts on substance and the multiple modes of being, and in MacKinnon‘s atomist realism 
and pluralist metaphysic. Aristotle struggles to comprehend an individuation that is relational 
and historical, while MacKinnon leans towards an ‗objectivism‘ that has difficulty (at least 
prima facie) in accounting for the constructive element of perception. Both also have 
difficulties relating finite being to infinite being: Aristotle has no account of creation, while 
MacKinnon (like Aristotle322) denies analogical participation, as we will see shortly.   
But what is salient for our purposes is the way that Aristotelian ontology remains unclear in 
answering the question of the Prime Mover‘s relation to materiality. In a similar way, one 
could ask whether MacKinnon‘s suspicions of analogy create problems as regards the 
ontological connection between God and created being, and moreover, how contingency is 
reflective of divine infinity. Lacking a notion of analogical participation, the immanent order 
becomes empty of intrinsic divine signification, while God‘s action comes to be viewed as an 
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external ‗intervention‘ in the created order. Yet by construing things so, it becomes hard to 
avoid the charge of theological domestication, since God is construed here as a spatialised and 
ontic being – ontologically greater, but still within the realm of finite causes, since God 
remains ‗outside‘ and contrasted with finitude. MacKinnon misconstrues theological analogy 
as endangering transcendence, whereas the analogy of being (since Lateran IV) has been 
conceptualized as a negative theology. Thus to avoid ‗anthropomorphism‘, one actually needs 
analogical participation to steer through the pitfalls of hyper-transcendence and pantheistic 
reduction (as Erich Przywara cogently argued323).  Finally, MacKinnon‘s apparent dis-ease 
with Platonic methexis and his agreement with ‗the Third Man Argument‘ have their own 
problems. Gregory Vlastos has argued,324 after repeating a presentation of the critique of 
Forms in Parmenides, that infinite regression is not applicable to Platonic metaphysics. While 
the ‗separation‘ (τφριζμός) between ‗appearances‘ and their transcendent ‗forms‘ is certainly 
Platonic, an asseveration within the forms themselves is not supported by the mature Plato (as 
confirmed by Alexander Nehemas).325 From this it is suggested that while Aristotle‘s critique 
of the Platonic ideas is damaging to a certain Platonism, such criticisms were anticipated by 
Plato himself.    
We still need to explore some other reasons why MacKinnon had reservations regarding 
analogical participation. He did not always have such reservations: some of his earlier texts 
have an explicit openness to Thomistic accounts of analogy. However, there does appear to be 
a progressive weakening of its hold in his thinking, for reasons that seem primarily Kantian in 
origin. This story needs to be traced further to make sense of this change.  
 
5.2. Kant’s Agnosticism: The De-Ontologizing of Analogy 
 
Kant‘s presence in MacKinnon‘s corpus is widely apparent.326 It is the goal of this section to 
give background to MacKinnon‘s reception of Kantian ideas anterior to and around the time 
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of the Gifford Lectures, with a particular focus on its influence on his account of analogy. At 
this stage, the weight of commentary lies on those texts in which Kantian metaphysics is 
prominent, while bearing in mind that MacKinnon viewed Kant‘s ethics and metaphysics as 
being holistically entwined (since for Kant ‗ethics and religion are almost identified‘327). My 
focus now is to show that MacKinnon‘s digestion of Kantian scepticism played an integral 
role in his own project, and contributed to a gradual disinvestment in analogical metaphysics, 
a process that occurs gradually through a permeation of Kantian criticism, as well as a 
residual anti-Platonism that rejected ‗existence‘ as a predicate of things. For Kant, ‗being‘ 
was merely the product of a judgement that something existed, and was not a trait added onto 
‗essence‘. Something either exists or it does not: ascribing ‗being‘ to its ‗essence‘ is simply 
pleonastic. With this assumption at hand, the idea that one could ascribe degrees of being or 
talk about an analogical participation in being is rendered nonsensical. The so-called analogy 
of attribution (analogia atrributionis), central to Aquinas‘s metaphysics, is excluded outright.   
In a Signpost pamphlet, MacKinnon wrote that Kant had bequeathed ‗relativism‘328 into 
Western thinking, particularly in the doctrine of categories.329 Such a tradition seemed to 
occlude the awareness that our finitude might be dependent on, and answerable to, a higher 
order of accountability. On this score, MacKinnon said that the task of metaphysics was to 
indicate an ‗ultimate‘ which relativizes contingent and limited perspectives. Here MacKinnon 
expressed admiration for the doctrine of analogy as a ‗formal schematization in metaphysical 
terms of the creature-creator relation‘, and open to a ‗dynamical‘ and even the ‗dialectical‘ 
nature of this engagement. It acknowledged that creaturely ‗likeness‘ could only be 
understood within a greater ‗unlikeness‘ (here echoing the maior dissimilitudo of Lateran 
IV).330 In a piece written around the same period,331 MacKinnon sought to recover 
‗metaphysics‘ within the debates of phenomenalism and logical positivism. MacKinnon was 
concerned here to demonstrate the limitations of focusing only on what physical sensation 
gives us. For him, metaphysics provides us with an encompassing matrix into which physical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Tony McWalter (eds.), Kant and His Influence (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 348-
66.  
327
 ‗Metaphysical and Religious Language,‘ 219.  
328
 Cf. God, the Living and the True. See especially the sections entitled ‗The Paradox of Revelation‘ 
and ‗Renewal of Understanding‘. This specific quotation can be found in Donald MacKinnon, Kenotic 
Ecclesiology: Select Writings of Donald M. MacKinnon, (eds.) John C. McDowell and Scott Kirkland 
(Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2016), 57.  
329
 While maintaining a transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant nevertheless advanced a form 
of the correspondence theory of truth. Cf. Kant, The Critique of Reason, A820-821= B848-849. 
MacKinnon himself held to a version of this idea (though not uncritically). On this, see MacKinnon, 
‗The Christian Understanding of Truth,‘ in Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty, 35-43.  
330
 MacKinnon, Kenotic Ecclesiology, 80. 
331
 MacKinnon, ‗What is a Metaphysical Statement?‘ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 41 (1940-
1941): 1-26.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
sensations are to be placed, apart from which they lose sensibility.332 He provided a critique of 
the positivist tradition, attempting to show that metaphysics cannot be written off as an 
‗impossible‘ enterprise (as A. J. Ayer would have it333). Instead, metaphysics is required for 
the preservation a moral and intellectual integrity.334 MacKinnon‘s point here is that without 
some kind of metaphysical compass, moral positions have no deeper basis in reality as such, 
beyond the conclusion that they are just mental impositions. This idealistic deduction stands 
in contrast to a ‗pluralist metaphysics‘ that attends to the particular and to the irreducibly 
different kinds of ‗facts‘ that appear in the world. Following Aristotle, MacKinnon stated that 
the ‗pluralist metaphysician‘ is concerned with conceptualizing ‗the self-subsistent‘335 and 
‗the reality of the individual‘.336 Such a metaphysician seeks to emulate a ‗healthy respect for 
the particularity of the individual, which continually militates against that besetting 
philosophical sin of reducing types of entity to terms of one another.‘337 Once more, Moore‘s 
critique of Bradley lingers in the background. Especially important for MacKinnon here is 
how an idealist or monistic metaphysics struggle to account for the specificities of selfhood 
and created particularity, while a pluralist metaphysic, on the contrary, could do so. 
Furthermore, pluralism makes space for ‗analogical‘ thinking, in the Aristotelian sense of 
making comparisons between different modes of being, rather than the Thomistic account of 
analogical participation as such.338 Following on from this anti-idealism, MacKinnon sought 
to wrestle with ‗phenomenalism‘ and specifically the influence of Kant on this tradition. 339 
Kant proposed that experiences only occur within a priori structures,340 apart from which any 
notion of ‗experience‘ as becomes unintelligible, a move which has affinities to the idea of a 
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‗charmed circle‘, since it is precisely through transcendentally-deduced categories that 
‗experience‘ is conceived.341 The importance of these aprioristic structures is inseparably tied 
to subjectivity and the question of freedom.342  
Kant‘s doctrine of categories – as a mode of structuring human experience within certain 
limits – remains important for MacKinnon decades before the Gifford Lectures. But what is 
interesting to note at this stage is MacKinnon‘s openness towards ‗Catholic‘ modes of 
analogical thinking. For instance, in ‗The Function of Philosophy in Education (1941)‘, he 
affirms that ‗we are metaphysical animals, naturally curious, with minds open to comprehend 
the analogy of our being with that of our Creator‘.343 In another essay from the same year, he 
has many positive things to say about this: ‗The process of analogical thinking whereby the 
human understanding schematizes to itself the dependence of all things on the sovereign will 
of the Creator, who called them de nihilo is complicated and subtle, yet the ultimate insight of 
the doctrine of that what is, depends utterly upon God for its being, but is utterly unnecessary 
to Him for His‘. He concludes that ‗St. Thomas was right in his insistence on the ultimacy of 
ontology‘, and that ‗Only if we are prepared to admit that analogy of being…can we hope in 
any sense…to achieve theology‘.344 MacKinnon concurs that the analogia entis is a 
manifestation of ‗Thomist agnosticism‘, and he understands well that for this theology ‗The 
via negativa inevitably precedes the via eminentiae in the ordered process of our thought of 
God. Only thus can the worse of Kantian antinomies be avoided‘. But he also stresses that we 
‗can and must affirm a radical discontinuity between God and man‘.345 Under the influence of 
Jacques Maritain, MacKinnon seeks to connect the analogical, as regards divine-human 
relations, to the human self-reflection of a ‗moral agent‘ in which we try to grasp the ‗unity‘ 
of our ‗nature‘ as a kind of ‗norm‘. For MacKinnon, to be sure, ‗The character of that norm 
may be very obscurely grasped‘, since ‗its character [is] analogical, capable of a multiplicity 
of diverse realizations in modes proportionate to a multiplicity of divergent historical 
situations‘. But ‗it is only in and through an act of specifically metaphysical (that is 
analogical) thought that man [sic] can thus achieve the concept of his ‗nature‘ whether or no 
[sic] the impulse to perform that act be derived from acceptance of the Gospel‘.346 This is part 
of MacKinnon‘s ‗Catholic‘ (and also Butlerian) attempt to connect moral reflection to ‗the 
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ethical importance of desire‘, and constitutes a critique of the deontological tradition which 
attempted to articulate an ‗abstract moralism‘347 apart from our created and historical 
constitution. Thus regarding the task of metaphysics, he says that it is not an ‗achievement of 
a theoretically satisfying system, such as certain forms of monism have claimed to provide. It 
was the derivation of the contingent from the necessary, but the question of why the necessary 
should thus have generated the contingent remained always unanswered‘. He goes on to say 
that  
 
We are utterly unnecessary for [God], we cannot make our existence (unless we deny 
its character) a matter of any necessity whatsoever, yet we cannot deny that through 
revelation the character of our relation to God is profoundly illuminated by the 
disclosure in an act, that is necessary to its achievement, of His relation to us…if we 
refuse to allow that, in any sense, the schematization in analogical terms of the whole 
creature-creator relation is possible we will inevitably restrict the sphere of that 
relation. Unless one supposes that relation is grounded ontologically, one will put the 
Anknüpfungspunkt of creature and creator in some isolated capacity of the former, 
whose relation to his whole nature is not clearly definable. Students of Kantian 
philosophy will remember that at the last the problem of the relation of the 
phenomenal and noumenal self is unsolved.348  
 
The last line is revealing: it appears to show that MacKinnon considers the analogia entis, at 
this juncture of his development, to be a metaphysical alternative to Kantian phenomenology. 
This shows that MacKinnon already was by no means a dogmatic Kantian. But in addition to 
Kant, attention should also be directed to the fact that Barth – as mediated through his debate 
with Brunner – already had a significant influence on MacKinnon (as the reference to the 
Anknüpfungspunkt shows). He overtly states that ‗I incline somewhat in a Barthian direction 
myself‘, thereby affirming the Lutheran-Reformed perspective that ‗nature…is wounded 
almost beyond recognition‘.349 What these passages show is that MacKinnon was trying to 
articulate a via media between two agnosticisms: on the one hand, the epistemological 
strictures of Kant and Barth,350 and on the other, the apophatics of Thomas.  
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A few years after this (1947), MacKinnon wrote an essay detailing the importance of Kant 
for theology.351 His intention was to recover Kantian (and Thomistic) agnosticism against the 
‗Hegelian absolutism‘ then making its appearance within British thought. In MacKinnon‘s 
perspective, Kant is important for his implicit negative mode of metaphysical inquiry, insofar 
as he emphasised the limits posed for sensibility as it approximated ‗the unconditioned‘.352 
This inquiry is constantly renewed in view of our time-bound consciousness353 – a move that 
is a part of MacKinnon‘s attempt to ‗historicize‘ Kantian transcendentalism (a lá Hegel, 
Dilthey, Collingwood, and Cassirer).354 Much like we have seen elsewhere, MacKinnon sees 
delimitation and categorisation as a central aspect of Kant‘s metaphysics, especially in 
relation to human cognition.355 This is due to the fact that ‗discursive understanding and the 
schematized categories are by Kant conceived as the way in which human beings make 
response to their world. The world must answer to their demand – that we know, for 
otherwise the world would not be our world as the object of our theoretical understanding‘.356 
For Kant, metaphysics is ‗primarily an extension of theoretical questioning‘, because human 
beings are continually ‗beset by ultimate questions. They cannot easily rest, they ask 
questions which cannot be settled by any mere extension of their theoretical 
understanding‘.357 
However, the movement towards ‗the unconditioned‘ is reflected for Kant not primarily 
within theoretical abstraction, but in the claims of the ethical.358 This touches upon 
MacKinnon‘s metaphysics to the degree that Kant, in a manner more strident than Aquinas, 
placed a stronger emphasis on ‗the reality of morality‘ (or so MacKinnon thinks), even though 
Thomas expounds a ‗deeper agnosticism‘ which Kantians should learn from.359 But 
MacKinnon nonetheless says that if ‗Thomism, with its profound conception of analogy, is to 
help and illuminate the perplexities today it must take account of those whose sense of 
incompleteness, of duality, lies more at the level of conduct than understanding‘.360 What 
should be marked here is that while there is still an appreciation for the doctrine of analogy, 
there seems to be a dampening of his earlier reception. The experience of conflict within the 
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moral life, existing against the risks of human responsibility, seems to temper his account 
towards a stronger feeling for the woundedness and limits of every human enterprise. And it 
is precisely within this claim of the ethical that transcendence enters worldly engagements, an 
opinion which is in accord with a Kantian conception of ‗the primacy of practical reason‘. 361 
Without attention to the particular, so MacKinnon thinks, the doctrine of analogy becomes 
abstract and formalist, unable to deal with historicity.   
By the time we reach ‗Metaphysical and Religious Language‘ (1954), there is a much more 
critical reception of Thomism. Clearly a cleavage has opened in the years between this text 
and the previous ones. In this paper, he understands Thomistic analogy as espousing an 
‗analogically participated transcendental‘, as a ‗fundamentally ontological‘ concept rather 
than a purely logical one.362 The influence of Kant here is explicit (and Barth too, though not 
with the same centrality363). He acknowledges that analogical language tries to avoid ‗the twin 
perils of anthropomorphism and agnosticism‘, but in a volte-face MacKinnon states that it 
relies on out-dated assumptions: ‗we have to admit‘, in relation to Thomism (and Platonism), 
‗a kind of intuitive awareness of analogically participative being which we do not seem to 
have‘.364 For MacKinnon, the doctrine of analogy seems untenable in a post-Enlightenment 
cosmos. Central to Kant‘s ‗meta-metaphysics‘ is his ‗theory of the a priori‘ and the so-called 
‗doctrine of categories‘, which (following Paul Tillich) MacKinnon reads as a rendition of the 
‗doctrine of human finitude‘ as this emphasized ‗the peculiarly limited character of human 
knowledge‘.365 Kant was concerned not to press ‗the tools of ordinary empirical knowledge‘ 
towards grasping ‗the unconditioned‘.366 Therefore, Kant expressed a ‗confidence in 
discarding the scheme of analogy‘ since it ‗sprang in a way from a conviction that he was 
liberating the essence of religion from a false entanglement with metaphysics‘.367 
MacKinnon‘s own worry is with the problem of ‗intuition‘ since ‗if we claim intuitively to 
see things as they are, we are unwilling to give proper attention to those who bid us revise our 
assumptions, change our frames of reference and so on‘. He even speaks of ‗the perilous 
mythology of a faculty of intuition‘,368 and ‗the tyranny that metaphysical conviction can 
exert over the proper assimilation of new insights concerning the ways of human knowing‘, 
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and produces a ‗canonizing as dogma some particular systematization of human knowledge‘. 
Such assumptions can lead to ‗a false acceptance as final truth of that which in its nature is 
inevitably impermanent and relative‘.369 This seems in-step with Aristotle‘s critique of Plato, 
and most certainly is integral to MacKinnon‘s critique of ideology more generally.370 Overall, 
it is the risk of intellectual or moral absolutism that MacKinnon finds worrying in regard to 
the analogia entis, since it appears to rely on outmoded forms of metaphysical intuitionism. 
Nonetheless, MacKinnon does say that while  
 
Few of us find it easy to accept the principle on which the doctrine of analogy of 
being depends, that is the conception of being as an analogically participated 
transcendental; yet, we may be thankful for the statement of this doctrine as revealing 
something of what the problem of metaphysics is. We may even in certain moods 
envy those who can accept analogy as men [sic] who have at their disposal a 
supremely effective device for reconciling the logic of the familiar with that of the 
unfamiliar. The close understanding of the gulf between ordinary and transcendent 
description which we owe to Kant and his successors prohibits our acceptance of 
what scholastic analogy promises, and leaves us with the problem of the relation of 
settleable and unsettleable questions.371 
 
In a review of P.F. Strawson‘s monograph of Kant (1966), MacKinnon expresses very similar 
views. He does not mention ‗analogy‘ as such, but he does reiterate Kant‘s critique of 
humanity‘s ‗pretension to penetrate the secrets of the unconditioned‘. Here Kant appears as a 
metaphysician of ‗experience‘ and ‗an agnostic, whose delineation of the most pervasive 
features of the objective world is but a propaedeutic study to the definitive recognition of our 
ineradicable intellectual limitation‘.372 Elsewhere (in 1975), there is mention of ‗analogical 
representation‘ in his essay on Kant‘s philosophy of religion, which is here read as a form of 
‗negative theology‘. But here it seems that his reference to analogy is strongly tied to Kant‘s 
phenomena-noumena division,373 as well as his accounts of analogical predication and 
schematism. This text seems to show that his earlier disquiet regarding Kant‘s 
phenomenalism is suppressed somewhat, and that ‗analogy‘ is being deployed as a method of 
relating the known to the unknown, but here within a transcendentalist division of phenomena 
from noumena. In Kant‘s ‗negative theology‘, we can know things only as they appear, and 
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are unable to conceive them within themselves. At best these are known as ‗a something = X‘ 
(as Kant clearly says) and cannot even be cognized, but are understood as a correlate of the 
postulated unity of the sensible manifold. God too can only be thought (within the sphere of 
pure reason) as a ‗Something‘ of which we cannot form any positive concepts.374 This is 
intrinsic to Kant‘s transcendental sublime. What is apparent now is that Kant‘s influence on 
MacKinnon, though not uncritically received, seems to have developed a stronger hold in his 
mature thinking. This conclusion stands despite even the strong influence of Catholic thinkers 
like Balthasar.   
In an introductory essay on Balthasar (written in 1969, with a postscript dated 1974), 
MacKinnon speaks of the Swiss theologian‘s ‗traditionalism‘, namely, his Catholic 
‗theological method which brought Christology into close, even perilously close, relation to 
ontological metaphysics‘. MacKinnon does qualify this by saying that in Balthasar ‗Jesus 
Christ, and not being as such (an analogically participated transcendental), is the 
Anknüpfungspunkt between God and man‘.375 This passage does seem to imply MacKinnon 
had nuanced his account of analogy towards a Balthasarian appreciation of the analogia 
Christi, in which the kenotic (and even tragic) particularity of Christ‘s life is seen to trump 
any abstract, ontological analogy between God and being-as-such. This meant for MacKinnon 
that any ontology must deal with the blood-and-flesh materiality of the incarnation. But even 
here his reception of Balthasar‘s Christology has a Kantian tinge. Firstly, he appears to read 
‗being-as-such‘ as a quantifier without qualities – a post-Scotist-Suárezian gesture in which 
‗being‘ is constructed as the pure non-nihil. Secondly, MacKinnon was keen to apply the 
concept of ‗limitation‘ to the trinity, in a way that is distinctly Kantian. At one point he speaks 
of an ‗analogy of limits‘ as applicable to the triune God in a comparable manner to the 
analogia personarum. His emphasis here is to ground ad intra the facticity and temporality of 
Christ‘s life within the eternal life of the trinity.376 But as a later essay from 1986 reveals,377 
‗the concept of limitation‘378 is deeply informed by Kant‘s ‗doctrine of categories‘, which he 
calls ‗a profound examination of the limitations of characteristically human knowledge‘, even 
suggesting that Kant‘s concept of free and determined ‗receptivity‘ might have helped 
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Balthasar‘s conception of the intra-trinitarian relations.379 It is not negligible to remark here, 
once more, that Kant‘s theory of freedom and necessity is predicated on the transcendentalist 
division between the phenomena and noumena, and most certainly lies behind his idea of 
‗limitation‘ as well. Thirdly, we also know that by this stage that MacKinnon had accepted 
Kant‘s rejection of being-as-predicate. In an essay on Collingwood,380 and in unison with 
Ryle‘s agreement with Kant‘s critique of the ontological argument,381 MacKinnon stated its 
crux:  
 
to accept the ontological argument involves treating existence as a predicate, and 
failing to recognize that to say e.g. of tame tigers that they exist is something of a 
different order from saying that they growl. If we affirm that they exist, we are saying 
that the complex concept of tame-tiger-hood is exemplified; we are saying simply 
that animals of this sort are found in the world; we are not characterizing them as we 
are when we say that they growl. It is impossible to escape the conviction that Ryle is 
right and that the ontological argument is invalid inasmuch as it obliterates the 
distinction between characterization and affirmation of reality. Existence is not a 
characteristic and must not be treated as such [italics mine].382 
 
The central thrust of Kant‘s rejection of Anselm centres on predication, and concerns this 
dilemma: is ‗existence‘ related to or extraneous to ‗essence‘? The ‗ontological argument‘ (a 
term not used by Anselm383) ascribed ‗existence‘ to God on the basis of a concept of 
‗perfection‘. Since our imagination can postulate a most perfect being, beyond which nothing 
greater can be thought, it follows that ‗perfection‘ must include ‗existence‘ , because without 
‗existence‘ it would not be the most perfect being, since ‗existence‘ is always more perfect 
than ‗non-existence‘. It is this logical step that Kant rejects because ‗existence‘ is not 
something we add to ‗essence‘. It is – to use the language of G. E. Moore again – simply a 
question of facticity, that is, it is ‗judgement‘ or a ‗positing‘ about whether something exists 
or does not exist. If we say that ‗being‘ is a predicate of ‗essence‘, we would be engaging in 
tautology, a restatement of what is already there. In a salient passage, Kant argues thus:  
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Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to 
the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations 
in themselves. In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. The 
proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that have their objects: God 
and omnipotence; the little word ―is‖ is not a predicate in it, but only that which 
posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) 
together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs), and say God is, 
or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit 
the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to 
my concept.384  
     
Jaakko Hintikka has perceptively commented that Kant‘s argument here ‗can be construed as 
criticizing the medieval and neo-Platonic ideas that existence qua existence carried with itself 
interesting attributes of which we can profitably theorize‘, a problem which goes back to 
‗Aristotle‘s aporia concerning the science of being qua being‘.385 Hintikka is presumably 
referring to the question of whether metaphysics is primarily a question of ‗being‘ (ηὸ ὄν) or 
‗substance‘ (οὐζία), and certainly has in mind the Stagirite‘s assertion that ‗being is not the 
substance of anything‘ (Posterior Analytics II.7.92 b13-14). For our purposes, what is 
important to notice is that if ‗being‘ is the product of a ‗positing‘ – a judgement of sheer 
‗existence‘ or ‗non-existence‘ – then participation (methexis) in being or any analogical 
metaphysics is disallowed. Ontological participation requires an axiological account of being 
in which entities are thought to exist at different levels of intensity and actuality. The analogy 
of attribution (and especially Aquinas‘s deployment of it) presupposes this account, since it 
necessitates the predication of one thing (Being) to different entities (God and creatures), 
without proposing a reality that exists prior to or apart from the entities in question, as if 
‗being‘ could be an independent ‗third‘ entity. But without participation and ontological 
predication, MacKinnon would have to distance himself both from Platonism and Thomism, 
and any account of analogy that presupposed its insights. Such a move was further buttressed 
by his acceptance of Aristotle‘s critique of methexis, Plato‘s self-critique in Parmenides, and 
his own suspicion of the Platonic intuitionism that underpinned the analogia entis. We have 
already spoken of these a bit earlier and have suggested that these ripostes are by no means 
decisive, and (as we will now see) are in some sense undermined by MacKinnon himself.  
In his mature thought, MacKinnon nuanced his critique of Plato in PM, without rejecting 
completely his earlier suspicions. He emphasized much more the dialogical rather than 
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dogmatic aspects of Plato‘s method, especially as regards the Socratic aspect of subjecting 
one‘s own viewpoints to a serious and even precarious interrogation. However, this nuancing 
does not mean that MacKinnon has substantially transgressed his earlier positions (cf. PM, 
99). He is appreciative of the central problem of Plato‘s ontology of Forms, as this concerned 
the theorization of an ideal – as a ‗standard metre‘ (Peter Geach) – which does not decrease or 
change with the progress of time (PM, 154-160); he also has a particular tenderness for the 
notion that ‗ideas‘ can only be discovered and not made (since Plato was not a constructivist). 
Moreover, his affirmation of Plato‘s dialectics has connections to MacKinnon‘s repeated 
references to painting and art (e.g. Paul Cézanne and Paul Nash) as opening us to a ‗truth‘ that 
exceeds naïve realism or representation. With this in mind, it does appear that MacKinnon‘s 
perspective makes allowance for mediation, in the sense that creativity is tied to a progressive 
un-concealment of reality. And behind this, there appears the half-suggestion (within the 
overall argument of PM) that Plato‘s dialectics might serve as a philosophical counterpart to 
Cézanne‘s aesthetics. However, one is still not clear whether MacKinnon comprehended this 
linkage, or ever saw how it undermined his original critique of the analogia entis that began 
in the 1950‘s, especially as this was premised on a rejection of an overly-confident and 
Platonic intellectual intuition. If he did, then he could be a step closer to its re-affirmation.      
What can be gathered from the genealogy traced here is the gradual de-ontologization of 
analogy within MacKinnon‘s thought. Through the adoption of Kant‘s transcendentalism and 
his critique of Anselm, MacKinnon chastened and ultimately departed from his earlier 
acceptance of analogical participation. It is this Kantian influence which explains 
MacKinnon‘s movement away from his earlier more enthusiastic reception of Aquinas. If he 
does have a remaining openness to analogy, it is through a post-Barthian affirmation of the 
analogia Christi without the analogia entis. It is surprising that MacKinnon opted for this in 
spite of the influence of Catholic theologians, since what is clear for Balthasar and Przywara 
is that Christology remains the foundation of ontological analogy. Christ as the God-Man 
constitutes the ‗concrete analogy of being‘ and is the paradigm for analogical participation 
more generally.386  
So was this gradual rejection a necessary move on MacKinnon‘s part? Is there a positive 
appreciation of historicity and particularity within this tradition that MacKinnon has failed to 
discern? With perspicacity, MacKinnon did read the analogia entis as a participatory and 
ontological account of created being, and not just a semantic or logical account of language. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely this ontological version of the doctrine that he rejects. However, 
we cannot take this conclusion at face value, and should interrogate the reasons for it. For 
instance, MacKinnon (echoing the Schulmetaphysik) reads the analogia entis through the 
                                                          
386
 Cf. Hans Urs Von Balthasar, A Theology of History (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 74-75n.5.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
scholastic prism of metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis (a move connected to 
the invention of ontologically ‗neutral‘ science387), and also through Kant‘s critique of being-
as-predicate (which is traceable to Scotism and Suárez).388 Because of this, one can see how 
‗existence‘ becomes prised from ‗essence‘, and ‗being‘ is transformed into a conceptually 
minimalist place-holder.389 On the one hand, this means that ‗existence‘ does not reference 
anything more than the presence or absence of any particular thing, that is, anything apart 
from a sheer happening, since ‗being‘ does not add anything of interest to our knowledge of 
particular entities. On this schema, ‗being‘ is an undetermined X whose most transcendental 
structure is that it be not nothing and that it obeys non-contradiction. Such pliability allows 
for an unrestricted multiplicity of potential existents, but one in which their respective acts of 
being are conceptually univocal. On the other hand, the actualization within time of possible 
essences has no impact on their content, since ‗existence‘ is already presupposed within their 
‗essence‘. Within this model, ‗essence‘ is rendered static and unchangeable, unperturbed by 
the accretions and advancements of history because, once more, it presupposes that being-as-
such is not a predicate of real things.390  
It is also worth saying some points regarding Kant‘s metaphysics and apophatics. Firstly, 
we are reminded of Milbank‘s comments on Kant‘s negative theology: since it is predicated 
on an unquestioned dogmatism regarding our access to the ‗noumena‘, does it in the end 
really avoid transgressing the boundaries it has emphatically drawn?  How can one survey the 
phenomenological borders without exceeding them at the same time? Costantino Esposito has 
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argued that Kant‘s metaphysics establishes epistemological limits, boundaries which at the 
same time substantively determine what is projected beyond those boundaries, a move which 
undermines his supposed agnosticism.391 Secondly, the non-realist theologian Don Cupitt is 
sceptical about whether Kant can be placed within the tradition of theologia negativa, since 
Kant doubts if an unknowable divine essence is philosophically tenable..392 Kant instead 
chooses a regulative notion of God in which the contours of divine nature are delimited for 
use within practical reason. For Kant it is primarily the existence of God that remains 
unknown, not God‘s essence – a reversal of the classical position. Kant‘s rational theology 
thus moves within a different paradigm to negative theologians precisely because it 
undermines divine simplicity, since essence and existence are metaphysically prised apart.393 
Thirdly, there is an irony within this radical agnosticism: since any knowledge that exceeds 
the bounds of pure reason is apodictically curtailed, such ‗anti-anthropomorphism‘ can only 
serve an ‗extreme anthropocentricism‘. For Kant, to quote Roger White, ‗everything that we 
say about God is always to be interpreted solely in terms of the repercussions for 
humanity‘.394 Moreover, Howard Caygill argues that Kant ultimately oscillates between an 
anthropocentric immanence, on the one hand, and an absolute sublimity on the other, an ontic 
divinity or an unknowable otherness.395 Such becomes especially cogent as regards the 
phenomena-noumena division: because there is no pre-established harmony or analogy 
between ‗appearances‘ and ‗things-in-themselves‘, there is an indeterminacy regarding the 
distinct essence of beings, including God in se. 
Our intentions in this chapter have been to trace both the dissemination and convergence of 
Aristotelian and Kantian tendencies in MacKinnon‘s metaphysics. Aristotelian aporetics 
maintained the irresolvable tensions between particular and universal ‗substance‘. Such 
interplay was repeated in MacKinnon‘s reflections, and was combined with an atomist 
realism that advocated the primacy of discovery and particularity in our engagements with 
objects. Additionally, it is important to note the way in which Aristotle‘s critique of methexis 
and his separation of ‗being‘ and ‗substance‘ spurred on MacKinnon‘s suspicions regarding 
ontological analogy. Nevertheless, Aristotle‘s metaphysics of causality (the Prime Mover is 
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not involved in the material constitution of being) and his ahistorical approach to the Forms 
(which never change, despite his emphasis on movement) did not aid MacKinnon in including 
historicity within metaphysics, and moreover might have hindered him from appreciating the 
cogency of analogical participation. As regards Kant‘s apophatics, his transcendentalism was 
read by MacKinnon as a mode of negative theology that chastened all overconfident accounts 
of ‗intellectual intuition‘. Such proclivities, as blended with Kant‘s critique of ‗existence-as-
predicate‘, further repealed MacKinnon‘s residual endorsement of the analogia entis since on 
its assumptions any analogical metaphysics remains untenable. However, we questioned the 
veracity of Kant‘s apophatics in that it harboured a clandestine dogmatism vis-à-vis our 
rational access to the transcendent, and had a tenuous relation to the classical tradition of 
theologia negativa. Besides this, it remains ironically anthropocentric in its religion, and does 
not assist true self-transcendence.  
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Chapter 6 
Donald MacKinnon III: 
Between Tragedy and Metaphysics  
 
The aim of this chapter is to show that Donald MacKinnon‘s metaphysico-ethical perspective 
informs his reception of the tragic. This is most apparent in his argument for a moral realism 
that serves as a truthful disclosure of the transcendence claims.  In particular, MacKinnon‘s 
(Wittgensteinian) reading of Plato‘s The Republic and Kant‘s moral metaphysics is discussed 
with the purpose of displaying these connections.   
 
6.1. Plato the Moralist 
 
The exercise of ‗descriptive metaphysics‘ served an introductory purpose of showing that 
theological reflection must account for those limitations that chasten any over-confidence that 
they could be exceeded. But MacKinnon is not satisfied with purely descriptive accounts: he 
remains concerned with the ‗revisionary‘ and the ‗speculative‘ aspects of metaphysical 
inquiry also. He is especially focused on what Wittgenstein calls ‗the thrust against the limits 
of language‘,396 and how this pulsion intimates transcendent ends. Metaphysical method, in 
his terms, means being ‗puzzled‘ about how the ‗foundations of morality‘ participate in a 
continual ‗pressure‘ against ‗the familiar confines of intelligible descriptive discourse‘ (PM, 
17). Such a move is placed within MacKinnon‘s argument for ‗a system of projection‘ that is 
both ‗descriptive and referential in intention‘397 as regards ‗the transcendent‘, without being 
‗crudely anthropomorphic‘ in its scope.398 The ‗system of projection‘ does not rely on ‗a 
simpliste model of correspondence‘,399 since it does not presuppose ‗a one-one correlation 
between terms of propositions and constituents of fact‘.400 Instead, it aims to articulate an 
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‗analogical unity of truth‘401 (or what he elsewhere calls a ‗conceptual unity‘ established 
through ‗focal realization402). In this framework, he seeks to relate, comparatively, different 
modes of truth articulation such as mathematics, philosophy, or literature, etc.403 This kind of 
‗truth‘ cannot be ‗described and illustrated‘ in ‗a few neat formulae‘.404 On the contrary, the 
‗complexity and many-sidedness‘405 of this means that the truth happens, as it were, on ‗the 
borderlands‘, at the areas of ‗same level criticism‘ between differing projections.406 It 
suggests a degree of convergence, a possibility that we inhabit ‗similarly situated territory‘.407  
These statements show his desire to bring together the historical and super-historical, a move 
which exceeds the strictures of Kantian rationalism. However, his particular interest presently 
is to argue that moral language has a revelatory function within its reflective structure.408 He 
does this through a reading of The Republic, wherein MacKinnon argues for an ‗ethical 
reflection‘ that is always ‗inchoately metaphysical‘ (PM, 30). MacKinnon‘s thesis appears to 
be that the unfolding of moral language, especially when it touches on paradox and 
perplexity, reveals that our language has reference, that it is accountable to something. The 
fracture of intelligent discourse suggests that language at this point touches reality, opening 
up towards a horizon of new discovery.       
MacKinnon turns to Plato‘s story of the perfectly just and unjust man (Republic II.357a-
368c). Here the myth of the Ring of Gyges is used by Glaucon and Adeimantus to probe the 
connection between justice and happiness. The earlier cynicism of Thrasymachus lingers in 
the background here: he argued that people only behave ‗justly‘ when they are seen by others, 
and that it is rather the ‗unjust‘ who are truly honest. He also contended that ‗justice‘ could be 
enacted only through a hegemonic rule of the strong over the weak (Republic I. 336b-354c). 
In another thread of conversation, Glaucon and Adeimantus imagine a scenario of a perfectly 
unjust man who, by using the powers of invisibility granted by the magic ring, was able to 
live a life of moral turpitude while appearing perfectly upright to others. The perfectly just 
man, on the other hand, would be someone who lived excellently, while sabotaging his 
reputation so that he might receive no recognition or reward for his achievements. It is only 
when we have reached these extremes that we are able to judge who, ultimately, is the happier 
of the two, and answer the question whether justice is bound to happiness.   
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MacKinnon‘s use of this illustration is an attempt to show that moral language can be made 
strange and difficult. His purpose is to illustrate how we remain ‗haunted‘ by ‗the system of 
restraints under which we live‘, provoking a ‗dream‘ of an alternate reality in which we could 
indulge ourselves without recompense (PM, 21). For MacKinnon, inspired here by the 
Socratic dialogue, it is when we question the ‗validity‘ of the assumptions that underlie our 
actions that we enter ‗the restless quest‘ of metaphysical inquiry (PM, 24), since for him it is 
in ‗the actual moral and political choice that the metaphysical problem is raised‘ (PM, 25). 
Such a metaphysic is pre-eminently concerned with ‗truth‘ and ‗what is the case‘, and so is 
not materially reductionist (PM, 26-29). He argues that we are concerned with the problem of 
how language can be truly ‗descriptive‘ and ‗referential‘ (PM, 27), which relates to his 
emphasis on the priority of ‗discovery‘ over ‗creation‘ (PM, 28), and with a ‗correspondence‘ 
between mind and world (PM, 29). Central to Plato‘s ‗realism‘ therefore is a concern with 
‗what is the case‘, a realism which aspires towards a transcendence of the Good, because it 
reaches for that ‗highest‘ standard of morality, that ideal which approximates, albeit 
incompletely, ‗the embodiment of the real‘ (PM, 29).  
Influenced here by Wittgenstein (and John Wisdom),409 MacKinnon offers a reading of 
Plato in which the enigmatic quality of moral language opens us to a perplexity that is the 
beginning of metaphysical inquiry.410 The attempt to grasp and make sense of the difficulty 
that underlies everyday interactions alerts us to a reality of a givenness that exceeds ordinary 
perceptions. Experience reveals its strangeness, and indicates a deeper reality that defies 
reduction. Of course there is no infallible logic that substantiates ‗transcendence‘, but there is 
an argument which says that moral perplexity is undermined in a world without transcendent 
ideals. On this score, one could argue that MacKinnon, in a similar manner to Wittgenstein‘s 
Tractatus,411 uses Socratic dialogue as a way of manifesting the transcendent, beyond what 
logical demonstrations can achieve alone. When we encounter in the world something that 
resists complete description, and becomes stranger the more we attempt to describe it, we are 
allowed to claim reference for our language, for the fact that our speaking is about something. 
There is a connection to Kant here: MacKinnon was mindful of Wittgenstein‘s Kantian 
heritage (and was appreciative of it), as seen in his appropriation of Erik Stenius. He was 
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compared Wittgenstein‘s method of ‗manifesting‘ in the Tractatus to Kant‘s ethical mode of 
‗metaphysical‘ projection (PM, 56).412  
MacKinnon‘s concern with realist ‗facticity‘ is clear in his ensuing argument, where he 
returns again to ‗logical atomism‘, and especially its assertion of a ‗correspondence 
conception of truth‘ (PM, 31), and ‗a thorough-going pluralistic realism‘ (PM, 32). ‗Pluralist 
realism‘, as we have seen, asserted the reality of ‗different sorts of facts‘ which cannot be 
reduced to one another. Moore argued that ‗we do know, beyond shadow of question, certain 
states of affairs‘ (PM, 33). This leads to a reading of empiricism, and even a short chapter 
dedicated to its exposition in Collingwood and the Vienna Circle (PM, 46-52). MacKinnon 
does question certain ideas of factuality espoused by some empiricists, as when ‗verification‘ 
becomes equated with the merely observable. MacKinnon has internalized the contributions 
of Popper and Einstein on the unavoidable ‗speculation‘ and ‗creation‘ involved in any 
hypothetical science (PM, 34-36; 44-45). Nonetheless, MacKinnon would still assert that 
hypotheses are concerned with ‗what is the case‘, and therefore not with mere conjecture. 
While certain beliefs might be ‗self-authenticated‘ realities (PM, 37), he rejects the claims of 
‗the thorough-going constructivists‘ who have precious little recourse against ‗a free play of 
undisciplined inventiveness‘ that dispenses with ‗the factuality of any world‘ (PM, 43-44). 
Despite idiomatic differences, MacKinnon believes such conclusions are comparable to 
Plato‘s ethics, in which people are urged to live in accordance with ‗the way in which things 
are‘, so that ‗their lives correspond with the order of being and becoming‘ (PM, 37). Such 
‗morality‘ could be described as an ‗ultimate seriousness concerning what is and what is not 
the case‘, and is not therefore a matter of ‗arbitrary choice‘ (PM, 38). However, the ethical 
concern with what is ‗the factual‘ should not be reduced to a ‗time-consuming, besetting 
concern with ultimate integrity‘, a ‗false scrupulosity‘ that ‗abstains from the risk of action, in 
the name of purity of motive‘ (PM, 39). Moral reflexivity should not be an excuse for 
irresponsibility. As we will see again later on, Mackinnon is critical of this kind of tragic in-
decision.  
What is apparent from this discussion of Plato‘s ethics, as refracted through Wittgenstein 
and atomist realism, is a concern with ‗morality‘ as a ‗system of projection‘ in which 
transcendent realities are re-presented and manifested. It is animated by a drive to establish 
‗some kind of analogy between our commerce with the transcendent, and our commerce with 
the world around us‘. Such predication is ‗the very heart of the problem of metaphysics‘. But 
such a supposed ‗commerce‘ should not give us solace for ‗there is no substitute for hard 
work, perhaps no finality of assured attainment‘ (PM, 39). In speaking about a genuine moral 
concern then, ‗we are speaking about learning facts‘ (PM, 40) in which the moral claims 
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‗press down on the stuff of human life itself‘ (PM, 41). Here literature (particularly tragedy) is 
able to represent processes of learning,413 since ‗tragedy‘ provides a blending of ‗discovery‘ 
and ‗invention‘. MacKinnon argues this is so in his discussion of Shakespeare‘s Julius Caesar 
(PM, 40-43). The question posed here exposes us to the precariousness of decisions risked in 
‗a world we have not made‘ (to use the language of Rowan Williams). 414 Since we encounter 
in tragic experiences ‗the nature of our human responsibility‘,415 then on MacKinnon‘s view 
we cannot reduce such learning to an ‗ethical naturalism‘ (e.g. Bentham). On the contrary, to 
take moral dilemmas seriously, is ‗one way of advancing beyond such frontiers‘ (PM, 44), 
namely, beyond the ‗frontiers‘ of a purely immanent description. This linkage between ethics 
and metaphysics is a concern that MacKinnon will return to again and again in his writings.  
Before transitioning to the next section, there are a number of critical questions that should 
be raised. As already hinted at, MacKinnon‘s acceptance of the ‗Strawsonian‘ distinction 
between ‗descriptive‘ and ‗speculative‘ metaphysics is already questionable. One needs to 
thoroughly deconstruct any clean separation between these methods. Here Milbank‘s 
comments are worth repeating: ‗to conceive of purgation entirely as a prelude to illumination, 
or of ‗description‘ as a task innocent of speculation, may forestall illumination altogether, or 
else radically determine its instance‘.416 In this regard, MacKinnon admits a sway to the 
‗creative‘ element of knowledge, but he does seem at pains to resist post-Kantian 
‗constructivism‘.417 And while he is certainly not a positivist – nor an adherent of the fact-
value distinction418 – it is again worth raising whether Mackinnon‘s account of ‗facticity‘ is 
sufficiently sensitive to way that facts are dependent upon historical processes.419 This could 
be because MacKinnon‘s proclivity remains for Platonic ‗presence‘ over Aristotelian 
teleology (as Milbank says).420 Admittedly, this is not exactly right since, as Catherine 
Pickstock has argued regarding The Republic,421 Plato‘s reflections on ‗justice‘ already gave 
place to temporality and its impact on ‗practical wisdom‘. Yet despite these qualifications, 
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 On the processes of growth-in-knowledge as found in tragic literature, see Rowan Williams, The 
Tragic Imagination. The Literary Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 30-55.  
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 Milbank, ‗The Critique of a Theology of Right,‘ 18. One does wonder whether Wittgenstein‘s 
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Creative Knowledge in Theology and Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004).  
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 See again Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (3
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 ed., London and New York: Verso, 1993), who is 
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 Cf. Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 21.  
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 Catherine Pickstock, ‗Justice and Prudence: Principles of Order in the Platonic City‘. Heythrop 
Journal 42 (2001): 269-282. 
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one can see something of Milbank‘s concern here: MacKinnon appears to have abstracted 
Glaucon and Adeimantus‘s thought-experiment from the context of Socrates‘s response, 
which was directed to how justice is situated within the polis, and how our dependency on 
civic structures is the context in which true justice should be established (Cf. Republic 
II.368dff.). Moreover, he has neglected, as Milbank suggests, the ‗particular social practice‘ 
that formed the figure of Socrates,422 remaining too focused on the individual philosopher and 
his enigmatic persona. One possible reason why MacKinnon avoids this ‗pedagogy‘ is 
because he refused Plato‘s politics, since he reads Plato (and Hegel) as collapsing the ideal 
with the actual. For him, Plato‘s politics is short on moral irony, and how ideas of a just order 
are subject to change and growth (PM, 160).  
Much like Wittgenstein‘s Zettel, MacKinnon appears to emphasise irresolution itself as an 
answer to our dilemmas.423 Not providing a ‗solution‘ but to ‗lay the texture of the problem 
bare‘424 is central to MacKinnon‘s realism. It is this emphasis on irony that makes MacKinnon 
weary of Platonic metaphysics, and any account of participation and ‗intellectual intuition‘ 
that is linked to this. In other words, MacKinnon‘s tendency is towards the primacy of 
problem over solution, in his meta-ethics, and elsewhere more generally. Whether this 
preference is problematic cannot be decided abstractly, since there are circumstances where it 
is morally necessary to emphasise one or another. What can be said is that MacKinnon‘s 
preference tends to be deontological in its emphasis, placing supremacy on situations where 
moral crises are prevalent, rather than on the ordinary virtues – ‗the banality of goodness‘425 – 
that characterises the everyday. It tends towards authenticity and scrupulosity rather than the 
development of Sittlichkeit, those moral institutions that remain essential for socialized justice 
and law-making.   
 
6.2. The Irreducibility of the Ethical 
 
Kant‘s theory of ‗the primacy of practical‘ reason cannot be separated from his metaphysics, 
especially as this relates to his stringent limitations on the capacity of reason.426 However, as 
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 Milbank, ‗A Critique of the Theology of Right,‘ 20.  
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 Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §314.  
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 This phrase is taken from Terry Eagleton‘s The Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics (Oxford: 
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is recognized by Kant scholars,427 what seems unachievable within reason is essential to the 
ethical domain. Here a metaphysical structure is required to supplement the formalist and 
universal scope of ethical norms.428 For Kant, ethical duties are not subject to contingencies or 
‗hypothetical‘ deduction; rather, they form an unequivocal claim that transgresses any 
particular or localized observation, and are thus ‗categorical‘.429 As MacKinnon reiterates, in 
Kant‘s moral scheme we are claimed by something that approximates ‗the unconditioned‘,430 
by a ‗peremptory authority‘ (PM, 54) that works against our parochial interests. Thus we have 
to discipline ourselves from ‗trying to jump out of our cognitive skins‘ (PM, 55), since our 
constant temptation is to usurp our finite condition. For MacKinnon, morality is intrinsically 
bound up with ‗self-criticism‘,431 with that movement in which we test our assumptions. Such 
a process is essential for moral humanity, since as we are made conscious of the relative 
boundedness of our perspectives, we become aware of our entanglement and dependency on 
what is other to us. The diligence of an ethical askesis constitutes, for MacKinnon, a negative 
theology because it makes us aware of ‗the limits of the intelligible‘ against which our moral 
language continues to ‗thrust‘ (PM, 57), and awakens us to the transcendent reach of its 
claims.432 Our capacity to relativize perspectives is entwined with our freedom, which for 
MacKinnon and Kant is our mode of ‗commerce with the ultimate‘ (PM, 62). For Kant (and 
MacKinnon it would seem), ‗the absolute for human beings is always realised as a Sollen‘,433 
a willingness which establishes the ethos of self-questioning as the essence of metaphysics, a 
process of conscientisation whereby moral idiolects are ever-so gradually stretched towards 
‗ultimate questions‘.434  
Metaphysics according to MacKinnon is found in a ‗constancy‘ or ‗style‘ of interrogation 
that aims to formulate a deepened practice of questioning rather than any ‗positive body of 
achievement‘,435 which for him constitutes the only achievable ‗finality‘ within metaphysical 
and moral speculation.436 Once more, the primacy of problem over solution remains 
paramount for MacKinnon. Within the order of ethical thinking, this questioning manifests 
                                                                                                                                                                      
partly to establish room for the claim upon us of that which we say lies altogether outside that 
experience‘ (PM, 64).  
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itself in our introspective ‗dialogue‘ and ‗conversation‘ regarding moral agency,437 a practice 
which forms part of the ‗grammar‘ of ‗transcendence‘,438 since within internalized judgements 
there is manifest a moral authorship that exceeds any reductive ideas of pure determinism 
which are unable to account for ‗the quality of mystery‘ and ‗tragedy‘ that belongs to human 
freedom.439 Our ability to question and revise our decision-making forms the essence of our 
freedom, but it does not imply that we can have a fully substantive account of what such 
freedom is. MacKinnon believes, like Kant, that ‗it is metaphysical agnosticism which before 
all else safeguards the transcendent character of morality‘,440 to the extent that ‗we do not 
know what we are saying when we say that men [sic] are free and yet we do know what we 
are not saying‘.441 Rather than being a ‗dogmatic exposition‘,442 there is a kind of game-like 
or even ‗performative‘443 character to freedom, in the sense that it is only in the exercise of 
liberty that we ‗bring into being a moral universe‘.  
Once again, this is a Kantian manoeuvre: one only acts free on the assumption that one is 
free. Freedom cannot be proved: it can only be assumed – or transcendentally deduced – as a 
prerequisite for action. And yet the ‗moral universe‘ that is represented through action is 
(paradoxically) already there, but is not revealed apart from its performance.444 Here again, 
the philosophy of the ‗charmed circle‘ reappears. Such attains legibility within MacKinnon‘s 
attempt (after Cassirer445) to harmonize Kantian epistemology and autonomy through the 
mediation of ‗spontaneity‘,446 specifically as this ascribes a creative aspect to the rational and 
ethical faculties.447 One could read this as a part of his attempt to alleviate the dualisms of 
freedom and necessity, as can be seen in his claim that the production of moral insight and 
freedom occurs through a experimentation in language that is at once truthful and quasi-
fictional – ‗truthful‘ because we are made to recognize the impact of a world not of our 
making, and ‗quasi-fictional‘ because we can imagine and create worlds that are not reducible 
to ‗necessity‘. For MacKinnon, our freedom emerges as a kind of ‗game‘ that ‗matters‘,448 and 
                                                          
437
 MacKinnon, ‗Moral Freedom (1969),‘ in Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty, 92. 
438
 Ibid., 93.  
439
 Ibid., 98.  
440
 A Study in Ethical Theory, 82-83. He says elsewhere that ‗Agnosticism is, in a sense, a foundation 
of a belief in human freedom‘ (‗Moral Freedom, 97).  
441
 A Study in Ethical Theory, 104.  
442
 MacKinnon, ‗Ethical Intuition (1956),‘ in Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty, 102.  
443
 Ibid., 108.  
444
 Ibid., 109.  
445
 Cf. Ernst Cassirer, ‗Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik: Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers 
Kant-Interpretation‗. Kant Studien 36.1-2 (1931): 1-26. Heidegger read Kant in a proto-
phenomenological manner in accordance with his own reflections on temporality, that is, as a Being-
towards-death, cf. Jean-François Courtine, ‗Kant y el Tiempo‘. Universitas Philosophica 24.49 (2007): 
55- 77.  
446
 On Kant‘s metaphysics of spontaneity, see the summary found in Marco Sgarbi, ‗The Spontaneity 
of Mind in Kant‘s Transcendental Logic‘. Fenomenologia e Societá 32.2 (2009): 19-28.  
447
 A Study in Ethical Theory, 74-75.  
448
 MacKinnon, ‗Ethical Intuition,‘ 113.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
discloses for us ‗the irreducibility of the ethical‘,449 in which we continue to encounter ‗the 
strangeness‘ and ‗persistence‘ of moral debate as a sample of ‗the metaphysical questionings 
and gropings that are raised within the compass of a human life‘.450  
MacKinnon chooses moral conflict and tragedy as a prime example of such ‗persistence‘, 
since it is here – most pre-eminently for him – that metaphysical questions impose themselves 
within the ordinary tracks of life. For if ‗conflict is a permanent element of human life‘ then it 
provides justification for thinking that we are ‗reckoning with the stuff of a predicament, with 
what is perhaps problem, or even mystery, rather than solution‘.451 This discovery of what-is-
the-case segues into MacKinnon‘s thinking around ‗natural law‘ in which ‗the way of human 
life‘ is structured according to limits and regularities.452 Such a presence makes itself known 
when human beings are ‗pressed upon, even visited, by the eternal in the most ordinary 
occasion of life‘.453 For MacKinnon, where ‗practical and theoretical perplexity meet‘, it is 
there that we encounter ‗the possibility of metaphysics‘, since it is at this juncture that we 
engage with the real depths of being.454  
But as has been mentioned previously, the attempt to reach beyond limits has the risk 
attached that we might ascribe an absolutised significance to the merely local, resulting in ‗the 
denial of freedom‘ by sacrificing its ‗ultimacy in the name of a supposed vision of the world 
as it ultimately is‘.455 MacKinnon is at pains to stress that ‗an advancement of our moral 
understanding‘ comes ‗through the banishment from the world‘ of ‗the theoretical all-
embracing‘ (PM, 60). So rather than seeking for a metaphysical and visionary totality that 
absolutises our fragmented perspectives, MacKinnon seems to say (following Kant) that ‗it is 
at the level of Sollen that we have commerce with the ultimate‘.456 This seems to be because it 
is only within the remit of moral duty that we cannot avoid the impress of transcendent norms 
upon our ordinary activities. On this point, one could say that the reason why moral freedom 
is considered to be the site of transcendence is because it acts, like in Kant, as a causa 
noumenon. It resists metaphysical cognition precisely because it cannot be deduced 
phenomenologically, even though it has effects within the natural world.457  We are unable to 
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cognize the essence of freedom, but we are able to discern it effects. It is within this drive 
towards the actualization of freedom, and the mysteries surrounding its transcendent basis, 
that provides an alternative to a Catholic or Thomistic metaphysics, since for MacKinnon 
there is ‗something suspect‘ in finding solace within ‗the delineation of the modes of an 
analogically participated being‘ which purport to have glanced the wholeness of reality.458 For 
MacKinnon (and Kant), ‗the ultimate‘ is intuited through that which ‗engages the allegiance 
of our will without possibility of question or cavil.‘459 As he will say in a later essay on Kant: 
‗We cannot represent: we achieve the sense of what we affirm in action‘.460 
The world disclosed within the Sollen is discussed in a reckoning with ‗causality‘. Without 
a notion of ‗causality‘ – transcendent or otherwise – moral action becomes ‗inconceivable‘ 
(PM, 62), and it becomes difficult to harmonize the realms of nature and morality. As has 
been mentioned already, there is a complex interplay of invention and discovery in moral 
reflection within MacKinnon‘s thinking. ‗Causality‘ is manifest in the fact that we are both 
active and passive in regard to our environments, since we do not ‗invent our moral nature‘. 
Rather, it is something that we have received (at least partially) from without ourselves. 
Nonetheless, through self-questioning our nature becomes something that ‗we disclose to 
ourselves‘ (PM, 66). This interplay between ‗discovery‘ and ‗creation‘ is a dialectic that 
MacKinnon returns to again and again in the Gifford lectures, and forms a part of his labour 
to articulate ways of thinking about truth beyond the reserves of mere ‗self-revelation‘ (PM, 
73). MacKinnon is constantly concerned with the reality of that ‗givenness‘. To be sure, this 
reality cannot be represented apart from evaluative language, but MacKinnon wants to show 
that when we question ordinary modes of awareness, we encounter a depth-dimension to our 
engagements that reveals the unfamiliarity of the ordinary. The deepening of the 
‗linguistically or conceptually familiar‘ constitutes an ars metaphysica (PM, 78), and also 
connects to MacKinnon‘s penchant for the parabolic.  
Parables are a mode of estranging the commonplace: they are invitations to transform our 
beliefs about the world (cf. PM, 80), disturbing the usual renderings of our environments, 
disclosing their ‗the transcendent ground‘, though without ‗evacuating [the] familiar of its 
own proper dignity‘ (PM, 82). As such, they act as a catalyst for enlarging our perceptions of 
the world by de-familiarising our normal contexts of judgement (PM, 83), thereby provoking 
us to ‗self-knowledge‘ (PM, 91).461 Deceptively simple narratives can display our activities as 
more mysterious than we usually think, and can even be shocking in their estrangement since, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
determinable in terms of time), he can contain a determining basis—of that causality according to 
natural laws—which is itself free from any natural law‘.  
458
 As we have suggested previously, this is a deeply problematic reading of the analogia entis.   
459
 A Study in Ethical Theory, 89.  
460
 ‗Aspects of Kant‘s Influence on British Theology,‘ 364. The italics are original.  
461
 MacKinnon‘s compares parables to Cajetan‘s ‗analogy of proper proportionality‘ (PM, 80) in which 
two separate instances of relation are shown to have a similar proportion (e.g. A/B: C/D). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
 
to quote Roger White, ‗our attention becomes focused on the wholly bizarre nature of the 
analogy we are being asked to argue from‘.462 MacKinnon states explicitly: ‗[a] parable must 
disturb, rather than edify‘.463 And this is particularly true when one considers the parabolic 
use of ‗irony‘ as a mode of projecting the ultimate (PM, 86), since by showing that our moral 
actions are situated in complex and often conflicting chains of causation, we come to realise 
that the world is not only the product of human direction, but is recalcitrant, irruptive and 
even tragic in its fabric. Rather daringly, MacKinnon submits parables such as ‗The Good 
Samaritan‘ to this style of interpretation, pointing to the ‗illusion‘ of supposing that a purely 
‗spontaneous response to human need‘ is immune from ‗tragic flaw‘ (PM, 89). Whatever one 
makes of MacKinnon‘s readings (which will be discussed later), one should keep in mind that 
his readings are being given to supplement an insight that our continued engagement with ‗the 
dialectical character of ethical reflection‘ (PM, 105) opens us to certain impositions, in which 
we become aware of transcendent values. All parables are ‗incomplete‘ and it is exactly this 
‗incompleteness‘ that serves as an ‗indirect indication of the transcendent‘.464   
This mode of expanding awareness and perception, of penetrating the metaphysics of the 
mundane – ‗the easily neglected, often unnoticed richness and diversity of the everyday‘ (PM, 
109) – is also tied to MacKinnon‘s attempt to deepen empiricism with an account of poetic 
ontology. As mentioned previously, MacKinnon is resistant to the idea that ‗the factual‘ 
should be equated with the observable. He questions whether the representation of reality can 
be reduced to a simple mirroring or ‗photographic‘ model. Instead, here using the example of 
painting (namely Cézanne), MacKinnon shows that truthfulness is in some sense only gained 
by a process where ‗time and reflection, little by little, modify our vision‘ (PM, 106), a 
movement in which we become cognisant of ‗the very interior complexity of sense-perception 
itself‘ (PM, 109). Here there is something which needs time and patience to unfold, 
something that cannot be reduced to wish-fulfilment. We have to be aware of that which 
exists in independently, of ‗the very externality of the natural world‘ as well as its ‗sheer 
objectivity‘.  
 
To see the scene before [our] eyes demands a tremendous effort. We may say of the 
world of which we take note by a cursory glance or even an elementary description, 
that we do not really see it, thereby suggesting a perception which transcends in the 
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sense of lying outwith the reach of everyday concern with that with which we are in 
contact…we have to acknowledge perceptual experience which transcends our own, 
an experience which lies outwith our achieved awareness (PM, 108). 
 
This patient attention on ‗the particular‘ also buttresses MacKinnon‘s critique of Plato (and 
Kant too). For MacKinnon, Plato seems to have ‗[dodged] the disciplines of close attention to 
the concrete and the familiar‘, specifically as they open us to an ‗enlarged awareness of 
realities‘ (PM, 111). This procedure is opposed to Aristotle, in MacKinnon‘s opinion, since he 
seems to have believed in a diversity of realizable ‗goods‘ and resisted Plato‘s ‗totalizing‘ 
vision of ‗the Good‘ (PM, 95-103).465 Plato‘s failure to attend to the particular results in a 
conceptualization that promotes absolute, non-negotiable claims, and leads potentially to what 
MacKinnon calls ‗the cult of the tragic‘ (PM, 105),466 in which an individual or ‗hero‘ 
sacrifices herself in the name of some all-encompassing intuition.467 Kant also is not immune: 
MacKinnon repeatedly rallies against Kant‘s ethical ‗formalism‘. Even though he 
acknowledges that Kant tried to display ‗the mystery of the transcendent‘ not from ‗beyond‘ 
but from within ‗the substance of human experience‘,468 he thinks that Kant‘s moral thought 
needs to be supplemented by using ‗a multiplicity of examples‘, so that ‗the austere rigour‘ 
and ‗paradoxes‘ of his thought can be tempered.469  
Summarizing so far, we have seen how MacKinnon‘s reception of Kantian ethics has been 
used to metaphysical effect, specifically as this relates to the manner in which we as ethical 
subjects are able to render questionable our ordinary modes of perception. This is done with 
the aim of showing us how such questionability is entwined with the claim of ‗the 
unconditioned‘ upon our lives. We come to realize that our entrenched habits of being are by-
no-means ‗natural‘ or unassailable, since they are finite, subject to the flux of circumstance. 
But if such finitude is our only point of reference, then the question as to what we are 
ultimately responsible to remains occluded from our reflection. If our moral concerns cannot 
be reduced to the empirical, we have to continue to probe as to what reality we are finally 
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accountable to. For Kant, this can only be the self-legislating moral will that is enacted 
‗categorically‘. Any other form of responsibility implies ‗heteronomy‘ and a denial of the 
voluntary agency of human actors.470 Kant consequently refuses all modes of ‗compatibilist‘ 
metaphysics in regard to divine-human relations.471 Being a theologian also, MacKinnon 
would resist this conclusion, but he nonetheless appreciates Kant‘s ethical rigour. Particularly 
important is the idea that human agency cannot be reduced to ‗naturalism‘, because this 
would evacuate moral debate of any metaphysical substance. This is arguably one of Kant‘s 
most significant insights within the field of moral philosophy, namely, that we need a 
procedure whereby moral claims cannot be reduced to the powers of sheer observation.472 But 
it is precisely at this point also where some of Kant‘s most controverted claims become 
apparent.  
Since Hegel, criticisms of Kant‘s ethics have centred upon its emptiness and formalism; 
this is because Kant appears to have separated reason from sensibility, the universal from the 
particular, reason from morality,473 thereby rendering the ethical law as separate from the 
determined ends of moral agents, as pre-existing both good and evil.474 Such formalism, as 
Gilles Deleuze suggests, corresponds to Kant‘s notion of the moral law as an ‗empty form‘ 
devoid of concrete substance (as seen in the second Critique), and is comparable to Kant‘s 
notion of time as ‗pure form‘ (in his first Critique).475 But such formalism leaves many 
questions unanswered.  Hösle476 summarizes several of these aporias: firstly, there is little 
place for a hierarchy of values within Kantian moral philosophy. It gives little sway to the 
operation of discernment or practical judgement in relation to competing or even conflicting 
duties. This appears to be the case since Kant‘s aim to establish an abstract and autonomous 
ethics represses the constraints of historicity and ‗the intersubjective world‘477 in which agents 
are enmeshed. Secondly, as regards Kant‘s idea of human freedom as a causa noumenon, 
Hösle says that if the ‗noumenal‘ self is really unknowable, we cannot know that it is really 
free (since we cannot exclude that it might be predetermined by another Ding-an-Sich). 
Furthermore, if there is no epistemic correspondence between the phenomenal and the 
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noumenal self, then we cannot assert with confidence the moral integrity of any person, 
because there always remains the possibility that phenomenal ‗appearance‘ does not cohere 
with the unknowable, noumenal subject of moral responsibility. Such remains the case, that 
is, unless one asserts that the noumenal creates the phenomenal or that God, in a Leibnizian 
fashion, forms a ‗pre-established harmony‘ between these two realms. Both of these moves 
are ultimately rejected by Kant.478  
This also has theological implications: for if it is through the pure formality of moral law 
that we have contact with the divine, then the question remains as to what kind of deity is 
thereby disclosed, since it is by a kind of practical ‗faith‘, rather than knowledge, that we have 
contact with this realm.479 But this procedure has a difficulty, since on its assumptions it 
appears to include ‗God‘ within the regime of the noumenal sublime. We can see this in the 
following way: Kant says that freedom is a causa noumenon, insofar as it does not belong to 
‗appearance‘, because to do so would apply an objective necessity to actions. Furthermore, 
divinity does not apply to the realm of ‗appearances‘, but belongs to the noumenal (or is 
himself a noumenon). Such a God, as Kant says explicitly,480 can only be the creator of the 
noumenal self, which has no guaranteed correspondence to the sphere of phenomenality. It is 
difficult then to avoid the possibility that ‗appearance‘ might be nothing more than that: mere 
appearance. And since God is not the creator of ‗appearances‘ but is the creator of the 
noumenal self, and is himself a noumenon (‗a Something = x‘), then it becomes hard to 
discern whether divinity is even distinct from the noumena themselves.481  
MacKinnon cannot be reduced to such tendencies. As has already been mentioned, he 
seems to have digested, at least partially, some of the post-Hegelian critiques of Kantian 
ethics that have focused on its formalist character.482 This is particularly clear in his 
appreciation of Butlerian ethics,483 which sought to bring into harmony the concerns of ethics 
and human interest. Butler strengthened his awareness of the limitations of Kantian morality, 
insofar as it remained ‗independent‘ of ‗the contingencies and idiosyncrasies of individual 
character and circumstance‘.484 Importantly, MacKinnon rejects ‗an ethics of sheer obligation‘ 
in accordance with the ‗arbitrary dictates of a God‘ that fails to take into account our created 
nature, since morality is bound to the fact that we are certain kinds of beings, and that our 
                                                          
478
 Ibid., 151.  
479
 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx.  
480
 Cf. Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, 101-102.  
481
 Cf. Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of 
Theology (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 93.   
482
 In light of Hegel, MacKinnon said that ‗human freedom could and must be taken beyond Kant‘ (A 
Study in Ethical Theory, 233).  
483
 MacKinnon, A Study in Ethical Theory, 179-206.  
484
 Ibid., 268. Also see the comments of Milbank: ‗[MacKinnon] tends to suggest cautiously that a 
deontological ethics requires qualification in so far as our conduct may be radically guided by attention 
to particular facts, or particular persons regarded as embodying particular sets of values‘ (‗A Critique 
of the Theology of Right,‘ 18).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
125 
 
moral behaviour is entwined with this reality. Desire and happiness cannot be excluded from 
these considerations; however, it is only God who can guarantee a harmony between morality 
and human flourishing. Hereby, we should then be ‗encouraged to see ourselves as enticed by 
the way of obligation to tread the road of our proper humanity‘.485 This is the case because 
MacKinnon seeks to maintain ‗the ethical importance of desire‘486 within the theatre of moral 
action. Additionally, as a theologian he does not possess the same qualms as Kant does 
regarding a ‗heteronomy‘ between human and divine willing, since God is the creator of 
reality in its totality, and not just the noumenal sphere.487 Divine providence and omnipotence 
(as disclosed through the narrative of the suffering Christ488) applies to the whole range of 
created being, including within its aegis human action, without implying any ‗theodicy‘. 
MacKinnon‘s Kantianism thus does not reject ‗heteronomy‘.489 Furthermore, his concern with 
historical embeddedness means that our moral freedom cannot be separated from the realities 
of tragic limit and consequence, which implies (as he makes clear) that even good-intentioned 
actions have unpredictable results which cannot be considered as morally neutral. This means 
that something like the categorical imperative cannot have the same place in MacKinnon as in 
Kant.490  
But such concessions do not mean that his Kantianism does not create problems. There still 
seems to be too much of an individualist anthropology at work within MacKinnon‘s account 
of moral deliberation, whose ideal seems to be that of a lonely agent who discovers her 
‗negative‘ freedom through reflective abstraction.491 Such anthropology remains in tension 
with his stated opinion elsewhere that personhood cannot be considered apart from 
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relationality,492 and his affirmation of Hegelian critiques of ethical abstraction. For Hegel, to 
remove the instance from its socio-historical circumstance is precisely to misprision the 
instance itself.493 Furthermore, as Rowan Williams has suggested, MacKinnon‘s concern with 
tragedy emphasizes precisely the point that our actions are not self-enclosed but rather extend 
their repercussions in often unforeseen ways, binding us therefore to community.494 These 
points, at least partially, rebuff an over-individualizing take on MacKinnon‘s ethics. And yet 
what Williams says does not banish completely the suspicion that MacKinnon is still too 
much entwined with post-idealist notions of freedom and necessity, in which there remains a 
‗standoff‘ between ‗purely individual motivation‘ and the ‗lethal realities of the public world‘, 
a world in which the imagination of a Sittlichkeit, a collective ordering toward the good, 
remains largely absent.495  
Kant and Schiller‘s notion of freedom looms large in this background. In the words of 
Milbank, MacKinnon still seems to read Hegelian theories regarding ‗historical situatedness 
in semi-Kantian terms as a further categorical restriction on knowledge and behaviour, and 
not as the positive fact of the culturally constructed character of theoretical and ethical 
categories‘.496 Without addressing how (to use Hegelian language) ‗subjective‘ freedom can 
be rendered ‗objective‘ within institutions and legal procedures that promote such freedom, 
we continue to the remain in a diastatic vision of a purely ‗negative‘ freedom, pitted against 
all forms of heteronomy, and a socio-political order that is viewed, dubiously or correctly, as 
hindering human liberty. Examining our present configurations, one can see how this vision 
incarnates itself either as a right-wing neo-liberalism that promotes atomism and 
authoritarianism at the expense of social justice,497 or as a leftist melancholy and resignation 
to the irrecuperable losses of alienation.498 All these aporias appear to echo suggestively the 
Kantian distinction between phenomenality and noumenality, in the sense that we only exist 
as free agents when freedom is banished from material ‗appearance‘. This lends itself to a 
narrative of perpetual conflict in which the physical world as ‗appearance‘ is considered to be 
the sphere of un-freedom, and the hidden world of the noumenal ego is construed as the site 
of liberated expression. This regime of ‗sublimity‘ underpins what Milbank calls a ‗practical 
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‗contentlessness‘‘ that acts as a ‗disguised theoretical source of the insistence on a 
‗contentless infinite which goes with an exclusion of constitutive metaphysics‘.499  
One can see why some have spoken of a ‗gnostic‘ temptation within Kantian philosophy, 
since there is a rather pessimistic conceptualization of the physical order in it. Kant‘s 
privileging of the noumenal as the real sphere of freedom only seems to strengthen such a 
contention.500 Whether MacKinnon completely bought into the Kantian division that underlies 
this schema remains an open question (since he was familiar with Strawson‘s critique of it).501 
But he does seem to have been persuaded by Kant‘s transcendental deduction of freedom as 
something to be negatively circumscribed but not positively stated,502 since it remained finally 
‗without grounds‘.503 This point does appear to be predicated on a Kantian division, since it is 
only within the phenomenal-noumenal distinction that his dualism between freedom and 
necessity becomes intelligible. MacKinnon takes seriously Kant‘s determinism, but did lean 
towards a certain objectivity of freedom.504 This places MacKinnon on the libertarian side of 
the freedom-necessity debate,505 since when ‗individual responsibility‘ is ‗eroded‘ then ‗the 
tragic element in human life begins to disappear‘.506  
In spite of this qualification, MacKinnon nonetheless continued to have an appreciation for 
the Kantian division, as it corresponded to ‗the distinction between a man‘s [sic] unique 
presence to himself as agent, and his subsequent achievement of a different sort of self-
knowledge through a review of his [sic] actions as a series of causally continuous events‘.507 
By commandeering this idea, MacKinnon desires to guard ‗the mystery of the individual‘508 
from the sieges of metaphysical determinism and biological reductionism. But at the same 
time, as Milbank has provocatively suggested, this model of the ‗noumenal‘ individual could 
also form a part of the ‗secular groundwork‘ within post-Kantian ethics that aims to secure 
‗the absolute disinterestedness of ethics, and the purity of ethical freedom, by stressing 
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agnosticism with regard to transcendence as a counterpart to an existential refusal of any 
materialist necessitarianism‘.509 
Therefore, it is my judgement that the Kantian influence on MacKinnon places limitations 
on his conceptualization of morality, and probably justifies Milbank‘s concern that he tacitly 
endorses ‗liberalism‘, that political vision which asserts private ‗goods‘ at the expense of 
common beatitude. This is supplemented by the following observations: if one takes seriously 
his rather pessimistic account of materiality and ‗evil‘ more generally,510 it becomes harder to 
defend MacKinnon against the charge of a quasi-Manichaeism,511 in which the created order 
is opposed to the realization of goodness, as seen especially in MacKinnon‘s rejection of any 
Augustinian theory of evil-as-privation (as we will see later). Such pessimism is not all-
embracing because MacKinnon rejects such a totalizing perspective. But when one considers 
the fact that MacKinnon wants to assert a linkage between ‗the realm of ends‘ and ‗the realm 
of nature‘ (after Butler), it becomes harder to believe in the final coherency of this project, 
since without the privatio boni, the inherent ordering of nature towards goodness becomes 
unsustainable. Here the contentions of Milbank accrue further support: as we have learned 
from intellectual historians, the prioritization of evil has an intimate connection to the advent 
of liberalism, confirming the proposal that MacKinnon might not have adequate internal 
resources to resist this consequence.512 By saying this, I do not claim that MacKinnon was a 
liberal, but rather that liberalism is an outcome of his ethical vision. This is so because if 
goodness does not hold ontological priority, morality becomes a process of containment and 
reaction against evil, which now is just as ontologically authentic as goodness. 513. Again, this 
is not to say that he would have endorsed these tendencies, but rather that his individualist 
ethics, and his rejection of the privatio boni, make it difficult to achieve a coherent 
reconciliation between creation and moral teleology, between the spheres of ‗nature‘ and of 
‗ends‘, even though this is exactly what he wants to do.  
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6.3. The Transcendence of the Tragic 
 
MacKinnon‘s preoccupation with tragedy is pervasive, and should not be limited to the period 
of the Gifford Lectures and thereafter.514 However, MacKinnon‘s main discussion of tragedy 
within The Problem of Metaphysics begins with an analysis of the differences between 
Sophocles‘s Trachiniae and Antigone.515 The particular motivation here is to establish the 
essentiality of tragic experience, and how this difference inflects our own context – especially 
since we can no longer share the worldview that Sophocles inhabited. MacKinnon argues that 
while the Trachiniae, on the one hand, seems to inhabit a world more ‗remote‘ from ours, 
filled as it is with ‗semi-divine heroes‘ and ‗monstrous centaurs‘ (PM, 123), Antigone 
displays a series of mundane events that have a kinship to present experience. This connection 
becomes clear within his plangent stress on tragic ‗conflict‘ and ‗irony‘, both of which form 
touchstones for the larger argument regarding the relevance of tragedy for contemporary 
ethics and metaphysics. This is so since ‗irony‘ is an exemplary mode of showing how our 
moral lives are entwined with realities that exceed fabrication (PM, 86). As such, tragedy is 
attuned to the exigencies of living, and is ‗in accordance with the facts of the human 
situation‘, forming ‗a disclosure of what is‘, making apparent what is often in contradiction to 
‗the comfortable musings of theologians and metaphysicians‘.516  
Such does not imply that he is unaware of the problems related to distilling the ‗essence‘ of 
‗the tragic‘. For MacKinnon, there cannot be a simplistic reduction of ‗tragedy‘ to a tightly-
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canonized, marginal mode of presentation (e.g. George Steiner), on the one hand, or an over-
generalizing ‗tragic sense of life‘ on the other (e.g. Miguel de Unamuno). MacKinnon is 
conscious that we need to avoid essentalisations of this kind. He was familiar with Raymond 
Williams,517 and was sensitive to the opinion that any taxonomy of tragedies is ‗inherently 
complex‘, requiring a correlation of ‗family resemblance‘.518 This is because tragedies have a 
certain ‗open-textured quality‘ that defies cheaply-acquired reductions.519 He has said that it 
would be ‗a great grave mistake to generalize about tragedy as if there were an ‗essence‘ of 
the tragic that we could extract and capture in a manageable formula.‘520 Yet despite these 
qualifications, MacKinnon assigns a privilege to the category of ‗tragedy‘ as a ‗system of 
projection‘, which can be traced to its narration of the hidden consequences of moral action, 
the as-of-yet undisclosed threads of connection that exceed immediate grasp. It is precisely 
this ironic excessiveness within the moral life that manifests the non-triviality of transcendent 
questions. This non-triviality of tragic disclosure requires an openness to metaphysical 
‗presence‘ (cf. PM, 146-163), because without its admission, we would render vacuous the 
moral life and undermine its aporias. Without transcendence, tragedy ceases to exist, precisely 
because it is predicated on a moral axiology that pure immanence cannot provide.  
Nevertheless, MacKinnon does not espouse a ‗tragic philosophy‘, or any systematic ‗tragic 
sense of life‘. Such would count as a capitulation, once more, to philosophical monism. 521 
Against superficial readings of MacKinnon, one should emphasize his pervasive suspicion of 
any all-embracing ‗tragic‘ or ‗pessimistic‘ philosophy. For him, against a totalizing system, 
‗metaphysics‘ must be bound to the ‗concretely descriptive‘.522 Already in the 1940‘s 
MacKinnon had spoken (under the influence of H. A. Hodges) of tragedy as providing a 
mediating position between ‗the old-fashioned rationalism and a more nihilistic 
philosophy‘.523 This is so because tragedy discloses a kind of ‗metaphysical ultimacy‘ that 
resists a ‗teleological explanation‘ of the comprehensive kind.524 It provides both a realistic 
vision of the contingency of the world, while at the same time avoiding the trivialization of 
the transcendent. The ‗paradox‘ of tragedy for MacKinnon then is that it both ‗demands and 
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resists metaphysics‘, to quote Giles Waller. For MacKinnon, ‗Tragedy reveals the necessity 
of metaphysics, while regulating the speculative metaphysics that attempts to pass ‗beyond 
tragedy‘‘.525 ‗Tragedy‘ proposes and presupposes a realm of values, apart from which the 
pathos of human circumstance is rendered trivial; but this does not imply a confident system 
of ‗meaning‘ into which all suffering can be plotted. Such applies equally to accounts of 
natural teleology that lack tragic irony, as it does to universalized declarations that all values 
are without substance, as in nihilism. This is also why MacKinnon aimed to transcend 
philosophies that endorsed either ‗pessimism‘ or ‗optimism‘. He made clear that the Christian 
assertion of the resurrection of the crucified surpasses these options.526 Here MacKinnon is 
Johannine in his approach, reading the glory of the ascended Christ as coterminous with his 
crucifixion, his kenosis with his anabasis. As this implies, the Christological element has a 
centrality within MacKinnon‘s theology, and has special implications in his reception of 
tragic themes – a point to which we will return.  
But it is important to note again that MacKinnon opposes any uncritical commitment to 
‗the tragic sense of life‘ or ‗the cult of the tragic‘527 (or any ‗romantic cult of the heroic‘528). 
Central to this critique is that tragic philosophy – much like Plato‘s politics, or Hegel‘s 
collapsing of the ideal with the actual – tends to convert the is of the present into an ethical 
ought. For MacKinnon, tragic philosophies are susceptible to this trend, since they imply a 
resignation before the seemingly unchangeable present. Treated thus, ‗tragedy‘ would be 
converted to a form of ideology, a mode of mystification in which the current order is tacitly 
endorsed. Additionally, it could provoke self-immolation in the name of an all-embracing 
totality.529 All of this would be a distortion of the gospel since Christianity, on the contrary, 
does not have a ‗vested interest in human failure and disaster‘.530 He castigates theologians 
and preachers who engage in an ‗academically precise pessimism‘, who found their métier in 
the ‗disintegration of societies‘ and ‗the coming of despair‘.531 This praxis of ‗despair‘ or 
tragic ‗pity‘, in his eyes, encourages a culture of moral irresponsibility that inhibits political 
‗action‘.532 MacKinnon is opposed to this move, as he makes clear: ‗[the] recognition of the 
tragic must not be allowed to inhibit action, even if it must deepen perception and, in 
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consequence, purify the motives and intentions from which men [sic] act‘.533 MacKinnon 
certainly acknowledges the metaphysical import of tragic awareness, but this should not 
imply that ‗the tragic is a sort of Anknüpfungspunkt between creature and creator‘. Instead, ‗it 
is to remind ourselves that it is at the level of personal self-interrogation, to which tragic 
perception belongs, and not at that of abstract speculation that metaphysics often finds its 
home. We need to revise our concept of the metaphysical, to do justice to its situation in the 
stream of human life‘, and ‗inevitably such a revision will enable us to take stock of its 
human role, and therefore of its tragic quality.‘534 The only real Anknüpfungspunkt between 
God and humanity is to be found where the divine has most profoundly disclosed its nature, 
namely Jesus Christ.  
One of MacKinnon‘s most trenchant Christological emphases is on ‗the cost of victory‘.535 
MacKinnon‘s particular inspiration is taken from the story about the Duke of Wellington: in 
response to a woman‘s adulations of his military triumph, the Duke had replied to her by 
saying ‗Madam, a victory is the most tragic thing in the world, only excepting a defeat‘ (PM, 
126).536 This statement reverberates in several of MacKinnon‘s texts, but its gravitas is tied to 
the sense that our moral actions take place within a world ‗we have not made‘,537 a world 
which does not obey an unflinching law which guarantees that actions – even good ones – 
will result in desirable consequences. Even our victories can come at an unexpected cost, for 
ourselves and for others. To quote Rowan Williams: ‗If the world is our creation, or even if 
the world is masterable as a system of necessities, the idea of irreparable and uncontrollable 
loss ceases to make sense‘. In this world, ‗there are no tragedies‘.538 Connected to this, as 
MacKinnon suggests, is the insight of tragic fiction in which protagonists are ‗frequently 
broken not by their faults but by their virtues‘,539 as can be seen in the examples of Deianira, 
Antigone, Oedipus, and Creon, to name only a sample. MacKinnon‘s purpose is to manifest 
the ever-present truth that actions, even when they are bolstered by good intentions, cannot be 
immunized against the moral risk that lingers over every act. To deny such would result in us 
becoming ‗frustrated‘ or ‗dangerously self-deceived‘540 in our ethical responsibility. 
MacKinnon‘s complexification of ‗victory‘ provides an entrance to his tragic reading of the 
gospel. Since Christ‘s life cannot be abstracted from the continuum of time and space, it 
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cannot be considered apart from its history of effects. By establishing this, MacKinnon‘s aim 
is to translate this into the sphere of Christology, countering the claim, made by some, that 
‗where the Christian religion is concerned‘ we are done with, or have moved ‗beyond 
tragedy‘ (PM, 124).541 For MacKinnon, this will not do since even at the level of scripture 
there are examples of ‗tragic irony‘ that warrant comparison with tragic drama. MacKinnon 
mentions the story of Job, but it is the Gospel of John that becomes the central text for 
displaying this.  
Earlier in The Problem of Metaphysics, MacKinnon had called the writer of this Gospel ‗a 
supreme ironist‘ (PM, 120), particularly as regards his recounting of the miracles stories (PM, 
114-121). Apropos Lazarus (John 11.1-44), he argued that John gives an example of 
‗omnipotence in concreto‘ (PM, 119) in which ‗a question-mark is set against the way in 
which we are easily to understand it‘, that is, the divine as an unbounded miraculous power. 
In his reading, John is inviting us to continue the lectio until we approach the end. For 
MacKinnon, the resuscitation of Lazarus belongs to ‗the world of myth‘ and ‗fairy-tale‘ in 
comparison with ‗[the] bitter submission to the harsh realities of the human life‘(PM, 120) 
that are manifest in the immediately subsequent section: the recounting of the Pharisees‘s 
murderous plot (John 11.45-57). This section is summarized – in a masterstroke of irony – by 
Caiaphas‘s statement ‗that it is better for you to have one man die for the people than to have 
the whole nation destroyed‘ (11.50, NRSV), here understood by the writer of the Gospel as 
applying not just to Israel, but to ‗the dispersed children of God‘ as well (11.52, NRSV). 
Their murderous scheme however is unable to resist the very thing which the Pharisees 
feared, namely the destruction of the city itself (11.48) in 70 AD. MacKinnon‘s purpose in 
using this example is to show that the gospel, through its use of ‗double-intendre‘ and 
‗devastating irony‘, is able to display ‗an unmistakeable tragic quality‘ (PM, 125). In 
particular, it plays with ideas of recognition and misrecognition, inviting the reader to see the 
‗truth‘ that is there, but which is unrecognized by those who need it most.542  
This reading is contrasted with the Lukan narrative which for MacKinnon (and especially 
the Book of Acts) evinces ‗a narrative of triumphal progress‘ (PM, 127) that undermines ‗the 
deep complexity of the Gospel‘ (PM, 128), and legitimates a non-tragic characterization of 
early Christianity. It lays the foundation for ‗The most devastating intellectual temptation‘ in 
Christian thinking, in which ‗the catastrophic course of events‘ becomes ‗expressive of the 
working of a traceable providential order‘. This leads to ‗the emergence of an apologetic style 
which seeks to make the intolerable bearable, even edifying, which seeks to eliminate the 
element of unfathomable mystery by the attempt to move beyond tragedy‘ (PM, 129). 
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MacKinnon thinks that the church is constantly tempted to make history ‗endurable‘ when its 
task was precisely to make it ‗unendurable‘.543 He therefore rejected all the attempts of 
abstract theodicies to solve ‗the problem of evil‘ (even once describing such solvency as a 
‗lie‘544 or ‗sheer nonsense‘545). In a similar fashion, MacKinnon rejects the privatio boni as 
‗the most profound spiritual error of transcendent metaphysics‘,546 since it draws upon a 
‗metaphysical idealism‘ that ‗refuses to recognize evil as positive, and not merely a negative, 
force‘.547 He dilates his rejection by saying ‗that [the Platonic theory of privation] has only to 
be stated clearly, and worked out in terms of concrete examples, to be shown to be totally 
inadequate as an analysis either of moral or of physical evil‘.548 MacKinnon‘s pluralist 
impulses are again at work because, in his view, any account of evil-as-privation is premised 
upon (what Giles Waller calls) ‗a totalizing order of the Good‘. To quote Waller more 
extensively: ‗Speaking of evil as privation in a way risks, for the metaphysical pluralist, an 
idolatry of our own theoretical construct of the Good at the expense of our premature 
reduction of suffering and evil to a mere instance of something else, in this case a lack of the 
Good.‘549 To accept the privatio boni would be to miss the radical particularity of suffering, 
and thereby renders evil as merely an absence or lack, failing to account for its own irruptive 
quality. Ultimately, both theodicy and the privatio boni, in his opinion, are reducible to a form 
of metaphysical monism that is unable to recognize the refractions of the individual and the 
particular.    
Such monistic philosophies undergird a triumphalist narration of the church that tends to 
ignore ‗the tragic element in Christianity‘ (PM, 130). It forgets that even its defining event, 
the death and resurrection of Christ, cannot be absolved from tragic circumstance. 
MacKinnon‘s favourite example is stark: in his mind, Christianity has to bear its share of 
responsibility for allowing the Holocaust to occur. He does not scold the church as such for 
direct responsibility, despite reprimanding (probably unfairly) the Catholic Church and Pope 
Pius XII for their response to the plight of Jews in Rome.550 But beyond these details, 
MacKinnon‘s point is that the longue durée of the church‘s anti-Judaism produced ‗a blunting 
of the sensibility‘ (PM, 130) that contributed to the atrocities of Hitler‘s Germany. These 
teachings find their basis in the New Testament itself, especially (though MacKinnon does 
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not mention this here) within John‘s gospel.551 The atoning death of Christ cannot be parsed 
out from its historical aftermath, to which the pogroms and genocides of Europe serve as an 
exemplary testament.552 As such, Christology cannot be confessed apart from particularity, as 
well as its historical contributions to unjust suffering.  
MacKinnon‘s Christology at this juncture simply constitutes a deepening, in his mind, of 
what orthodoxy says concerning the homoousion. For him, to ‗acknowledge the supremacy of 
the Christology is to confess that finality belongs somehow to that which is particular and 
contingent‘.553 This is done without trivializing, as MacKinnon thought Hegel did, ‗the tragic 
depth of human existence‘, in which Gethsemane is turned into a kind of ‗charade‘.554 But just 
because there is ‗no escape from contingency‘555, ‗no transcendence of the pervasive 
temporal, no leaping over its condition‘,556 such should not mean that Christ‘s particularity is 
refused ‗ontological‘ relevance, especially for the church which is constantly tempted to 
forget its own contingent polity.557 There is a perennial tendency to convert or reduce Christ‘s 
‗deed‘ into an ‗idea‘, rather than being drawn to ‗the concrete detail‘ that forms its specific 
history.558 This explains why MacKinnon thinks that ‗Christian theology may be much more 
than it realizes the victim of the victory won in the person of Plato by the philosophers over 
the poets, and particular the tragedians‘.559 Because Platonism has contributed to the 
avoidance of the particular, such an aversion to ‗the concrete detail‘ has led to a blindness 
around the historical limitation of Christ, and has contributed to some rather docetic 
renditions of Christ‘s humanity. Controversially, he even suggests that Christ‘s sinlessness 
cannot be divorced from contingent infractions, and even sinful outcomes. His was a 
‗historically achieved innocence‘560 rather than a ‗bloodless myth‘ (to quote Geoffrey Hill561). 
As MacKinnon argues: ‗Even if we count Christ sinless…we still see in him one whirled to 
destruction by the choice he made, broken to pieces in inevitable consequence of the way he 
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elected to follow‘. Therefore, to ‗portray him as a serene heroic figure, always the confident 
master of the situations which confronted him, always sure and certain of touch in his 
handling of them, is to trivialize his ordeal, and diminish his significance, to belittle his 
mystery, and to render inauthentic his humanity.‘562 For Christ, to be human implied an 
element of subjection to the constraints of time, growth and limitation:   
 
For this element of temporality…belongs to Jesus‘ comings and goings. What is was 
for him to be human was to be subject to the sort of fragmentation of effort, 
curtailment of design, interruption of purpose, distraction of resolve that belongs to 
temporal experience. To leave one place for another is leave work undone; to give 
attention to one suppliant is to ignore another; to expend energy today is to leave less 
for tomorrow…We have to ask ourselves how far this very conformity to the complex 
discipline of temporality, this acceptance of the often tragic consequences that spring 
from its obstinate, ineluctable truncation of human effort, belongs to the very 
substance of Jesus‘ defeat. Jesus‘ acceptance of this part of his burden can arguably 
be interpreted as a painfully realized transcription into the conditions of our existence, 
of the receptivity, the defined, even if frontierless, receptivity that constitutes his 
person.563 
 
For MacKinnon, the irrepressible configurations of time and space apply to Christ, just as 
much as they do to us. Our natures are implicated and formed through ‗growth‘ and 
‗estrangement‘564, experiences that are fundamental for our advancement towards maturity. 
The temporality of human personhood does not imply a ‗facile determinism‘,565 but rather 
provokes an awareness that we are able ‗to fashion or refashion‘566 ourselves in accordance 
with the givens of memory and circumstance. It is through this narration that we achieve 
adulthood and coherency, in which we are able to let go of past identities (or fixations) in our 
journey towards maturity.567 Dwelling within the constraints of time necessitates a kind of 
loss, but it also grants the possibility of learning. It implies a ‗ceasing to feel and think in 
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certain ways‘,568 a growth from childhood to adulthood. This awareness of loss and historical 
limitedness is intrinsic to his understanding of tragic narration. But this perspective, it should 
be emphasized, does not gesture towards an unavoidably ‗negative‘ outcome. It might suggest 
a non-retrievable loss for some, but this does not imply an ontological ‗necessity‘. Rowan 
Williams has made some excellent comments on this aspect which deserve a hearing.  
 
To exist in time and its limits is to exist in a world where there is no historical end to 
risk and suffering, and thus to the likelihood of damage within any and every action. 
Yet this does not mean presupposing some supertemporal principle or existential 
curse. It is simply a matter of parsing what it means to recognize our finitude: 
narrative itself presupposes the irreversible passage of time and thus the 
omnipresence of loss. But that‘s the point: it is only in narrating it, ‗plotting‘ it if your 
will, that it can be spoken of. What happens as result of our decisions is not an 
abstract and identical calamity but always the specific kind of loss that this unique set 
of temporal conditions will generate…the very act of narrating anything at all 
involves the possibility of tragic narration. The passage of time is a process of loss, 
identified as such in the act of relating it.569  
 
This narration does not solve ‗the problem of evil‘ or imply some soul-making theodicy. 
MacKinnon wholeheartedly rejects any such consolation, any ‗recipes for living‘ that insure 
that suffering serves ‗an end‘ by which our ‗endurance will be justified‘ (PM, 134). To do so 
would involve a blunting of the edges of tragedy, and would imply a metaphysical monism in 
which catastrophe is absorbed into a finalized reconciliation, obliterating the profundity of 
tragic deprivation (PM, 169). MacKinnon‘s provocations have been summarized by Paul Janz 
as offering a ‗system of projection‘ that manifests ‗the finality of non-resolution‘. Janz writes 
that for MacKinnon, ‗Orientation to the tragic – to the sheerly discontinuous in human life – 
allows us to project our questioning to the transcendent like no other form of discourse 
because it gives us factual, tangible examples in real empirical human experience, of the 
finality of non-resolution that we must encounter in the transcendent‘.570  It is at this point that 
MacKinnon might be accused of adopting the ‗speculative closure‘ of the tragic sublime,571 
which – especially in its postmodern versions – asserts the unthinkability of pain and pre-
judges its state of irresolution. However, for the moment, it is important to stress that for him 
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it is this non-negotiable presence of the tragic that resists systematic containment, and it is 
Christianity which, ‗properly understood‘, that might be able to ‗hold steadfastly to the 
significance of the tragic‘, as this resists ‗that sort of synthesis which seeks to obliterate by the 
vision of an all-embracing order the sharper discontinuity of human existence‘ (PM, 135). 
The hope of the church, instructed by the crucified and resurrected Christ, is not found in 
consolatory visions of universal meaning or theodicy, but through a participation in the 
‗endurance‘ of Jesus, as he moved through the darkness of Gethsemane towards the light of 
Easter.572 This constitutes MacKinnon‘s own ‗practical‘ response to the problem of evil, 
against the over-generalizing approaches of philosophical theology.573  
MacKinnon appropriates this non-negotiability of the tragic as an instance of the priority of 
practical rationality (PM, 53-71).574 As we have seen, Kantian morality is a touchstone for 
MacKinnon‘s metaphysics. Following Wittgenstein‘s ‗intuitive‘ rather than ‗discursive‘ 
praxis (as evidenced in the Tractatus),575 MacKinnon does not construct extensive logical 
premises on which metaphysics is possible. Much like Kant, he thinks religion becomes most 
pertinent through the claims of morality than through any abstract reflection. It is through 
moral perplexity that questions concerning the super-sensible become manifest, because 
without this dimension the question of transcendence is compromised and reduced to a variant 
of biological naturalism. And in MacKinnon‘s eyes, it is moral tragedy that is the best ‗system 
of projection‘ for manifesting such metaphysical concerns. In his words, it is ‗in tragedy we 
reach a form of representation that by the very ruthlessness of its interrogation enables us to 
project as does no available alternative, our ultimate questioning‘ (PM, 136). This procedure, 
as Milbank has said, seems to place MacKinnon within a tradition of Anglican metaphysics 
that aims to radicalize the impositions of natural law as a mode of revelatory disclosure 
through ‗a confirmation of the conditions of our perplexity.‘576 It positions him against Kant 
and Butler who, he says, displayed overconfidence in the capacity for self-mastery. As he 
emphasizes repeatedly, human beings exist in ‗situations that are very often not of their own 
making‘ (PM, 137). Our intentions, even good ones, are subject to the uncertainties of chance 
and ‗indeterminacy‘.577 It is this aspect of contingency which is the kernel of MacKinnon‘s 
idea of the tragic, even though he sometimes seems to articulate ‗an unmistakable air of 
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fatalism‘ in other contexts.578 Such an element of ‗contingency‘ re-appears when he returns to 
his discussion of the parables of Jesus.  
Milbank half-jokingly described MacKinnon‘s ‗realist‘ interpretation of the parables ‗the 
other way round‘ as a form of postmodern ‗deconstruction‘ – though not in the style of 
Derrida but as if ‗done by A. C. Bradley‘.579 In his opinion, MacKinnon tends to read the 
parables in a ‗Romantic‘ fashion, in which the ‗parabolic‘ is distinguished from the 
‗allegorical‘.580 Here the parables are taken as ‗woven out of a ‗real life‘ unmediated by 
emplotment and carrying all the freight of a ‗given‘ human ambiguity which can then become 
the symbolic vehicle of a gesture towards transcendence‘. And there is also ‗half a suggestion 
in MacKinnon that the element in the parables which indicates the absolute is the pointing up 
of some finitely irresolvable hesitation‘.581 These statements, as indicated previously, are part 
of Milbank‘s critique of MacKinnon in which he charges him with reading the tragic into 
certain narratives, in which the parables (in this case) are re-narrated within an already-
presupposed tragic system. MacKinnon‘s mistake, according to Milbank, is that he imposes 
‗the tragic‘ onto narratives, rather than allowing the stories to resolve naturally. This 
predisposition towards tragic narration explains, for Milbank, MacKinnon‘s attempt to read 
the parables against the grain of their texture, turning their unique construction into an 
illustration of moral alienation. For this reason, MacKinnon aims to shore up the presence of 
contingency within the parables, showing that one could read them ‗the other way round‘, 
instead of reading them as they were written. But Milbank suggests, on the contrary, that the 
gospel implies that ‗the tragic abyss‘ should be ‗represented rather than mutely indicated‘, 
and shown to be ‗contained in its historical occasion and final non-necessity‘.582 For Milbank, 
we should hold out instead for the possibilities that history creates, making allowances for a 
narration that projects different outcomes, and it is this posture that will militate against any 
tragic necessitarianism. By inscribing ‗the tragic‘ into the hinterland of the text, even where it 
is not present, MacKinnon cements Milbank‘s suspicion that he is much more concerned with 
a tragic and irresolvable sublime (which serves as a gesture towards transcendence) than with 
the particularity of human stories. Once more, the priority of problem over solution assumes 
a centrality for MacKinnon.      
However, there is a qualification to this picture of MacKinnon given by Milbank himself. 
He admits that it is over-simplistic to characterize MacKinnon‘s readings simply as a 
whimsical re-telling ‗the other way round‘. For Milbank, this is ‗not quite‘ what MacKinnon 
is attempting. To encapsulate MacKinnon‘s exegesis so would be a failure to attend to why he 
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engages in this deconstruction. It is certainly not that MacKinnon is being wilful in his 
exegesis, or re-plotting the parables for the fun of it. On the contrary, there is as Milbank 
suggests a deeply moral rationale for his re-reading, one which places an emphasis on human 
contingency and finitude. Milbank admits that MacKinnon is quite right to insist ‗that one 
cannot legislate in advance the criteria for correct choices‘, and that his aim to undermine the 
‗deontological schematism‘ (à la Kant) of ethical absolutism is certainly warranted. 
Seemingly then, in sequel to MacKinnon‘s comments on pacifism,583 Milbank argues that ‗an 
ethics of virtue can never escape the problematic of ‗moral luck‘, which reveals that all 
possibilities of good require a particular social context for their viability‘. This is not to 
castigate pacifism as such – ‗the way of peace, the way of exemplary persuasion and 
forgiveness, is always the more final way‘, he admits – but such a concession should not be 
used as a ‗sublime imperative‘. Here the parables are shown to be literary exemplars of ‗the 
partial (never complete) alienation of the very possibility of virtuous action‘.584 Our actions 
take place within conditions of fragmentation, implying that even good-intentioned 
motivations can be thwarted, which is why Milbank is sympathetic to MacKinnon‘s 
exemplification of the ‗tragic sundering between deontology and consequentialism‘585 in the 
context of post-war Britain.  
How do these admissions qualify his take on MacKinnon? One could hazard an answer and 
suggest that it is precisely through a tragic re-imagining of the parables ‗the other way round‘ 
that we are alerted to the finitude of all moral action. Milbank‘s ‗not quite‘ implies that such a 
re-reading of the parables is not simply arbitrary, but a way of showing that our choices are 
formed within a world that exceeds our making. Such exegesis, blended with an allegorical 
and anagogic reading, could do what Milbank describes as ‗the ceaseless re-narrating and 
‗explaining‘ of human history under the sign of the cross‘.586 Such re-narrativisation, in which 
we become conscious of our historical limits, could contribute to our ethical growth as human 
beings, since it is by becoming aware of such limits that we are provided an opportunity for 
moral expansion. So the point of telling the story ‗the other way round‘ is not to sombrely 
advocate a sublime resignation – as if we were fatalistically incapacitated by tragic facts – but 
to show that any actualization of ideals needs to attend to context, a context which might or 
might not resist the establishment of such virtue. The cognate inference to be made from this 
is that if ideals are to be embodied, there must be a labouring towards a social compact in 
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which such ideals can be incarnated. But since we are not there as of yet, one should attend to 
the authentic, pre-Kantian sense of ‗the sublime‘ in which there is a constant ‗suspension‘ in 
our ‗reaching towards transcendence‘.587 Having sensitivity to this perennial ‗suspension‘ is a 
part of the growing and every-increasing ‗estrangement‘ that is essential for our moral and 
spiritual maturation.  
One can demonstrate this from MacKinnon‘s own reading of the parables. Take for 
instance his slant on the Prodigal Son (Luke 15.11-32), in which he impressionistically 
compares the father of the story to King Lear, hereby attempting to draw out the ‗ambiguities‘ 
of the original parables. Like the father‘s exuberant reception of the younger son, combined 
with his rather tepid response to the older one, Lear seems to adore ‗the flattery of Goneril 
and Regan in self-indulgent gratification of their hopes, and rejects the sharp but devoted 
honesty of Cordelia‘ (PM, 137). MacKinnon finds the expression of love and acceptance 
within the parable, like in King Lear, to be fraught with tragic irony. This is because the 
father‘s hyperbolic gratuity towards the prodigal are not replicated towards the more 
responsible older brother, whose own reception of his kin is decidedly cooler and even bitter 
in tone. He bemoans the fact that ‗For all these years I have been working like a slave for 
you‘ and yet ‗you have never given me even a young goat so that I might celebrate with my 
friends‘ (15.29, NRSV). The father‘s riposte to this is undoubtedly gracious: ‗you are always 
with me, and all that is mine is yours‘, but ‗we had to celebrate and rejoice because this 
brother of yours was dead and has come to life; he was lost and has been found‘ (15.31-32, 
NRSV). But for MacKinnon this response is punctured with irony since  
 
One wishes to ask the old man why then he had not made it plain, not merely in 
general terms, but with the sort of party the hard-working, dull, elder brother suggests 
now that he always wanted, and which might in fact have made him a more 
forthcoming, less unattractively puritanical human being. For if the parable affirms 
the power of love to recreate a life, we may well ask whether that same love should 
not equally avail to transform the grave, disciplined prudence of the industrious (PM, 
138).  
 
What MacKinnon is saying is that the father‘s enthusiastic acceptance of the prodigal son had 
not been communicated to the elder son, and that it is precisely this paucity that has left him 
embittered. The brother‘s anger stems from a sense of inequality; it is not that the display of 
affection was wrong, but that it lacked parity.588  
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What is the point of such an ‗unduly sophisticated‘ reading (PM, 138)? It is to show ‗the 
deep, characteristic human ambiguity with which the parable is saturated‘ (PM, 138), and not 
simply, as Milbank suggests, to plot the parable into an a priori tragic edifice. This is duly 
expanded through examining a similar tension within the parable of the Good Samaritan 
(Luke 10.25-37). Here MacKinnon, at several points, raises questions concerning the 
supposed message of the parable. For instance, could the Priest and Levite not claim that ‗by 
passing on the other side they were exercising a proper sense of discipline, refraining from 
any well-intentioned but possibly disastrous attempt to do for the injured man what they could 
not do‘? This is not to condone their action, but rather to probe as to whether such assistance, 
without the required ‗competence‘, is in the best interests of the suffering individual. Aid 
should be given – this fact is not in debate – but neighbourly charity should inform genuine 
assistance, and not a mere ‗opportunity for [the Samaritan‘s] own gratification‘ (PM, 139). 
Such would not stem from a proper regard of the other, but rather a subtle form of ‗egoism‘ 
(PM, 140). But beyond this emphasis on personal motivation, good or bad, there are other 
contingent factors which are determinative.  
Suppose, hypothetically, that the Samaritan upon crossing the road discovers that ‗his 
hands are infected and the oil he had used gone rancid‘. What would the meaning of his 
assistance then imply? In such a situation, his help would contribute to the injured man‘s 
suffering, rather than providing alleviation. MacKinnon‘s stress is that ‗human beings are not 
thrust into the sorts of situation to which they must respond as agents perfectly designed to 
suit the emergencies that they must meet‘ (PM, 140).  Within any good intentioned response, 
the Samaritan included, there remains ‗the possibility of tragedy‘ (PM, 141). This is because 
even if his actions were well-intentioned and well-executed, the injured man could still be 
placed, so to speak, at ‗the mercy of his saviour.‘ Here the potential tragic ‗flaw‘ could be 
activated, counter-intuitively, by that which deserves high ‗commendation‘, provoking the 
‗sombre irony‘ that ‗in many situations it is the one who serves who, by that service, makes 
his beneficiary his bondslave‘ (PM, 141). His point is that we cannot predict the ripple effect 
that our actions will engender; they could bring about just relief, but they could also bring 
about other consequences in their wake. The knowledge of such possibilities, however, should 
not lead to debilitation, as MacKinnon clearly says, because even though ‗self-knowledge‘ is 
an essential part of ‗human maturity‘, this self-knowledge can potentially ‗inhibit action‘ 
(PM, 143) for those who obsessively engage in it, or who fail to yield to its insights, as 
MacKinnon thinks Oedipus did (PM, 143-145). Such knowledge is necessary to achieve a 
greater self-honesty, but it might lend itself to tragic outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
comparable links, for instance, between MacKinnon‘s reading of the Prodigal Son and Stanley Cavell‘s 
reading of King Lear. For this reading, see Cavell, ‗The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear,‘ 
in Disowning Knowledge, 39-123. 
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What these last comments suggest is that MacKinnon‘s analyses of the parables are aimed 
at generating an awareness of finitude, to those instances that are not always congenial to 
moral action. They are directed at gaining ‗knowledge‘ of ourselves, and the substance that 
forms our environment. He is not trying to be ingenious in his textual playfulness, but to show 
that our moral envisioning needs to be enlarged by this aspect, namely, that we do not 
perform our actions within an enclosed vacuum. Rather every action is contained within a 
history, and – in accordance with the heterogenesis of ends – cannot be considered apart from 
its effects. Our knowledge of the limits that impinge upon experiences forms an inextricable 
aspect of our humanness, so that a denial of them can only lead to further unwanted or tragic 
outcomes. By being made conscious of the often-refractory qualities of our physical and 
socio-historical constitutions, we are confronted with the question as to whether these indicate 
a non-negotiable item that cannot be suppressed, that is, without a truncation of that reality. 
By ignoring these factors, we fail to recognize and come to terms with ‗what-is-the-case‘, and 
therefore deny reality. For MacKinnon, it is within tragedy, and its exemplification of ‗the 
conflict of duties‘, that the problem of metaphysics becomes most tangible. Here again, we 
see MacKinnon‘s preference for deontological modes of ethics that centre on authenticity and 
perplexity.  
In conclusion, he summarizes the impact and importance of tragedy by saying that when 
we are confronted by ‗the irreducibility of the tragic‘, with those experiences that restrict 
‗ambitious metaphysical construction‘, we come to see that ‗in pondering the extremities of 
human life‘ we have to ‗acknowledge the transcendent as the only alternative to the kind of 
trivialisation‘ that would ‗empty of significance the sorts of experience with which we have 
been concerned‘, namely ‗the tragic‘. The metaphysical inquiry opened by this resilience is, 
indeed, not ambitious: it bespeaks of a ‗departure‘, a commencement of disclosure, rather 
than ‗arrival‘. The ‗problem of metaphysics‘ is not ‗resolved‘ by an attendance to those 
experiences that most deeply provoke such perplexities, but they might allow us ‗dimly to 
perceive the sort of aliveness to connections which will refuse facile consolation‘ (PM, 170). 
6.4. Critical Evaluation 
After detailing MacKinnon‘s account, we can now take stock of its particular contours, 
bearing in mind the criticisms lodged against it. A glance at the evidence catalogued seems to 
present a mixed picture, one that partially confirms and contests the claims of MacKinnon‘s 
detractors: does MacKinnon mistakenly transcribe the gospel into a tragic form? Does he read 
narratives (e.g. the parables) into a predetermined structure of perpetual deprivation and loss? 
We have already intimated that this is not quite the case since, as MacKinnon has shown, the 
gospel predisposes itself to tragic structures. We have also shown that on the question of the 
parables, even Milbank concedes that MacKinnon is onto something.  
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But beyond these easier adjudications, it is clear that Milbank and Hart‘s concerns touch 
upon wider theological problems. One has in mind here their critiques of ‗sacrificial totality‘, 
and MacKinnon‘s ‗speculative‘ account of the tragic sublime. On the one hand, MacKinnon 
stressed ‗the tragic‘ as an exhibition of irresolution that in its non-triviality demonstrates a 
metaphysical probity. He argued for moral tragedy as a ‗system of projection‘ that is able to 
approximate in a more penetrating manner than others a certain ‗adequacy to reality‘ (to quote 
Walter Stein).589 On the other hand, MacKinnon would be resistant to any overly-systematic 
account of ‗the tragic‘. While he certainly deems tragedy to be a non-negotiable element of 
experience, this does not imply that we can construct any totalized picture from it. This is 
why adducing the language of ‗tragic theology‘, as Hart does vis-à-vis MacKinnon, should be 
approached cautiously. MacKinnon explicitly places himself in opposition to any ‗sacrificial 
totality‘. He opposed any metaphysical and moral totalization, as in philosophical monism 
(e.g. Hegel, Bradley, etc.) and Platonic ‗intellectual intuition‘, which all seemed to place too 
much confidence in our ability to perceive the spiritual ‗whole‘. It was for this reason that he 
was critical of any language of ‗sacrifice‘ and tragic heroism that advocated holocausts in the 
name of any absolute. Capitulating unthinkingly would evade moral circumspection, and thus 
support ideological conceits. Worth mentioning, by way of contrast, is that MacKinnon did 
not follow the trend of other theologians interested in ‗the tragic‘, who seemed to adopt a 
more resigned posture in relation to supposed ‗inevitable‘ developments (e.g. nuclear 
armament).590 Milbank opposes MacKinnon‘s realism to the ‗Stoicism‘ of Reinhold Niebuhr 
on exactly these kinds of questions.591 These aspects of his thinking seem to resist, at least 
prima facie, the thesis that MacKinnon espoused a ‗sacrificial totality‘ and any ideological 
conservatism.  
Similar responses could be given to Hart‘s critiques of MacKinnon‘s regarding the 
resurrection, as well as Milbank‘s comments on MacKinnon‘s truncated historicism. It could 
be argued that Hart, in The Beauty of the Infinite, tends to underplay the kenotic elements of 
the gospel. Paul says that the resurrected Christ remains the crucified one (1 Cor. 1.23, 2.2, 
Gal. 3.1, 2. Cor. 13.4; ἐζηασρφμένος: perfect passive participle), and is contemporaneous 
with us. His theology of soteriological participation in the redemptive suffering of Christ (e.g. 
Gal. 2.19-20; Rom. 6.1-14), as well as his understanding of the Lord‘s Supper (1 Cor. 10; 
11:17–34), presuppose this. The Gospel of John‘s identification of Christ‘s crucifixion with 
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his ascendant glorification also supplements this tradition (John. 3.13-14; 8.28; 12.27-33; 
13.31-32; 17.1). MacKinnon‘s own Christology deliberately aims to bring together these dual 
realities.592 He also states the resurrection is ‗the prius of my whole argument‘, and that it is 
this that constitutes ‗the ultimate source of that peculiar tension between optimism and 
pessimism‘ within Christianity.593 One could say that MacKinnon does temper the clamour of 
Easter, and therefore is open to criticism. But he does so because he is trying to disabuse the 
resurrection from any cheap optimism. ‗MacKinnon so resisted the reduction of the 
Resurrection gospel to the usual categories of happy endings – reversals of fortune, 
revelations, journeys ending in lovers‘ meetings and so on. What we are talking about is 
neither a comic resolution nor a simple re-presentation of the catastrophe (resurrection as the 
proclamation of the crucified as Lord): it is a new fact‘.594 Furthermore, MacKinnon is not 
immune to the joy-giving aspects of Easter – even though he could have been a bit more 
sanguine in this regard.595  
But if Hart castigates MacKinnon for dampening Easter, one could respond that Hart is 
similarly reductive in his theologia crucis. To say that Easter ‗vindicates not the cross but the 
Jew who died there‘596 is true enough, but it remains too minimalist. Of course one should not 
reduce the cross to a symbol of resignation, or abstract the crucifixion from its historical 
matrix as a political and unjust subjugation.597 But one must still deal with the scriptural 
testimony in which Paul declares ‗I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, 
and him crucified‘ (1. Cor. 2.2). Nor can we ignore Jesus‘s declaration regarding the intimate 
connection between discipleship and the cross (Mark 8.34; Matt. 10.38; 16.24; Luke 14.27). 
What we should say is that the cross, as a form of repression and state-sponsored murder, has 
been transfigured by the resurrection into a sign of God‘s intention for the cosmos, that not 
even death can undermine the divine commitment to humanity. By our incorporation through 
baptism and Eucharist, we are given the promise that suffering and death are not the end, but 
are the birth-pains of a new life (Rom. 8.18-39), one to be lived already in the present, since 
we have died and risen with Christ (Rom. 6.1-14; Eph. 2.1-10; Col. 2.8-15; 3.1-4). On this 
model, the cross becomes a non-violent symbol of resistance against the operations of 
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demonic power, and is not a sublime resignation. To avoid this would be a failure to attend to 
the particularity and historicity of Christ‘s mission.598  
A limitation might be present in Milbank‘s criticism too, since he privileges a positive, 
Nietzschean ‗forgetfulness‘ as regards human suffering within the eschatological climax.599 
One could raise the question as to whether Milbank‘s tendency to ‗emplot‘ narratives within a 
‗tragi-comic‘ structure downplays stories which do end horrendously. One could legitimately 
probe as to whether this coheres with Milbank‘s own historicist intentions. Rowan Williams 
implies as much when he says regarding Milbank‘s account of narrative ‗resolution‘ that  
 
the issue is not whether ‗resolution‘ is ever possible but whether we can craft or 
imagine a resolution that embraces the narrating of what cannot be mended – rather 
than resolution which explains and so nullifies the tangles and injuries of what has 
been done or suffered. And it is clear enough that, unless you believe that resolution 
must mean an unmaking of the past (a far more serious attempt to exit from the world 
of narrative), it has to be thought about as a moment in which the strands of past 
narrative are so entwined as to mark a possible new stage in the story – not an 
absolute ending which obliterates the cost of what has gone before.600  
 
It could be said that Milbank already pre-empts such critiques somewhat. In some later 
reflections on martyrdom and death, he questions as to whether mourning can be understood 
as ‗coming to terms with loss‘ without constituting a forgetfulness of that person‘s 
‗irreplaceable‘ subjectivity. Such a move, in his eyes, would be both ‗immoral and 
unchristian‘.601 Of note also is that he has argued that Christianity baptizes the experience of 
‗moral luck‘: ‗the Christian construal of the total sway of moral luck is to understand fortune, 
as always, however disguisedly, the personal gift of grace: to believe therefore that only utter 
exposure constitutes the ethical‘.602 However, as long as ‗loss‘ is ‗ineradicable‘, the possibility 
of ‗the ethical‘ is hindered, even impossible, because here ethics is construed as a ‗maximum 
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possible minimization of loss‘ and therefore is bound to the givenness of death.  Only ‗hope‘ 
in the resurrection… is able to guarantee the reality of the ethical‘.603 But the question 
remains as to whether an ethics that concerns the ‗irreplaceability‘ of subjects can bypass the 
particular narratives that have made them to be who they are. Since the resurrection is a 
redemption of the temporal, can one suggest that the resurrection cancels or ‗unmakes‘ those 
histories that have constituted those specific bodies? Would this not be a kind of ‗exit from 
narrative‘ that Milbank wants to undermine?  
But what about MacKinnon‘s take on divine suffering? Is this not part-and-parcel with his 
theologia crucis? By affirming the passibility of God in se, does not MacKinnon thereby – on 
a more traditional account of the immanent trinity– render suffering ontologically basic? And 
when one combines this perspective with his Kantian positivity regarding evil, is this reading 
not strengthened further? I would say that these concerns are granted somewhat, but are 
dampened by other balances MacKinnon wanted to uphold. Under the influence of P. T. 
Forsyth, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Sergei Bulgakov, MacKinnon is critical of traditional 
accounts of ‗impassibility‘ as being unable to account for the revelation of God‘s nature in 
Jesus Christ.604 He does not want to restrict the story of Christ, in his words, to a ‗universal 
pattern‘, but rather to allow that ‗career‘s particularity‘ to constitute precisely the foundational 
‗order‘ of any such pattern.605 This means that MacKinnon reads the gospel as a narrative of 
God‘s kenosis and self-limitation, which itself reveals the eternal life of the triune God to be a 
coincidentia oppositorum of omnipotence and vulnerability.606 This particular history is where 
‗the unity of God‘ is ‗realized‘ and the ‗consistency of God in relation to his creation‘ is 
disclosed, providing us with ‗the very rationale of creation itself‘.607 Of course God is 
absolutely ‗transcendent‘ as regards created being, but the very ‗dependence‘ of the creation 
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upon God is itself a reflection of the ‗eternal relatedness‘ of the divine life in se.608 Much like 
Balthasar and Bulgakov, MacKinnon stresses that the divine kenosis is an expression of the 
unending perichoresis of the uncreated persons, so that temporal unveiling is not an alteration 
of the divine life ad intra.  
However, MacKinnon is more reticent, than say Moltmann or even Balthasar, to speculate 
on the immanent trinity; he is concerned that the ‗aseity‘ and ‗ultimate invulnerability‘ of God 
are maintained, however ‗mythologized‘ this language remains to be. The creator and creature 
cannot be reversed, since there is ‗a genuine, if asymmetrical, reciprocity‘ between them.609 
However, for him, the account of transcendence presupposed by impassibility too readily 
supposes a ‗divine immunity from involvement in the affairs of the world‘, and thereby 
‗securing an infinite, unaffected resourcefulness in creative design‘ that comes at ‗the cost of 
rendering the exercise of such resource virtually self-contradictory‘. For MacKinnon, it is ‗as 
if to secure the possibility of the radically self-initiated, one rendered impossible its 
execution‘. Christianity does not affirm any ‗abstract possibility‘ of the immanent triune life 
of God, since this would again convert the deed into an idea. Instead, it is in ‗Jesus of 
Nazareth in whom the incommensurables of God and man are found united, or in whom, and 
by whom the problem of the ‗flow‘ of their union is raised by the daunting dizzying presence 
of its reality‘.610 What these comments show, on the one hand, is that he is suspicious of 
‗impassibility‘, but on the other hand, he does not seem to be persuaded by the more baroque 
speculations of Balthasar, Bulgakov, and Moltmann, which go too far in the direction of an 
overly-confident cataphasis.  
And yet despite such qualifiers, it can be claimed that MacKinnon has not fully grasped the 
grammar of divine apatheia. As is shown by patristic scholarship,611 impassibilitas or ἀπάθεια 
are not used to render divinity ‗immune‘ from any or all ‗passion‘, as when we speak of 
affection between human subjects. Rather, it says that God ad intra is not determined by 
anything ‗outside‘ the operations of divine being, precisely because God does not exist over-
against other ‗beings‘. God‘s transcendence exceeds finite being and non-being altogether. 
Impassibilitas was related to ‗passions‘ in antiquity which were paired with ‗imbalance‘ and 
‗reaction‘, and classified as ‗negative‘ or non-temperate emotions.612 After Nicholas of Cusa – 
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who echoes the patristic tradition (e.g. Maximus the Confessor) – God is understood to be 
transcendent to such reactivity because God is the infinite source of all being and therefore 
non aliud. Since the infinite is not opposed to the finite – not defined over-against it – God as 
actus purus cannot be ‗determined‘ by anything in creation, adverse or otherwise, because 
God would then be a merely ontic being. This becomes particularly acute when addressing 
evil and suffering: as we have stressed previously, if God suffers, then one appears to theorize 
agencies ‗outside‘ the divine reality that determine and alter it. One could argue that this 
undermines the created-uncreated distinction, because the world in its limitation is seen to 
have a potency that works at the same ‗level‘ as divine activity. But if this is so, then God as 
the infinitely creative source of everything is ‗externally‘ determined by sinful agencies. The 
question then arises as to whether evil is not hereby rendered ‗positive‘, and therefore has as 
much ‗reality‘ as beatitude.  
But it should be stressed once more, to avoid misunderstanding, that ‗divine impassibility‘ 
does not advocate a cold and heartless deity, unperturbed by human beings. On the contrary, 
precisely because God is not limited by finitude, God is able to express an intimacy to created 
life, as it enfolds esse within the unfathomable perfection of the divine persons. The undying 
interpenetration between the Father, Son and Spirit, undetermined by sinful degradation, 
provides an assurance and comfort for believers. God is not ‗reactive‘ but infinitely active and 
creative, an agency at work in every creature‘s most intimate act of being. Precisely because 
God needs nothing, nor is dependent on anything, God‘s love towards creation is unlimited, 
grounded as it is only in the infinite and eternal act of the trinity, and therefore completely 
gratuitous in its enactment.613 This account does not neglect the place of Christology, or a 
theology of the cross. An orthodox treatment, along Cyrilline-Thomistic lines,614 gives place 
for human suffering within divinity, because it is precisely in the unity of divine-humanity, 
here through the sinless offering of Christ, that suffering is endured and redeemed. Since God 
is transcendent and non aliud, God‘s intimacy to created being is equally infinite in scope, 
and not limited by tragic circumstance. Such a profound relatedness is the ground for Christ‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as I have realized when time and again distressed by Arthur‘s distress, finding it hard to cope when he 
is unsettled, unwell, or in pain, cannot express what is wrong, and the more we try to sort the problem 
the more frantic and furious he gets, hating to be handled, not understanding that we‘re trying to deal 
with his discomfort. Frustration mounts, creating its own distress and anger, which hardly helps his – in 
fact compounds it. Too easily inner demons of self-pity, a sense of failure, inadequacy and helplessness 
take over. So I recognize that I really need apatheia in order to love properly. Love requires a degree of 
detachment, an ability to let the other person be, to be ‗other‘, to be what they are rather than what you 
want them to be.‘ In Frances Young, God‘s Presence: A Contemporary Recapitulation of Early 
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 292-293.  
613
 Rowan Williams, ‗On Being Creatures,‘ in On Christian Theology, 63-78 has some excellent 
comments in this regard.  
614
 Weinandy, Does God Suffer, 172ff.; Aaron Riches, ‗After Chalcedon: The Oneness Of Christ and 
the Dyothelite Mediation of His Theandric Unity‘. Modem Theology 24.2 (2008): 119-224; Riches, 
Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016).  
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enhypostatic union in which we, through our own participation εν τριζηώ, are granted access 
to the divine. On this model, human suffering is re-narrated, non-identically, within Jesus‘s 
cross and resurrection: we can complete and embody in ourselves what is lacking in Christ‘s 
suffering (Col. 1.24). For the church, this is enacted through our identification with Christ 
through baptism, the liturgy and sacraments, as well as our continuing witness, in word and 
deed, to the reality disclosed in these rituals. Our woundedness and trauma is united to 
Christ‘s perpetual self-offering in the Eucharist615 and in the tragedy of the Mass,616 in which 
we continue to participate in his oblation to the Father; consequently, we are united with each 
other in the body of Christ, in which we are all called to bear one another‘s burdens (Gal. 
6.2).  
Here tragedy is not transcribed as a ‗final‘ necessity. Instead, suffering and tragedy are 
framed as a narrative of loss, and precisely because it is privative, because it is a loss of some 
particular good, it witnesses to the ideal of goodness, the resourcefulness of providence, and 
the dignity of endurance.617 However, the question of how this process will work itself out 
will differ in varying circumstances. Even horrendous evils can contribute to the advancement 
of goodness, while still remaining deplorable as such.618 Admittedly, this is never guaranteed, 
but what is pertinent to stress though is that without any transcendent goodness or value, we 
would not be able to charter the true depths of misery or joy. As Terry Eagleton has written, 
‗there can be no tragedy without a sense of value, whether or not that value actually bears 
fruit. We would not call tragic the destruction of something we did not prize. If tragedy cuts 
deeper than pessimism, it is because its horror is laced with an enriched sense of worth‘.619 
Similarly Walter Stein has said that  
 
Tragic awareness is the awareness of absolute violation of being: a confrontation with 
infinite meanings. This is the defining distinction between ‗mere suffering‘ and tragic 
awareness. The witness of the tragic tradition – as of any authentic direct response of 
tragic exposure – is basically just this: that man [sic] is the locus of absolute 
                                                          
615
 Cf. Marcus Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM Press, 2007), 154-170.  
616
 One is reminded here again of Gemma animae of Honorius Augustodunensis (1080–1154), who was 
mentioned in Chapter Two. As we mentioned there, he sought to bring Greek tragedy into an explicit 
relation with the Catholic Mass.  
617
 Cf. Augustine: ‗In this universe, even that which is called evil, well-ordered and kept in its place, 
sets the good in higher relief, so that good things are more pleasing and praiseworthy than evil ones‘ in 
in Augustine of Hippo, The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Charity, trans. 
Bruce Harbert (New York: New City Press, 1999), §11 (p. 40).  
618
 One could imagine ways in which past tragedies and suffering provoke us to think about how they 
happened, and how they might be mitigated in the future. This is a perspective that is advanced by 
Gillian Rose and Rowan Williams. Extreme instances may suffice to demonstrate this: the Shoah and 
apartheid remain monstrosities. Nothing can ameliorate that. However, one could argue that in their 
historical aftermath expressions of anti-Semitism and racism became more intolerable, which is 
something good.      
619
 Eagleton, Hope without Optimism (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 2015), 115.  
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violations of being. Tragedy occurs where we enter the timeless significance of such 
violations.620  
 
MacKinnon, while rejecting the privatio boni, nonetheless desires something similar. Can one 
coherently grasp moral tragedy without claiming metaphysical probity? MacKinnon‘s answer 
to this is clearly no. Since we cannot evacuate the transcendent without thinning-out the 
texture of perplexity, we cannot avoid the metaphysical context in which our actions are 
placed. To reduce freedom to an illusion, or to trivialise the presence of tragedy within human 
affairs, would be to undermine the importance of the moral life, giving little place for what is 
truly valuable within human experience. It is this concern which animates his stress on ‗the 
irreducibility of the tragic‘, an experience which for MacKinnon – here adopting the language 
of Milbank – instigates both the ‗purgation‘ and ‗illumination‘ of metaphysics as such.  
But this project has a weakness that deserves notice. As mentioned earlier, we suggested 
that MacKinnon‘s denial of the privatio boni undermines his Butlerian attempt to coherently 
relate ‗nature‘ and ‗ends‘. This insight has pertinence here: MacKinnon hopes, apart from 
analogical participation, to render tragedy as a ‗parabolic‘ gesture towards the transcendent. 
This presupposes, as Milbank has suggested, that MacKinnon makes use of the Anglican 
natural law tradition in which the preponderant ‗limits‘ of the physical world are 
commandeered as a ‗system of projection‘ for what lies beyond the material. Such a model 
requires an intimate connection between the creational order and those metaphysical 
structures that are opaquely reflected in it. However, minus an analogical metaphysics and 
evil-as-privation, one honestly wonders whether this project maintains coherency. Besides the 
question of how one coherently relates the historical and metaphysical without something like 
the analogia entis, the question remains as to what kind of transcendence is implied by this 
system of projection. If goodness does not hold ontological primacy, then what kind of 
‗presence‘ is the subject of our practical ‗intuition‘ of the ultimate? If the natural order has no 
final orientation towards the Good, then how can we trust the transcendence thereby projected 
is not malevolent? How do we know that the ‗ends‘ of humanity are coherent with the 
operations of natural law, or that such ‗ends‘ are aimed at the perfection of our moral nature? 
Without a conjecture of the primacy of the Good, it becomes difficult to articulate the 
‗transcendence‘ of tragic loss in the manner that MacKinnon so desires, since without its 
ontological primacy, how do we speak of loss? Would evil not then be equally an expression 
of the realia too? And would this not be a consummate theodicy since tragic deficiency could 
be traced to a mythic ontologization of violence? On this reading, deprivations are simply an 
expression of the violence of being, and thereby explained and justified. Does this not resign 
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us to the worst of philosophical theodicies that instigate a resignation to the way things are?621 
Again, this is not MacKinnon‘s intention – he is diametrically opposed to such consolation – 
but it is, arguably at least, an outcome of its trajectory.    
 
6.5. Summary  
 
MacKinnon is clearly a complex thinker. The previous chapters have aimed at justice, 
balancing an appreciation for his achievements with an awareness of his limitations. Our 
larger argument, however, did not focus just on MacKinnon, but on the sources that informed 
him. In summary, we said that MacKinnon‘s metaphysics argued for a ‗transcendence‘ that 
impressed itself upon consciousness, especially within those encounters of extremity that 
demanded non-trivial acknowledgement. The inference to be drawn from this is that any 
reduction of the ontological compass of such extremities would indicate, for MacKinnon, a 
refusal to yield to them. 
 Of paramount concern here is the connection between metaphysical realism and moral 
responsibility. As shown throughout these chapters, MacKinnon is at pains to stress that our 
discernment of truth is tied to our ethical responsibility. In MacKinnon‘s perspective, 
morality is not the only site of metaphysical discovery, but it is by far the most emphatic. 
How ethics discloses ‗the ultimate‘ remains for MacKinnon (as for Kant) of supreme 
importance. On this score, what is apparent is that his arguments do not adhere to a strictly 
logical or deductive approach. For him, we ‗cannot represent‘, but instead ‗achieve the sense 
of what we affirm in action‘.622 What he appears to be stating is that if our image of reality 
lacked this dimension, namely, that morality and axiology that gives tragedy its edge, then are 
we really engaging the world we inhabit? Here philosophical argumentation expresses a 
diversity that exceeds pure analytical method. This is expressive of his imitation of John 
Wisdom, who enacted a mixture of logic and poetics within his method,623 one that focused 
less on sequential accumulation than on persuasion and exemplification.624 Overall, one could 
say that MacKinnon‘s general approach implied an intermixture of argumentative styles, and 
so cannot be easily placed within the traditional aegis of Oxbridge analytics. MacKinnon 
works at the borderlands of philosophy, between the logics of Moore, the historicism of 
                                                          
621
 Cf. Terrence Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991).  
622
 ‗Aspects of Kant‘s Influence on British Theology,‘ 364.  
623
 Cf. ‗Metaphysical and Religious Language,‘ 208.  
624
 Martin Warner, following John Wisdom, has shown how traditional modes of induction and 
deduction are not philosophically exhaustive when it comes to argumentation. Philosophy is as much 
about rhetoric and aesthetic persuasion, which is probably even more fundamental than the usual 
techniques of analytic (e.g. reduction ad absurdum). See Martin Warner, ‗Literature, Truth and Logic‘. 
Philosophy 74.287 (1999): 29-54.  
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Collingwood, and the metaphysics of Aristotle and Kant, and so his arguments need to be 
evaluated from the perspective of this hybridity.    
The focus of these chapters was MacKinnon‘s The Problem of Metaphysics, in an attempt 
to discern whether the critiques given by Milbank and Hart might apply to his mature thought. 
The prominent figures that arose were Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. My argument is that 
MacKinnon – here in partial agreement with Milbank– was finally unable to coherently relate 
the historical and the metaphysical within his assumptions regarding analogy, the Kantian 
sublime, evil-as-privation and divine impassibility. To establish this, I traced MacKinnon‘s 
reception of Aristotle and Kant. Beginning with Aristotle, I argued that his assimilation of 
‗substance‘ into atomist realism meant that he tacitly endorsed a subject-object dualism which 
resisted the constructive elements of intelligence, hereby disconnecting historicity from 
metaphysics. When combined with Aristotle‘s disconnection between the Prime Mover and 
materiality, his rejections of methexis, and the Platonic idea of the Good, another dimension 
was added to MacKinnon‘s suspicion of analogical participation. On this point, MacKinnon 
adopts the approach of Kant, leading to a gradual de-ontologization of analogy within his 
thought, which complicated the problems of relating the historical to the metaphysical. In 
addition to this, MacKinnon‘s movement away from the analogia entis traded upon the idea 
that it was based on an overconfident mode of ‗intellectual intuition‘ that failed to embrace 
our historical and particular situatedness, as exemplified by the Platonic intellection of Forms.  
In the following chapter, we argued that MacKinnon – here following Wittgenstein – 
wanted to show, through a reading of The Republic, how ethical language might be pressed 
for metaphysical benefit, in the sense that it is through the intensification of moral perplexity 
that one might be ‗thrust against the limits of language‘. In practicing this, we manifest a 
moral realism, an accountability to something that exceeds the constructive habits of mind. 
However, it was suggested that MacKinnon tends to abstract Plato‘s dialogues from their 
drama, in accordance with his general tendency to prioritize problem over solution. Such links 
up with Milbank‘s critique that he treats moral dilemmas within a hyper-perplexity that is not 
always helpful. Furthermore, it was also proposed, again in agreement with Milbank, that 
MacKinnon‘s Kantianism was predicated on a individualism which, when connected to his 
rejection of the privatio boni, makes it vulnerable to a ‗liberal‘ assimilation, which denies the 
mutuality of goods (the idea that my goods are bound up with yours) since liberalism accords 
primacy to evil and ‗negative‘ liberty‘ also.  
Regarding his account of the tragic, however, it appears that MacKinnon‘s work mounts 
some resistance to their critiques. Acknowledging his subtlety was important, and his concern 
that moral tragedy resists reductive naturalisms deserves to be taken seriously, in that sheer 
determinism does not accord dignity to human agency, and the tragic suffering to which it is 
subjected. His understanding that our experience of ‗loss‘ can act as a form of ‗estrangement‘ 
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from entrenched strictures of selfhood added another dimension to this vision. This under-
emphasized aspect of MacKinnon‘s thought shows that his sensitivity to the tragic did not 
occlude historical sensitivity. Growth is possible for the self and our social formations can be 
altered by choices. Of course these efforts are often tragically thwarted, but one should not 
assume that these are some kind of ontological necessity – even though MacKinnon can adopt 
neo-Manichaean language at moments. We did admit however that his rejection of evil-as-
privation, his qualified acceptance of divine passibility, and his post-Critical phenomenalism, 
finally makes him susceptible to the tradition of Kantian sublimity, in which (like Schiller) it 
is only through the irresolution of moral tragedy that we come to know our transcendent and 
noumenal freedom.  
In our next two chapters, we will turn to Rowan Williams, with the aim seeing whether he 
is able to address and critically supplement the deficits of MacKinnon‘s approach. This will 
be done, largely, through an examination of his monograph The Tragic Imagination (2016). 
But before we reach that point, we will need to unpack Williams‘s metaphysical assumptions, 
in the hope that they give a larger background to our discussion. It is also structured in this 
way because such an examination of these themes in Williams‘s writings will further assist us 
in addressing some questions that Hart and Milbank have regarding whether an adoption of 
‗the tragic‘ within theology undermines a classical metaphysics of transcendent goodness, 
insofar as it denies aseity and the privatio boni, and thereby – tacitly or explicitly – promotes 
regimes of unrepresentable sublimity.     
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Chapter 7 
Rowan Williams I 
On Metaphysics and Poetics 
 
The previous chapters have led us here, where we reach a conclusion regarding our central 
question: can one inscribe ‗the tragic‘ within a classical account of transcendent goodness? 
And if so how? In Chapter 3, we expounded this terminology as implying, on the one hand, 
that God cannot be reduced to an available object within the created universe. But on the 
other, the radical difference of God does not exclude an eminent description of divine nature, 
since everything remains caused by God, and therefore reflects God‘s nature, however dim 
and perspectival this perception might be. In the chapters thereafter, we addressed Donald 
MacKinnon, who was considered as the most preeminent figure within the dialogue between 
Christianity and ‗the tragic‘. There we exposed his strengths and limitations, especially as 
regards his Kantianism. Such a heritage implicated him within a ‗speculative closure‘ of 
being, since without an analogical participation and the priority of a transcendent good, 
MacKinnon struggled to account for how created being, and the materiality of language and 
historicity, could act as a truthful projection of divinity, one in which God is both 
transcendentally different and good. Because MacKinnon rejected analogical participation, 
the privatio boni, and moreover internalized transcendentalism and the Kantian sublime, we 
argued that he remained conceptually hamstrung as regards his proposal of a ‗system of 
projection‘ that harmonizes ‗the realm of nature‘ and ‗the realm of ends‘. This was the case, 
we argued, since once a noumenal metaphysics and ‗radical evil‘ were accepted, as well as a 
denial that historical being participates within an infinite and transcendent goodness that is 
ontologically prior to all deprivation, then it remains hard to see how the natural order could 
have a more necessary linkage with moral goodness. On this model, our abstractions from 
‗appearance‘ to the invisible realm of the noumena can no longer project a transcendence that 
is unequivocally good as such. It remains within the indeterminacy of the modern regime of 
the sublime. 
So the question lingering throughout is the following one: is there an option that is able to 
maintain divine transcendence and goodness, while remaining sensitive to the insights of ‗the 
tragic‘?  The assumption throughout has been ‗yes‘, but we have not expounded what such an 
option might be. We have hinted at a response throughout this study, but it is here that we aim 
to bring out this answer more fully by looking at Rowan Williams. In doing so, we will need 
to be alert to the way in which he develops the classical tradition, especially as this touches 
the topics of transcendence and ontological analogy. We have already expounded upon his 
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thoughts on aseity and transcendence earlier on, but in light of the argument throughout it is 
beneficial now to expound his metaphysics of analogy, and its connection to the experience of 
historicity. Here we will have to unfurl the minutiae of his broader project, as this grows out 
of his reflections on creativity, language and analogy. We will also have to address a niggling 
lacuna, hovering throughout the discussion of MacKinnon, namely, the question of evil. If we 
talk about creaturely being as having an analogical existence to divine being, then what are 
we to say about those aspects of reality which do not reflect God‘s nature? As a consequence, 
we will need to unpack the privatio boni, and why MacKinnon (and others) misunderstand it. 
We will insist on seeing privation as being linked to created finitude – without identifying the 
two – and will also suggest, more substantively, that it implies a perversion of the gratuity of 
being. Evil is a contingent rupture and is not ‗naturally‘ connected to existence-as-such. Such 
a conviction attenuates any ontological pessimism which propounds that createdness is fated 
towards non-beneficent outcomes; this is because all deviation from goodness implies a non-
necessary inversion within creation. On this reading, evil is de-natured: it is not a ‗thing‘ or 
‗substance‘, but rather a perversion of rightly-ordered relations and desire.  
 
7.1. The Metaphysical Poetics of Rowan Williams 
 
Our previous discussion of divine transcendence in Chapter 3 has already covered some of the 
ground presupposed here. There we indicated the problems with a ‗contrastive‘ approach, as 
regards the transcendence-immanence relation, and also rejected a ‗conflictive‘ account as 
being dogmatically unsustainable. Since God does not occupy an ontological ‗space‘ within 
the created world, we must affirm both the radical difference of divinity and the profound 
intimacy that this difference enables, since God is closer than we could ever be to ourselves. 
God is not a being within the world, but rather is the one who gives everything its reason-for-
being, and in which everything persists. Consequentially, God is both infinitely different and 
infinitely close to the life of creatures. It is precisely this logic that underlies the affirmation 
of the analogia entis, because within its affirmation we are able to see the world as providing 
– however dimly – a truthful disclosure of divine truth. This means that no aspect of reality 
can be excluded a priori from revelatory potential even though such vantages cannot be 
absolutised, since God always remains God. It is this vision that informs Rowan Williams‘s 
constructive engagements, and is one that he seeks to develop.  
Overall, Williams agrees that the reduction of ‗being‘ to univocal or merely formalist 
predicates has not assisted ‗metaphysics‘. In his estimate, the language of ‗being‘ has become 
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‗muddied‘ to many philosophers and theologians alike.625 However, he does not shy away 
from the development of such language, and is even critical of those who too quickly reject it 
(e.g. Jean-Luc Marion).626 From this we can see that Williams is not opposed to the language 
of ‗being‘ in relation to God, that is, when it is doctrinally qualified. Also worth noting is that 
Williams combines this with a proclivity for a ‗realism‘ that accounts for the non-reducibility 
of truth,627 without assuming an extra-linguistic or ahistorical ‗reference‘ for it.628 For 
Williams asserts that ‗the ‗real‖ cannot be abstracted from ‗the continuing processes of 
representation‘, and that apart from this it remains a ‗chimera‘. On the contrary, it is precisely 
through these never-ending attempts at representation that we achieve an approximation to 
‗the real‘. For him, ‗this is how we display ‗realism‘‘, namely ‗by ‗following‘ what has been 
said and done in ways that are open to continuing scrutiny and revision‘. That means we 
‗show that we are serious about the extra-mental by certain features of our linguistic 
behaviour…by the exposure of our representations to response and correction or expansion, 
by behaving as though they were accountable to something more than their own inner logic or 
the convenience of the speaker‘.629 Williams‘s realism shows a critical internalization of G. E. 
Moore,630 in that he denies any ‗immanent comprehensiveness‘ or ‗the reduction of 
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 Williams, ‗God,‘ in David F. Ford et al (eds.), Fields of Faith: Theology and Religious Study for the 
Twenty-First Century, 85. Also see this: ‗The language of absolute being, ipsum esse subsistens, and so 
on has become problematic in the wake of the dissolution of those elements in earlier metaphysical 
discourse that worked against a univocity in speaking of being. When ‗being‘ has become a more 
unproblematic and territorialised concept than it is in Platonic and early medieval (including Thomist) 
thought, the risk is of seeing God as possessor of an unlimited quantity of it – or as a synonym for the 
totality of what there is. God is either a supreme individual or an all-pervasive quality or force in what 
exists. We forget in such a context the inseparability in Aquinas of the language of pure act and the 
language of God‘s ‗excess‘ in respect of being.‘ He also is critical of Jean-Luc Marion – who rejects 
the language of God-as-being – since Marion is ‗at best cavalier about the extended social and 
historical processes whereby the name of God appears, concentrating instead on the luminous, timeless 
act of God in the eucharist; so that his focus upon love and gift as the words needed to speak of a God 
beyond, prior to, or other than being threatens to become abstract‘. But he also worries (here echoing 
Milbank) ‗whether Marion is not himself caught in the early modern misapprehension that assumes a 
univocal sense for being, thus missing the nuance typical of the entire Platonic tradition by accepting 
too uncritically the Heideggerian insistence on the ideologically malign character of ontology‘ (85-86).   
626
 See his critique of Kevin Hector, in Rowan Williams, ‗To Speak Truly about God: Rowan Williams 
on Kevin Hector‘s Theology without Metaphysics‘. Marginalia: The Los Angeles Review of Books 
(May 27, 2014), accessed 1/10/2018: http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/speak-truly-god/.  
627
 See Williams, ‗‗Religious Realism‘‘: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt,‘ in Wrestling with 
Angels, 228-254.   
628
 See his endorsement of ‗a broadly Davidsonian picture of reference‘ in ‗To Speak Truly about God‘, 
and his reference to Davidson again in his critique of MacKinnon (‗Trinity and Ontology,‘ in On 
Christian Theology, 154). Williams is drawing here upon the essay entitled ‗Reality without 
Reference,‘ in Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 
215-225. Williams‘s Gifford Lectures can be fruitfully compared with the more recent essays by 
Hillary Putnam entitled ‗Corresponding with Reality‘ and ‗How to be a Sophisticated ―Naïve Realist‖. 
Both of these can be found in Philosophy in an Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics, and Skepticism, 
(eds.) Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2012), 72-90; 624-
639 resp.  
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relationality to the necessary internal constitution of a thing‘.631 Williams could, on this 
account, be described as an ‗ideal realist‘, since for him ‗materialised form is continued in 
another and higher…mode, as the form and word of thought‘.632 He could even be described 
as ‗speculatively realist‘ (a lá Quentin Meillassoux633) in the way that he denies – against 
Kant – that ‗historical mediation provides a sceptical barrier to the knowledge of nature, and 
of essences‘ since for him ‗nature herself…may be seen as inherently historical‘ in its 
being.634 For Williams, ‗historical mediation‘ is important for metaphysics: he appears to 
agree with Hegel that ‗history is how we do our metaphysics‘ – not in the sense that history 
serves as a ‗record‘ that ‗delivers to us a map of the constructions of the universe, or a 
comprehensive account of natural kinds or a compelling thesis about the nature of reference‘. 
Instead, it is about an ‗engagement with history‘, and how this ‗lays bare for us the character 
of thinking as engagement, as converse, conflict, negotiation, judgement and self-
judgement‘.635 The reason why these processes should be described as ‗metaphysical‘ is 
because any thinking of ‗the particular‘ requires that we place it in a wider context of 
unfolding, that we move back and forth between the ‗law‘ of the universal and ‗the singular 
that eludes category‘.636 Such a process renders as untenable any separation between ‗identity‘ 
and ‗difference‘, the particular and ‗the concrete universal‘.  
Because of these tendencies, it is worthwhile to engage with his metaphysical poetics more 
deeply, and how it has inflected his theological output.   
 
7.1.1. On Creativity 
 
Williams has engaged with ‗the metaphysical or ontological dimension of poetry‘637 since the 
1970‘s. Then already he proposed that creativity-as-such intimated something more than self-
expression; for him, poetics is not reducible to manifestations of personality. He had a sense 
that creative practice exhibited an excess, namely, that which could not be reduced to the 
representing will of the artist: ‗Poetry is not most fundamentally concerned with the 
expression of personality‘.638 Human creativity is irreducible to the particular genius or ego of 
the artist; rather, it forms a response to what is already there, a perception that somehow 
                                                          
631
 Catherine Pickstock, ‗Matter and Mattering: The Metaphysics of Rowan Williams‘s. Modern 
Theology 31.4 (2015): 599-617 (p. 611).   
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(London and New York: Continuum, 2008). 
634
 Pickstock, ‗Matter and Mattering,‘ 600.  
635
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reality itself is expressive, that the ‗symmetry‘639 which is achieved in poetics represents ‗a 
hidden holding-together‘640 or ‗occult affinity‘641 between objects, and is not the product of an 
extraneous imposition, but an unfolding of their true nature.642 Such is revealed in a ramifying 
process into which an artist is enfolded through an attention to her subject matter, the product 
of which is not a mere sample of personal effulgence. ‗Poetry‘ conveys objects into relation 
or proportion (through rhyme, rhythm, assonance, enjambment, synesthesia, metaphor, and 
structure, etc.),643 all of which is predicated on an ‗analogical vision that allows us to see one 
thing through another [italics mine]‘, ‗to see one thing through the ‗lens‘ of an unexpected 
other‘. This vision is not an inexplicable irruption but instead suggests that ‗we are always 
seeing ‗through the other‘, that we never see anything in its own isolated terms, and that we 
cannot rule in advance which others are ‗acceptable‘ and which [are] unacceptable in the 
business of extending and enlarging our perception‘.644  
In order for such analogies to occur there needs to be an element of non-arbitrariness in the 
composition, a sense that there is an objective affinity between the layers of the composition. 
Within the poem, the disclosure of the total ‗idea‘ or ‗image‘ is only achieved through the 
interrelation of its active elements at the level of their arrangement. The whole is revealed 
through its parts and remains enfolded within them. Simultaneously, such densities of 
expression could not be grasped without a collective allusion to the whole,645 without a more 
comprehensive spiritual invocation through material ordering.646 In poetics there is a genuine 
co-operation between the forces of active collation and receptive disclosure.647  
                                                          
639
 Michael Maltby, ‗Wordless Words: Poetry and the Symmetry of Being,‘ in Hamish Canham and 
Carole Satyamurti (eds.), Acquainted with the Night: Psychoanalysis and the Poetic Imagination 
(London and New York: Karnac, 2003), 49-70. Williams has drawn upon this work in his Clark 
Lectures, which will be discussed shortly.  
640
 Pickstock, ‗Matter and Mattering,‘ 611.  
641
 Ibid., 608.  
642
 John Milbank speaks of poetry as being ‗the apostrophic invocation of the unknown which lurks 
always behind the site itself,‘ in The Mercurial Wood: Sites, Tales, Qualities (Salzburg-Oxford-
Portland: University of Salzburg, 1997), xiii.  
643
 Cf. Roman Jakobson, ‗Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry,‘ in Krystyna Pomorska and 
Stephen Rudy (eds.), Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985), 36-46.  
644
 Williams, The Edge of Words, 133.  
645
 See the reflections of Douglas R. Hofstadter, ‗Prelude…Ant Fugue,‘ in Daniel Dennett and Douglas 
R. Hofstadter (eds.), The Mind‘s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1981), 149-201. Hoftsadter‘s work is also influential on Williams as well, especially in the later 
parts of his Clark Lectures.  
646
 Milbank, The Legend of Death: Two Poetic Sequences (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2008), 5: 
‗poetry constantly objectifies the spiritual in order that it can exist on earth at all, while it equally 
spiritualizes the material in order that its meaning may be realized.‘    
647
 Cf. J. H. Prynne, ‗Mental Ears and Poetic Work‘. Chicago Review 55.1 (2010): 126-157 (p. 138): ‗if 
the underlying textual features exist it is because poets are tuned into their language structures to an 
unusual degree of linguistic susceptibility. Such features are neither invented nor discovered, they are 
disclosed.‘  
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And it is for this reason that he denies a ‗poetics whose focus is the will of the artist…a 
view of poetic creation which turns away from the sense of ‗coming upon‘ something already 
given‘.648 This remains in tune with his Thomistic prioritization of the intellect over the will 
as regards the disclosure of ‗the basic things about ourselves-in-the-world.‘649 Connected to 
this also is his critique of the idea that there is ‗a clear difference between active mind and 
passive stuff, between the mind and its intellectual property or acquisitions, between language 
and ‗objects‘, those mysteriously self-contained or self-defined things lying around waiting to 
be noticed and collected‘. Instead, the ‗metaphysical tradition‘ suggests that we ‗cannot think 
a reality in which substances exist as atomized systems‘. Of course there is a need to maintain 
the ‗authentic difference‘ that marks ‗the being of things‘; and yet, such difference should not 
be objectivized to the level of ‗discrete lumps of stuff‘ since there is an ‗everlasting ‗slippage‘ 
of definition‘, a ‗pattern of self-deplacement‘ that occurs between things. In such a schematic, 
‗difference is neither (at any moment) final, a matter of mutual exclusion, nor simply 
reducible, a matter of misperception to be resolved by either a return to the same or a 
cancellation of one term before the Other‘.650  
This needs to be clarified further: Williams argues that ―being‘ is apprehended primarily in 
the endless variety of particular forms, and it is only by attending to this variety of particular 
forms that being may be grasped as gratuitously creative – and thus as concrete fullness‘. For 
Williams – echoing Maximus the Confessor –‗the logoi of all things‘ pre-exist ‗in God as 
particular creative intentions, dependent upon the eternal Logos who is the divine ground of 
the possibility of all otherness, all differentiation‘. This metaphysical assumption underlies 
‗the experience of being in the world‘ since ‗the fundamental cognitive moment is the 
apprehension of participation, the participation of beings in being‘. Such implies that an 
‗affirmation of being is not the grasp of a formal limitlessness [e.g. the Kantian sublime or 
Rahner‘s Vorgriff], since there is no possibility of expressing or thinking being without beings 
[because] Being depends upon the existence of particulars‘.651 But such difference should not 
distract us from ‗the apprehension of being as a system of interdependent contingencies, the 
response to which can never be abstraction,‘ and can only be enacted in ‗the yielding of a 
privatised, self-enclosed perception to an ‗ekstatic‘ participation [or ‗kenosis‘652] – a self-
forgetful involvement, both active and receptive, in the world as a whole‘.653  
                                                          
648
 Rowan Williams, ‗The Standing of Poetry: Geoffrey Hill‘s Quartet,‘ in John Lyon and Peter 
McDonald (eds.), Geoffrey Hill: Essays on his Later Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
55-69 (p. 62).  
649
 Williams, ‗Between Politics and Metaphysics,‘ 73.  
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 Ibid., 70-71.  
651
 Williams, ‗Balthasar, Rahner and the Apprehension of Being,‘ in Wrestling with Angels, 86-105 (p. 
92).  
652
 ‗Between Politics and Metaphysics,‘ 72.  
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 ‗Balthasar, Rahner and the Apprehension of Being,‘ 95.  
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For Williams, poetry aims to manifest ‗a vision of the wholeness of the contradictory 
world‘654, an ‗incontrovertible solidity‘ that intimates ‗God‘s own vision of the created order‘. 
Such serves as witness to a ‗grace constantly running ahead of our seeing or knowing, always 
therefore there already to be seen or known‘.655 But it also means that there is a participatory 
element in our ‗re-creation‘ of things that necessitates ‗an entirely committed immersion in 
the world, a watching and listening in silences‘.656 However, as one begins the perception is 
strengthened that there is something that exceeds the artist in her production, that there is ‗a 
tension between the life of language and its use…between what is meant by us as users and 
what is ‗meant‘ by the elusive resource of language itself, escaping our conscious 
strategies‘.657 ‗The poet adds to the world,‘ that is, ‗to the totality of language,‘ but such 
creative impulsion should not be read as being traceable only to the genius of the artist. 
Rather there is an awareness that ‗[t]he reality before him [or her] is obscurely incomplete: it 
proposes to the poet the task of making it significant,‘ without implying that the artist projects 
‗an alien structure of explanation‘ upon the world as such.658  
There is a peculiar kind of gratuitousness in art that goes beyond the immediately 
perceivable. One initiates a creative process that stems from a unique representation, and yet 
the creative process finally exceeds the artist‘s initial ‗intention‘. It is as if ‗reality‘ exceeds 
itself in its repetition, and that such excessiveness is part of the substance of things. The 
image exceeds the original and becomes just as original.659 It appears then, quoting Catherine 
Pickstock, that in ‗order to describe, we must have recourse to invocation‘, and that this 
‗anterior figural process is never completed, and is matched prospectively by an 
accompanying sense that more has yet to be said…[that] the gift of reality to us must be met 
by a counter-gift‘.660 But in light of this, one could ask: if all ‗doing involves gratuitous 
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 ‗Poetic and Religious Imagination,‘ 179.  
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 ‗The Standing of Poetry,‘ 62.  
656
 ‗Poetic and Religious Imagination,‘ 180. In an essay on R. S. Thomas, Williams has said that ‗we 
image/imagine/explore ourselves only by our immersion in what‘s other – the life the structure of 
which the subject is neither centre nor essence,‘ in Rowan Williams, ‗Adult Geometry: Dangerous 
Thoughts in R.S. Thomas,‘ in M. Wynn Thomas (ed.), The Page‘s Drift: R.S. Thomas at Eighty 
(Wales: Seren, 1993), 82-98 (p. 84).  
657
 ‗The Standing of Poetry,‘ 57. It is worth consulting here the outstanding essay by Geoffrey Hill, 
entitled ‗Poetry as ‗Menace‘ and ‗Atonement‘. This can be found in Collected Critical Writings, (ed.) 
Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3-20.  
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 ‗Poetic and Religious Imagination,‘ 179-180.  
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 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall (2nd rev. 
ed., London and New York: Continuum, 1989), 130-138.  
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 Pickstock, ‗Matter and Mattering,‘ 607. She goes onto say that it ‗is as if a seascape naturally 
precipitates or demands an encomium, as naturally as it is shaped by swell and wave breaking. These 
poetic aspects of truth-making, it seems, covertly enter into our ordinary prosaic practices, and yet we 
are not attended by the sense that we are arbitrarily making things up or being dishonest as to the way 
things are. Do we rather feel that we are responding to the impress of reality, its imperatives?‘ (607-
608).  
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making‘,661 and all true poetry ‗adds to the stock of available reality‘ (R. P. Blackmur),662 then 
how is one to understand this addition as being reflective of being-as-such, of what is there 
already?  
To approach this, we should say initially that for Williams ‗poetics‘ always works within 
restraints, within material or medial limitations. ‗Absolute innovation is not possible. To add 
to the world, to extend the world and its possibilities, the artist has no option but to take his 
[or her] material from the world as it is‘.663 One engages with an finite index that is specific 
and concrete – such as a tonal range, a unique density of words, or an ideation that emerges 
through the creative process. The artistic product cannot concern nothing-in-particular, nor 
can it accomplish everything. Creativity seeks a representation of aspects, as it has been 
produced within the interplay between the artist and the developing habitus of the artistic 
process. But this attempt at presentation (or re-presentation) does not render the subject 
matter merely self-identical or stable. The emergence of the artwork can set in motion a new 
chain of significance that includes a non-foreclosable range of meaning. For instance, a whole 
range of contingencies can alter our perception of the aesthetic object: a work produced in one 
context can register different overtones in another, and the movement of time can offer 
expanded valences. The work – especially the masterpiece – creates its own before and after; 
an event in which previous contributions are re-signified in light of the present addition, and 
sets in motion a different stage of consciousness that retrospectively alters our perception of 
its origins.664 Temporality remains essential to an unfolding aesthetic, whether in relation to 
the production or reception of the artwork itself.665 
But it follows that the self-identity of the specific work can only be maintained through the 
differences that time and context provides, that is, insofar as it remains non-identical to itself. 
It is only through temporality that the aesthetic object can achieve its ‗timelessness‘ or 
‗contemporaneity‘ with our own time,666 and it is precisely through its concreteness that the 
poem achieves its universality. For poetry, as for metaphysics, ‗Being‘ is disclosed through 
the specificity of beings.667 Repetition and re-presentation implies a paradoxical difference 
and sameness which belongs to the objectivity of the poem. As Williams says ‗The poetic 
embrace of the concrete is something more than the repetition or reproduction of what is 
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 Milbank, ‗Scholasticism, Modernism and Modernity,‘ 668 
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 R. P. Blackmur, ‗Statements and Idylls‘. Poetry 46.2 (1935): 108-112 (p. 108).  
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 ‗Poetic and Religious Imagination,‘ 180.  
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 As Pickstock says, ‗any poem is in excess of any poetics, and may cause us to revise our ideas as to 
such a poetics‘ (‗Matter and Mattering,‘ 617).  
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 Cf. Rowan Williams, ‗Art: Taking Time and Making Sense,‘ in T. Devonshire-Jones (ed.), Images 
of Christ. Religious Iconography in Twentieth Century British Art. An Exhibition to mark the 
Centenary of St Matthew's  Church, Northampton (St Matthew's (Northampton) Centenary Art 
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 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 119-124.  
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given; it evokes or realizes the given in a new way, it posits a new world which is the depth of 
the old, not by denying the particular and immediate but by seeking words for its unspoken 
setting, its setting within the presence of God‘.668 Or as Pickstock writes: ‗Repetition…is 
defined by non-identical variation because the universal is never sufficiently determinate as 
universal, and likewise, the particular never attains to sufficient determination as particular. 
And so it is the case that these two levels constantly interfere with one another in human 
discourse and have always already done so‘. She goes on to say that ‗Non-identical repetition 
does not serve to distinguish the way in which something is universal from the way in which 
it is particular, and so to deflate paradox. Rather, it reasserts a coincidence of the two to the 
point of apparent contradiction‘, and that ‗One can only palliate this contradiction by playing 
through or inhabiting the never-ending tension of such coincidence in iterative, analogical 
variation‘. For her, since we are present within ‗the finite world, we must be reconciled to the 
perplexity of the interplay of the particular and universal which is the reflex of the 
incomprehensible grounding of the finite in the infinite.669 
In the Clark Lectures,670 Williams expounded an ‗ontology of art‘ that grasped ‗the labour 
of art as something rooted in the sense of an unfinishedness in ‗ordinary‘ perception, a 
recognition that the objects of perception [are] not exhausted by what could be said about 
them in descriptive, rational and pragmatic terms‘.671 Such excess of ‗perception‘ moves 
against a ‗scheme where stimulus is followed by determinate response‘. Instead, within our 
deepening perceptions, ‗there [are] constantly more response[s] evoked‘.672 Art necessitates 
an attunement to the way things are, to the incompleteness of the world, and is not something 
imposed or exerted upon it. ‗True art is in some sense a part of nature, nature in its human 
embodiment pursuing its natural intellectual and formative character‘.673 As per the lexicon of 
‗grace‘ (as revealed in the title of this work), this is tied to the idea that beauty implies an 
‗excess‘674, an ‗‘overflow‘‘ or ‗‘radiance‘‘ that addresses us, one which implies a 
‗metaphysical dimension‘ to creativity.675 This is because art outstrips the instrumentality of 
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 Rowan Williams, ‗Suspending the Ethical: R.S. Thomas and Kierkegaard,‘ in Damien Walford 
Davies (ed.), Echoes to the Amen: Essays after R.S. Thomas (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2003), 
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need676 and ‗the will‘, even though it ‗unquestionably works on the [artist‘s] will‘ as well.677 
This is what Williams means by ‗necessity‘.678 He thus sees a connection between the tropes 
of ‗grace‘ and ‗necessity‘,  because ‗the more connections [which] appear that do not belong 
simply to the artist‘s will and decision, the more the work can embody both the freedom and 
necessity of the actual finite world and the material produced by the artist can communicate 
the excess of reality‘.679 Art is not about ‗deciding to create this or that pattern, because that 
would reduce it to an act of will‘. Instead, art has ‗more to do with intelligence than will‘ , and 
therefore ‗is bound to be exercised in relation to what is actual, since intelligence…is 
necessarily oriented towards being‘.680 ‗The maker‘s obedience is to the integrity of the thing 
made, to the unfolding logic in the process of making, as the work discloses itself‘.681  
The work establishes connections between things, displaying links that exceed the 
arbitrariness of choice,682 and require the exercise of ‗‘judgement‘‘ on the part of the artist.683 
Thus art seeks ‗to reshape the data of the world so as to make their fundamental structure and 
relation visible‘, even suggesting startlingly that ‗the artist does set out to change the world, 
but – if we can manage the paradox – to change the world into itself‘.684 ‗Art challenges the 
finality of appearance, the actual ‗conditions of existence‘, not in order to destroy but to 
ground, amplify, fulfill.‘685 It can never be simply ‗imitative‘,686 but rather implies a non-
identical perception of the aesthetic ‗object‘. Artistry implies a correspondence to ‗the whole 
active presence of the object‘ in which it is ‗being re-presented by the artist‘, and is not 
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‗simply the reproduction of aspects of its appearance‘.687 This is because the act of knowledge 
itself is already involved in a process of representation, which means that ‗whatever stimulus 
starts the process off is not adequately thought of as a fixed entity requiring no more than a 
single identification‘.688 ‗Re-presentation assumes that there is excess in in what presents 
itself for knowing, and that neither the initial cluster of perceptions nor any one set of 
responses will finally succeed in containing what is known‘.689 Such does not necessitate a 
post-Scotist and Kantian mode of mentalist representation,690 in which ‗there is a fixed ‗for 
itself‘ hidden in what is perceived, standing over against the ‗for me‘ dimension‘. Rather ‗the 
inner life of a reality is what unfolds in time, generating more and more symbolic structures, 
not a timeless and relation-free definition‘, whereby ‗the life of the object in the knowing 
mind is genuinely in some sense an aspect of the objects own life – not a construct by an 
independent thinking substance working on dead or static material presented to it as a 
determined set of data‘.691 For Williams, the world, through continuing refractions, continues 
to ‗‗make itself other‘‘.692  
But from whence does this otherness appear? For Williams, it is ‗located in the 
preconscious life of the intellect‘, namely, in ‗God‘s formative mental activity within our 
own,‘ in a ‗participatory awareness‘ that is not expressed, at least initially, in ‗word or 
concept‘.693 Such divine activity within the world registers doubts for Williams about any 
‗pristine independent subjectivity‘. There is always a blending of passivity and activity in our 
perceptions of the world, a sense of being ‗‘always already addressed, impressed, 
illuminated‘, of being ‗acting upon, processing and transforming raw data‘. Such a contention 
proposes a demythologization of our ‗modern epistemology‘ that creates a dualism between 
‗the innocent receptacle of the disinterested mind and the uninterpreted data of external 
reality‘.694 We need to move away from a model of there being non-intelligent stuff out there 
upon which our structures are simply added. On the contrary, there is an intelligent 
construction as regards things-as-such. Materiality and significance are intimately connected, 
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and cannot be considered independently.695 As Williams repeats again and again, ‗‗things are 
not only what they are‘ but ‗give more than they have‘‘.696  
This plenitude of signification is linked to the idea that art is able ‗to bring out relations and 
dimensions that ordinary rational naming and analysing fail to represent‘.697 Such is 
predicated on the analogical connections or ‗proportions‘ that exist between things, ‗a sense 
of objects as it were carrying with them a charge of feeling that links them to other objects‘, 
as can be seen in music, where there are ‗intrinsic relations and proportions in the world of 
sound‘ and in poetry, in which the play of ‗metaphor‘ is able to undermine our simplistic 
notions of ‗self-contained entities‘, making it appear that different objects are operating on a 
similar ‗‗frequency‘‘. Here we could even speak of ‗[a] participation between different 
agencies‘,698 here intimating an ‗ontological depth‘ under ‗the surface of appearances‘,699 or 
what he calls ‗the interconnectedness of reality‘ itself.700 For him, there is a real sense that if 
‗you cannot place a perception, a specific thing, in the context of its resonances and formal 
echoes, you cannot place it at all‘.701  
Williams‘s Thomistic Hegelianism is fully on display here.702 But it also reflects a 
historicized Platonism: as he says, ‗the part of the material world that is the human system of 
knowing cannot be spoken of except as a spiral of self-extending symbolic activity; its 
relation to its environment is inescapably mobile, time-related‘. Moreover, ‗There is no way 
of abstracting from the passage of time some necessary, non-revisable and exhaustive 
correlation between inside and outside, a set of determinate, entirely ‗objective‘ stimuli and a 
‗correct‘ reception of and reaction to them‘. This is because what ‗you can meaningfully say 
is constrained by what is given‘. And yet, ‗truthfulness unfolds – it doesn‘t happen all at once 
– and makes possible different levels of appropriating or sharing in the activity that is the 
world,‘ which implies ‗a sense of the real as active, rather than static, a mobile pattern whose 
best analogy is indeed musical and not mechanical‘. The Platonic parallels are not lost on 
him:  
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The relation between knower and known envisaged here is remarkably similar to the 
‗participation‘ spoken of in a more traditional idiom of scholastic and Platonic 
thinking. There is some activity which, beginning in the object known, continues to 
exercise a characteristic mode of life in another medium: the material in which it is 
first embodied does not exhaust the formal life that is at work. The ‗what‘ of what is 
known is not something that belongs to the given shape we begin with in our 
perception; it extends possibilities, or even, to use a question-begging word, invites 
response that will continue and reform its life, its specific energy.703 
 
This is what Milbank is referring to when he speaks of Williams‘s metaphysics as proposing 
an ‗intra-finite ―horizontal‖ participation‘704 that reflects a ‗vertical‘ participation in the being 
of the Logos‘. It is this that helps explicate the ‗analogical resonance or convenientia between 
things‘ as they appear within the world.705 Williams, however, is more blatantly historicist 
and Hegelian in his approach, more so than Platonic realism would suggest. His position is a 
kind of transcendence of ‗realism‘706 altogether since for Williams ‗the act of understanding 
and representation is bound up with the actual life of the material order‘, and because this 
order intimates an incompleteness, then one could conclude ‗the implication that world is not 
yet as it ‗really‘ is‘. Williams suggestively adds that ‗There is the possible hidden 
assumption…that the world‘s reality is always asymptotically approaching its fullness by 
means of the response of imagination – the assumption of an ‗ideal‘ fullness of perception in 
which things reach their destiny‘.707  
But what is the nature of this ‗destiny‘? Williams has said elsewhere regarding Hegel that 
‗all that is said about [the] telos has a necessarily quasi-fictional character‘ about it, in the 
sense that ‗the telos is not representable (not present) in the structure of any given historical 
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consciousness or set of consciousnesses, not a meaning which a speaker or writer could 
articulate as a piece of communicable information‘.708 But beyond these caveats, Williams 
suggests that the ‗constant pattern of ‗making other‘ that runs through the reality of artistic 
encounters‘, that pattern in which the world of objects are constantly ‗re-forming, re-
embodying‘ themselves into ‗something radically different‘ is something ontologically 
fundamental, and that if we ‗suppose…at the heart of this or at the end of the tracing of it to 
its first principles lies an ultimate sameness, simply an endless interiority within the world‘, 
then that ‗ought to strike us as in some way jarring‘.709 For him, as a Christian theologian, this 
continuing ‗making other‘ suggests an eternal dance of identity and difference that has been 
named as the trinity.710 Such a God expresses a ‗radical‘ and ‗self-dispossessing‘ love not 
only in the timeless relations of Father, Son and Spirit, but also as regards creation. Here ‗the 
world comes into being‘ in a manner that is ‗gratuitous‘ and ‗continuous‘, in an analogous 
way to ‗the order of the divine mind‘, and does not therefore imply a fundamental ‗change‘ to 
God‘s being ad intra.711 And this world in turn, because it is caused by and exists within God, 
continues to reflect this reality within its own life as a form of continuous self-othering and 
creative production.  
The above summary of Williams‘s account of creativity has attempted to lay out some of 
the basic assumptions which will be repeated later in his reflections on language and analogy. 
But already, he has shown how the elementary factor of historical movement, namely change 
and our progressive advance through time, has significant ontological implications. We have 
been made aware of how ordinary perceptions are filled with a profound level of depth that 
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exceeds our immediate grasp. Williams argued that poetics is itself an intensified form of this 
perception more generally, and that in order to save appearances, one needs a metaphysical 
supplementation that makes sense of these disclosures. That is, how is one to make sense of 
the paradox of difference and identity, as it appears in representation? How is it that the work 
of art ‗exceeds‘ the intentions of the artist, and so takes on a life of its own? How is one to 
explain that apparent ‗fittingness‘ between mind and world? And why does language give us 
an adequate access to reality? Might it be that reality itself remains strangely generative and 
intelligent in its very essence?  
 
7.1.2 On Language 
 
Williams‘s Gifford Lectures aimed to investigate how ‗the very way we speak and think can 
be heard as raising a question about the kind of universe this is, and thus about where and 
how language about God comes in‘.712 Like Grace and Necessity, he explored how ‗the 
significance of perceptions‘ – and their defiance of ‗any stimulus-response pattern‘713 – can be 
deepened more fully, finally showing that our ordinary processes of ‗making sense‘ require a 
metaphysical dimension in order to be comprehended.714 What is required is ‗a metaphysics 
that thinks of matter itself as invariably and necessarily communicative‘ and ‗not as a sheer 
passivity moulded by our minds into an intelligible structure‘.715 Such a view implies that 
material reality is ―always already‘ language-saturated and language-bound‘.716 He therefore 
rejects any ‗world beyond language‘ or ‗word/world dualism‘ that ‗encourages us to think of 
language as the labelling of a passive environment‘.717  
Williams‘s own project aims to steer between those styles of natural theology in which God 
is simply ‗waiting‘ to be discovered by a purely rationalist reflection,718 and a revelational 
theology (á la Barth) that holds divine disclosure to have little actual connection to the kind of 
cosmos we inhabit, as if revelation could be territorialized to a mythical ‗outside‘ (‗a simple 
model of divine utterance – an otherworldly agent providing otherwise inaccessible 
information‘, as Williams puts it719). Rather, a practicable natural theology should be focused 
on ‗the recognition that a faithful description of the world we inhabit involves [the] taking 
into account of whatever pressures [move] us to respond to our environment by gesturing 
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towards a context for the description we have been engaged in‘, as this appears through ‗a 
cluster of models and idioms and practices working quite differently from the discourse we 
have so far been operating [in], and without which our ‗normal‘ repertoire of practice would 
not finally make sense‘.720 And if such a pressure yields to ‗the horizon of further 
questioning‘ – which is ‗unlimited in prospect‘– then we could conceive this unconstrained 
expanse, this ‗indeterminate diversity of representational possibility‘, as evoking ‗a shadow of 
the image of an infinite flow of activity‘ that could be adjectivized as ‗generosity‘721 and 
‗intelligence‘, since such is ‗literally the only phenomenon in the universe that makes sense of 
the overall direction of material existence towards coherent, sustainable, innovative, adaptable 
forms‘.722  
This again does not involve an extraneous impulse on our part, a willful imposition upon 
the disarray, but rather indicates a continuing ‗participation‘ between objects themselves, as 
well as the knowing subject who represents them. Such ‗representation‘, again, does not 
imply a simple mirroring ‗reproduction‘ but rather displays that inherent amenability of the 
world to be carried into ‗another medium‘, one that does not require an exact likeness (since 
repetition, as we emphasized earlier, does not necessitate tautology).723 This means that what-
is-thought is related to, but not identical to, the object perceived. It can take on another ‗form‘ 
in which some ‗aspect of what is perceived‘ can ‗be read into another moment in our seeing 
and speaking‘. We are not simply dealing with ―raw‘ material‘, ‗a set of wholly discrete 
monads‘ or ‗mutually oppositional moments‘, but instead ‗a continuum of ‗analogical‘ 
relations in which we can speak of one thing in terms of another‘, that is, ‗of participation 
existing between not only object and object in the world but between object and representing 
subject‘. On such a model, any one object can ―come to be‖ differently, and is not blandly 
self-identical.724 We thus continually, through the simple act of knowing and representing, 
‗make things other than themselves‘.725  
Representation is not then ‗something which comes between a reality and its apprehension 
by a subject – a sort of obstacle or substitute for the real thing.‘ One should instead 
                                                          
720
 Ibid., 8. Williams goes on to show how this project has a kinship with Aquinas‘ own quinque viae 
(ibid., 10-14).  
721
 Ibid., 32. See cf. 170 
722
 Ibid. 102.  
723
 For more on this non-dualistic matrix of representation, and it connections to the dynamics of 
allegory, see Graham Ward, ‗Transcendence and Representation,‘ in Regina Schwartz (ed.), 
Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 127-147.  The essay is relevant insofar as it situates the ‗representation‘ within a 
genealogy of the sublime.  
724
 The Edge of Words, 20.  
725
 Ibid., 60. Also see his reflections on pp. 121-125 which repeat some of the insights contained Grace 
and Necessity, though now with a distinctly Milbankian tone (in light of his reading of ‗Scholasticism, 
Modernism and Modernity‘).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
171 
 
understand it as ‗the ‗thereness of the object in relation to the perceiver‘726, as an activity 
which ‗performs what it refers to‘, and ‗enacts the mutual investment of subject and 
object‘,727 which ‗claims that for any element in the environment in which we live, there is an 
irreducible…dimension of its reality which is its life in speaking and thinking‘.728 By adopting 
the language of ‗representation‘, Williams is rejecting a ‗pure postmodern dualism…of 
compromised speech and silent, formless, non-historical interiority‘ and ‗a pre-critical revival 
of would-be simple representation, representation without mediation‘729 – that is, in a naïve 
belief in ‗the immediate datum of perception‘.730 The act of representing should not be 
confused with ‗imitating or substituting‘, since ‗the character of mediation‘ is that which 
‗enables us to recognize our act in the other, and the other‘s act in us, and the need to 
understand truth as more than the correspondence of formal elements in a structure‘731 (as 
found in mainstream ‗realism‘). ‗Representation‘ does not imply a mirror effect, a direct 
imaging of the world without linguistic and affective mediation, but is always a non-identical 
repetition of our perceptions in a different form, perceptions which are themselves never 
neutral or value-free, but always a seeing-as, that is, a seeing of something in particular.732 
This means that our attempts at reference are always over-determined by a historical and 
linguistic density that defies an unmediated perspective.  
But it should be added that this ever-increasing ‗density of reference‘ does not mean that 
communication is without limits. There is a sense in which material limitation affects our 
language-usage – our physical capabilities and language-mastery included. But there is an 
additional valence given in the fact that the continuing accretion of historico-linguistic 
deposits means that we cannot just signify whatever we please. To say anything, is ‗to set it in 
the context of the echoes and resonances that come with utterance‘.733 Such implies an 
interpenetration between ‗freedom‘ and ‗determination‘: ‗The unceasing effort to re-work 
perceptions as our means of exploring what it is for something to be ‗there‘ for us is both free, 
in the sense that it is never accounted for by an energy-impulse exchange model, and deeply 
constrained, in the sense that we are always trying to allow what is there to show itself‘.734 We 
are thus always placed in an ‗environment‘ that is ‗irreducibly charged with intelligence‘ in 
which there is a ‗mutual adjustment and readjustment of meaningful communications and 
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intelligence receptors‘.735 This basic over-determination within our linguistic engagements is 
visible even at an elementary level, since ‗we cannot ever simply say the same words twice 
with absolutely precisely the same meaning‘.736 Here ‗the passage of time makes a difference‘ 
whereby ‗What is said, performed, enacted becomes ‗material‘ to the next utterance and 
performance, so that this latter cannot be in any very interesting sense the same‘.737 As such, 
there remains ‗an irreversible trajectory in language‘ in which ‗what has been said cannot be 
unsaid, and what is now to be said has to reckon not only with the environment as such but 
with the speech of others which makes the environment we encounter always already 
represented‘. ‗The world we inhabit is already a symbolized world, a world that has been 
taken up into a process of speaking and making sense together‘738, and is a world in which 
‗Performance generates new possibilities of performances‘.739  
This is exemplified by Margaret Masterman‘s essay on metaphysics and ideographs740 
(which Williams draws heavily on741). In the construction of ideographical signs, one begins 
with a simple item, such as the word ‗Play‘. This word while evidencing a ‗basic 
indeterminacy‘742 is subject to a form of ‗Progressive Definition‘ through repeated usage. One 
repeats the word ‗Play‘, within temporal gaps, and eventually one infers an ‗indexical‘ 
reference, so that we can talk of ‗that Play‘, since ‗past performance contributes to present 
meaning‘.743 Metaphysical and ideographical language abstracts from particularity, from the 
―this‘, ‗here‘, and ‗now‘‘, towards more ‗universal‘ forms of designation,744 from unitary 
‗statements‘ towards ‗clusters‘ of implication that set this specificity within an ever-widening 
context of meaning. The generalized context abstracted from particulars is then condensed 
into words that are ‗the simplest possible, the most compact, the simplest, the most stark‘.745 
Metaphysics and ideographs thus extend the scope of ‗statements‘, and reduce them so that 
‗sufficiently specific meaning is attained‘.746 Within this remit, the word ‗Play‘ may come to 
refer to a universal activity extracted from a horizon of complexity and implication. This 
complexity, in turn, can extend into the paradoxical where seemingly opposing concepts can 
be mutually implicated, which might appear contradictory to those unaware of the network of 
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meanings that any one concept might imply.747 For example, the Christian confession that 
‗God is One‘ and ‗God is Three‘ is only contradictory if one remains ignorant of the 
environment that gave rise to its usage; it should not therefore be rejected as simple nonsense, 
as in logical positivism.  
For Williams, this continual building-up of historical meaning implies that we can never be 
isolated speakers, but are always socialized in our interactions, being subject to the constraints 
and plenitudes of human exchange.748 Linguistic objects present themselves in a ‗three-
dimensional‘ manner that implies a certain level of ‗resistance‘ which assumes ‗a 
convergence of different possible points of view and points where resistance is met‘.749 On 
this reading, any ‗coherent material object‘ comes to be ‗through a fairly intricate interplay of 
processes‘, so that such an object is ‗always already ‗saturated‘ with the workings of mind‘, 
and therefore cannot be abstracted from ‗the means we are using to examine it‘.750 As such, 
there can be no ‗isolated subjects acting on each other in a void‘, nor can this process be 
reduced to ‗mechanical interactions‘ on the part of a biological machine‘.751 Rather, since we 
live in a world in which ‗matter‘ is ‗inherently ‗symbolic‘ – a ‗cosmos of interacting signals‘ 
– this indicates that we are ‗engaged with and [are] in a shared situation‘. ‗We know what we 
know as something always already known by another‘, so that our ‗attempts to 
characterize/represent a situation in speech will therefore be diverse: not chaotic or vague, but 
equally not reducible to the single authoritative reproduction of some basic structure‘. Such 
means that to be ‗truthful‘ is to ‗find a way of speaking that does maximal justice to the 
diversity and plurality of a situation‘.752 But it also implies that we take seriously the assertion 
that ‗the entire system of the universe‘ is ‗an intelligible whole‘, that is, we should read it ‗as 
‗a‘ world‘. As Williams goes on to suggest, this intelligible whole might reflect to us the fact 
that there is an intelligent mind that gives rationality to this order.753  
Williams‘s reflections on the inherently additive nature of language leads him to conclude 
that ‗Extreme or apparently excessive speech is not an aberration in our speaking‘.754 Instead 
he suggests if our very speaking concerns an attunement to the material world, then this tells 
us that the world is always in excess to itself, that there is a ‗complexity we are always 
catching up‘ to. Our attempts at comprehensiveness will continually fall short of their ideal, 
since it is herein that we encounter ‗the ‗difficulty‘ of the world, its complex resistance to 
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exhaustive description‘.755 But what does this excessiveness tell us about this reality as such? 
As Williams has reiterated again and again, it means that if ‗intelligence is fundamental to our 
apprehension of our environment‘, and that there is no ―mindless‘ materiality‘, then we are in 
‗an important sense ‗addressed‘ by what we encounter‘. ―Extreme‘ utterance presupposes that 
only when the fullest imaginable range of allusion and cross-reference has been explored do 
we begin to be capable of ‗precision‘, because only then do we see what it actually means for 
some agency within our experience to come into speech‘.756 This requires a certain ‗faith in 
language‘,757 a trust that our speaking contains ‗resources beyond its immediate referential 
vocabulary‘, and ‗treating our words as vehicles of an energy beyond them‘, ‗disclosing 
futures we had not consciously imagined‘.758 And if such language is inherently social and 
produced through a multiplicity of perceptions, then one could suggest that it appears ‗as if 
‗Being‘ itself were in effect the irreducible otherness of speakers, the complex of 
inexhaustible potential for relatedness‘.759    
But what happens when words stop? What are we left with? Williams suggests that no 
‗silence‘ is ‗pure absence‘ since we ‗cannot imagine an ‗unframed‘ or pure silence‘, but only 
a ‗silence in which we are not hearing anything, not hearing what we might expect to hear‘.760 
Silence is never value-free, so that the assumption that silence communicates nothing is not 
valid. There is always a context in which non-speech occurs, which further implies that not all 
silence is ‗justifiable‘. We have to look at where this stoppage occurs and the kind of 
language it ‗interrupts or refuses‘. That means that ‗the way in which silence ‗comes in‘ 
should be something to do with admitting the most formidable level of difficulty‘,761 that is, 
where language reaches an aporia, where it begins to ―break down‖.762 When this 
‗incompleteness‘ or ‗difficulty‘ is stressed, this does not necessarily imply ‗a failure exactly‘, 
but rather shows ‗that this is one way in which language copes with this sort of difficulty, by 
naming the bare fact that it is difficult‘.763 ‗Silence is significant because of where and how it 
comes in, and so is arrived at by a variety of ‗strategies‘‘ which are ‗meaningless without  the 
silence they induce‘. But it also means that ‗silence is equally meaningless without the time 
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taken to arrive at it, the particular narrative of its achievement‘.764 This interrelation between 
speech and silence leads Williams to question any privileging of silence over speech as 
regards ‗truth-telling‘, since ‗speech points into silence and is itself altered by it‘.765 For 
Christian and mystical speech, this has traditionally be associated with the naming of God, 
with the fact that God does not exist as a definitive ‗object‘ within history – since he is both 
innominabile or omninominabile – a fact which reveals the ‗time-and-matter-bound nature‘ of 
language more generally.766  
The significance of this incapacity, on the part of language, does not mean that 
communication itself is ‗some kind of ‗fallen‘, distorting medium or activity‘. It is ‗finite and 
historical‘, and therefore has an ‗unfinished character‘– a sense of ‗what has not yet been 
said‘ – but it is not thereby ‗intrinsically corrupt‘.767 Speech about what is difficult is 
continually primed to be ‗paradoxical and baffling‘, implicating us in a ‗suspension‘ of ‗our 
habitual words‘ so that a new kind of language can ‗emerge‘.768 This continual ‗suspension‘ 
of usual patterns has a moral aspect to it as well: ‗it is not simply [about] God‘s existence‘ but 
also ‗the existence and survival of a certain kind of humanity‘. Williams makes this 
conclusion because he believes that there are ‗Versions of humanity and of human language 
which, deliberately or not, work towards excising some of the difficulties involved in 
[speaking of the human self]‘, and are ‗hostile to that account of humanity which sees it as 
basically accountable, engaged in growth, risk, love‘, and in a practice of ‗shaping itself in 
relation to what is given‘.769 Such might also hold in check those ‗shapeless ideas of liberty 
and autonomy‘770 that have come dominate our popular discourses.   
Williams‘s argument has served to show that the material practices of language-usage and 
language-creation are not irruptions into an otherwise non-intelligent matrix. For him, 
materiality itself is imbued with symbolic resonance and capability that defies any reductively 
immanent account. To say or think anything involves oneself in a deeply profound 
undercurrent of meaning that is only rarely brought to the surface consciously. There is an 
ever-expanding range of significance that is implicated in every act of speaking and thinking 
we engage in. There is no dualism for Williams between the material and the metaphysical, 
the immanent and the transcendent, the temporal and non-temporal: we are rather given a 
framework in which the symbolic excess of being is reflective of the nature of the cosmos, 
and therefore of the divine life in which all things participate and have their being. With this 
participatory structure in place, we are ready to approach Williams‘s account of analogy. 
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7.1.3. On Analogy 
 
Throughout the previous two sections, there have been various hints at a more substantive 
account of analogy that underlies Williams‘s tangential commentary. In various places, there 
have been allusions to analogy as providing insights regarding the real proportion between 
mind and world, or the affinity between objects that implies an intersection between vertical 
and horizontal modes of participation. However, it is worth expanding Williams‘s own take 
on analogy, and its impingements on metaphysics. Here it can be said that one will not find a 
text where Williams expounds his own systematic account of analogy as such. The closest 
one comes to this are ‗Balthasar and Difference‘771 and ‗Dialectic and Analogy‘.772  
The argument of the former, like many of Williams‘s other texts in Wrestling with Angels, 
aims to counteract a postmodern disavowal of ‗representation‘, here understood by critical 
theorists as a drive towards ‗identity and totality‘.773 Williams is thinking specifically of 
Derrida and his assertion of that différance which indicates ‗the unsayable‘.774 But he reckons 
that Derrida and others (e.g. Lyotard) have not really been captured by difference. Instead in 
their ‗refusal of a relation between same and other‘, they have produced ‗another kind of 
reduction to the same‘, a postmodern sublimity of the unpresentable.775 Their project remains 
‗curiously disincarnate‘ in its denial of human ‗dialogue‘, and ‗the temporal conflicts and 
resistances of ‗ordinary‘ interpersonal exchange‘.776 In contrast to this, one needs to 
conceptualize ‗a difference that is both simultaneous and interactive, a difference that allows 
temporal change, reciprocity of action‘, and which avoids all ‗varieties of totalization‘.777 It is 
here that the analogia entis comes to its own, especially as mediated through Balthasar and 
Nicholas of Cusa‘s non aliud.778  
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But how does Williams understand the analogia entis more substantively? He begins with 
a qualification: ‗Analogy is…emphatically not a correspondence between two or more things 
exhibiting in varying degrees the same features, as if God had a very great deal of good and 
creatures steadily diminishing qualities of the same‘, for ‗There is no system of which God 
and creatures are both part‘, since they cannot be ‗moments in one story‘. He denies that the 
analogia entis implies an ontotheology – in the sense implied by Heidegger.779 – as if the 
participatory relation between God and creatures were simply an amplification of common 
traits. On the contrary, the analogy of being is predicated on a radical difference between 
Being and beings, which cannot be occluded without undermining the unfathomable interval 
between created and uncreated. These comments are qualifications regarding the doctrine of 
analogy; but more positively stated, what can we say about it? Using language inflected by 
Balthasar, he argues that 
 
It is the active presence of the divine liberty, love and beauty precisely within the 
various and finite reality of material/temporal reality. ‗The divine‘ is not present in 
creation in the form of ‗hints of transcendence‘, points in the created order where 
finitude and creatureliness appear to thin out or open to a mysterious infinity, but in 
creation being itself – which includes, paradigmatically, creation being itself in 
unfinishedness, time-taking, pain and death. The crucified Jesus is, in this context, the 
ground and manifestation of what analogy means.780  
 
Such means the material processes whereby language of God is produced is not about 
‗denying undialectically the realities of time‘, so that we ‗arrive at an apt rhetoric for the 
divine‘. Rather it is by ‗working with the modalities of talk about time‘ that ‗the timeless (that 
is, in concretely theological terms, the faithful, always active) reality of reciprocal 
differentiations of trinitarian life is brought to view‘. For Williams, temporality and historicity 
are not excluded from metaphysics and the doctrine of analogy: ‗God is not to be spoken of 
by denying contingency‘, since ‗The mysterious difference of God is never an abstract 
otherness defined simply by the negation of predicates of contingent being‘. To think God‘s 
transcendence in this way would actually imply a subtle denunciation: for ‗if divine difference 
were the negation of all finite predicates, God would be the other belonging to a discourse 
about the finite world. God‘s life would be subsumed under that of the world, the antithesis of 
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the world‘s thesis; and out of such a discourse, no possible language for divine freedom or 
love could be generated‘.781 
Similar trajectories are present in the second essay. However, rather than focusing on 
postmodern aversions to representation, ‗Dialectic and Analogy‘ is penned against the 
background of post-Kantian and Romantic ideas of subjectivity. These are particularly related 
to Barthian worries about how the ‗ego‘ has served as the ‗pre-existing constant‘ over-against 
which God‘s being is contrasted.782 One‘s starting point, already at the outset, subordinates 
God to a finite measure of proportion – a decision which taints any outcome, no matter how 
far one extends the chain of measuring, even unto infinity.783 For Barth, the God conceived 
along these lines could be hardly less than ‗a fantastically deferred and re-routed vision of a 
human form of mental life‘ that is supposedly ‗reconciled with its own unlimited 
possibilities‘.784 Barth‘s concern is that the knowledge of ‗truth‘ should stem from ‗a process 
or activity that is not generated by the finite subject, whether in terms of ideas or 
‗experiences‖.785 It is for this reason that Barth emphasizes the importance of God‘s self-
revelation as being the only basis for a theology worthy of its name.  
In this regard, Barth‘s negative antipode is Hegel, who exemplifies this trajectory which he 
desires to counter. Williams contemporizes this through an interpretation of Hegel offered by 
Conor Cunningham, which proposes that Hegel collapses all difference into a univocal 
grammar, in that each distinct thing is defined by a relation to what it is not. Everything is 
determined by its shadowy and non-existent opposite, an alternate reality of sublime vacuity – 
which is the highest instance of univocal predication.786 Williams suggests that these concerns 
are centered on the problem of analogy, in that Hegel‘s metaphysics (as read by Cunningham 
and others) cannot sustain a vision of ontological difference. Williams contests this reading, 
                                                          
781
 Ibid., 83. A longer and more dense study on the relation between the question of historicity and 
analogical metaphysics can be found in Lorenz Puntel, Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit I: 
Philosophiegeschichtlich-Kritischer Versuch über das Grundproblem der Metaphysik (Freiburg, Basel 
and Wien: Herder, 1969). For some historical background for this argument in this monograph, see the 
historical treatement given in Vincent Holzer, ‗Les thomismes de langue allemande au xxe siècle: 
science de l'être et métamorphoses du transcendantal‘. Revue des sciences philosophiques et 
théologiques 97.1 (2013): 37-58. Holzer makes the point that many German Catholics, especially those 
who rely heavily on Kant and Heidegger, to a lesser or greater degree, are unconsciously influenced in 
their reading of Aquinas by a kind of crypto-Suárezian ontology in which the study of general being is 
separated from particular being itself (e.g. God-as-Being), a tendency that operates in accordance with 
the distinction between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis.  
782
 ‗Dialectic and Analogy,‘ 274.  
783
 This argument has deep similarities with Aquinas‘s rejection of an analogy of proportion as a 
legitimate option for Christian metaphysics, as we saw in a previous chapter.  
784
 ‗Dialectic and Analogy,‘ 276.  
785
 Ibid., 277.  
786
 Ibid., 277-278; also see Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and 
the Difference of Theology (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 100-130.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
179 
 
asserting, here and elsewhere,787 that Hegel‘s philosophy (as a form of thinking) does not 
necessitate that any object be determined by ‗what it is not‘,788 but that it always is thought in 
its particular or ‗determinate‘ location.789 Furthermore, the very act of thinking implies an 
objectivity that can never be reduced to the machinations of the ego, and therefore indicates a 
never-to-be-completed process of ‗dispossession‘ by the thinking subject (a point we will 
return to later).  
However, Williams‘s main focus in this essay is not primarily on which of these readings 
of Hegel is more correct. Instead the central protagonist in this text is Barth‘s theological bête 
noire, Erich Przywara. It is well-known that Barth had a profound distaste for the analogia 
entis,790 and was particularly critical of Przywara (even though he probably did not read his 
magnum opus791). But Williams argues that Barth‘s rejection of the analogy of being leaves in 
place ‗a stark dilemma as to the relation of God to creation‘, and could ‗imply a picture of 
divine and finite action as simply mutually exclusive‘, ‗a picture that entails a univocal 
understanding of finite and infinite being, two modes of action that are in competition for one 
logical space‘.792 In Williams‘s estimate, it is analogy – against a decadent Hegelianism and 
Barthianism – that ‗moves us on from a dialectic that threatens to collapse into an ultimate 
self-identity‘.793 It proposes ‗a non-rivalrous difference‘, a difference that is not understood in 
‗binary terms‘.794 Substantively, this is fleshed out in Przywara‘s proposal for ‗creaturely 
metaphysic‘,795 or more specifically, a dual emphasis on a ‗meta-noetics‘ and ‗meta-ontics‘.796 
These respectively relate to ‗the act of knowing‘ and ‗the object of knowing‘, and constitute 
‗the irreducible duality‘ in our relation to the world.797  
To use Heidegger‘s lexicon, ‗meta-noetics‘ is related to Dasein (‗being-there‘) while 
‗meta-ontics‘ is connected to Sosein (‗being-thus‘).798 The former speaks to ‗the givenness of 
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a certain process of becoming‘ while the latter says that there is ‗no engagement with the 
historical givenness without recognising the continuity-in-change‘.799 Within this framework, 
the analogia entis is aimed at bringing-out the ―balance of tension‖ that occurs between these 
two polarizations, between ‗what is being thought‘ and ‗the temporal or process-related 
dimension in our knowing‘.800 Such a ‗balance‘ aims to counteract ‗a ‗pure‘ Idealist 
construction of the subject‘ and a ‗crude realism‘ found in ‗some neo-scholastic 
discussions‘.801 It does so in emphasizing the consistent interplay between Sosein and Dasein, 
whereby this ‗unity-in-tension‘ moves thinking onto ‗the analogical plane‘, since it is through 
the temporalised becoming of Dasein that we realize that Sosein is ‗not identical with any 
moment of our perception‘. Such a process is ‗both ‗critical‘ in the sense of being distanced 
from any one such moment of perception and united with the mysterious inner life of what is 
thought‘.802 Expressed theologically, this means that ‗God is never exhaustively the other of 
creation. God is God, the identity of essence and existence, of Da and So‘, which is never the 
case for created beings, who remain alienated from their essence. For Przywara, ‗[God‘s] 
being is…outside any process of measurement or proportion‘, since God remains infinite and 
omnificent. Nonetheless, ‗by the sheer gift simultaneously of existence and intelligible form 
to the finite, God establishes a world in which tension is inbuilt in our apprehension and thus 
‗analogical‘ thinking becomes of central importance‘.803 Once more, we can see that the 
radical difference of God makes analogy possible, and precisely in a way that gives time-
bounded existence its due regard.    
This section concludes the previous three sections. Its aim was to deepen our earlier 
expansions on Williams‘s account of divine transcendence, attempting to show that his non-
conflictive approach is deepened through his reflections on creativity, language and analogy. 
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Williams‘s metaphysics dilated these trajectories by examining the material practices of 
poetics and language, displaying that the interstices between time and matter disclose a world 
that is inherently symbolic and meaningful. Such contentions transgress the dualisms between 
mind and matter, nature and super-nature, time and eternity, the vertical and the horizontal. 
Connecting this to our previous allusions to ‗the sublime‘, this argument further substantiates 
the idea that the infinite can be mediated, however imperfectly, through creaturely ideation. 
We are not dealing here with a sheer negativity of the postmodern sublime, but a positive 
infinity of transcendent form.  
But all of this raises a question: what about evil? How does this vision account for that? 
One can anticipate a response, given by thinkers like MacKinnon, namely that our argument 
here fails to take into account the tragic seriousness of our lot, the deeply troubling factor that 
evil continues to characterize our being-in-the-world. It cannot be erased or papered over. It 
must be engaged.  
 
7.2. Without Substance: Augustine and the Problem of Evil 
 
One of the critiques lodged by Hart and Milbank at Donald MacKinnon‘s plea for the tragic 
was its aversion to the privatio boni.804 We can recall his statement that the Platonic-
Augustinian theory of evil-as-privation805 was ‗the most profound spiritual error of 
transcendent metaphysics‘,806  and further ‗that it has only to be stated clearly, and worked out 
in terms of concrete examples, to be shown to be totally inadequate as an analysis either of 
moral or of physical evil‘.807 MacKinnon‘s concern appears to be that we fail to conceive evil 
if we consider it primarily as a ‗lack‘, or as simply a deviation from an ideal. There is a real 
sense in which evil cannot be described as simple negation, that is, as an absence of the good. 
According to him, evil has a devastating positivism that resists this. 
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Williams‘s major treatment of this is found in his essay ‗Insubstantial Evil‘.808 Expounding 
Augustine‘s ‗‗grammar‘ of evil‘ remains the centralizing drift of this text: ‗Talking about evil 
is not like talking about things, about what makes the constituents of the world the sorts of 
things they are‘. Instead, ‗it is talking about a process, about something that happens to the 
things that there are in the universe‘. For Augustine, evil is ‗not some kind of object‘; on the 
contrary, ‗we give the name of ‗evil‘ to that process in which good is lost‘. This process is 
connected to Augustine‘s account of creation: since God is timeless and therefore not an 
agent within time, he creates the material world as a contingent and interrelated totality, as 
one shaped by forma and pondus – form and balance – in a way that constitutes the 
metaphysical rationale for created goodness-as-such. Created beings are placed and shaped 
within a hierarchy of relation that determines their particularity. Without this forma and 
pondus there would be no way to register what change might actually mean, because in total 
formlessness and contingency, change and process are meaningless.809  It is in this context 
that evil-as-privation and evil-as-process finds its possibility. One of the golden threads 
running through this essay is Williams‘s argument that Augustine‘s account of evil is deeply 
connected to the doctrine of God and creation. Being and goodness are convertible realities; 
they are attributes of the same object. On Williams‘s perspective, these two things are so 
intimately related that if we reject the one, the other is put in question as well.810  
As Williams knows, this teaching has been questioned in recent times. In this text, his 
interlocutors are John Hick and Kathleen Sands, and not Donald MacKinnon explicitly. For 
his part, Williams thinks the non-substantiality of evil is not a negligible aspect of Christian 
metaphysics, since it concerns ‗the question of what it is to speak of ‗a‘ world at all, with all 
that this implies about the universe‘s relation to a maker‘.811 But in talking about non-
substantiality, what are we saying? Does evil really not ‗exist‘? Williams suggests that we 
cannot see this clearly unless we see that for Augustine there is no concept of ‗sheer 
thereness‘, since ‗to be at all is to have a particular place in the interlocking order of things‘, 
that ‗to exist is necessarily to exemplify certain ‗goods‘, to be, in a certain way, actively 
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exercising the ordered and interdependent life that belongs to the creatures of a good God‘. 
Augustine‘s ‗axiological‘ account of being does mean that existents can be ontologically 
‗‗graded‘‘, that is, we can speak of differing levels of deficiency and actuality among distinct 
things. This should not be read as implying a ‗crass mistake about the possibility of different 
degrees of ‗thereness‘‘, but rather that ‗the exercise of the goods that go with existing may be 
more or less constrained in its environment, more or less capable of modification‘, which 
indicates that there is an ‗overall notion of interdependence‘ in which ‗some realities are more 
dependent than others‘.812 Addressing Hick, Williams disputes whether Augustine‘s privatio 
boni should be read as an ‗aesthetic‘ theodicy in which evil does not exist, because, from the 
divine perspective of the whole, evil is cancelled by the balancing of good, much like the way 
dark blotches on a painting are absorbed into the product‘s completion.813 Augustine‘s 
proposal is more radical than this: if there is no ‗evil‘ from the divine perspective this is 
because evil is not a thing or substance that literally stands-out on its own terms.814 Evil is a 
perversion; it is parasitic – a parhypostasis, to quote Proclus – and is preeminently manifest in 
the distortedness of desire.815 Our very perspective on reality is so warped that even our 
acknowledgement of evil is tainted, so that we cannot speak dispassionately about it . Only 
God remains untainted.816  
An additional argument in favour of rejecting the ‗aesthetic‘ reading of evil is that God – 
for Augustine and classical theology more generally – does not need anything outside of the 
sufficiency of God‘s own life. Therefore, any claim that God ‗uses‘ us to achieve some 
aesthetic balance that exceeds the particular goods of created things is theologically 
questionable: since God requires no further fulfillment, creation can only be there for the good 
of creatures: ‗The creature‘s perspective simply is defined by God‘s creative purpose…but 
that divine purpose is to maximize all possible fulfilment for the creature, since the good, the 
joy, the flourishing of the creature could never be in any way a threat to the divine bliss‘. 817  
Such a conclusion intimates that the co-ordination of divinity and humanity needs to be 
thoroughly ‗‗despatialised‘‘, as being non-conflictive, since we are not talking about different 
agencies vying for the same ontological territory.818 A consequence of this is that evil can 
have no ‗space‘ ontologically at all.819 Evil is a question of contingency and not metaphysical 
necessity. It is a question of time and process, and the inherent limits that these impose on us. 
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To use some remarks given elsewhere, ‗an authentically contingent world is one in which you 
cannot guarantee the compatibility of goods. That's what it is to be created‘.820 Evil is not a 
product of timeless essences engaged in eternal and bellicose struggles, as in Manichaeism,  
but are the historical production of finite actors.  
Hick‘s further criticisms however bring the discussion into an explicit relation with 
MacKinnon‘s concerns: for Hick ‗there is, or should be, an important difference between 
‗metaphysical‘ and ‗empirical‘ accounts of the reality of evil: whatever the accuracy of the 
metaphysical definition of evil as privation, it cannot be accurate to speak of evil as 
experienced in such terms…An evil will is not automatically one that tends towards 
disintegration and final extinction‘, because ‗Evil activity has a power and ‗integrity‘ of its 
own‘. On a certain reading, ‗if evil is to be described as the absence of good‘, one might see 
‗pain‘ as just an ‗absence of pleasure‘ – which is of course a ‗grossly inadequate account‘ of 
how evil ‗manifestly impresses itself upon the subject‘.821 Nonetheless, Williams thinks this is 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding: ‗the Augustinian argument‘ is that ‗the ‗terrifying 
quality and power‘822 of evil‘ stems from ‗those elements, in whatever reality we are talking 
about, that are most alive and active‘. The particular malignity of evil is linked to ‗the kind of 
world this is, a world in which the active, joyful goodness of God is mirrored or shared by 
creatures‘, and evil is terrifying precisely because the ‗underlay‘ of our existence is ‗this 
intensity of action‘, and this is why ‗the diversion or distortion of worldly reality is appalling‘. 
For evil to ‗‗impress‘‘ itself upon us ‗it has to employ the vehicle of action and, in the human 
sphere, [this means] intelligence‘. This intellective aspect is connected to the question of 
volition, and so for Augustine, ‗The corrupted will is certainly not, ipso facto, a weak or 
powerless will, so long as it shows the typical excellences of will: liberty, energy, persistence 
or whatever‘. The implication to be drawn is that sin or evil are not necessarily the result of an 
anemic will. Instead, ‗[what] makes…evil terrible are those excellences [and] nothing else‘. 
Such means that ‗[what] is distinctively evil in the evil will is simply not capable of being 
spoken of or understood in terms of liberty, energy and so on‘, or the lack thereof.823 There is 
a nexus of action and willing which brings about evil occurrences, but it is precisely what is 
distorted that makes its effects so awful.   
Even though evil should be understood as privative – defined as a loss or perversion of the 
good – this should not imply that the consequences of evil can be categorized merely as a lack 
of some characteristic. What makes evil truly devastating is that it corrupts the agencies of 
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intellectual will, and that it is precisely this factor that makes evil heinous and destructive. 824 
So while evil is ontologically inexistent – it does not stand out as an independent ‗thing‘ – the 
consequences it has on active agents is certainly not just privative: it has a ―terrifying quality 
and power‖ that is irreducible to the sheer absence of particular qualities, because ‗what we 
experience and call evil is, indeed, not simply a void, [or] a lack‘. One could say that ‗it is the 
effect of a lack, the displacement of true by untrue perception‘, even though ‗its effects within 
a system of forces may be powerful‘825 – which might sound ‗paradoxical‘, but Williams 
thinks the alternatives are even more stark and dire. If evil has ‗a power of initiative, a 
capacity to set intelligible goals and to advance those goals in a lastingly coherent manner‘ , 
such would mean, firstly, that ‗evil impinges on a finite agent in the way that another finite 
agent would‘, and secondly that there would be ‗nothing absurd in proposing, or having 
proposed to one, a set of objectives specified as evil in themselves and claiming to be proper 
objects for rational pursuit‘. On this model, goodness and evil have ‗being‘ univocally, which 
(as a result) places being-as-such into a sublime indeterminacy. Williams goes on to say that 
the first position is ‗Manichaeism‘ pure and simple, since it proposes ‗evil as an invasive 
‗other‘, struggling with the moral responsibility of the finite person, so that the victory of evil 
is the victory of a subject, or substance, distinct from the finite person‘.826 The second 
position suggests that ‗what is good for one subject is not necessarily good for any other‘, or 
‗that there is a plurality of intelligible goods, goals that may be pursued without absurdity by 
reasoning subjects‘.827  
This view stands in contrast to the traditional account of transcendent goodness given by 
Augustine, in which ‗[the] good of all persons is both unified and interdependent‘, insofar as 
‗I can not specify what is good for me without including what is good for you in the same 
calculation‘. On Williams‘s reading, ‗Augustine‘s assumptions and arguments about the 
unreality of evil as an independent substance, cause or agency are bound up with a conviction 
about the location of evil in the malfunctioning of relations between subjects, not in the 
relation of this or that subject to some other thing called ‗evil‘‘. Therefore, Augustine would 
argue that ‗a possible grammar for talking of evil has to be recognised as subverting the very 
idea of intelligibility as something relating the individual‘s mental/verbal life to a system or 
order transcending the individual frame‘. Williams thereafter draws a conclusion from this: ‗if 
the Good is in some sense one, evil cannot be allowed a place of its own, outside the system 
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of balancing and interweaving relations that actualise the Good for particular beings, and 
which, in a contingent world, are vulnerable to malfunction and distortion‘.828 
Hick‘s final criticism of evil-as-privation is linked to the Neoplatonic roots that inspire 
Augustine‘s metaphysics, which could be read as offering that the world develops in 
accordance with a principle of plenitude that has little connection to a divine choosing or 
willing. Different creatures, of relative sufficiency and deficiency, emerge from an 
impersonal process of ‗emanation‘ that serves an ontological precept bifurcated from God‘s 
active providence and election. Williams contests whether Augustine can be read like this: 
diversity and the relative hierarchies of finite being are linked to a temporal process of 
generation and dependence, in which lack or deficiency are not merely there to serve some 
‗aesthetic‘ purpose for a detached observer, or impersonal principle; moreover, deficiency as 
such does not designate something evil per se.829 For Augustine, the universe does not grow 
as the result of an independent principle of harmony that has little connection to a personal 
God. Rather ‗God ‗chooses‘ to make a world that is both temporal and interdependent‘, and it 
is this that underpins ‗the logic‘ of ‗free determination‘, in which the ‗variety‘ and ‗the 
oscillation of circumstances‘ comes into being ‗as agents act upon each other, never at any 
one point attaining perfect balance within the world‘s history‘.830 For Augustine, diversity 
indicates that ‗creation of any kind entails variety‘.831  
Nonetheless, this Neoplatonic trajectory within Augustine is subjected to a fiercer attack, 
this time by Kathleen Sands. According to her, Augustine‘s theology of evil effectively denies 
‗the tragic‘ since on the ‗rationalist‘ and ‗dualist‘ model proposed ‗there is no evil [which is] 
‗beyond comprehension or rehabilitation‘‘.832 As such, it fails to deal with the truly contingent 
nature of the reality, and divides the world up into good and bad, without taking into account 
the complexity and tragic interpenetration between virtue and vice. In creating divisions, 
Augustine lays the groundwork for an oppositional mentality – an ‗us-versus-them‘ ethic – 
that (at its worst) legitimates the oppression of those who do not conform to my conception of 
goodness,833 as in Augustine‘s repression of the Donatists.834 It serves an ‗anxiety to secure 
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moral fixity‘ through ‗the adversarial definition of evil in the present, and the negative 
account of it in the distant metaphysical horizon‘, ‗an anxiety about the maintenance of the 
threatened dominant position of the male, reasonable will‘. Evil-as-privation, for Sands, 
presupposes a metaphysics of ―closure‖, one that ‗constantly slip[s] into polarisations of ‗the 
Good‘ and ‗the not-Good‘‘, ‗polarisations that encourage the identification of actual agents 
here and now with the Good and the not-Good, and the projection of failure and lack on to 
certain classes and categories of existence (matter, woman, [etc.])‘.835 It ultimately denies a 
tragic perspective which displays that even good actions can be entwined with negative 
outcomes, and that we cannot fully anticipate the historical shape of our decisions.  
Here following the suggestions of Martha Nussbaum, Sands wants to propose an account of 
‗the good‘ that is ‗various, mobile, vulnerable, rather than unified and stable‘,836 against an 
account of transcendent beatitude that denies historicity. Yet it is on precisely this point that 
Sands, according to Williams, misreads Augustine: on his view, Augustine affirms that ‗there 
is no timeless and stable goodness in this world, ‗no incarnation of evil‘. Augustine‘s vision is 
that every ‗creaturely good is realised in time,‘ and that ‗the perfection of goodness exists not 
as something that issues from a process, but as the eternal standard and direction of creaturely 
good‘.837 However, it is precisely this latter move that Sands wants to reject, namely, ‗a 
transcendent measure of good‘. She distinguishes her account of ‗the good‘ as that which 
‗emerges as a possible, a ‗viable‘, wholeness and balance in the life of moral communities‘.838 
This serves to counteract the ahistorical and dualistic metaphysics of evil which Sands traces 
to Augustine.  
But Williams wonders whether this denial has the desired effect Sands wants from it. 
Because if this is so, then ‗the Good is different for different created subjects, to the extent 
that what is good for one subject is necessarily and permanently at odds with what is good for 
another‘. Or one could say that ‗the Good genuinely differs from circumstance to 
circumstance, without any ‗grammar‘ of continuity‘, ‗that the Good of or for certain subjects 
might simply and finally fail or prove impossible of realisation‘. If this is the logical 
outgrowth of her position, then there are some stark conclusions to consider. For as he says     
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
834
 Williams does contest this reading of the Donatist controversy: ‗Part of Augustine‘s gravamen 
against both Pelagians and Donatists is to do with their identification of possible states within history 
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The first reading implies that there are genuine (truthfully conceived) creaturely 
goods that can be realised only at the expense of the genuine goods of others [which 
is] a view [that is] hard to reconcile with any properly emancipatory ethic, since it is 
the argument… of the slave-master. The second suggests that particular developments 
might render good what once was not, that torture or racial discrimination might be 
made good by historical changes. The third suggests that there are worldly subjects 
‗predestined‘ to final and irredeemable frustration. To appeal to the notion of a viable 
balance in a community‘s life as a way of avoiding the Hobbesian consequences of 
these possible readings (the war of all against all, the inevitable non-convergence of 
creaturely good) will not really meet the case. It assumes that the reconciliation of 
partial and competing goods is itself a good to be pursued, without qualification, it 
seems. There is no argument to establish why this good should be exempt from the 
general prohibition against general goods. An absolutist assumption is being 
smuggled in under the guise of pragmatism.839 
 
Williams, furthermore, contests the idea that Augustine‘s theodicy is averse to the 
inescapability of the tragic: on the contrary, he might say that the ‗world is tragic, in the sense 
that our fallen perceptions of the world are so flawed that we are constantly, and inevitably 
(since the Fall), involved in mistaken and conflictual accounts of our true interests‘. He even 
suggests as regards ‗the Good‘ within ‗the fallen order‘, that we do need ‗a measure of 
coercion if total incoherence and fragmentation are to be avoided‘. He would not however 
deny that ‗loss is always bound up with creaturely virtue, [and] even sanctity‘. For Augustine, 
because ‗there is no coercion that can ultimately overcome the perverse will, there are 
creaturely subjects whose good is eternally frustrated, [who are] lost souls‘. These however 
are ‗contingent on a history, [and] not intrinsic to the nature of their good‘. What Augustine 
would reject is ‗a definition of tragic conflict as a necessary feature of created order‘, because 
it is precisely that which will provoke a ‗return to naked dualism‘ in which ‗there is not one 
Good‘ which we are able to progressively access. A consequence of this dualism would be 
that ‗there [could] be no convergence of goods‘, and would result in an ‗irreconcilable cosmic 
struggle, with no ontological priority accorded to either side‘.840  
In contrast to Sands, Augustine proposes something that is simultaneously more radical and 
arguably more hopeful: for him, evil ‗neither has a place in the universe, [and] neither is a 
subject competing with others‘, because ‗talking about evil is always talking about temporal 
processes‘, which can be more deeply clarified as those ‗processes we learn to identify as loss 
or corruption‘, those in which ‗we identify more clearly and truthfully…the whole 
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interlocking pattern of the world‘s activity‘. Augustine‘s reflections on time, and the self‘s 
implication in it, means that ‗talking about God is always talking about the temporal 
processes of clarification, reconciliation, self-discovery in love, the processes that lead us 
beyond rivalry and self-protection‘. For Williams (and Augustine), ‗talking about God is the 
articulation of a self-knowledge that grasps the central dependence of the self, a knowledge of 
the self as lacking and searching and, thus, as presupposing a goal of desire that exceeds any 
specific state of affairs in this material world‘.841 Once more, he suggests that Augustine‘s 
vision provides resources for engaging horrendous evils, without collapsing this recognition 
into ontological despair or indeterminacy. Returning again to the central plea posed at the 
beginning, Williams argues that Augustine‘s reflections on evil and the transcendence of the 
Good cannot be considered apart from his wider acceptance of a specifically Christian 
metaphysic: ‗If we do not share his understanding of evil as privation, [as] no-thing, [as] no-
space‘, then we should ask the question as to whether we can in ‗any way share his 
understanding of God as subsistent and overflowing fullness‘, as ‗the non-competitive other 
whose freedom makes us free?‘842 
What the above exposition has shown is that the question of evil is intrinsically related to 
one‘s vision of God. The Platonic-Augustinian assertion of evil-as-privation is based on the 
assumption of transcendent goodness, and that the world has a necessary relation to this truth. 
Evil on the other hand comes about as a result of a historical process that is contingent and 
non-necessary. This is primarily evidenced in the distortion of intelligent agencies that have a 
greater capacity for creating harm and destruction than non-mental ones (‗corruptio optimi 
pessima‘). This explains why evil, despite being ontologically privative in nature, has effects 
in the world that are not privative, and also expands why it can exhibit a horrific positivity. 
Such does not, however, necessitate metaphysical pessimism: since goodness holds a 
transcendent sway over reality, and is more ‗substantially‘ connected to its material and 
historical development,843 this militates against any created part of reality as predestined to 
disaster – in the sense of being eternally fated, without any contingent involvement.844 Such a 
theology helps to explain why we can coherently claim that materiality contributes positively 
to our knowledge of God, since creation participates in God‘s goodness as its cause. But we 
can also see why evil is explicable in this context: evil has no ‗space‘ in being, and therefore 
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is not a ‗thing‘ which ‗exists‘ in the way everything else does.845 It comes as a result of a 
process, a privation within temporal being. Sinfulness means that our knowledge of God is 
always partially distorted by finite or perverted desires, but it does not mean that no truthful 
knowledge of God is possible. Because all of creation flows from goodness, and is 
providentially-directed to its respective goods, this means that our attempts to know the truth 
of being are never completely amorphous or eternally alienated. Our reflections on the world, 
on its repleteness of beauty and form, can give us truthful access to the transcendent, to that 
ordering reality that gives shape and unity to all things.  
This background helps us as we move to the final chapter, where we place our discussion 
of tragedy within Williams‘s expansions on the self. Apart from this wider context, the 
distention and fragmentation of the soul could imply an unremitting ‗hemorrhaging‘ of the 
subject, a never-ending rupturing that destroys any coherency of self, and which glorifies pain 
and woundedness as a desirable end as such.846 But as we will see, Williams‘s reflections on 
selfhood are placed within an eschatological context that refuses pessimism, or any final 
dissolution of the subject. Instead, it is placed in a frame in which the self‘s dispossessive and 
kenotic release of old identities are not opposed to the subject‘s good. Our continual self-
transcendence and estrangement involves us in risk and difficulty for sure, but it is by-no-
means a hopeless progression. It certainly does not imply a sublime elevation of sacrificial 
abjection-without-return, or a nebulous infinite opposed to human intellection. For 
Christianity, transcendence is ‗shaped‘, primarily by the character of God, who is the 
summum bonum of all creatures, and by the crucified and risen Christ who gives meaning to 
our rhythms of surrender and reception. Such patterning implies that self-sacrifice and kenosis 
is held open to the gift of a novum, and the unending plerosis of God‘s vitality. It speaks of a 
‗tragedy‘ held within ‗grace‘, of an excess that cannot be foreclosed by reward or merit. We 
cannot predict the circumstances of every decision, nor fully predict their ultimate outcomes. 
For the Christian, this means we live without certitude, but not without trust. Such emphasis 
means that we need an ‗eschatology [that] can cope with [tragedy] without diminishing its 
seriousness‘.847 And it is these themes to which we now turn.           
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Chapter 8 
Rowan Williams II 
The Tragic within Grace, or 
On the Politics of Estrangement848 
 
Here in the final chapter, we will try to disentangle Williams‘s reflections on the tragic. The 
argument will be made that Williams reads tragedy through the heuristic of estrangement, 
specifically as this is polarized on the trope of learning, that is, on the processes in which the 
self becomes distanced from self within time. Connected to this Augustinian doctrine is 
Williams‘s affirmation that our existence as finite agents implies a fragile subjectivity that is 
always labile to the risk of tragic irreversibility. But for Williams, such loss – and especially 
tragic deprivation – does not necessitate a closure of being, as if loss could be read as a kind 
of transcendental limitation (in the manner of a Kantian a priori). This is because deprivation 
always happens within the regime of history, and in the complex systems of meaning-making 
that form a part of human culture. Such implies that we cannot preclude that our knowledge 
of loss as loss can open us to other ways of being-in-the-world, a sense of avenues closing, 
and different paths widening, while being apprised that consolatory visions do not save us 
from difficulty. We cannot know beforehand whether this or that tragedy will occasion a 
disastrous climax, or whether it will destroy any possibility of integration, or something else. 
This is our tragic uncertainty.  
But to assume that this necessitates, in every instance, an irremediable devastation is 
precisely to claim too much, because for Williams it is precisely that we know such loss, and 
are able to speak and mourn it, that allows such events to be included within sign-making, 
which is basic for our sense of ‗world‘. Furthermore, since all of this occurs within a process 
that is governed by God‘s loving care, no distention, however fragmented, can finally 
separate us from this direction. Because God is transcendent, and therefore not subjected to 
the chances of history, we can trust that there is a final order that gives unity to existence, 
without the implication of theodicy. Pertinent for Williams is the fact that language implicates 
us in a community of language-bearers: we cannot communicate without placing ourselves in 
a socio-political context. The self does not evolve in isolation, and so the reverberations of 
tragedy are felt by others, since its material consequences happen in a nexus of causation that 
includes the community within its expansion. This means that ‗the tragic‘ cannot be reduced 
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to an individualist struggle of actors who are discharged with a private fate. Because tragedies 
influence communities, this means that its occurrence cannot be removed from the context of 
political mediation, and how such changes are re-worked by the societies it affects.  
 
8.1. On Learning
849
 
 
It is clear that Rowan Williams‘s theology has had a persistent focus on the exigencies and 
disciplines of learning, on how the practices of patient observance – or attente850– can 
contribute to the moral growth of human personality.851 As a philosophical theologian he is 
concerned to account for how we, as finite beings, are educated and formed in our language-
usage,852 that is, with how we are to negotiate the claims of ‗otherness‘, and that communality 
given within the dynamics of speech. He is focused particularly here on how this process 
becomes a necessary element in our discovery and dilation of truth, since there can be no 
privatized or punctiliar ‗meaning‘ discerned by lone agents. There is no sublimely-rendered 
‗otherness‘ beyond the reaches of intelligent communication, since how could we even 
cognize ‗what-is-other‘ without the adjudications of language itself? But even more 
profoundly, and from a metaphysical vantage, this certainly cannot be the case since for 
Williams all of reality is teleologically-directed towards intellection; the world is always-
already saturated with an excess of significance853 that participates, and is consummated in, 
the Father‘s creative and loving contemplation of the world itself within the Logos and the 
Spirit.854 ‗Difference‘ and ‗difficulty‘, within this theological (and Hegelian) model, are not 
then amorphous generalities, devoid of description or human ‗recognition‘, but are precisely 
thinkable entities since they are continually discovered through the dialectic of linguistic and 
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interpersonal mediation.855 These realities are thinkable just because they can be brought into 
speech and articulated amongst fellow language-bearers. But such a process implies that 
meaning can never be an individual project undertaken, but is irreducibly relational, 
entrenched within the interactions and communication of human agents. We are always-
already placed within a context that exceeds our grasp, which implies that there can be no 
‗private‘ articulations of ‗the self‘ apart from the negotiations of language,856 and that there is 
always a larger context in which our attempts at communication are to be placed, so that the 
significance thereof continually awaits a further social and metaphysical accretion. There is a 
perennial openness towards learning, and there is always a potentially deeper perspective 
from which something can be engaged (‗Humility is endless‘ as T.S. Eliot once said857.)  
This means that the subject‘s engagement with ‗difficulty‘ should not be seen as an 
‗indulgent‘ exercise in problems for their own sake, as if ‗one‘s moral being [were] somehow 
heightened by the mere fact of having become problematic‘858 (recalling here again Cornelius 
Ernst apropos Donald MacKinnon). Rather, for Williams ‗difficulty‘ is always tied to a moral 
framework of ‗dispossession‘, which in his usage implies a refusal to halt ‗the process of 
exchange‘859 that constitutes us in our humanness. Any attempt to extricate ourselves from 
this continuing conversation would imply a mythological picture in which we could establish 
for ourselves a locus standi apart from the unfolding drama of history, claiming thereby for 
ourselves a ‗divine‘ perspective above the fray of temporal strictures.860 A conscious and 
willing avoidance of ‗difficulty‘– here repeating Cora Diamond once more – would connote a 
‗deflection‘, a refusal to accept our finite ‗bodies‘.861 It would imply a refusal to appreciate 
‗the apparent resistance by reality to one‘s ordinary modes of life, including one‘s ordinary 
modes of thinking‘, and could be read as a failure to acknowledge ‗the difficulty‘ of being 
‗shouldered out of how one thinks, or how one is supposed to think‘.862 These words by 
Diamond summarize justly Williams‘s thoughts (as they did MacKinnon‘s), showing how for 
him the acknowledgement of ‗difficulty‘ or ‗actuality‘ has a deep moral and political register 
within his thinking, and cannot be reduced to a love of the ‗problematic‘ for its own sake. 
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Instead, his concern with ‗difficulty‘ is tied to a vision of spiritual transformation that refuses 
to understand such moral growth as a reductive or privatized ‗technology‘,863  as if such 
development was exclusively about self-expression, self-management, or any kind of egoism 
for that matter. Spiritual growth cannot be a solitary accomplishment, apart from a ‗world‘ of 
interaction; and so the denial of ‗difficulty‘ and limited perception, within the sphere of 
interpersonal engagement and spirituality, can only imply a furtive ‗ideological‘ bid towards a 
conclusive power, a ‗totalized‘ knowledge that claims metaphysical comprehensiveness for 
febrile parochialisms.864 This aspect of moral expansion is essential for his understanding of 
the self, and its place within the order of the world, and requires that we tease out this theme a 
bit further, since it remains important for the discussion that is to follow.  
 
8.2. The Self in Fragments: On Tragi-Comic Augustinianism
865
  
 
Williams‘s dilations on ‗the self‘ place an emphasis on ‗the inescapable significance of time 
as a correlate of bodiliness‘, as these form ‗a return to ‗surfaces‘ or appearances‘‘. In this 
mood, we become ‗conscious of the irreducible elements of history and contingency‘ that are 
part of ‗the formation of knowledge and religious faith‘.866 Personhood cannot be prized apart 
from materiality and relational connectedness, especially as this physicality contributes to 
meaning. There is no matter without mattering, no objectivity apart from intellection: ‗the 
body is never helpfully described as an object like other material objects‘, because by ‗that 
curious material transaction called language, we continue to recognize that the oddity of this 
material reality that is my body is an oddity shared by other materially recognizable 
bodies.‘867 Williams‘s phenomenology is resourced by Merleau-Ponty and Aquinas: ‗the body 
is the soul…the body does not become intelligent, purposeful, endowed with feeling and so 
on because something is added to it. This is what the body is – a meaning portion of 
matter‘.868 The body is inseparable from physical communication; it is temporal and therefore 
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finite: ‗what we are are our limits, that we are here not there, now not then, took this decision, 
not that, to bring us here and now‘.869 Our embeddedness means that we are limited, that we 
are particular entities who are opened to ‗the being-at-hand of love‘870 – the love of other 
beings and the infinite love of the Creator. Christianity is incarnational and not dualistic 
because ‗the self God deals with is not some mysterious inner core, but my body‘, and it is 
here ‗where we learn and where we speak and share‘. He goes as far as to say that if ‗we 
cannot love our mortal vulnerability, our own frail flesh, we shall love nothing and 
nobody‘.871 This is because ‗we encounter God truly only when we accept our mortal fragility 
for what it is, do not seek to escape it, but put our trust in a God who speaks and relates to us 
through flesh‘.872 
As Christians, we should not aspire to be untrammelled from the embodied life. On the 
contrary, ‗fleshly life is not a burden to be borne, nor a prison to be escaped from, but a task 
to be perfected in grace.‘873 It is precisely within embodied life and temporal fragility where 
holiness is received and discovered, where we come to ‗the recognition of the holy within the 
contingent order‘, even though this progression is ‗always undercut by…disruptive [and] 
discontinuous elements‘, by ‗exile and alienation, loss and death.‘874 Such means that ‗to live 
in the material and temporal world is to be vulnerable to the impact of unstable 
circumstances‘. For the Christian, an existence within time‘s unfolding compass is about 
‗how we deal with those circumstances that will bring to light who and what we actually are‘. 
Nevertheless, our response to the bringing-to-light of sin and self-knowledge should not 
imply a repression or an escape from bodiliness, but a therapy of desire that includes our 
materiality: ‗what Christ delivers us from is not bodily circumstance, contingency, or 
instability…but from the habits of mind and heart that make of this environment only a 
theatre for our private obsessions to be staged and our lust for control to be exercised‘.875 
This emphasis on the rapacious drive towards mastery, or libido dominandi, transitions us 
to Williams‘s writings on Augustine. A discussion of this figure is apt since he is considered 
by some as being the foundational theorist of Western subjectivity, a proto-Cartesian thinker 
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who anticipates the self-reflexivity of modernity.876 Williams takes a serious departure from 
this perspective: in his estimate, Augustine resists the suasions to ground self-knowledge 
within the ego. He does so by placing the soul within an epektasis and ekstasis of desire, that 
is, in an active movement of the soul towards God in its continuing displacement and de-
centering. For him, the self is formed through a ‗radical incompleteness and other-
directedness‘.877 In Williams‘s reading, Augustine‘s understanding of the soul is ‗relational‘, 
being analogous to ‗the self-relatedness of the divine essence‘.878 Rather than being ‗proto-
Cartesian or proto-Kantian‘,879 Augustine aims ‗to ‗demythologise‘ the solitary ego by 
establishing the life of the mind firmly in relation to God‘, a God understood as ‗self-gift, as 
movement to otherness and distance in self-imparting love‘.880 Therefore ‗for the mind to 
acquire sapientia is for the mind to see itself sustained and embraced by this self-
communicating action of God‘.881  
For Augustine, our identity is ‗ultimately in the hand of God‘, in the divine memoria, and 
therefore not self-constituting. This differentiates Augustine from the Platonic account of 
anamnesis – or so Williams thinks – since Augustine is not talking about the soul as ‗a non-
temporal thing‘; the self is in ‗some sense made, by the infinitely painstaking attention to the 
contingent strangeness of remembered experience in conscious reference to God‘.882 The soul 
grows within time: ‗The self is…what the past is doing now, it is the process in which a 
particular set of ‗given‘ events and processes and options [crystalize] now in a new set of 
particular options, responses and determinations, providing a resource of given past-ness out 
of which the next decision and action can flow‘.883 Augustine‘s emphasis on memoria 
‗affirms that the present situation has a context; it, like the self, is part of a continuity, it is 
‗made‘ and so it is not immutable‘.884 This sense of contingency and constructedness is linked 
to the imagery of the soul as a wandering pilgrim, existing without a final home in time. Its 
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movement is continual, everlastingly drawn towards its final cause. In fact, ‗we are not able to 
know or love ourselves ‗accurately‘ unless we know and love ourselves as known and loved 
by God‘.885 However, the counterpart to this ascent is that the soul continues to be wounded 
by divinity, fragmented within its distentio, in its inability to reach an achieved unity within 
time. The Pauline concept of kenosis and its cruciform pattern requires that we leave behind 
identities which hinder us from inhabiting Christ‘s identity. Precisely because we are not God, 
and therefore limited, our personal integrity cannot be achieved apart from dispossession, an 
acknowledgement that our identity is ungraspable (cf. Phil. 2.1-11). Of course it must be 
added that the unhanding of self is always contextualized by resurrection, by the plenitude of 
the divine memoria. Augustine suggests that despite the fragmentary nature of the soul, there 
is still the hope that God ‗can make a story, a continuous reality, out of the chaos of 
unhappiness, ‗homeless‘ wandering, hurt and sin‘.886  His  account of interiority is that ‗we 
are to know and love ourselves as questing, as seeking to love with something of God‘s 
freedom (in the sense of a love not glued to any object of satisfaction)‘.887  
In an essay entitled ‗Language, Reality and Desire in Augustine‘s De Doctrina,‘ Williams 
explicates Augustine‘s distinction between frui and uti (‗enjoyment‘ and ‗use‘) as well as res 
and signum (‗thing‘ and ‗sign‘).888 For Augustine, we can approach any particular res in two 
distinct ways: either we treat it as an end in itself, or as a sign towards something else. Since 
God is supremely res – the one who forms the context in which all things are to be 
meaningfully positioned – Augustine argues that created reality should be read as signum, 
since it does not have its existence within itself. Therefore ‗no worldly res is securely settled 
as a fixed object ‗meaning‘ itself, or tied in a fixed designation‘. Such  implies that ‗no 
worldly state of affairs can be allowed to terminate human desire…all that is present to us in 
and as language is potentially signum in respect of the unrepresentable God‘.889 Hereby the 
self is moved by dilectio towards God, who as the telos of human desire is the only one who 
can be enjoyed for his own sake, as the res itself. But since this is the case, and it is only 
within God‘s life that res and signum – or essence and existence – coincide, it follows that 
created reality can only be ‗used‘ towards ‗enjoyment‘, since it is only God who exists per se. 
Such language is easily open to misinterpretation, since as post-Kantians we are suspicious of 
categorizing people as ‗means‘ rather than ‗ends‘.  
But in Williams‘s opinion, Augustine‘s language of uti avoids such a conclusion, since he 
orientates the final end towards God. Precisely because God is the end of desiring, human 
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beings should not be treated as an ‗end‘ but rather as a signum towards our ultimate source: 
‗the language of uti is designed to warn against an attitude towards any finite person or object 
that terminates their meaning in their capacity to satisfy my desire, that treats them as the end 
of desire, conceiving my meaning in terms of them and theirs in terms of me‘.890 Augustine‘s 
deployment of the uti-frui distinction does not justify an instrumentalisation of human persons 
for the sake of some transcendent goal – completion or self-satisfaction – at the expense of 
another‘s given dignity. One could actually suggest that it is precisely the opposite: it is to 
affirm that no human object can be reduced to a mere tool precisely because it remains a 
signum – an imago dei. Since desire is infinite, no worldly object can bring it to completion: 
only God can do that. Therefore, to speculatively project any person as the ‗end‘ of my desire 
would be self-denial. It would idolatrously claim that a finite entity could act as ‗God‘ for me. 
This would be the supreme instance of the libido dominandi, in which ‗the subject distorts its 
self-perception into fixity‘, into a form of ontological closure whereby selfhood is reduced to 
‗the meeting of needs in the determinate form in which they are mediated to [me] in the 
perception of the Other‘.891 If we become stuck within this restriction, according to Williams, 
then we hinder spiritual growth, thinking that our good finds completion within time.   
Augustine‘s account of desiring also is linked to his idea that the self is ‗bound up with the 
desire for the Good‘ and ‗for iustitia‘; such means that ‗the self in construction is a self whose 
good is understood in terms of a universally shareable good‘, which is ‗not known adequately 
without a grasp of the inseparability of its good from the good of all.‘ Williams even suggests 
that if ‗there is a ‗secret‘ to be uncovered by the search for self-knowledge, it is perhaps this 
unconscious involvement in desire for the common good‘, and that ‗if there is a ‗politics‘ of 
self-knowledge in Augustine, it lies in the dissolution of any fantasy that the good can be 
definitively possessed in history by any individual or any determinate group in isolation‘.892 
But this refusal implies that we accept a dispossessive negotiation, in which  
 
I must explain myself if I am to attain what I want, and as I try to bring to speech 
what is of significance to me in such a way as to make it accessible to another, I 
discover that I am far from sure what it is that I can say. I become difficult to myself, 
aware of the gap between presentation and whatever else it is that is active in 
acting.893  
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Such means that the ‗sense of the ‗hiddenness‘ of another self is something I develop in the 
ordinary difficulty of conversation and negotiation‘: ‗The proper logic of this recognition [is] 
that my self-knowledge emerges from converse and exchange‘. This ‗enjoins consistent 
scepticism about claims to have arrived at a final transparency to myself‘, and means that ‗I 
do not cease to be vulnerable to other accounts of myself, to the pressure to revise what I say 
of myself‘.894 Vulnerability is kenosis, an imitation of the infirma divinitas, of the incarnation, 
‗the weak God lying at our feet‘, that pattern of ‗Christ incarnate and crucified‘ which 
betokens an ‗emptiness of meaning and power that makes Christ supremely signum‘.895 For 
Williams, ‗The Word incarnate and crucified‘ – in a quasi-Derridean fashion896 – ‗represents 
the absence and deferral that is basic to signum as such, and represents also, crucially, the fact 
that absence and deferral are the means whereby God engages our desire so that it is freed 
from its own pull towards finishing, towards presence and possession‘.897 So rather than 
affirming a desire to control, Augustine‘s theology implies that we surrender identities which 
place the ego at its magnetic centre, and come to find our deepest interiority in the exteriority 
of kenotic self-giving.  
The topics of kenosis and dispossession lead to other influences on Williams‘s conception 
of the self, namely Hegel and Gillian Rose. Against a trend of critical scholarship, Williams 
wants to recover Hegel as a philosopher who places primacy on the activity of thinking, that 
is, how is it possible to think anything in particular. In ‗Hegel and the Gods of 
Postmodernity‘,898 he seeks to place Hegel in opposition to the postmodern emphasis on sheer 
negativity or différance in which ‗the sacred‘ is equated with ‗absence‘ and ‗rupture‘. Hegel is 
often paraded, within critical theory, as the prime example of that ‗totalizing dialectic‘ that 
reduces ‗the other‘ to ‗my other‘, that is, to ‗a resolvable, confrontable difference‘.899 
Williams however contests this reading: Hegel‘s system is ‗not a story of return to the same‘. 
In fact, his philosophy is an attempt ‗to challenge the all-sufficiency of the polarity of simple 
identity and simple difference‘. This is because what is ‗thinkable is so precisely because 
thinking is not content with the abstraction of mutual exclusiveness, but struggles to conceive 
a structured wholeness nuanced enough to contain what appeared to be contradictories‘.900 For 
Hegel, theological language is ‗bound up with the making of sense‘, with ‗the labour of 
making‘ and ‗the labour of finding‘. Such distinguishes Hegel‘s thinking from naïve 
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representationalism or any ‗voluntarist play‘.901 The kind of ‗negativity‘ here predicated does 
not emphasize the transcendent as an unspeakable rupture; rather, it requires ‗a moral and 
spiritual dispossession and recreation‘.902 The dangers of a ‗negativity‘ that favours some kind 
of ‗abstraction‘903 from ―exchange‖904 is that it leads to a ‗depoliticized – or even anti-political 
– aesthetic‘ in which ‗there is a subtle suggestion that social and linguistic order (as opposed 
to this or that particular and questionable order) is what we need to be delivered from‘.905  
In ‗Logic and Spirit in Hegel‘,906 Williams deepens his reading by saying that for him our 
attempts at thought cannot be ‗in the abstract‘ since they are always placed within the 
‗context‘ of their arrival, ‗their concrete, time-taking actuality‘.907 There is no thinking of any 
particularity without ―mediation‖, which he defines as that which is ‗realised and maintained 
by something other than itself alone‘. For Hegel, ‗no otherness is unthinkable‘, and any claim 
of ‗absolute otherness is fundamentally confused‘, since any ‗negation‘ is concerned with 
what ‗could be thought‘.908 But because this context is never circumscribable, this means that 
‗we think within…an infinite relatedness, a comprehensive intelligibility‘, which we call 
God.909 Much like Augustine, Williams‘s Hegel understands that there is no ‗timeless 
subjectivity‘. Consciousness, since it is mediated, is tied to ‗the recognition of the self in the 
other‘, in what is different to the ego.910 ‗Concrete freedom is the development of selfhood in 
the otherness of what is given‘,911 which again implies a Christological pattern of 
‗dispossession‘. Here, we ‗lose the pretensions of the individual consciousness, the mind at 
home in and with itself over [against] a passive externality‘.912  Hegel‘s account of the 
development of ‗Spirit‘ is thus ―ecstatic‖ and ―kenotic‖, a discovery of ‗the self‘s being-in-
the-other‘, which is a contemporisation of the Christian ‗form of love‘.913  
The explicit influence of Gillian Rose is present in two texts. In the former, Williams 
attempts to outline a metaphysical register that  takes ‗history‘ seriously, that is, one that does 
not halt that ‗process of exchange‘ as this discloses ―reality‘ or ‗actuality‘ as difficult‘ for 
us.914 Our speech takes place within a continuum, a sense of having recognized that collective 
meaning is not limited to my own selfhood. Since we are sign-making creatures, we are 
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concerned with that which ‗sustains intelligibility in the exchanges and negotiations that 
constitute our actuality‘, and not therefore with inexplicable and rhapsodic articulations of the 
ego. I can only work and communicate what I want to say within ‗a distinct accumulation of 
past negotiation‘ in which all ‗perspectives‘ are made ‗accessible‘,915 that is, in a meaningful 
‗action‘ that can be ‗followed‘ by others.916 Without this, we would not be able to chart ‗how 
error arises‘,917 or where we have failed in our bids for truth, since without an intelligible 
basis for political arguments, we cannot recognize our mistakes. Rose suggests that every 
claim for meaning is socially implicated, and is not created by me alone: ‗the taking of a 
position‘ is something distinct, and yet such positioning cannot be abstracted from ‗the 
entirety of the path‘ which is yet to be undertaken, and therefore should not be foreclosed.918 
This emphasis on staking a position does not imply a hopelessly antagonistic model, 
because it is through our discovery of the-self-in-the-other – albeit within ‗scarcity‘ – that we 
come to an awareness of shareable goods, an environment of ‗potential abundance‘,919 ‗a 
common life‘ that exceeds exclusionary competition.920 On the speculative level, the wager on 
the shareability of goods – that my goods are bound up with yours, that our interests are 
connected – suggests a metaphysical or ‗intelligible structure‘ that is not the product of 
‗arbitrary willed options‘.921 For Williams, metaphysics is primarily about the deepening of 
intellection, and not the imposition of will.922 Here we encounter previous themes touched on: 
to speak of ‗the good‘ requires that we think beyond a merely localized ‗good‘, a ‗good‘ that 
is not simply the product of contingency. To achieve understanding, one moves from specific 
instances of goodness towards what is the Good-in-itself, since if there was no transcendent 
Good, then we would be stuck in a conflictive arrangement in which rival ‗goods‘ would 
always be attempting to outbid each other without rapprochement.  
From a metaphysical perspective, the discovery of a non-conflictive account of the good 
implies a universalizing abstraction from the particular, whose ethical correlate is a 
‗dispossession‘ and ‗collaboration‘, the awareness that my good exceeds ‗any individual 
decision or project‘.923 Our intellection of the good is achieved in an engagement with 
particular standpoints as they continue to unfold within time, but this does not mean that the 
Good-as-such is produced through these contingencies. The Good can be represented in 
negotiation, but cannot be reduced to any individual attempt of representation. On this 
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reading, Hegel should be distinguished from ‗the pathos of perpetual negation‘924 exemplified 
in anti-representational sublimities, since there is no preemption or speculative closure of 
thought‘s horizons. Of course, there is a surplus or even ‗loss‘ in the cultural bids for meaning 
– since reconciliation does not dissolve otherness – but this does imply that no ‗labour of 
analogy‘ between differing ‗processes of production‘ is possible.925 Conflicting paradigms 
may be agonistic, and yet there is a hope that through a commitment to negotiation, we can 
charter avenues of commonality.  
Williams‘s more recent essay on Rose attempts to provide a balance to the austere vision 
given in his previous readings. In this text, he emphasizes that Hegel‘s dialectic can be 
described in comedic rather than ‗tragic‘ terms.926 In his definition, ‗Comedy arises from the 
gap between what we think we are and what in fact we are‘, in which ‗the more developed the 
apparent mastery of the environment by the subject, the more developed are the comic 
possibilities‘. More expansively, he says that ‗to be sure of myself as always mistaking, 
always misrecognizing‘ opens us to the possibility of a ‗comic resolution‘, one that ‗allows 
me to move decisively away from fear and bewilderment in the face of the other‘. It is ‗only 
recognition that liberates us, the recognition of the other as, like me, engaged, whether 
knowingly or not, in ―comic‖ self-discovery‘.927 Such a recognition of ‗the gap between what 
we hope for and what we achieve‘ is the basis for a laughter that is ‗holy‘, and not cynical or 
despairing.928 The ‗recognition‘ of myself within the other is, furthermore, intrinsically 
connected to the discovery of reason, a sense of coherency, within ‗the risky activity of 
assuming recognizability‘.929  
This means that ‗reason‘, according to Rose, ‗has to act with a confidence not in its final 
justification but in the possibility of truthfulness‘, hence its riskiness.930 Without this 
assumption, so Williams argues, we are back to the violence of exclusionary confrontation. 
Of course, a complete avoidance of ‗violence‘ is not possible, since engagement occasionally 
requires coercion in order to move forward. But it is also critical to emphasize that such 
‗violence‘ should not be equated with evil, or assumed to be always necessary.931 It is rather a 
sign of the tragic limitation that characterizes created finitude. The important distinction to be 
made here is that even though conflict may be unavoidable in some contexts, this does not  
mean it always has to be like this. If conflict arises, then ‗reason‘ unpacks how this conflict 
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has arisen here, at this specific juncture. In Williams‘s words, ‗Reason serves by exposing 
contradiction, showing the incomplete nature of this inhabiting and declaring that this need 
not be‘.932 It is about thinking why certain errors – or even atrocities have come about – rather 
than declaring that they have developed from some necessary logic.933 We have to be wary of 
any position that underwrites prophecies of ‗foredoomed failure‘ that assert ‗the impossibility 
of public virtue‘.934 Both of these are fatal for a truly transformative politics. To avoid this 
gloomy picture, we need to re-think political progress not in ‗tragic‘ terms – that is, in terms 
of inevitable defeat (here adopting Rose‘s lexicon), but rather as a ‗comedy‘ in which the self 
is able to recognize its mistakes, without self-laceration or ‗aberrated‘ mourning.935 Our 
diagnosis of error involves us in thinking more comprehensively about how structures have 
contributed to disorder, and also invites us ‗To know and think the complicity in and by 
which my agency is formed‘.936  
The picture of the self that has emerged in this section is one that is time-bound and 
relational, one formed through interpersonal and historical development. For Williams, the 
self emerges through temporal growth, as it is pulled, knowingly or unknowingly, by its 
desire for the Good – that is, God. On this model, because it is de-centered, the constitution of 
the self is kenotic, in the sense of having an identity that is primordially given, and therefore 
not to be grasped. The temporal aspect of the self‘s development is bound up with potential 
loss, and therefore has a certain tragic quality about it. However, this must be placed 
alongside Williams‘s assertion that Augustine‘s metaphysics of the self implies a being-ness 
discovered as gift, and therefore received in gratitude. Against some readings of Augustine, 
the self is not a proto-Cartesian cogito, but is discovered in movements and displacements of 
desire, in the unhanding of carapaced identities that restrict the agency of Christ in our lives. 
But while kenosis is an essential part of our moral growth, it is balanced by the continuing 
advent of desire and the plerosis of our participation in the triune life of God. This means that 
a surrendering of the ego does not necessitate a wounding without relief or healing; on the 
contrary, it predicates a trust that self-forgetfulness does not betoken complete loss; it works 
within a hope of plenitude beyond scarcity. Additionally important to note is that since the 
self is both social and ek-static, this implies a certain political vision as well. Following 
Augustine, Hegel and Rose, Williams argues that there is no concept of the self and one‘s 
private goods that can be thought apart from the discovery of shareable goods. The 
speculative counterpart to this is an account of transcendence and universal goodness that is 
non-reducible to the local. If such were the case, then there could be no rational mediation of 
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differing accounts of goodness; instead, we would have a Hobbesian picture of scrambling 
individuals within zero-sum conflicts. It is Williams‘s position that such a conclusion implies 
a denial of a common good, and the baptism of a metaphysical and cultural pessimism. We 
can say in summary then that Williams‘s Hegelian Augustinianism aims to balance the 
kenotic and ‗tragic‘ aspects of temporal distentio (after Donald MacKinnon) with a ‗comic‘ 
reading of self-discovery (after Gillian Rose). These clarifications will assist as we move 
forward in this chapter.  
 
8.3. Tragedy and Estrangement 
 
The above summaries regarding language, the self and the pedagogics of time might seem to 
be an overly-laborious and oblique introduction to our current preoccupation. But it is the 
contention of this chapter that Williams‘s recent monograph on the tragic genre should be 
engaged from this perspective, as we will see shortly. The Tragic Imagination937 constitutes 
Williams‘s most significant contribution to date on the question of ‗the tragic‘, and therefore 
deserves engagement, since it also forms one of the most subtle and tightly-argued attempts to 
bring Christian theology into dialogue with the heritage of tragic drama. However, it has to be 
mentioned that its appearance brings to fruition an almost career-long interest with ideas 
related to this topic, and so it is worth tracing genealogically its working within his thinking 
up to the present time. There are relatively few extensive engagements with Williams on this 
theme, especially before this book was published,938 and so this essay aims at once show its 
history within his thinking, as well as expositing its most full-bodied treatment.  
The tragic imagination, particularly King Lear, had already grasped Williams from a young 
age and so antedates his tertiary studies.939 But it is widely perceived, and admitted by 
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Williams himself,940 that Donald MacKinnon‘s influence on him was decisive in this regard. 
What is important to note again is that MacKinnon‘s attention regarding the tragic occurred 
within an over-arching moral awareness that resisted, through a contemplation of its 
refractory qualities, any attempt to claim a finalized human authorship for the world we 
inhabit. As we have seen in earlier chapters, MacKinnon‘s precise targets here were idealistic 
philosophies941 and Benthamite versions of ‗naturalism‘.942 But more generally-speaking, 
these criticisms would apply to any egoistic project that adhered to the fantasy that we can 
circumscribe our reality, bringing it thereby under our teleological mastery. Reality does not 
strictly adhere to how we conceptualize it, and any claim we could fully grasp it is an exercise 
in tragic hubris. For MacKinnon, our perception of truth is something that continues to 
unfold: there is an unflinching and recalcitrant ‗objectivity‘ within our correspondence to 
reality. And yet, such ‗objectivity‘ is not immediately graspable: much like an artistic craft – 
here remembering MacKinnon‘s reference to Cézanne – it takes time for the realia to disclose 
themselves.943 These tendencies, as we will see, are present within Williams‘s own work, but 
it will take several decades until they reach mature amplification in The Tragic Imagination.  
What is particularly noticeable in the early work of Williams is a tragically-imbued sense 
of historicity. Much like MacKinnon, Williams‘s sensitivity towards ‗the complex discipline 
of temporality‘944 was distinctly present even in his more youthful forays. In one of his first 
essays published, entitled ‗The Spirit of the Age to Come‘ (1974),945 he speaks of ‗an 
awareness of present reality as divided, fragmented, liable to internal struggle and frustration, 
an awareness, in fact of the tragic‘.946 It is within this context that the Spirit works to cultivate 
practices of hope and redemptive longing that are precisely not extractions from lived history, 
that is, they are not a ‗negation or abolition of what has gone before‘.947 If they were 
abstractions, they would imply a denial of the goodness of creation, and also it would reduce 
the Spirit‘s futurity as working on the same plane as other historical events.948 But even more 
strikingly, these contentions are grounded Christologically, in a Johannine and quasi-Lutheran 
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fashion, through his ontological identification of the crucified and risen Christ.949 Within this 
model, the church itself can be strikingly read as ‗a communion in horror and in glory‘. This 
is because we are still ‗in history, that history where tragedy occurs‘, in which ‗the gift of the 
Spirit is a gift that increases our vulnerability to a terrifying degree‘, and ‗are left exposed and 
humanly defenseless before the universal weight of tragedy‘, since the Spirit into which we 
are incorporated is a ‗Spirit of kenosis‘ that translates, into our varying contexts, the 
experience of the cross and resurrection.950 These revelations betray a starkness of vision from 
early on that is simultaneously realist and non-pessimistic in character, a kind of traversal of 
the optimism-pessimism binary altogether. This opinion is further weighted upon the 
consideration that, for Williams, classical tragedy already understood itself as a literary-
dramatic mode of protest, which in in its aesthetic constitution denied passivity and silence.951 
But it is also substantiated by the Christian belief that the presence of the Spirit in the here-
and-now constitutes an anticipation of a future hidden within the present. This 
contemporaneity of the Spirit gives believers the ‗power and confidence to act‘ because of the 
expectancy put before them.952 Many of these thoughts remain with Williams up to the 
present, but it is worth mentioning one area where there is a marked difference, namely, his 
reading of Hegel. In this early text, Williams still read Hegel as putting forward the notion 
that tragedy was about a conflict between rival goods – as in Sophocles‘s Antigone – 
provoking situations where ‗the good is divided against itself‘.953 Such a reading is hardly 
reconcilable with his later view that conflicting goods should not be seen as absolute. Instead, 
the agon of ethical difference should be submitted to a dispossessive negotiation, with the aim 
of discovering where the node of conflict truly lies. As regards ‗tragedy‘, Williams would 
come to see Hegel‘s reading of Antigone as focused less on the question of mutually exclusive 
goods, and rather on the problem of one-sidedness (Einseitigkeit) in our understanding of the 
good. But since this problematic will be discussed in more detail below, we will hold off 
further discussion until then.   
Returning to the genealogy, we should emphasize again that this vision of a redemption not 
bypassing ‗the historical‘ remains an assumption throughout Williams‘s theology up until the 
present day, as we will see. It is particularly apparent in his (as yet) unpublished lectures on 
Eliot‘s Four Quartets (delivered twice during 1974-1975),954 which could be read (if one 
could summarize them) as an expanded commentary on Eliot‘s line in Burnt Norton that 
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‗Only through time time is conquered‘.955 This central motif of Eliot‘s was, for Williams, 
simply an outworking of the poet‘s adherence to the ‗gospel‘ as a form of ‗incarnational 
religion‘.956 He argued that Eliot‘s own poetic practice of writing displayed a process of 
learning in which, through the labour of composition, he discovered that the original 
conclusions of Burnt Norton could not be the final word on the matter. This insight explains 
the oppositional voices displayed in the remaining poems which often place a question mark 
next to Eliot‘s initial statements regarding ‗the immutable present‘.957 In Williams‘s 
estimation, this vision failed to account for the diachronic, and reduced the present into a 
‗timeless‘ abstraction.958 This shows that Williams already at this point had a deep sense of 
the pedagogics of time and irony, of how our temporal endurance implies a continuing 
movement of moral education that can only be avoided through a collapse into the fantasies of 
the ego, or what Eliot calls ‗a world of speculation‘.959 This history to which we are subjected, 
to be sure, is a history of wreckage and disaster, one that could even be read as ‗Godless‘ – as 
is made clear in Eliot‘s The Dry Salvages960.  
The Christian faith, Williams stresses, cannot be an attempt to mitigate these refractory 
aspects of the world; on the contrary, he says that the ‗incarnation‘ both ‗validates‘ and 
‗condemns‘ us to the ‗unresolved tensions‘ of history.961However, we should not read this 
insight as implying an unreconstructed pessimism, since particularities are still able to 
formulate themselves into ‗a pattern of unified beauty‘.962 The vision of Little Gidding‘s 
fulgurating and pentecostal dynamism shows, on the one hand, that our moments are able to 
be redeemed in the ‗crowned knot of fire‘,963 without, on the other, ceding their concrete 
individuality. Already apparent here, in these early lectures, is a deep sense of how for us ‗the 
complex discipline of temporality‘ is an unavoidable element for human growth. Our 
redemption cannot be understood as an ‗escape‘ from the strictures of time and embodiedness 
without resulting in a denial of our humanity and, for Christians, the truths of incarnation. For 
Williams, as for the church fathers, the unassumed is the unhealed.964 But the stringent 
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application of this antique dogma needs to hold even for those most difficult, tragic aspects of 
reality that refuse easy consolation, even those experiences, as Williams readily admits, which 
invite conclusions of historical ‗godlessness‘.  
Such hyperbolic and vertiginous language re-appears in several texts written shortly after 
he delivered his lectures on the Four Quartets, as for instance where he starkly admonishes 
believers of the fact that God will not wipe the tears away from our eyes until ‗we have 
learned to weep‘.965 There are also comments (found in a review essay) that reiterate the 
vision exposited in his lectures on The Dry Salvages: ‗God is revealed in the death of Jesus, 
revealed in his cry of dereliction, revealed in Gethsemane [and] all this is straining language 
to the breaking point‘, that is, ‗because what we are affirming is that God is revealed by his 
absence, revealed in the condition of ‗Godlessness‘…a world of chaos, anguish and 
senselessness‘.966 Similar motifs of extremity are noticeable in a sermon on T.S. Eliot (given 
in 1984, but published in 1995) that shows the longevity of this vision within his thinking.967   
But cognate disclosures can also be discovered in a longer essay, penned within the same 
general period, called ‗Poetic and Religious Imagination (1977)‘.968 He spoke there of finding 
‗a place‘ within ‗the disordered flux‘ – which is a good definition of ‗personal maturity‘, he 
adds. It is about finding a ‗position‘, a ‗direction‘ that orientates us amongst the world‘s 
seemingly disparate constituency. In language that anticipates Gillian Rose‘s work, he speaks 
of making and taking forward ‗an option about reality‘,969 one that forms an aesthetic protest 
against meaninglessness, and opposes political postures that seek to close-down the range of 
human language. This curtailing of creative reference can only imply a foreclosure of the 
claims of history and its continued opening up of human conversation and meaning. 
‗Significance is a function of communication‘, which means that establishing meaning cannot 
be reduced to ‗an individual matter‘, because the artist does not offer us a moment of self-
expression, but rather an ‗incomplete‘ picture of his or her ‗world‘ which is then offered to us 
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as something ‗not yet fully realized or grasped‘, and to which we are invited to respond.970 
This struggle with incompleteness, the experience of ‗irony‘, the sense that every attempt at 
creative re-description is a falling short of the whole picture, is an intrinsic part of the poet‘s 
growth in maturity.971 At this point, we are beginning to see an argument that anticipates the 
emphasis on tragic irony and one-sidedness to be found in his later work.    
In his contribution to Donald MacKinnon‘s Festschrift (delivered in 1986 and published in 
1989), he adumbrates many of the themes which will recur in his most recent volume on this 
topic.972 There he said that if ‗the world is our creation, or even if the world is masterable as a 
system of necessities, the idea of irreparable and uncontrollable loss ceases to make sense: 
there are no tragedies‘.973 A further expansion reads thus:  
 
All explanation of suffering is an attempt to forget it as suffering, and so a quest for 
untruthfulness…The resolution of the sheer resistant particularity of suffering, past 
and present, into comfortable teleological patterns is bound to blunt the edge of 
particularity, and so to lie; and this lying resolution contains that kind of failure in 
attention that is itself a moral deficiency, a fearful self-protection. It is just this that 
fuels the fantasy that we can choose how the world and myself shall be.974  
 
The moral register that we have mentioned previously reoccurs here: the invocation of an 
irrepressible tragic element within the human and natural world serves to highlight our 
contingent location and boundaries, with the purpose of showing how such an awareness of 
human limitation can provide imaginative resources for ‗transformative action‘.975 This is 
because ‗the tragic by definition deals with human limit‘, with ‗what is not to be changed, 
with a pain that is ‗non-negotiable‘.976 In itself, this might suggest a model of ‗acceptance‘ 
that is ‗ideological‘ in its conceits.977 However, Williams suggests on the contrary that ‗it is 
one‘s own appropriation of the limits of possibility‘ that serves as a ‗protest against a polity 
and culture that lure us to sink our truthful perceptions‘ into ‗a collective, mythologized 
identity that can shut its eyes to limits‘.978 But ‗the possible world of truthful perception‘ does 
not fall to us from the sky but is ‗made possible, however precariously and impermanently, 
for actual persons in communication with each other‘. In a sentence that summarizes a 
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position he will expand on later, he writes that ‗Tragedy is capable of being lived with and 
articulated because…of the particular, the narratively specific, out of which certain kinds of 
new language grow‘.979 What is apparent again here is how an awareness of the temporal 
limits of human action can serve as a truly creative source for human transformation. This is 
not to imply that suffering as such is invested with a transcendent significance, because this 
would imply again an attempt to access a locus standi apart from the fray of contingency,980 a 
supra-temporal position from which such deprivation could be aesthetically plotted.981 It 
would be a denial of that truth to which tragedy is an exemplary disclosure. This emphasis on 
the ‗always-already‘, non-extricable aspect of our involvement in history (and its often-tragic 
implications) is often reiterated in his friendly, but critical, engagements with John Milbank 
on the question of tragedy982, and is also apparent in his writings on Gillian Rose.983  
Responding to a rather critical review of The Tragic Imagination (written by the classicist 
Edith Hall), Williams encapsulated his monograph on tragedy within this problematic: rather 
than ‗attempting to force Greek tragedy into a Christian mould‘, Williams said that he wanted 
‗to grant the full weight of its negativity‘ and probe further as to whether ‗Christian discourse‘ 
would be able to ‗sustain‘ such ‗negativity‘.984 Williams does not expand here upon his sense 
of ‗negativity‘, but what we have read up to this point provides some indication: it is a short-
hand for ‗what is utterly unresolved in the human experience‘ (1).985 For Williams, tragedy is 
concerned with how ‗language‘ is able to accommodate ‗unwelcome truth‘ and its ‗own 
failure to master extreme experience‘ (1). But such accommodation is entwined with the 
production of ‗new knowledge‘, since ‗we are not simply passive in the face of terror and 
suffering, because we can imagine it, narrate it, make pictures of it that make it an agenda for 
others and for ourselves‘ (1-2). When ‗ordered community‘ is ‗shaken‘ we look for words 
even in ‗extremity‘ to make sense of the ‗challenge‘ or ‗pressure‘ before us (2). So rather than 
indicating a sense of inescapable doom, one could argue that tragic drama simply ‗assumes 
that practically unspeakable things happen‘ and that our various ‗concordats with reality are 
as fragile as could be‘ (2). But this is not the same as sheer passivity, since ‗language‘ which 
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takes tragedy seriously sits uncomfortably with certain visions of the world (‗an 
instrumentalizing and managerial spirit, an anxious shrinking of language into cliché and 
formula, a nervousness around emotional risk and exposure‘, etc.). It is not supinely laissez-
faire in posture, or reducible to a Nietzschean amor fati. We could rather say that it is 
concerned with how we ‗speak without false consolation in a world like this‘, hopeful of the 
fact that language (and ‗religious language‘ in particular) is able to account for the reality of 
‗non-resolution‘ within our experience; not out of a sense of ‗pessimism‘, but in a rather ‗odd 
confidence‘ that our language is ‗not so easily exhausted or defeated‘ by these realities (3).  
By way of clarifying our treatment, one could summarize Williams‘s harmonization of 
Christianity and the tragic in the following way. The first thing to say is that tragedy avoids 
pessimism by showing that ‗suffering can be narrated‘ and therefore ‗communicatively or 
imaginatively shared‘, becoming thereby ‗a cultural fact‘. Reading tragedy in this way means 
that ‗existential guilt‘, or understanding ‗identity as burden and trap, would have to be 
modified as soon as this becomes a matter of language and representation‘, because as he 
states, ‗identity is reconfigured in exchange and recognition‘. As a result of this, we become 
strange to ourselves. The adoption of such a posture would instigate, as a consequence, both 
‗a critique of fatalism‘ and ‗an affirmation of value‘, a refusal of any proposal that we are 
damned to meaninglessness.  
The second point to mention is the centrality of ‗irony‘ for tragedy, which in its own way 
stifles the totalization of pessimism. For him, ‗if tragedy is the sheer burden of existence, that 
would leave us with another non-ironic model‘. Tragic drama specifically – and implicitly, 
‗the tragic‘ as such – is concerned with ‗the unbearable nature of finitude‘. Such is reflected 
within the performativity of tragic drama itself since ‗There is no generative gap between 
what the dramatic agent knows and what we know‘, because there is a shared ‗awareness of 
ignorance in both the dramatic characters and the observing audience‘. The reason why this 
resists metaphysical pessimism is because irony shows that since we do not know the 
outcome, we cannot know how ‗the mere fact of narration, the following on from the record 
of horror and failure‘ will change the meaning of the unfolding circumstance (132). Things 
could get worse, even when we think they cannot sink any lower. The bottom could fall even 
more, revealing new tonalities of horror (e.g. Agamemnon, Choephori, Antigone, The Women 
of Trachis, Oedipus the King, Medea, The Bacchae). But the opposite could be true as well: 
circumstances can take a surprising turn towards happier outcomes (e.g. The Eumenides, 
Oedipus at Colonnus, Alcestis). And it should be stressed again: even if things get worse, the 
very fact that they are able to be communicated shows that meaningful engagement with 
suffering is not finally excluded. These two points regarding ‗narration‘ and ‗irony‘ give us 
orientation for what is to follow.  
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In a remarkably distilled treatment of ‗the political roots of tragedy‘, Williams speaks of 
the origins of Attic tragedy within the staging of the City Dionysia of Athens,986 in which the 
citizens are invited ‗to contemplate disaster and suffering, chains of events unleashed by rash 
action…engulfing guilty and innocent alike‘. This occurs within ‗the context of a celebration 
both of the city‘s solid identity and the god associated with the dangerous realm of excess‘, 
namely Dionysos. It is this theme of danger that becomes prevalent within Greek drama (5), 
the sense that reality is unstable and requires some kind of containment. But in order for these 
narratives to be brought home, such a presentation of danger requires familiarity (6), which is 
why tragedies draw upon the stock of common fable and legend. And yet, the risk is that a 
mere repetition of ancient and familiar tales might not appear to give a sense of ‗continuing 
threat or risk‘.  
But as Williams insightfully suggests, ‗the fact of repetition itself declares that we have not 
yet–never yet–grasped the nature of the danger being represented. We tell the familiar story 
because we know that we do not yet know it‘, because ‗we don‘t know yet what the scale of 
the danger is‘ (7). Stories, as they are re-told, become ―readable‖ in more than one way, and 
as ‗the dramatic complexity increases, so does the danger experienced by the audience, 
despite the familiarity of the story being represented‘ (7). They teach us that ‗we cannot be 
certain of what is past‘ (9). This tendency of increasing danger, this intensification of ‗risk‘, 
seems to be further nuanced and increased, not only in the transition from story to dramatic 
re-telling, but even within the development of the tragic genre from Aeschylus to Euripides 
(8). But Williams also wants to stress that since tragedy occurred within the context of ‗ritual‘ 
and ‗liturgy‘, this assumes that, to a certain extent, ‗it can in some degree manage, if not 
control the Dionysian‘, but only if it is willing ‗to be rediscovered again and again by posing 
new challenges to it, testing it to destruction‘ (9). To quote further 
 
the tragic‘ is originally a function of how a verbal and visual representation works in 
the mind of a community gathered to celebrate or affirm its resilience and legitimacy 
in full awareness of the fragility that always pervades its life. It exists in the 
disturbing gap between that affirmation and a complementary recognition: the 
acknowledgement that we do not have a final point of view about the crises or 
catastrophes which both haunt and justify the existence of the political order (10).  
 
One of the precipitous occupations of tragedy is its portrayal of ‗the different pressures and 
impulses that are at work on actual agents in the world‘. Tragedy ‗obliges us to pay attention 
to sheer circumstance‘, to the fact that we live in a world in which ‗the fantasy of a virtue that 
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has no cost‘ is constantly being undermined (11). The city‘s self-description, as found within 
Greek drama, is concerned to show ‗a divinely ordered balance of different obligations 
running in different directions‘ that requires ‗law as the institutionalized means of recognizing 
these multiple interdependencies‘. It is within this context that ‗the individual agent‘ is 
presented as ‗always implicated‘, as ‗always defined by unchosen connections and the 
obligations that come with them‘. This is because ‗Human action is not a simple assertion of 
the individual will but a thinking-through of the diverse sorts of connection that we inhabit‘, 
with the purpose of discerning ‗courses of action that are as truthful as possible and as little 
harmful as possible‘ (13).  
Williams, here drawing on the work of Martha Nussbaum, argues that tragedy aims to 
‗handle danger by challenging the idea that obligations can be so ordered that we will never 
collide‘ (15). There is no social space in which we are completely safe, in which our actions 
are immune to asseverations of conflict and loss. But it is precisely through narration that 
tragic drama acts as ‗a vehicle for managing loss‘. As long as these events ‗can be spoken of‘, 
we are not ‗reduced to absolute silence or paralysis‘ (15-16). Adopting the language of 
Nussbaum again,987 Williams says tragedy is a mode of representation that provides healing 
without giving a ‗cure‘ for what ails us (16). Tragedies do not necessarily give us a ‗happy 
ending‘ in which all deprivations have been resolved, but rather provoke us to an ‗urgency‘ 
regarding the containment of such repercussions, without ‗softening the atrocity or making 
more bearable what should be terrible to us‘ (17). An avoidance of seeing or speaking about 
such things would imply that ‗the self and the city‘ would become ‗less secure‘, since the 
refusal to know leaves intact ‗the very mechanisms from which the drama is supposed to 
deliver us‘ (17).  
Williams is also concerned to distinguish his account from some pervasive understandings 
of tragedy which reduce the question of ‗conflict‘ to one of ‗duties‘, since this seems to stem 
from a rather ‗modern argument‘ that ‗demands a central figure who is distinguished by 
‗nobility‘ of spirit, a figure who is morally sophisticated enough to grasp the seriousness of 
rival imperatives‘ – as seen in post-Kantian accounts of the tragic. On the contrary, as should 
be clear from tragic drama and our experiences, ‗tragedy does not affect only the morally 
sophisticated‘ (25). Rather its more basic impulse lies in the fact that our social relations are 
‗breakable‘ (25), and that we are herein confronted with ‗the utterly unpredictable 
dissolutions of human solidarity and humanist stability‘, in which we become aware of ‗the 
fact of our not-knowing‘, the fact that we might have ‗never really known‘, where the danger 
truly resides (27). Here echoing Gillian Rose, Williams provides us with a call to recognize 
our precarity, to acknowledge our complicity within these dynamics, and therefore to convert 
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from habits that continue to entrench such structures. This should not take the form of self-
laceration or self-edification, but rather should focus on the question of ‗law‘: how is it that 
certain institutions continue to reinforce or allow the existence of historical tragedy or 
‗atrocity‘? It is an invitation to think about why these realities continue to exist (26-27). 
This problem of knowledge is deepened in Williams‘s appropriation of Cavellian ideas 
regarding skepticism and Shakespearean drama.988 For Cavell, tragedy is about ‗what we 
know and do not acknowledge‘; or more specifically, it concerns ‗the failure to acknowledge 
what we know‘. In this universe, we ‗seek a complete and unmediated transparency and fail to 
tolerate the ordinary uncertainty that attends the ordinary certainties we know‘ (31). It is what 
happens when ‗the human is denied‘, in the sense of being ‗engaged, invested, a participant in 
language and so in interdependence‘ (32). It involves ‗refusing to be conscious of its own 
urge to resolve tension in favour of a fantasized freedom‘ (34). For Williams, and Cavell, our 
attendance to tragic drama provokes a sense that time is needed for the drama to unfold, that 
our learning is temporally bound to the mediation of plot and development. This is exposed 
when reflecting on the physicality of such attendance: Williams says that if ‗we watch a tragic 
drama, we are deliberately immobilized; we cannot respond as we should do to human 
suffering in other circumstances‘. This experience ‗reinforces the recognition of 
separateness‘, that we have ‗to allow to happen what the tragic agents on stage are 
struggling not to allow‘ (35). Here Williams is underscoring the contemplative dimension of 
tragedy, which involves our attention to the ‗inexhaustible dense ‗solidity‘ of the other‘ (36). 
It allows ‗difference‘ to unfold, to not promote a premature closure of the narrative. As he 
says in his commentary on King Lear (referencing the statement in Act IV.1 that ‗The worst is 
not/ So long as we can say ―This is the worst‖‘):  
 
No reconciliation on this personal scale will be adequate to the unreconciled reality 
that prevails all around and that may once again intrude into the lives of the 
reconciled. ‗This is the worst‘ is a statement that seeks to close down the history of 
suffering; now we know how bad it can be. But the drama declares that we do not 
know how bad it can be, and that this is one of those things we must know that we 
don‘t know (41).  
 
And yet, this ‗it-could-be-worse‘ attitude does not necessitate pessimism: ‗The business of 
tragedy is neither to tell us that the world is more bearable that it is nor to insist that it is 
‗absolutely‘ unbearable‘. On the contrary, tragedy transcends such binaries by showing ‗how 
some pain can be spoken of and understood, ‗humanized‘, and some cannot, because the 
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words are not yet there‘ (41). It does not exclude the various agencies of suffering subjects 
who are able to grasp suffering precisely as human suffering, that is, a pain that can be 
thought and shared beyond sheer passivity (42-45).  But even at this level of sharing and 
communication (here drawing upon the figure of Iago from Shakespeare‘s Othello), Williams 
says that there are potential ironies and ambiguities, since the possibility remains that the 
suffering of others can be co-opted in a narrative which serves our own ideological interests, 
rather than giving space to their unique deprivations (45-51). Our re-telling and exaptation of 
‗the pain of others‘ (Sontag) might be liable to miss the particular contours of such stories, 
and constitutes a moral failure since it implies, once again, a return to a form of narration that 
colonizes these extremities for our own purposes. It implies, at the level of practice, a denial 
of difference.  
This concern with difference, as has been hinted at earlier, is central to Williams‘s reading 
of Hegel. And since Hegel has proved, like Aristotle, to be a central figure within the 
philosophical reception of tragedy, Williams devotes an entire chapter to Hegel (one that 
draws on the work of Gillian Rose989 and Stephen Houlgate990). As Houlgate argues, for 
Hegel ‗The problem in Greek tragic drama is that each individual is so absorbed by [their 
own] governing ―pathos‖‘, and that they fail ‗to respect (or even recognize) the justified 
pathos that moves another individual‘.991 Tragedy is produced through an adherence to one‘s 
pathos in a ‗one-sided way‘992, in a fashion that is ‗unyielding‘993 in the face of the claims of 
other agents. For this reason, it is tragic and self-destructive since it fails to internalize the 
truth within opposing perspectives. However, Hegel‘s argument should not be misunderstood 
(as it often is): such ethical contradiction is not an unavoidable metaphysical datum, but is 
rather the consequence of intransigent human actors who fail to acknowledge a judicious 
balance of concerns.994 Tragic conflict is aimed then at ‗reconciliation‘ and harmonization, 
since it desires to produce in the audience a sense of ‗justice‘ by displaying the catastrophic 
outcome for agents who are one-sidedly and individualistically committed to their own stake 
on things.995 In Williams‘s own words, tragedy for Hegel is about a misrecognition in which 
the subject understands themselves as ‗already unified‘, fully identified with ‗an embodied 
ethical value‘ and a ‗particular imperative‘ that denies ‗another subject‘s equally 
misrecognized self-identification‘ (57). It implies a failure to learn, to see the other has 
having a claim that deserves attention and respectful engagement. And it is this, rather than 
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‗fate‘, that explains the disaster of the dramatis personae, as exemplified in Sophocles‘s 
Antigone (58-66).  
In this drama, both Creon and Antigone articulate truths that are good in themselves: as 
regards Creon, ‗we owe respect and the ritual acknowledgement of dignity to those who have 
not broken the basic contract of human community‘, and for Antigone it is the case that ‗we 
owe respect to any and all, because nothing is more universal than the death we all confront‘ 
(61). The problem of Creon and Antigone is that they have ‗made themselves fixed objects of 
self-contemplation. Their identities and value are as solid and externalized as the principles 
they uphold‘. But for Williams, any self so constructed is ‗a fiction‘ since no self can be 
understood as ‗an atomized external object‘ (63). More specifically, ‗Creon‘s problem is that 
he wants to absolve himself of obligation in a particular and extreme case; while Antigone‘s 
problem is that she treats obligation has having no specific content beyond the recognition of 
a general claim that is based on the universal fact of mortality‘ (62). Such exemplifies the 
dilemma of ‗law‘ itself, as Williams has said elsewhere, namely that ‗law by its very nature 
must be forgetful of the particular, and that ‗if it is recaptured or restructured by the 
particular, it risks returning to the level of violence and contest, and so to the level of what 
cannot be thought‘. But this is not all that needs to be said, since ‗to maintain law at the 
expense of the particular is potentially to unleash the same unthought violence‘ upon human 
society. Thus there is a constantly shifting perspective, or even a ‗metaphysics‘, that is 
required here to account for ‗the singular that eludes category and the universal without which 
we cannot think past ―coercive‖ definition‘.996 Here again, we encounter the Aristotelian 
aporia between the individual and the universal, between the ηόδε ηι and the ηί ἐζηιν.997  
This concept of lawfulness also forms for Hegel the intrinsic source of ‗conflict‘ within 
modern tragic drama, with the difference here that law is no longer tied ‗essentially to an 
‗externalized pressure‘, a ‗set of imperatives ‗out there‘ with which the agent is driven to 
identify‘. Rather, it is about ‗an ultimately self-contained model of integrity and authenticity‘ 
(64), a tragic ‗necessity‘ that is bound-up with ‗certain kinds of misrecognition‘ that is ‗bound 
to destroy human agents‘, and is, therefore, not about the ‗mechanically inevitable‘ (71). 
Tragic drama consequently is able to provoke within us reasoned reflection, but not in the 
sense that rationality will simply produce ‗triumphant order‘. Instead, we are invited to 
sympathize with the characters in their misrecognition, and therefore are made aware of ‗what 
we must search out and change in ourselves‘ (72). This ‗comic‘ reading of Hegel, which 
Williams draws from Rose, undermines the conclusion that ‗existence is tragic‘, or any ‗fully 
tragic worldview‘ (Nietzsche is presumably the target here), since that would mean that ‗there 
is no continuity in thought‘, no ‗perspective from which we can see what it is for humans to 
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live unreal, deluded, and profoundly pain-ridden lives‘. The ‗comedy‘ of Hegel here is that 
‗there is nothing that cannot be looked at truthfully‘ (74); and such an acknowledgement 
already militates against a conception of tragedy as inherently pessimistic, because herein we 
are made aware of ‗the sources of particular kinds of error and suffering‘ (76), and how they 
might be avoided. Here again we are made aware of how a conflictive account of 
exclusionary goods is unable to underwrite a transformative politics, and rather promotes an 
ontology of unremitting violence.  
It is for this reason, amidst others, that Williams distances himself from George Steiner‘s 
reading of tragic ‗extremity‘. Steiner has spent a significant portion of his career making the 
argument that tragedy is a very limited and specific category of artistic presentation, one that 
is no longer attainable within a strictly modern consciousness. Steiner, to be sure, does not 
celebrate this loss, but simply points us to the fact that the cultural imaginary that once 
nourished tragic drama is longer an assumed index of reference. This is not because ‗modern 
suffering is not interesting enough‘ but rather that ‗our representation of suffering has become 
thinner‘ (83). Steiner‘s import is that within modern technological and scientific framing, the 
erstwhile givens of divine ‗grace‘– that which exceeds the merely human – are no longer 
taken as given. Therefore suffering is rendered simply as an ‗environmental malfunction‘ 
rather than an ‗irredeemable loss‘. In this perspective, ‗no tragic vision‘ is possible any longer 
(83). Without any sense of ‗presence‘998 or ‗the sacred‘, meanings are always going to be 
‗disposable and exchangeable, never crushingly difficult‘. There will no longer be any true 
depth to our engagement, or any ‗words for what we are bound to wrestle with‘ (84). For a 
‗culture in which all signs are exchangeable, or in which no signs have a value that cannot be 
renegotiated‘, it is doubtful that such a culture will be able to deal with ‗the idea of 
inescapable cost‘ (100-101), since any ‗language‘ which celebrates the ‗entirely fluid would 
be inimical to tragedy‘ because ‗it would treat loss as an invitation to compensation, not as an 
invitation to mourning‘ (101). Here Williams appears to be echoing the sentiments of 
MacKinnon as regards the interplay between ‗transcendence‘ and ‗the tragic‘, since (as he has 
said elsewhere) ‗Without the evocation …of God in [tragic] narratives, the scope of human 
actuality would be denied or reduced‘.999  
Up to this point at least, Williams seems to support Steiner‘s concerns; where he differs is 
in regards to his theory of ‗absolute tragedy‘. Herein, Steiner attempts to articulate a rather 
narrow canon of tragic drama that reduces it to the finally and utterly disastrous, in which 
human beings, so to speak, are placed before the yawning, unspeakable horror of being 
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itself.1000 It is this conceptualization which most coheres with Steiner‘s attempt to relate the 
essence of tragic consciousness to the post-Shoah milieu. But Williams‘s central gravamen is 
that Steiner, ultimately, reads tragedy as ‗a text‘ rather than a ‗shared event‘ (85): he fails, in 
Williams‘s mind, to account for tragedy precisely as drama (86). Here the dedication to find a 
‗pure and definitive literary form is always shadowed by the passion to ignore something in 
the actual material work‘ (86). This continuing risk of misprision is inherent within all 
generalizing accounts of ‗the tragic‘, as Simon Goldhill has already argued.1001 But beyond 
Steiner‘s hyper-reduction of ‗the tragic‘, Williams seems especially concerned to show how 
Steiner‘s reading of tragedy, in fact (against his own stated affinity for renewed notions of 
‗presence‘), is very much attuned with postmodern and Derridean suspicions of embodied 
communication, tendencies that privilege ‗writing‘ over the human speaking-situation. For 
Williams, ‗the perception of suffering as capable of being spoken about‘ is excluded by 
‗Steinerian tragedy‘, because it is ‗compromised as soon as it opens its mouth, because it is 
committed to representation, and so to an undetermined future exchange of words‘ (86).  
For Steiner, the paradigm of tragedy is the silence of Timon of Athens rather than the 
‗Never, never, never, never, never!‘ of King Lear. This model refuses dialogue, and therefore 
seems to be undermined, in its focus on textuality, by the actual experience of tragic drama, 
which assumes that pain can be represented and spoken. Against Steiner‘s contentions, 
Williams shows that this is the case even for the most brutalizing and extreme versions of 
modern drama, like that of Sarah Kane (89-96). Even within these admittedly horrendous 
narratives, the potential for ethical provocation remains: it gives the opportunity to learn and 
expand our moral sensibility by showing that our refusal to acknowledge certain truths about 
ourselves leads to catastrophe. We are again aware here of how tragedy cannot be equated 
with a pessimistic or capitulatory vision, precisely because it does not leave us with silence 
and passivity, but rather a form of narration in which pain is ‗integrated‘, even if ‗not 
consoled‘ (105).   
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It is worth pausing here for a moment to touch on tragedy and the sublime, as this is 
revealed in the interplay between suffering and its representation. Steiner‘s proclivities are 
exemplary of an intellectual proclivity (e.g. Adorno) that theorizes the non-representablity of 
tragic suffering (especially within the post-Shoah epoch). As Brett Gray has argued, such a 
‗dark ineffability‘, which is ultimately ‗destructive of representation‘, is traceable to ‗the 
aesthetics of the sublime‘. This trajectory bothered Milbank vis-à-vis MacKinnon,1002 and 
Williams too, particularly as regards certain postmodernists (e.g. Derrida, Lyotard, etc.) who 
have privileged a ‗pathos of perpetual negation‘.1003 Williams has concerns that this tradition 
of the ‗sublime‘ tends to emphasize ‗the intense feelings of moral awe and emotional pathos‘ 
without a corresponding focus on its intellectual content (150-151).  
One problem derivable from this unsayability is that it hypostasizes evil (e.g. Auschwitz) 
into an unspeakable or even deified reality: Giorgio Agamben has compared it to a perverse 
religiosity: an ‗adoring in silence, as one does with a god‘.1004 Gillian Rose also spoke about a 
‗Holocaust piety‘ present within thinkers such as Adorno and Lyotard, who – in her estimate–
conceptualized the Shoah as a manifestation of ‗the ineffable‘. Such ‗non-representablity‘ 
animates the drive ‗to mystify something we dare not understand, because we fear that it may 
be all too understandable, all too continuous with what we are – human, all too human‘. 1005 It 
transcendentalises evil into a substantial entity and converts ‗the positivity of evil‘ into ‗the 
evil of the positive‘.1006 It demonizes the affirmatory and is finally logophobic.1007 This is 
connected to Rose‘s critique of ‗aberrated mourning‘ as a form of lament that ‗cannot work‘ 
because it remains entrenched in ‗melancholia‘.1008 Such a refusal of ‗inaugurated mourning‘, 
as Rose argues in the case of Walter Benjamin,1009 implies a denial of ‗mediation‘ and 
‗negotiation‘ (or ‗law‘, to use her recurring term) which leaves us with a stark dualism 
between the violence of law-making and the ‗divine violence‘ of law-abolition. Here we are 
denied representation, judgement or mutual recognition, being entrenched in a ‗stasis of 
desertion‘,1010 waiting on God for the anarchic destruction of every law. Here again, we are 
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dealing with a subtle vision of the Kantian sublime that involves a denial of the mediation of 
Being through the particularities of beings. It also suggests a canonization of melancholia and 
pessimism at the expense of an emancipatory ethic.    
This theme of pessimism comes forward in his chapter on religious language and tragedy, 
and it is here that Donald MacKinnon re-appears, refracted again through the critiques of 
‗tragic theology‘ given by David Bentley Hart and John Milbank, of which we have discussed 
at length. Overall, it seems that Williams considers Milbank‘s critique to be the more serious 
and nuanced of the two, as can be seen in the space he gives to his arguments. Hart seems to 
reduce Greek tragedy to ‗a single theme which has to do with the sovereignty of unfriendly 
fate and the unavoidability of appeasing a violent sacred order‘ (111).1011 But it is a reading 
that sits rather lightly on detail, and fails to account for how tragedy interrogates notions of 
‗lawfulness‘, and how even some tragedies (e.g. Antigone) display ‗the destructive effect of 
setting the sacred against itself‘ (111). Williams does not go into much detail regarding Hart‘s 
critique here1012 – even though it appears to lie in the background of his chapter on Hegel. At 
this point, his preference is to engage Milbank more extensively.  
As we have noted previously, Milbank argues that MacKinnon‘s moral philosophy aims to 
‗naturalize‘ (108) tragic occurrence, since (as he sees it) it is only within ‗the destructively 
conflicting absolutes of tragic decision that we discover the nature of our human 
responsibility‘ (109). Milbank worries that MacKinnon ‗lacks a theory as to how non-
destructive social practices may be created and maintained, and so is trapped in a standoff 
between purely individual motivation, with whatever integrity it can muster, and the 
inescapably corrupting and lethal realities of the public world‘. MacKinnon is unable to 
articulate a thicker moral description of Sittlichkeit, in which we come to recognize ‗the moral 
self in the other or in the communal discourse of humanity‘. Rather, MacKinnon‘s treatment 
of tragic irresolution seems to imply ‗a near-Manichaean metaphysic‘, or even a ‗fundamental 
sickness or rupture in reality‘ (109), that ultimately achieves a non-negotiable and ontological 
status. For Milbank, the operative mode of ‗tragic narration‘ in Mackinnon‘s thinking leads to 
a denial of ‗the significance of narrative itself‘, in which human characters are able to 
‗genuinely grow and change with the passage of time‘, implying an emptying of ‗the very 
idea of plot‘, since it fails to account for the reality of ‗change‘ that is bound up with ‗a 
sequence of narrated events‘. In MacKinnon‘s account then, it seems, ‗nothing really alters‘ 
(110). Where Hart and Milbank‘s critiques converge is in their rejection of any ontological 
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violence, and in their disavowal of all abstracted accounts of human suffering. For them, this 
metaphysic would constitute ‗the very opposite of a discipline of specific attention to pain and 
loss‘. Against MacKinnon‘s stated concern with particularity and a pluralist realism then, his 
actual practice is ‗universalizing‘ and appears to buttress ‗violence and conflict as the 
omnipresent conditions of human existence‘. In their reading, his tragic vision ultimately 
‗mystifies and glamorizes violence‘ itself (110).  
But Williams does not think the issue is quite so simple: rather than giving-in to a form of 
politics that privileges personal authenticity, he thinks that for MacKinnon tragedy is not 
simply about self-discovery in the moment of tragic indecision, where one is confronted with 
that ‗conflict of duties‘ on which one‘s personhood is staked. MacKinnon‘s more primary 
concern, rather, is to show how ‗horrors‘ can be the result of ‗good intentions‘ that are ‗as 
much personal and relational as they are public or social‘ (112). For MacKinnon, ‗ignorance 
of the effects of our actions‘ is the manner in which we experience our finitude and 
‗limitedness‘, and that it is precisely through internalizing this that we become human beings 
who ‗cease to think and feel in certain ways‘, enduring our existential ‗estrangement‘ as a 
part of human ‗growth‘ (112). This is another way of saying that our actions cannot avoid 
precariousness since there is ‗no historical end to risk and suffering‘, even though we should 
not imply by this some kind of ‗supertemporal principle or existential curse‘ (113). On the 
contrary 
 
It is simply a matter of parsing what it means to recognize our finitude: narrative 
itself presupposes the irreversible passage of time and thus the omnipresence of 
loss…What happens as result of our decisions is not an abstract and identical 
calamity but always the specific kind of loss that this unique set of temporal 
conditions will generate…the very act of narrating anything at all involves the 
possibility of tragic narration. The passage of time is a process of loss, identified as 
such in the act of relating it. Telling the story of the past is a representation of what 
both is and is not ‗here‘…Yet to recognize this element of loss or absence is not 
necessarily to be committed to a picture of finite existence as a struggle between fate 
and the noble but helpless subject. There are no subjects independent of awareness in 
time, and so to be a human subject is to be involved in understanding that growth, 
movement in time, [and] entails a letting-go of past identities (113-114).   
 
So our finitude and contingency, our estrangement from fixed identities, does not stem from 
‗a form of pessimism‘, an insuperable woundedness, because ‗if acts and events are 
uncontrollable in their effect, if we do not know what may flow from this or that happening‘, 
then we cannot exclude the possibility that ‗anguish and atrocity do not make a future 
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impossible‘, even if such a future may be ‗incurably damaged for at least some‘. It does not 
deny the openness inherent within historical action, nor does it imply that such tragedies ‗stop 
things happening‘ and ‗things being spoken of‘. For Williams, tragedy would be 
‗incompatible‘ with the ‗Christian narrative‘ only if it advocated ‗a form of Stoicism‘, ‗[a] 
reconciliation with the unbearable as inevitable‘ (115). All that Williams has said thus far 
should question such a conclusion.  
All this is not to say that Williams is in complete unison with MacKinnon‘s perspective. As 
Brett Gray has argued, Williams‘s Augustinianism leads him to privilege a metaphysics more 
congenial to the claims of orthodoxy, especially regarding the impassible transcendence of the 
Good. Since Williams presupposes that the human self is ‗fundamentally desirous, motivated 
by its foundational lack of God as its ultimate good‘,1013 such an anthropology ‗transposes‘ 
human finitude into ‗an almost eudaemonic register‘, as ‗the self‘s distension‘ is placed 
against ‗an eschatological horizon‘ and a ‗social manifold‘ that moves it ‗towards repair‘.1014  
Such ‗an amelioration of the tragic‘1015 means that tragedy as such ‗does not persist as an 
intractable fate‘ since, for Williams, a ‗future is always being opened up‘ by the God who 
providentially orders it.1016 Thus we are enjoined not to place hope not in some primordial 
harmony, but in the Creator, who has made a world in which the ‗good will take time to 
realise‘.1017 Such a reading does not exclude that ‗healing or mending‘ can take place,1018 nor 
does it leave out of account that ‗work of grace‘ and ‗victory‘ that is ‗never produced by 
history itself‘,1019 since there is ‗no temporal mending of the drama‘.1020 Such ‗healing‘ should 
not bypass or simply cancel those histories that constitute personhood, because that would 
precisely imply an ‗exit from the narrative‘ (as was noted in Williams‘s critique of Milbank). 
So while it must be emphasized that Williams expands and continues MacKinnon‘s thinking 
into the present, we should not assume that they are of one accord at every juncture.      
As we bring the discussion of this monograph to a close, it could be said Williams‘s focus 
on tragic drama is open to the misunderstanding that it is only through this kind of narration 
that we are provoked to ‗the unwelcome and subversive knowledge of our flawed self-
picturing‘. Such a reading might indicate an overly narrow or even Westernized and elitist 
conclusion – only the privileged are granted such knowledge – a conclusion that is certainly at 
odds with the spirit of his text. This non-elitism is presupposed in the place he gives to 
Raymond Williams, who disputed the conclusion that tragedy could not be about ‗ordinary‘ 
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people and events (96-101), and is also implied in Williams‘s,  admittedly brief, discussion of 
African and non-Western drama (137-142). But on a further note, he clearly distances himself 
from this conclusion by arguing that tragic drama is simply one instance of ‗dispossession‘ (a 
recurrent word in his lexicon, as we have seen) that makes us conscious of ‗the world of 
bodily limit‘ and ‗mutual negotiation‘ (151). It is not through tragedy alone that we are given 
access to such insights; rather, tragedy forms an intense and acute example of those processes 
of learning and conversion to which we are constantly enjoined. This leaves open the 
possibility (though Williams does not explicitly discuss this) of relating his insights on tragic 
drama to ‗narration‘ more generally, especially in its relation to the communication of 
trauma.1021 Such an emphasis on ‗narrative‘ might then provide an analogical link between 
drama and ‗ordinary‘ experiences of suffering, while being fully aware of Williams‘s caveat 
that we should not simply reduce ‗tragedy‘ to ‗accidental misfortune‘ (97-98). But this might 
also imply that Williams‘s criticisms of treating tragedy as a ‗text‘ rather than ‗drama‘ (in 
regard to Steiner) might have to be nuanced further, since there is intriguing evidence that 
suggests the collective reading of tragic texts has produced healing results amongst PTSD 
sufferers, for instance.1022 But these are all rather minor quibbles, which do not undermine his 
concern to show that tragedy is concerned with how we learn through time and human 
engagement, and about how, consequently, it cannot be equated tout court with metaphysical 
pessimism.   
A synthesis of what we have been trying to say as regards Williams can be attempted now: 
in the previous chapter, we attempted to show why for Williams the very materiality of 
creating and speaking has metaphysical significance; this is because  ‗matter‘ and ‗mattering‘ 
are profoundly connected for Williams. The process of creating form, of giving shape to the 
world is not a willful imposition on an otherwise non-intelligent environment, but rather a 
discovery of something excessive within reality itself. Similarly, language and representation 
always involves us in a super-addition of meaning, because we can never say exactly the 
same thing twice, since representation does not involve a simplistic mirroring procedure. 
Because of our placement within time, and in a community of language-users, our meaning is 
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never defined by individuals alone, but in conjunction with the wider context in which it is 
placed. This means that the self-identity of any item or person can only be maintained through 
difference, through a non-identical repetition within time. Such impresses, in contemporary 
terms, the intuition (that has been suggested since Aristotle) of a perennial interplay between 
the particular and universal. For his part, Williams‘s own register leans more on Hegel‘s 
historicism, and specifically focuses on the way Hegel sought to overcome the dichotomies 
between sameness and difference. This rejection of dualism, that is, between particular and its 
abstraction, between the transcendent and the immanent, gives credence to the analogical 
metaphysic we have been stressing throughout, namely, that there is an intimate – albeit 
infinite qualitative distinction – between the being-there and the being-thus (to use 
Przywara‘s lexicon), between temporal being and Being-as-such. In order to think particulars 
then, we have to place them within the context of their unfolding, which stretches into the 
infinite.  
The same can be said in regard to selfhood: we cannot think of ourselves apart from the 
regimes of language and community, and especially, for Augustine, in the way that we are 
related desirously to God in an unending pilgrimage. We exist as embodied and temporal 
beings, and therefore we cannot come to a self-understanding apart from embracing our 
limited existence, our sense of createdness. Again, as in the case of language, our material 
bodies have a significance that is not simply imposed arbitrarily, but is something that is 
discovered as gift, as something received in trust. This means that the self does not have to 
assert itself at all costs, or hang onto strict identities for the sake of survival. For Williams, 
one of the elements of our moral pilgrimage is that we learn to let go of identities that hinder 
expansion. Such dilation might imply loss, but precisely because this forfeiture can be spoken 
and historically communicated, we cannot foreclose the meaning such loss might accrue. And 
because matter matters, we should not assume prematurely that ‗meaning‘ is a product of self-
deception or fantasy. Certainly, ‗meaning‘ can be credulous or delusory, but that is something 
which can only be tested relationally, through the way that narratives display their ‗adequacy 
to reality‘ (Walter Stein). Through reflections on narratives of loss, and in having the courage 
to speak them, we may chance upon disclosures which we did not expect. We might 
encounter another self on the other side of death.  
But because the self exists within relations, this also implies a political order that does not 
privilege atomized individuals or privatized goods. To say that I discover myself in another is 
to imply that I am not defined in opposition to other agents. If I can know or recognize myself 
in someone different, this means that I am not a self-constituting subject, but rather am re-
discovered in the other. But if this is the case, then it means that my interests are not 
exclusively mine alone, but are found within the encounters and negotiations I have with 
others. And this suggests that what is good for my well-being does not have to come at the 
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expense of others, in the sense that their goods are opposed to mine. The alternative option, 
which assumes that my good is opposed to yours, would seem to be predicated on an 
inherently conflictive account of bilateral exclusion – an ontology of violence that fates us to 
a lugubrious social compact. This is the conclusion that follows if we think of the Good as 
being purely contingent or hopelessly pluralistic. It is this metaphysic that underlies the 
Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, and the liberal order that denies a deeper 
commonality beyond sectional interests. The alternative to this picture is the assumption that 
the Good is transcendent and universal, and finally convertible with infinite Being-as-such. 
The Good cannot be grasped in its plenitude within time, but only slowly and progressively 
inched towards– with plenty of setbacks and misconceptions along the way. But to say that 
the Good is historically mediated for us does not mean that the Good is a product of history 
itself. To assume this would reduce the Good to a purely immanent site of production, without 
any ontological ground for intersectional interest. Such a vision, if true, would mean that I 
could not engage with others on the assumption that we might recognize a common good; 
rather, it presupposes an endless rivalry and exclusionary politics.  
In a text entitled ‗Resurrection and Peace‘,1023 Williams speaks about the ‗error‘ of seeing 
‗the reality and inevitability of conflict‘ as a ‗kind of metaphysical statement about the 
inevitability of mutual exclusion and strife‘. Instead, we should trace them to ‗the ways in 
which we are formed in the hard tasks of responding to resistance [and] the otherness of the 
world‘, in ‗the accepting of our inability to guarantee ourselves or anyone an untroubled 
passage through it‘.1024 It is into these tensions that we are placed: neither pessimism nor 
optimism, but a sober acknowledgement of where we are at, how we got here, and how this 
might assist us in imagining alternate futures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1023
 On Christian Theology, 265-275.  
1024
 ‗Resurrection and Peace,‘ 273.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
226 
 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion  
Our study has focused on a single question: can a classical account of transcendence reckon 
with ‗the tragic‘? And if so, how might it do this? Behind this question was the assumption 
(as suggested in Chapter 3) that the regime of ‗the tragic‘, especially within the modern 
period, carried residual imports that a classically-orthodox theology would struggle to accept. 
I did not suggest these were the only problems, but that they were some of the most pressing 
for a traditional metaphysic. In other words, I was not so much focused on the relation 
between Christianity and the tragic in general. I was not primarily concerned whether other 
varieties of Christian thought and practice would have greater (or less) ease in appropriating 
the negativity of the tragic. Though I certainly think that a classical theology has something 
important to say, I do not presume it provides the only viable Christian response to the tragic. 
Instead my intention was narrower, insofar as I have been trying throughout to ask whether 
there are specific grammars of transcendence – especially within their contemporary 
reception– that hinder a more ‗systematic‘ correlation between orthodox Christianity and 
‗tragedy‘. Are there ways of construing transcendence which alleviate this juxtaposition, or 
are we resigned to opposition?    
In Chapter 1 we gave an outline of our argument and the theological method we would be 
adopting for this study. In Chapter 2, we situated our discussion of ‗tragedy‘ within the debate 
between the poets and philosophers, with a concentration on the writings of Plato. Our goal 
here was to find out where some of these tensions might have begun, that is, between ancient 
philosophical metaphysics and the tragic. We noticed that the Platonic rejection of theatre was 
ambiguous, and therefore could not be decisive for the contemporary debate. We 
subsequently moved on to the interconnections between Christianity and the tragic, there once 
more emphasizing its more traditional incarnations within the patristic and medieval periods. 
Here we encountered a significant diversity of responses, which were difficult to schematize 
into a single strategy. There was a suspicion of the genre and its broader thematic within 
influential quarters (e.g. Tertullian and Augustine), but an acceptance and deployment of its 
structures by others. What this means is that we cannot assume a permanent antagonism 
between Christianity and the tragic as such, and therefore should not situate the conceptual 
abrasiveness at this point at least. Instead, we suggested that the supposed tension between 
Christianity and the tragic was a more recent phenomenon, and had more to do with a specific 
generalization of the tragic and Christianity in toto. Thereafter, we introduced the figures of 
David Bentley Hart, Donald MacKinnon, John Milbank, and Rowan Williams as modern 
theologians who were representative within this debate. Within Chapter 3, in anticipation of 
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the importance of the theme of divine transcendence for this debate, we sketched this teaching 
with the assistance of John Webster and Rowan Williams. Thereafter, we laid out the 
connections between transcendence and the tragic, and moreover, how this relation was 
reconfigured in modernity. This was done specifically in relation to the modern regime of the 
sublime, the idea of a suffering Absolute, and the rejection of evil-as-privation, developments 
which ultimately have created tensions for a classical reading of transcendence, specifically as 
regards analogy, aseity and the ontological priority of the Good.  
In Chapter 4, we introduced Donald MacKinnon more substantially, before engaging in a 
detailed reading of his critics, namely Hart and Milbank. It was argued by Hart that 
MacKinnon‘s adoption of tragedy implicated him in a sacrificial totalitarianism that was 
unable to account for the irruption of the resurrection gospel. Hart also castigated ‗tragic 
theology‘ as being entwined with a rejection of divine impassibility and evil-as-privation, and 
therefore remained problematic for an orthodox theology. Milbank for his part argued that 
MacKinnon‘s use of the tragic was interlaced with an acceptance of the Kantian sublime, and 
a failure to appreciate an analogical metaphysics as providing an avenue for reconciling 
transcendence and historicity.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, we entered into a detailed reading of MacKinnon, with the aim of 
seeing whether these critiques hit their mark. Our answer was a qualified yes with some 
dissensions. Chapter 5 argued, through an examination of his reception of Aristotelian 
philosophy, atomist realism and Kantian metaphysics, that MacKinnon was unable to 
conceptually account for the interrelation between historicity, constructionism and 
transcendence. We suggested that this was connected to his rejection of analogical 
participation, a decision based upon his suspicion of Platonic ‗intellectual intuition‘, and also 
his Kantian rejection of the idea that ‗being is a predicate‘ of particular things.  
The following chapter turned to his account of ethics, metaphysics and the tragic. Here we 
discussed MacKinnon‘s desire to construct a ‗system of projection‘ that deduced 
transcendence through a focus on moral perplexity and the tragic. MacKinnon‘s 
argumentation supposed that these realities required something more than a purely immanent 
description could give, because without this transcendent supplementation, these realities 
would be rendered trivial, and therefore the tragic would cease to be about anything truly 
difficult. Biological naturalism displaces metaphysics, and with it tragedy ceases to be a 
problem. However, we nonetheless suggested, as a result of his acceptance of Kantian 
transcendentalism and ‗radical evil‘, that he remained captured within the modern regime of 
sublimity, insofar as he lacked a coherent model of projection regarding the relation of 
created finitude to infinite beatitude. Insofar as he rejected the privatio boni, and accepted 
divine passibility and a noumenal sublime, he rendered indeterminate the quality of ‗the 
unconditioned‘. Therefore, it remained difficult for him to establish an intimate connection 
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between the realm of nature and the realm of ends, between nature and its transcendent good, 
and therefore escape the critiques of Milbank. We did not argue that this was his explicit 
intention, but rather that it was an implication of his conceptual instability. However, we did 
suggest that Hart‘s comments regarding sacrificial totality could not be applied to the 
substance of MacKinnon‘s thought. Moreover, Milbank‘s accusations that the ‗speculative 
closure‘ of the tragic avoids historicity, while having some validity, did not address 
everything that needed to be said regarding MacKinnon vis-à-vis tragedy. We also argued that 
Milbank‘s own approach, at points, might not be historicist enough.  
It was the intention of Chapters 7 and 8 to provide a critical supplementation to 
MacKinnon‘s insights through an intensive reading of Rowan Williams. This was done with 
the aim of showing that a classical account of transcendent goodness can be coherently 
related to the negativity of the tragic. In view of the previous argumentation, Williams‘s 
contribution would need to traverse the conceptual problems which we associated with 
MacKinnon‘s approach. It would need to espouse an orthodox metaphysic of the creator-
creature relation, via the doctrines of aseity and analogy, and would also have to address 
questions of historicity. This question was partly addressed in Chapter 3 already, but this 
chapter sought to develop those reflections more as they occurred in his other writings. Also, 
his position would need to advance an account of the privatio boni that was able to endure the 
critiques lodged at it by MacKinnon and others, and would moreover have to transcend the 
Kantian and postmodern sublime. We suggested that Williams meets these requirements: we 
examined his metaphysical writings to show that he was able to bring-together a traditional 
account of analogical transcendence within a modernist and Romantic theory of poetics. This 
was seen in his various writings on creativity, language and analogy, insofar as it attempted 
to reconcile a metaphysical realism with a robust historicity. Thereafter we discussed 
Williams‘s interpretation of Augustine as regards the question of evil, and its deep 
interconnection with his idea of God as transcendent goodness. We saw him argue that the 
rejection of evil-as-privation is a by-no-means trivial choice, and has implications as regards 
our conceptualizations of metaphysics, politics and ethics. If the Good is not convertible with 
the transcendent and infinite One, and not anterior to any ontological perversion, then evil is 
rendered transcendental, and our respective ‗goods‘ can no longer be implemented on the 
assumption that they are reconcilable within the higher order of the Good. Both of these 
outgrowths tacitly imply either an ontological violence or ontological pessimism – neither of 
which gives us much assistance with regard to a truly emancipatory politics.   
Chapter 8 provided a capstone to the dissertation, as far as it sought to exposit Williams‘s 
The Tragic Imagination, a monograph which constitutes his most significant testament on the 
question of tragedy. In a comparable manner to our discussion of MacKinnon, we prefaced 
our take on Williams with a discussion of ‗difficulty‘ and its relation to moral maturation. We 
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then moved to a discussion of his reception of Augustinian concepts of selfhood through 
Hegel and Gillian Rose. It was argued that Williams‘s appropriation of the self proposes a 
kenotic restatement of the Augustinian path, specifically as this connects to the displacement 
of the ego through desire and the unhanding of self. We could say that this is the ‗tragic‘ 
aspect of his reading. However, Williams‘s predilection for rupture and dispossession is 
complemented by a Hegelian ‗comic‘ iteration in which human failure and error was 
bracketed by laughter. Moral growth is not about self-laceration or simply ego-bashing, but 
about a letting-go of those assertions that restrict and distort – in other words, those identities 
that are taken too seriously. After that, we turned to The Tragic Imagination, placing its 
content within the background that led up to it. In this part, we argued that Williams‘s 
approach was centered on the claim that ‗the tragic‘ characterized events that could be carried 
in language: they are communicable and subject to relational engagement between agents. 
Pain is not locked within a silent abjection of the sublime, but incorporated into narratives, 
stories that can be re-told, engaged and enlarged. Therefore, tragic suffering does not mean 
we are isolated into any transcendental restrictions of unthinkability or unspeakability, as if 
we could not imagine that pain within a larger story, or that we could not think about how and 
why certain tragic errors might have arisen in the past, or that any sense-making is a priori 
excluded. Rather, it is to say that we never quite know whether this word will be the last 
word. This insight brings us to the next major theme, namely the problem of irony. It says that 
history places indeterminacy over actions, which (because they happen within a finite causal 
nexus) can irrupt into conflict and suffering; to exist within time means that we never quite 
know the outcomes of our decisions and actions, or whether these outgrowths are final or not. 
History has a way of overturning expectations, for better or for worse. The import of tragic 
experience is that we can never quite know what this outcome will be. And one could say that 
this is intrinsic to what we have been calling the negativity of the tragic.             
Reflecting on these last chapters, it is worth remarking upon some ways in which Williams 
sustains this negativity, because they are not always spelled out in detail within The Tragic 
Imagination and the other texts we have discussed. One of the first things to mention is that 
Williams‘s acceptance of the privatio boni means not only that the Good is granted priority, 
but also that evil has no meaning in itself. If this is the case, then it resists any theodicy that 
presupposes that we can ascribe depth or order to evil. Such is excluded at the outset by the 
Platonic-Augustinian perspective. On this reading, evil does not have any ‗being‘, nor is it a 
distinct ‗thing‘ within the world, nor does it have any persistence apart from the reality it 
corrupts. Evil is devoid of rationality: it is the black hole of meaning, a gaping maw of 
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nothingness.1025 What this means is while we cannot equate all suffering with evil, it certainly 
means that we cannot ascribe meaning to suffering as such. Williams‘s criticisms elsewhere 
of philosophical theodicies as ‗an attempt to forget [suffering] as suffering‘ and therefore as 
entwined with ‗untruthfulness‘1026 remain in force, as does his rejection of more subtle 
approaches to this question (e.g. Marilyn McCord Adams).1027 However, this necessary 
qualification does not exclude the possibility that human beings are able to create meaning 
within suffering. Williams‘s major contribution to our discussion is that tragic experience is 
not excluded from communication, which means that suffering can be narrated in such a way 
that it is included (potentially) within a larger scope of meaning. We cannot predetermine the 
scope this or that event will generate, and the context into which it will be ultimately placed. 
Because of this, we do well to hold onto a healthy dose of irony, in the knowledge that it is 
possible that ‗there are unpredictable, unsystematisable integrations of suffering into a 
biography in the experience of some‘,1028 while for others this may be lacking. This aspect of 
narrative touches upon one of the other ways Williams attempts to incorporate tragic loss 
within his system: one can recall here how he criticized Milbank regarding the question of 
‗resolution‘ within narrative, and whether Milbank himself could be accused of an account 
that was implicated in ‗an unmaking of the past‘, one that conjectured ‗an exit from the world 
of narrative‘, and ‗an absolute ending which obliterates the cost of what has gone before‘.1029  
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that Williams‘s attachment to the negativity of the 
tragic cautions him against any eschatological cancellation of the tragic. Our gospels appear 
to confirm this: Christ‘s wounds are not erased but raised with him (John 20.24-29). The 
resurrection does not obliterate human history but redeems it. This is a continuing motif 
within Williams‘s oeuvre ever since his lectures on Eliot‘s Four Quartets. For Williams, as 
Benjamin Myers says, ‗Whatever Christian eschatology might mean, it cannot posit any final 
triumph over human imperfection and limitation. To eliminate tragedy would be to do away 
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with the difference that makes us human‘.1030 Moreover, ‗Christian hope does not invalidate 
[a] tragic vision, but reaffirms it – just as Christ‘s resurrection does not cancel out the 
crucifixion, but transfigures it and discloses its inner significance‘.1031 This eschatological 
vision is able to sustain MacKinnon‘s phraseology of ‗the transcendence of the tragic‘ insofar 
as it does not attempt ‗to eliminate the element of unfathomable mystery by the attempt to 
move beyond tragedy‘,1032 nor does it deny what Paul Janz called ‗the finality of non-
resolution‘.1033 This does not negate what Brett Gray has said, namely that Williams‘s 
eschatology has ‗an almost eudaemonic register‘1034 that proposes a final ‗amelioration of the 
tragic‘ within its scope.1035 But it does mean that redemption does not necessitate the erasure 
of any past, but rather implies its transformation.  
Another thing needs to be remarked upon before we transition to some critical commentary 
on Williams‘s work. One of the running strains throughout this work is the impact of the 
Kantian sublime on the reception of the tragic. We saw this already in Chapter 3 and it has 
persisted throughout this study, as seen in the debate between Milbank and MacKinnon in 
Chapters 4-6. However, it should be said that Williams (except for a rather brief reference) 
scarcely addresses this trope explicitly within The Tragic Imagination, or in his other writings 
for that matter, nor does he engage much with MacKinnon‘s Kantianism– at least in this 
work1036 – and how it featured prominently within Milbank‘s critique of MacKinnon. It is this 
paucity that has inspired my own study. So in the previous argument, I have suggested that 
Williams‘s metaphysics is incompatible with a Kantian transcendentalism or an abstract 
negativity of postmodernity. Williams‘s questions anti-representationalism, or any wager that 
privileges an ontological excess which remains absolutely non-thinkable and unspeakable, 
one entrenched within the ‗pathos of perpetual negation‘.1037 Moreover, his proposal that 
‗suffering can be narrated‘, ‗communicatively or imaginatively shared‘ and therefore made 
into ‗a cultural fact‘,1038 implicitly counter-acts a tragic sublimity that would baptize silence 
as being the only response to traumatic anguish. Such is seen in his interactions with George 
Steiner, but within the space of his monograph these connections are not unfurled as much as 
they could have been. This is not a negligible point, since (as we already indicated in earlier 
chapters) the post-Kantian sublime has had a seminal impact on continental readings of the 
tragic, running from Schiller, through Nietzsche, up until postmodernity. Our own study has 
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been written within this background, suggesting that Williams contributes a particular lucidity 
to the debate around the modern sublime, even though he does not explicitly address it in 
those terms.         
That being said, Williams‘s account is not immune to critique or opacity. David Bentley 
Hart, in his response to The Tragic Imagination¸ remains largely unrepentant – despite 
Williams‘s countervailing. Hart complains about how Williams‘s Hegelian reading of tragedy 
proposes ‗an unhistorical imposition of post-Christian notions on a society to which they are 
irrelevant‘.1039 Hart repeats his previous critiques that tragedy ‗beautifies‘ suffering,1040 and 
narcotizes us into submission, implying that ‗all these terrible truths could somehow, by the 
application of sufficient art, be made beautiful, hypnotic, gorgeously grave, and 
stupefying‘.1041 In his lapidary remark, he argues that rather than instigating critical reflection, 
‗the infallible mark of the tragic is that it helps one sleep well‘.1042 Here Hart is echoing his 
earlier contention that ‗tragedy‘ does not provoke a clear-eyed wisdom regarding the nature of 
reality, but rather consoles us into inaction. He qualifies perceptions of his previous work 
(e.g. The Beauty of the Infinite) by saying that his problem with tragedy is not that it proposes 
a ‗pessimistic‘ outlook, but that ‗it is not yet terrible enough to account for what the gospel 
brings into human reflection‘.1043 For Hart, tragedy does not diagnose the depth of our 
alienation and loss, nor does it provide remedy. On the contrary, it is only the ‗logic‘ of 
resurrection faith, with its ‗mad and quite imprudent vision of divine truth‘ , which establishes 
that ‗the only horizon of hope is that of the humanly impossible‘. In his estimate, Christianity 
is more child-like in in its hope, having greater affinity to fairy-tales than the tragic.1044 
Moreover, Hart assumes within these interventions the idea that a narrative-dramatic 
representation of pain as a mode of ‗healing without cure‘, however beneficial, is not yet the 
gospel.  
Williams concedes that the eschatological dimension of Christianity says that ‗‗happy 
endings‘ are not earned by the logic of a narrative, nor do they cancel what has happened in 
the story so far‘, but have ‗the nature of a startling novelty, a gratuitous plot-twist‘.1045 For 
Hart and Williams, the resurrection does not succeed the crucifixion like a simple alteration in 
the mise-en-scène. The gospel is more radical and apocalyptic than that. Nevertheless, 
Williams does write that  
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The discourse, the imaginative labour, which we call ‗tragic‘ is an act of faith that 
what in its intensity of pain or emptiness defies language may not after all be a final 
victory for chaos. Perhaps it is not inappropriate to say that in this sense tragic 
representation is analogous to theological proclamation. It states that something 
remains possible in the wake of atrocity. And how to make such a statement without 
doing less than justice to the weight of what has been seen or felt is precisely what 
makes this kind of discourse difficult and laden with ambiguities and possible 
failures.1046 
 
In addition to this qualification, one could advance several other points of reply: firstly, 
Hart once more displays a rather entrenched concept of Attic tragedy that is advanced without 
any references to contemporary classical scholarship (e.g. Vernant, Goldhill, etc.), even as he 
accuses Williams of ‗a literary interpretation‘ of tragedy, a ‗treatment principally of texts, 
abstracted from the historically concrete realities of both the aesthetic form and the religious 
context of the plays‘.1047 Williams remains perturbed by this: he is worried by ‗a continuing 
essentialism‘ within Hart‘s critique, and argues that if Hart‘s characterizations of tragic art are 
serious, then ‗my disagreement is fundamental (to a degree that surprises me)‘. While Hart 
‗appears to reduce tragic representation to a stratagem to avoid seeing‘, Williams makes the 
opposing argument ‗that it is one of those disciplines that enables some kinds of seeing‘.1048 
The contradiction could not be clearer than this. Secondly, Hart makes some rather confusing 
remarks regarding ‗beauty‘ which stand in contrast to some of his earlier proposals. There are 
moments in Hart‘s text1049 where he appears to suggest that ‗‗beauty‘ is automatically elided 
with a manifest form that veils rather than reveals‘, which appears to contradict his earlier 
contentions that ‗the beauty embodied in the form of what we actually see or hear or touch is 
precisely its aptness to the truth, not an embellishment‘.1050 What Williams is suggesting is 
that Hart rather strangely appears to succumb, at moments, to a quasi-Kantian sublimity that 
proposes the negligibility of form to the communication of the beautiful. This is despite his 
metaphysical conceits expressed elsewhere, in The Beauty of the Infinite, that the triune God 
is the coincidence of both infinite beauty and perfect form. These apparent tensions would 
need to be addressed by Hart, who seems to have muddled things a bit in this particular 
response. Thirdly, one could query Hart‘s prima facie dualism between ‗the tragic‘ and ‗the 
fairy-tale‘, inasmuch as fairy-tales – especially in their earlier recordings – often resist the 
                                                          
1046
 Ibid., 280-281.  
1047
 Hart, ‗The Gospel According to Melpomene,‘ 223.  
1048
 Williams, ‗‗Not Cured, Not Forgetful, Not Paralysed‘,‘ 281.  
1049
 Hart, ‗The Gospel According to Melpomene,‘ 221, 222, 225.  
1050
 Williams, ‗‗Not Cured, Not Forgetful, Not Paralysed‘,‘ 281-282.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
234 
 
simplistic resolutions found within their expurgated versions. Fairy-tales can display a moral 
complexity and tragic irresolution that renders fast distinctions liable to deconstruction.1051 
One only has to see, for example, Guillermo Del Toro‘s Pan‘s Labyrinth (2006) or Matteo 
Garrone‘s Tale of Tales (2015) to notice that such divisions are not absolute. Also important 
to recognize is that some tragedies themselves have been compared to the structures of fairy-
tales (like Euripides‘s Alcestis).1052 Hart might respond that these samples are not really 
tragedies, but then we are back at Steinerian essentialism. So in relation to Hart and the tragic, 
it appears that not much has changed.  
Graham Ward has also penned a largely appreciative critique of Williams‘s book.1053 His 
responses are centered on the question of liminality, on the thresholds between the human and 
non-human. Ward‘s recent excursions into evolutionary psychology most certainly occupy a 
hinterland, as seen in the way that he shows how the tragedians themselves toyed with the 
interplay between the human and non-human in their imagery. The central thread of this text 
is that ‗the tragic‘ touches upon something deeper, more traumatic, than intellectual resources 
can capacitate. He worries that Williams rushes too quickly towards ‗eloquence‘.1054 Ward 
desires to linger, to tarry with the negative. Or to use Lacanian terminology, he wants to more 
greatly emphasize the traumatic Real vis-à-vis the Symbolic. For Ward, ‗the tragic‘ or 
traumatic reaches towards the animality we share with the non-human, exposing us to the 
threat of a ‗nothing‘ (as in King Lear) that is ‗ontological, even meontological‘, and ‗not 
epistemological‘.1055 Ward‘s language here projects tragic risk onto a cosmological landscape, 
a risk he takes, despite refusing the fatalisms of ‗absolute tragedy‘.  
Williams takes on Ward‘s concern insofar as ‗to observe that tragedy is always already 
something said is not to flatten it into a matter of verbal bromide and quick consolation. It 
isn‘t so much that a tragic drama wins through to a conclusion that is thinkable and therefore 
consolatory in some illegitimate way‘. In his perspective, the ‗imagination‘ is always-already 
implicated in representation, so that we should be weary of proposing a traumatic Real that is 
non-representable (in the manner of postmodern theorists like Lyotard and Nancy).1056 In 
reference to Walter Davis‘s concept of the ‗crypt‘, Williams acknowledges that ‗internal 
chaos‘ is ‗the raw substance of any tragic imagining‘, and moreover that ‗the roots of 
outrageous pain and atrocity in a damaged cosmic order should indeed be drawn into any 
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thinking about tragedy‘.1057 But he is worried that Ward‘s de-centering of humanity within the 
tragic imagination is not pellucid enough: how does one speak of the cosmically tragic 
without advancing the ‗absolute tragedy‘ or the ‗ontological violence‘ he clearly desires to 
traverse? Additionally, Ward opens himself to the misinterpretation of relativizing human 
agony within a cosmological and evolutionary glance – which is certainly not his intention. 
Williams thinks, on the contrary, that ‗to speak about trauma is to speak from where we 
actually are; never mind the black holes and the deep evolutionary history‘.1058 There is also 
the not uncontroversial suggestion, given by Ward, that the ‗nothing‘ of King Lear and the 
creatio ex nihilo are identified ex profundis – a move that has affinities to a Derridean khora 
(á la Plato‘s Timaeus).1059 But this begs the question – which I am sure Williams would want 
to ask – as to where the radical goodness of creation comes in within this schema. One could 
also ask how the moral indeterminacy of the nihil plays out within Ward‘s larger theology of 
creation, questions that might require further nuance in the future.1060 
Nevertheless, Ward‘s critique of ‗eloquence‘ is well-taken: his interventions have been 
echoed by trauma theorists and metaphysicians such as William Desmond.1061 Cathy Caruth 
argues that traumatic occurrences fall into a category that resists comprehension within 
normal symbolic registers, as so far as trauma disrupts the relative homeostasis we habituate. 
As such, precisely because it is unexpected and comes without warning, trauma comes too 
‗early‘ for the mind to conceptualize and resists simplistic incorporation into what Bessel Van 
der Kolk calls ‗implicit‘ memory‘.1062 William Desmond also theorizes that ‗the tragic‘ 
reveals our ‗being at a loss‘, a particularity of suffering that is manifest in ―the Once‘ or ‗the 
Howl‘ (King Lear is again the reference here). These experiences demand attention, and 
problematize any cozy metaphysics. However, we should register the ambiguity of trauma 
too, more than Ward himself does in this admittedly short text. Desmond admits there is ‗no 
geometry of the tragic‘1063  – in a swipe against the Spinozist perspective that would cancel 
the tragic within a mirror of eternity. But Desmond also proposes a concept of ‗the 
posthumous mind‘, which imagines trauma as a ‗thinking of being as if from beyond death, 
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being in the worthiness of present joy‘ of a ‗Tragic insight [which] crosses over from life to 
death, and looks back on life, crosses back and lives life otherwise‘.1064 On this reading, tragic 
events, and their post-traumatic narration,1065 exhibit an openness which cannot simply be 
predetermined.1066 Traumas are radically life-altering events, for better or worse, and it is this 
that makes it ambiguous and liminal. For those who have gone through traumatic experiences, 
the intermingling of ‗death‘ and ‗life‘ involves the problem of ‗survival‘, a living after ‗death‘ 
– an ambiguous ‗middle‘, to reference Shelly Rambo.1067 To quote Kirby Farrell: ‗trauma 
destabilizes the ground of experience, and therefore is always supercharged with significance 
and always profoundly equivocal in its interpretative possibilities. Like a traditional religious 
conversion experience, it can signify rebirth and promise transcendence, or it can open into an 
abyss‘.1068 One could also reference Jacques Lacan (again in deference to Ward‘s text) when 
he says that ‗when the traumatic elements – grounded in an image which has never been 
integrated – draw near…holes, points of fracture appear in the unification, the synthesis, of 
the subject's history.‘ But he goes on to say ‗how it is in starting from these holes that the 
subject can realign himself [sic] within the different symbolic determinations which make 
him a subject with a history‘.1069 In light of these comments, the re-alignment of the subject 
within language should certainly not be glossed over or treated as negligible; and so Ward‘s 
criticisms of ‗eloquence‘ should not undermine the importance of narrative integration. The 
stakes are just too high.1070 However, his concern about proceeding too quickly towards 
epistemological categories is important.   
 Terry Eagleton‘s comments about the book are addressed within a more political vein: he 
wonders whether ‗to regard tragedy from Aeschylus to Arthur Miller as being essentially 
concerned with a recognition of otherness is to project a modern (even, one might add, 
fashionable) liberal motif into spuriously universal terms‘.1071 He opines that ‗Williams is a 
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man of profound convictions who like many a liberal is rather wary of conviction‘, since it is 
‗too close for comfort to the zealous and doctrinaire‘. Here Eagleton disagrees: on the one 
side, ‗Not all certainties… are dangerously narrowing. On the contrary, there are assured 
truths that can be liberating‘. On the other side, ‗Being exploratory, self-questioning and 
open-ended about the latter fact is to put yourself on the wrong side‘, at least in some 
circumstances‘.1072 These critiques appear to center on the question of commitment, or lack 
thereof, and the degree to which Williams‘s tragic mindset tends to baptize an overly-hesitant 
approach to political action (a point echoed by Milbank1073). Such is related to Eagleton‘s 
suspicions of Williams‘s Hegelian dramatic criticism, especially as regards the Antigone.1074 
As Eagleton says, 
 
the solution to tragic conflict is not some Arnoldian flexibility of mind. You can be as 
pliable and unself-deceived as you like, as open to otherness and difference as the 
most dedicated Derridean, and still get it in the neck. Williams is too quick to endorse 
the Hegelian case that tragedy springs from the collision of two equally justified but 
lopsided positions.1075 
 
But Williams is not convinced by this critique (which seems to echo Hart‘s).1076 While he is 
fully aware that ‗it will not do to suspend action in order to honour moral complexity‘, and is 
generally persuaded by Eagleton‘s comments regarding the importance of commitments, he 
still thinks that Eagleton has not recognized the nuance of his position. He emphasized (along 
with MacKinnon) that ‗the need for action does not guarantee absolution‘. Additionally, 
‗There is indeed nothing much to be said for a view that simply identifies the virtues of 
contending positions and shrugs its shoulders or wrings its hands over the difficulty‘. But he 
does qualify this, since ‗to say there is a serious case to be made for two contending positions 
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is not the same as saying that there is no informed choice to be made between them‘. As he 
has stressed, ‗what the tragic imagination insists upon is the recognition that even a choice 
believed and undertaken in thoughtful, responsible moral conviction may carry a cost for the 
agent and the agent‘s world. Recognizing this should not paralyse, but it should inform‘.1077 
MacKinnon would agree. So it is not that a tragic perspective condones perpetual hesitancy or 
refrainment from action, but that we count the cost of our actions, with the realization that 
even good intentions can occasion unpredictable outcomes. Our awareness of this should not 
morally debilitate us, but rather chasten our resolve.  
To conclude this dissertation on the note of ‗action‘ is probably not inappropriate. If 
anything our plea for a non-contingent goodness and oneness, which we can gesture towards 
but never grasp, might lay the ground for an ethic that is at once hopeful but not hubristic. It 
wagers a foundation for a politics that acknowledges the persistence of conflict, but denies 
that this is necessary, that my goods are at their depth opposed to yours. Moreover, it says that 
if the Good is primordial, then this supports that basic trust required for transformative action, 
so that we may let-go and thereby ‗clear a space for the new‘, for a hope that ‗even in these 
desolate conditions you can‘t give up on your faith or love, however little it can be realized or 
rewarded‘. And it is precisely this conviction that might ‗just transform [a] barrier into a 
horizon‘.1078 Or to adapt a phrase taken from Paul Ricoeur, it may stimulate the affirmation of 
‗the Joy of Yes in the sadness of the finite‘.1079 Or as Wallace Stevens once suggested:  
…How cold the vacancy 
When the phantoms are gone and the shaken realist 
First sees reality. The mortal no 
Has its emptiness and tragic expirations. 
The tragedy, however, may have begun, 
Again, in the imagination's new beginning, 
In the yes of the realist spoken because he must 
Say yes, spoken because under every no 
Lay a passion for yes that had never been broken.1080 
 
If tragedy, as Rowan Williams says, is conceived as an event of ‗the particular, the narratively 
specific, out of which certain kinds of new language grow‘,1081 and, moreover, constitutes a 
‗protest against a polity and culture that lure us to sink our truthful perceptions‘ into ‗a 
collective, mythologized identity that can shut its eyes to limits‘,1082 then Stevens‘s invocation 
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that ‗The tragedy…may have begun, / Again, in the imagination's new beginning‘ is rather 
apt. Tragedy was birthed within an imagination, at the cusp of the Aegean, in that ‗tremulous 
cadence slow‘ where the ‗eternal note of sadness‘ was ushered in.1083 At this shore, the poets 
invented a representation of the city, a mimesis of provocation which ran ‗counter to the 
tendency of the city and the law to reify its horizon and cast itself as wholly self-
sufficient‘.1084 It is this self-sufficiency that MacKinnon, imperfectly as we have seen, tried to 
counter-act, and it was this tradition that Williams differently repeated in his own work. 
Neither of their contributions is beyond criticism. However, our study has not been an attempt 
to resolve this debate, but rather to address tensions with the aim of moving the conversation 
forward.  
In an epigraph for his experimental film Adieu au Langage (2014), the French cineaste and 
filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard proposed this dictum: tous ceux manquet d‘imagination se 
réfugient dans la réalité (‗those who lack imagination take refuge in reality‘). I wonder if the 
tragic poets, within the pomp and bacchanals of the City Dionysia, conceived something 
similar: against a ‗reality‘ that had become complacent and self-congratulatory, they instituted 
a vision that nudged us into consciousness, a renewed distance in which we might know 
ourselves once more – theologians included.1085   
 
*** 
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